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Abstract  
Citizens of authoritarian regimes face multiple constraints when they express critical 
political views using digital media. The regime may monitor their activities, censor their 
speech or persecute them. Despite these challenges, politically-active citizens organise 
outside of traditional hierarchical arrangements to advocate for pro-democracy changes.  
I analyse how the affordances of digital media help activists to organise, to select and to 
protect their leaders, as well as to distribute information. I use interviews, content 
analysis and participant observation to study two recent cases of successful political 
campaigning on digital media. Unusually, both cases managed to challenge the state 
elites in authoritarian countries, Belarus and Russia respectively. 
I found that the two studied organisations relied on ad hoc, segmented and shadowed 
organisational configurations that deployed vast digital communication infrastructures 
to disseminate information. Journalists, the authorities and the public often 
misperceived these configurations as either over-centralised or not organised at all. This 
misperception, as well as the management of leadership visibility on social media, 
allowed activist groups to protect some of their leaders from persecution. 
The findings contribute to the discussion regarding the nature of political organising in 
the digital age by refining and problematising social movement theories for digital 
authoritarian contents. The study also contributes to the discussion of the strategies that 
authoritarian regimes use to respond to and combat online opposition. These findings 
challenge the idea that authoritarian regimes have neared full co-optation of the internet. 
Instead, the internet should be considered as a battlefield for political influence. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
List of contents 
List of tables and illustrations .......................................................................................... vi 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... ix 
Author’s declaration .......................................................................................................... x 
List of Terminologies and Abbreviations ........................................................................ xi 
Chapter 1 Introduction. The challenges of organising and content distribution in 
authoritarian settings ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Research problem and aim ...................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Three literatures explaining the political use of digital platforms ........................... 4 
1.3 The political and media systems of Belarus and Russia .......................................... 6 
1.3.1 Political systems ............................................................................................... 6 
1.3.2 Four steps towards non-democracy ................................................................ 10 
1.3.3 Digital media .................................................................................................. 16 
1.4 Methods ................................................................................................................. 23 
1.5 Organisation of the study....................................................................................... 23 
Chapter 2 Literature review ............................................................................................ 25 
2.1 Definitions of the concepts .................................................................................... 25 
2.2 Organisation .......................................................................................................... 29 
2.2.1 Communication repertoire and political opportunity structure....................... 29 
2.2.2 Organisational mechanisms of social movements .......................................... 32 
2.2.3 Organisational challenges in the digital age ................................................... 34 
2.2.4 Organisation and political participation .......................................................... 36 
2.2.5 Leadership ....................................................................................................... 41 
2.2.6 Collective and connective action .................................................................... 45 
2.3 Digital platforms as technological, commercial, social and cultural phenomena . 48 
2.3.1 Digital technologies and pro-democracy change ............................................ 48 
2.3.2 Digital platforms and their affordances and components ............................... 51 
2.3.3 The assumption of platform universality and local platforms ........................ 58 
2.4 Repressive digital politics ..................................................................................... 61 
2.4.1 Forms of repressive digital politics ................................................................. 61 
2.4.2 Censorship ...................................................................................................... 65 
2.4.3 Surveillance .................................................................................................... 69 
2.5 Summary of the literature review and research questions ..................................... 70 
2.5.1 Platform studies, digital politics and social movement studies ...................... 70 
2.5.2 Three challenges of digital dissidents ............................................................. 75 
2.5.3 Research questions .......................................................................................... 76 
iv 
 
Chapter 3 Methodology .................................................................................................. 78 
3.1 Selecting the cases ................................................................................................. 78 
3.2 Choice of methods, data collection and analysis ................................................... 81 
3.2.1 In-depth interviews ......................................................................................... 82 
3.2.2 Participant observation ................................................................................... 95 
3.2.3 Content analysis: Features analysis, textual analysis, analysis of documents 
and social network analysis ..................................................................................... 98 
3.3 Triangulation of the national cases ...................................................................... 107 
3.4 Methodological implications and challenges ...................................................... 108 
3.5 Research ethics .................................................................................................... 111 
Chapter 4 Political organisation in authoritarian settings ............................................. 113 
4.1 The background of the Navalny and the Anti-tax organisations ......................... 113 
4.1.1 The Navalny organisation: three campaigns in one year .............................. 113 
4.1.2 The Anti-tax campaign: Two month of rallies and repression ..................... 121 
4.2 Traditional structures and organisational narratives ............................................ 123 
4.2.1 The emergence and decline of the traditional organisation – the Anti-tax 
Coalition ................................................................................................................ 123 
4.2.2 The challenge of mobilising for collective action in authoritarian settings .. 126 
4.2.3 “Leaderless” and “ordinary citizens’” movements ....................................... 133 
4.3 The growth and the segmentation of the movements .......................................... 140 
4.3.1 Features analysis of the 26 march protest pages ........................................... 140 
4.3.2 Features analysis and SNA of the Anti-tax campaign pages ........................ 144 
4.3.3 Dynamic segmentation as a successful organisational strategy .................... 151 
Chapter 5 Political leadership in authoritarian settings................................................. 154 
5.1 Surveillance ......................................................................................................... 154 
5.1.1 The emergence of segment leaders ............................................................... 154 
5.2 The visibly management and persecution ........................................................... 165 
5.2.1 2000 days in jail ............................................................................................ 165 
5.2.2 The functions of segment leaders ................................................................. 166 
5.2.3 Three levels of leadership in an anti-authoritarian movement ..................... 169 
5.2.4 Types of leadership in anti-authoritarian movements ................................... 186 
5.3 Charisma .............................................................................................................. 191 
5.3.1 Limitations of the traditional understanding of charisma ............................. 191 
5.3.2 Communicable charisma............................................................................... 192 
5.4 Not least a struggle: a startup culture in the Navalny organisation ..................... 196 
Chapter 6 Information distribution and censorship ....................................................... 201 
v 
 
6.1 Communication infrastructure and analytic activism in the Navalny presidential 
campaign.................................................................................................................... 201 
6.2 The choice of platforms for information circulation ........................................... 208 
6.2.1 Surveillance, audience and affordances ........................................................ 208 
6.2.2 Cultural factors and communication infrastructure ...................................... 215 
6.2.3 Five factors explain the puzzle of platform choice ....................................... 218 
6.3 Censorship and methods of content dissemination ............................................. 221 
6.3.1 Content dissemination .................................................................................. 221 
6.3.2 Digital censorship: The case of Navalny.com filtering ................................ 225 
6.3.3 Politicising an apolitical platform ................................................................. 229 
6.4 Communication infrastructures of anti-authoritarian movements ....................... 233 
6.5 How the affordances of digital media shape organising and information 
distribution in authoritarian settings .......................................................................... 235 
6.5.1 Key affordances for digital information distribution .................................... 235 
6.5.2 Affordances of digital media and forms of repressive politics ..................... 237 
Chapter 7 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 240 
7.1 The contribution to knowledge ............................................................................ 240 
7.1.1 Organisation literature .................................................................................. 242 
7.1.2 Leadership literature ..................................................................................... 246 
7.1.3 Affordances literature ................................................................................... 248 
7.2 Limitations ........................................................................................................... 251 
7.3 Future research .................................................................................................... 252 
Appendix 1 Indicative interview questions ................................................................... 254 
Appendix 2 Informed Consent Letter ........................................................................... 257 
Appendix 3 The timeline of the Anti-tax campaign before the tax deadline ................ 259 
Appendix 4 The background of key founding members of the Anti-tax Coalition ...... 261 
List of references ........................................................................................................... 262 
 
 
  
vi 
 
List of tables and illustrations  
Table 1.1 The audiences of social media in Belarus and Russia………………...……. 18 
Table 1.2 Default sharing mechanisms of VK, OK, Facebook and Telegram ...............  23 
Table 3.1  ........................................................................................................................  86 
Table 3.2 Types of the interviewees ............................................................................... 92  
Table 3.3 The sample of features analysis ...................................................................  102 
Table 4.1 The three campaigns of the Navalny organisation in 2017 ..........................  116 
Table 4.2 The four protest waves of the Navalny organisation in 2017-18 before the 
presidential election .................................................................................................  117 
Table 4.3 The Anti-Tax rallies in February-March 2017. ............................................  122 
Table 4.4 The founding members of the Anti-tax Coalition in January 2017. ............  124 
Table 4.5 Features analysis of the 26 March protest pages..........................................  142 
Table 4.6 The design features of the five main Anti-tax campaign pages as of April 
2017 .........................................................................................................................  145 
Table 4.7 The front design of the five main Anti-tax pages ........................................  146 
Table 4.8 The pages linked to the PASD group with the highest degree value ............ 149 
Table 5.1 The types of leadership in the Anti-tax campaign .......................................  170 
Table 5.2 Summary of the administrating features of Telegram groups and channels  174 
Table 5.3 Coordination of the supporters of the Navalny presidential campaign on 
Telegram during the collective action on 7 October 2017 ....................................... 179 
Table 5.4 The leadership in the Navalny presidential campaign .................................  183 
Table 5.5 Leadership in the Navalny organisation and the Anti-tax campaign ............ 188 
Table 6.1 The most prominent campaign events and the posts with the #strike hashtag 
between 27 December 2017 and 16 March 2018 ....................................................  224 
Table 6.2 The role of digital platforms in the infrastructures of the Navalny and Anti-tax 
organisations ............................................................................................................  235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
Figure 1.1. Country scores (0 = free, 100 = not free) in the “Freedom of the Press” 
report for Belarus and Russia in 1997 – 2017….………………………………........14  
Figure 1.2. Internet penetration in Belarus and Russia in 2000 – 2016, as % of the 
population.. ................................................................................................................  17 
Figure 1.3. The Alexa Traffic Ranking for Charter97.org in February 2017 – February 
2018.. .........................................................................................................................  20 
Figure 4.1. The main symbols of the three campaigns of the Navalny organisation in 
2017-18. ...................................................................................................................  116 
Figure 4.2. The map of the Navalny offices and the boundaries of the eighty-five federal 
subjects of the Russian Federation as of August 2017. ...........................................  119 
Figure 4.3. The location of Navalny’s supporters who registered on Navalny.com. .... 120  
Figure 4.4. The feature image of the “Don’t Call Him Dimon” investigation video. ..  127 
Figure 4.5. A meme published in the VK Anti-corruption campaign page for Stary 
Oskol on the day when the 26 March protests were announced.  ............................ 128  
Figure 4.6. A picture used as an avatar of the Anti-corruption campaign page for 
Ryazan. ....................................................................................................................  139 
Figure 4.7. The screenshot from the video announcing the 26 March protests. ..........  131 
Figure 4.8. The SNA analysis of the linked pages to the PASD group.  ...................... 148 
Figure 5.1. The post on the VK anti-corruption page in Kostroma that announced that 
the authorisation for a rally was recalled. ................................................................ 158 
Figure 5.2. A fragment of the Anti-corruption campaign page in Arkhangelsk and its 
translation. ...............................................................................................................  161 
Figure 5.3. The profile of Ivan Ivanov. ........................................................................  161 
Figure 5.4. The profile of the administrator of the PASD page. ..................................  163 
Figure 5.5. Alexei Navalny after an attack on him and the meme of the Motherland 
Calls sculpture. ........................................................................................................  167 
Figure 5.6. Two of Liabedzka’s posts announcing the Homel Anti-tax rally. .............  171 
Figure 5.7. The two administrators of the Ufa Telegram group. .................................  177 
Figure 5.8. A section of the Navalny network on Telegram. The edges reflect the flow 
of content between the channels. .............................................................................  178 
Figure 5.9. The persecution of the activists and the participants of the Anti-tax 
campaign rallies in March 2017. .............................................................................  185 
Figure 6.1. Subscribers of the main Russian television channels on YouTube and of 
“Alexei Navalny” YouTube channel as of 15 November 2017, in million users. ..  202 
Figure 6.2. Growth of the number of users who registered as Navalny’s supporters…205 
viii 
 
Figure 6.3. The spending of the Navalny organisation from the beginning of the year to 
May 2017 in thousand Russian Rubbles .................................................................  206 
Figure 6.4. The cumulative audience of social media platforms in Belarus in December 
2016 according to age. .............................................................................................  212 
Figure 6.5. The audience of social media platforms in Belarus in December 2016.. ... 212  
Figure 6.6. The natural logarithms of the number of the posts and shares with the 
hashtag #strike (#забастовка) on VK and Instagram over a period between 
27.01.2018 and 16.03.2018. ....................................................................................  223 
Figure 6.7. The three-step scheme of information dissemination of the #strike campaign. 
224 
Figure 6.8. Alexa Traffic Rank of Navalny.com in 2017-2018 .................................... 226 
Figure 6.9. The access rate to Navalny.com (in %) after filtering ................................ 227 
Figure 6.10. Unique visitors of Navalny.com in December 2017 – 16 February 2018..
 .................................................................................................................................. 229  
Figure 6.11. The engagement of the REP pages audience across the three platforms 
during the protest stage of the Anti-tax campaign. .................................................  232 
 
 
  
ix 
 
Acknowledgements  
This four-year journey was of a great challenge but also an opportunity to learn and 
have fun thanks to the following people and organisations that supported me.  
I am grateful to my supervisor Dr Anastasia Kavada for her valuable advice, constant 
support from the initial to the final stages of the project, as well as an opportunity to 
develop my ideas and a comprehensive understanding of the field.  
I thank Julia Sakałoŭskaja for her help with learning people’s ideas, as well as for the 
photo materials she kindly supplied me for a poster presentation at the Graduate School 
Annual reception. These materials are now on display at one of the University of 
Westminster’s PhD rooms in Harrow. I thank Jura Sidun for his example and 
inspiration, and many other active citizens of Belarus to whom I feel indebted. I am also 
grateful to all the interviewees that found an opportunity to meet me and tell their 
stories. 
I am grateful to my PhD-program colleagues Steven Barclay and Yuqi Na, as well as 
Kristiina Silvan and Paula Borowska, who commented on my research at different 
stages. My thanks also go to Dr Svetlana Bodrunova and Dr Anna Litvinenko, the great 
researchers of media and communication in all kind of contexts, and my friend and 
colleague at University of Westminster Dr Anastasia Denisova. In addition, I would like 
to thank the participants of the Understanding and Examining the Digital Advocacy 
Pioneers workshop at the University of Portsmouth and its organisers, James Dennis 
and Nina Hall, who kindly provided valuable comments on my work.  
Four institutions supported my research and its dissemination. First, a grant from the 
Open Society Foundations (United Kingdom) supported my fieldwork in Belarus 
undertaken to collect data. Second, the staff of the Graduate School at University of 
Westminster provided generous support and immense opportunities to engage with the 
scholarship and present my work beyond the university through their Globally Engaged 
Scheme. Third, the Global Challenges Research Fund and Research Office at University 
of Westminster enabled me to present some of my findings to the audience of activists 
in Minsk through, so to help people to benefit on practice from the ideas that I present in 
the dissertation. Finally, the Francis Skaryna Belarusian Library and Museum in 
London provided me with a reliable shelter for all long nights and days that I spent 
working on this research. 
x 
 
Author’s declaration  
I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work.  
xi 
 
List of Terminologies and Abbreviations 
 
API Application programming interface 
FBK The Anti-Corruption Foundation (“Fond Borby s Korruptsiey” in 
Russian) 
FSB Federal Security Service 
GFC Great firewall of China 
ISP Internet service provider 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
PASD The “Parasites” and “Social Dependents” group 
PSL Pseudonymous segment leader 
REP The Belarusian Independent Trade Union of Radio-Electronic Industry 
Workers 
SMO Social movement organisation 
SNA Social network analysis 
UCP The United Civic Party 
UK The United Kingdom 
US The United State of America 
  
1 
Chapter 1 Introduction. The challenges of organising and 
content distribution in authoritarian settings 
1.1 Research problem and aim 
From the squares of North Africa in 2011 to the polling stations of the United States in 
2016, people in many countries have witnessed chaotic transformations of and 
disruptions in national political and media systems. These disruptions were partly 
facilitated by the increased use of digital media (Bennett et al., 2017; Chadwick, 2013; 
Kavada, 2018). Digital media are named among the factors contributing to the rise of 
populism, radical ideologies and brutal or antisocial behaviour. Organising for political 
ends has been transformed as well. In the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) 
and other democracies, new ways of communicating messages have modified how 
politicians and civic activists organise and campaign.  
As in democracies such as the UK or the US, these issues are also part of everyday 
reality in countries whose citizens do not enjoy as many democratic freedoms and 
where people can suffer for the expression of political views. We often describe such 
countries as non-democratic or authoritarian1. However, digital media are viewed 
slightly differently in these countries, which From China to Russia, digital platforms are 
one of the few media tools that critical citizens use to express themselves, reach a 
broader audience and mobilise their supporters for collective action. Alongside the 
profound changes that the use of digital media brings to many places, their democratic 
potential gives hope to the citizens of authoritarian countries. 
The aim of this research is to solve three puzzles related to the democratic potential of 
digital media: how political organisation evolves with the advance of digital 
technologies; whether and how organised pro-democracy citizens can rely on digital 
media to adapt to repressive environments of authoritarian countries; and what 
consequences this reliance has on the ability of these citizens to challenge authoritarian 
elites. By using predominantly qualitative techniques, such as interviews with leading 
activists and experts, observation and analysis of digital media content, I analyse two 
prominent pro-democracy organisations in order to uncover the layers of their 
organisational structures, leadership and innovative methods of content distribution. 
Authoritarian countries are places where billions of people live, and millions struggle, 
but this struggle is often under-recognised in scholarship. 2.8 billion people lived under 
 
1 I use terms 'authoritarian' and 'non-democratic' interchangeably. 
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authoritarian rule in 2018 (Freedom House, 2019). Around a third of the countries in the 
world can be described as authoritarian, excluding microstates (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2019). Another 23% of countries can be classified as “hybrid 
regimes” (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). In authoritarian and hybrid regimes, 
“repression for criticism of the government and pervasive censorship” is common, 
“media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling 
regime” and “corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak” (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 49). The number of authoritarian countries has 
been growing over the past decade, and democratic decline has been observed even in 
long-established or mature democracies (Freedom House, 2019; The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2019). There has been an increasing influence of authoritarian politics 
around the world.   
In the previous decade, many writers assumed that greater exposure to digital 
technologies would foster pro-democracy changes. Since then, many countries have 
built impressive digital infrastructures, and in some cases the higher exposure of the 
population to digital technologies combines with long-lasting repressive authoritarian 
regimes. For instance, Belarus has one of the highest rates of fixed-broadband 
subscriptions per capita in the world (International Telecommunication Union, 2019). 
Russia is home to many prominent digital technology companies such as Yandex, a 
search engine, and VK, the most popular social media platform in many post-Soviet 
states. The academic literature describes both Belarus and Russia as authoritarian 
regimes (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Tolstrup, 2015). These two neighbouring countries are 
ruled by strong leaders that continue enhancing their power by attacking political 
opponents, imposing censorship and controlling traditional media. Belarus and Russia 
have similar historical traditions in their media, social and political spheres. Belarus and 
Russia are chosen as the national cases for analysis because they are repressive states 
with a high level of proliferation of digital technologies. 
The dissertation analyses two cases of digital activism. First, it examines the three 
campaigns of Alexei Navalny during the pre-electoral period of 2017-2018 in Russia. 
Alexei Navalny is a dissident and is often considered  the main figure in radical political 
opposition in Russia. He was a popular anti-corruption blogger, an adviser for a local 
government and a leader of an unregistered party. In March 2017, his anti-corruption 
organisation launched a campaign demanding the ousting of the country’s prime 
minister. Later the same year, the Navalny organisation tried to register him as a 
candidate in the 2018 Russian presidential election. After the authorities refused to 
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register him, the Navalny organisation started its third campaign of that year which 
sought to democratise the electoral process. The three campaigns of the Navalny 
organisation number among the most prominent recent cases of large-scale digitally-
enabled political activism in Russia. 
Second, the dissertation analyses another highly prominent campaign, one that took 
place in Belarus in 2017. It is known as the “social parasites” protests or the “Anti-tax” 
campaign. It emerged following the implementation of an absurd tax on unemployment. 
The campaigners used different methods to advocate for change in the tax policy. This 
advocacy eventually led to a series of 32 rallies and turned into one of the largest 
protests since Belarus’s independence in terms of its geographical spread. Once the tax 
was revoked, the campaign transformed itself in a pro-democracy movement that 
demanded solutions to the socio-economic crisis and political reforms. 
The Belarusian Anti-tax and the Russian Navalny organisations are similar political 
movements in two similar countries. Both organisations demanded policy and systemic 
changes, were large in terms of geographical scale and actively used digital platforms. 
They also experienced similar challenges in the digital space. While there are many 
differences between the countries and the cases, it is hard to find two non-democratic 
countries that are so alike and that have experienced similar large-scale digitally-
enabled protest campaigns simultaneously in the same manner.  
These organisations should be viewed in the context of other large-scale digitally-
enabled political mobilisations happening in these and other authoritarian states. The 
significant difference between the selected organisations and previous pro-democracy 
movements in the two countries was that they were successful, at least to a certain 
degree. In fact, the Anti-tax campaign is a successful case in terms of averting the 
policy it opposed. The results of Navalny’s campaigning are more complex and 
associated with the process of building a sustainable movement. In other words, the 
studied organisations managed to produce visible and tangible results in terms of 
mobilisation or influencing the public agenda or policy. By studying these two 
successful cases of large-scale pro-democracy campaigns, we can learn about the 
organisational forms and communication mechanisms that emerge in such campaigns. 
We can also advance our understanding of the forms and mechanisms that enable an 
organisation to challenge authoritarian rule.  
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1.2 Three literatures explaining the political use of digital platforms 
Three overlapping literatures have advanced scholarly knowledge of digital platform 
use in political organisations. These are social movement studies, platform studies and 
the literature on political communication. Let me briefly review each body of literature. 
First, the literature on social movements has long dealt with the phenomena of 
collective action and leadership in movement organisations. The work of Gerlach & 
Hine (1970) is of special relevance to the study of social movements in authoritarian 
settings. Prior to the proliferation of digital platforms, Gerlach and Hine (1970) 
described a pattern of decentralised organisation. Using examples of contentious 
movements in the 1960s, they characterised decentralised organisation in terms of its 
ability to adapt in response to the ruling regime’s efforts to suppress it (Gerlach & Hine, 
1970, p. 65). The authors found that adaptations potentially made the suppression of 
such an organisation ineffective due to three characteristics. First, adaptive 
organisations consist of many diverse subgroups or segments. Second, they have many 
centres of influence – that is, they are polycentric. Third, these organisations constitute 
an integrated network rather than being a myriad of isolated instances. These three 
characteristics are the three pillars of Gerlach and Hine’s model of an organisation 
adaptable to the authorities’ pressure. 
More recent literature which addresses the use of digital platforms by social movement 
organisations (SMOs) mostly discusses the social and interactionist sides of platforms 
(Poell & van Dijck, 2018). This perspective has allowed scholars to learn more about 
the consequences of digital media use by social movements. However, this perspective 
often views social media sites as black boxes that merely support mediation and 
mobilisation (McCurdy, 2013). 
Second, digital platform studies open up these “black boxes,” examining the 
architecture, algorithms and other components of social media platforms (Milan, 2015b, 
p. 2). This literature highlights several dimensions of platforms including their 
technological, economic, social and cultural components (van Dijck & Poell, 2015). The 
analysis of these components helps us to understand how platform companies disrupt 
different fields, such as education or security. The proliferation of platforms also 
contributes to the datafication and the commodification of all social relations when 
platform corporations process, circulate and sell users’ data (Dencik et al., 2016; Fuchs, 
2014b; van Dijck, 2013b). In addition, platformisation poses new challenges to society 
such as the spread of computational propaganda (Sanovich et al., 2018) or unregulated 
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large-scale, data-driven political campaigning (Aagaard, 2016). Platform studies suggest 
that digital media shape, and are being shaped by, social and political processes and, 
thus, should not be taken for granted or viewed uncritically. 
Third, the political communication literature provides access to a long tradition of 
research into political participation, civic engagement and government policy. One of 
the fastest growing domains within this field is termed “digital politics.” The 
burgeoning literature on digital politics discusses the use of platforms by political 
actors, including activists, politicians and social movements (Postill, 2018, p. 8). This 
set of literature sheds light on the processes of mediatisation of politics and 
platformisation of political communication. However, relatively little attention has been 
dedicated to the digital politics of non-democratic countries. Digital politics in 
authoritarian states remain an underexplored area apart from a few notable exceptions 
(Karatzogianni et al., 2017; K. E. Pearce, 2015; Poell et al., 2016; Tufekci, 2017). 
One of key debates in this field is concerned with the nature of political organisation in 
the digital age (Karpf, 2019). The literature does not agree as to the optimal forms of 
organising in the era of platforms (Bennett et al., 2017). Analysis of innovative civic 
and political organisations demonstrates that a hybrid form of organising, combining a 
traditional vertical type of organising with a more innovative and ideal-driven 
horizontal type, can bring benefits to digital activists (Chadwick, 2013; Wells, 2015). 
However, the “hybrid” theories do not provide a definitive answer as to the nature of 
organisational adaptations required for successful campaigning in mediatised political 
environments. In addition, many studies point to a “connective action” organisational 
approach whereby digital media are used to mobilise decentralised voices by relying on 
“organising without organisations” (Karpf, 2019). At the same time, some 
organisational and leadership forms occurring among platform-based groups are not 
intended to be public (Kim et al., 2018), which can mislead the authorities and the 
media. This dissertation addresses these gaps by focusing on the behind-the-scenes 
practices of organising while exploring implications for publicity and security (Barros, 
2016). The combination of these three literatures helps to build a more nuanced picture 
of digital platform use in political organisations. 
This project represents one of the first attempts to study the political use of social media 
platforms in the contexts of Belarus and Russia. These non-democratic countries present 
us with a set of problems and questions that are in some respects distinct from the issues 
relevant to mature democracies. In the reviewed literature, I was unable to find a 
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systematic analysis of the factors that influence the organisational sustainability of 
digitally-enabled groups in Belarus and Russia. The existing studies also fail to provide 
a clear conceptualisation of the relationship between the organisation of digital 
campaigning and their practices of information dissemination in authoritarian countries. 
In addition, the political consequences of the use of local digital platforms such as VK 
(Vkontakte), OK (Odnoklassniki) or Telegram are often overlooked by studies that 
focus on these countries.  
1.3 The political and media systems of Belarus and Russia 
This section describes the media and political systems of Belarus and Russia and other 
relevant details that provide the background for the case studies. 
1.3.1 Political systems 
Belarus and Russia are often labelled as competitive authoritarian states (Levitsky & 
Way 2010). This means that they have the facades of pseudo-democratic institutions 
such as “legislatures, multiple political parties, and somewhat competitive elections” 
(Frantz, 2019), but incumbents, such as presidents or prime-ministers, abuse power in 
order to remain in their position (Levitsky & Way 2010, p. 5). By contrast, some 
variations of authoritarian systems like China provide no viable channels to contest 
executive power and, therefore, to change the regime legally. Levitsky & Way (2010, p. 
7) define such systems as China as “full authoritarianism.”  
Authoritarian regimes with pseudo-democratic institutions last a bit longer than those 
without them (Kendall-Taylor & Frantz, 2014). This is because authoritarian regimes 
can use pseudo-democratic institutions like elections to signal their dominance and 
establish a local base for support by distributing resources and positions in bureaucracy 
(Kendall-Taylor & Frantz, 2014). Competitive regimes also allow for more freedom of 
civic organising by legalising some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Diamond 
et al., 2016). The legalisation is important because authoritarian states often strictly 
control activities of political and civic groups by legal means such a requirement to 
register any group with the state to receive legal status. In Russia, for instance, many 
prominent human rights organisations such as Golos or Memorial (Respondent 6, 
personal communication, August 7, 2017; Respondent 7, personal communication, 
August 4, 2017) lost their legal status after 2011, which halted their activities (Mazepus 
et al., 2016). The advantage of legal status is that it allows campaigning openly rather 
than covertly. 
7 
In Belarus, public associations without legal status such as opposition groups are 
prevented from any activities related to political or social life. It is illegal to disseminate 
information on behalf of such an association (Szostek, 2015). From 2005 to June 2019, 
the Criminal Code provided liability for “illegal activities of a public association, 
religious organization or foundation or participation in activities thereof” (The Human 
Rights Center “Viasna”, 2018). Acting on behalf of an unregistered organisation is still 
an administrative offence in Belarus. However, the Belarusian state granted legal NGO 
status to many civic groups, including those organisations that were critical of the 
regime and advocated for contentious issues such as human rights or trade unionism. At 
the same time, opposition organisations that try to register as parties have been 
repeatedly denied this status (Charnysh & Kulakevich, 2016) and were forced to 
function illegally. The examples include the Belarusian Christian Democracy (BChD) 
and the Belarusian Party of Workers. The authorities of Belarus have not registered a 
new political party since 2000 (The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Belarus, 
2019).  
In Russia, many pro-democracy NGOs fall victim to laws that brand them as “foreign 
agents,” which in Russian is synonymous with a “foreign spy” (Kara-Murza, 2017; 
Robertson & Greene, 2017). Similar to Belarus, it is also difficult to register a party that 
would refuse to play by the government playbook. For example, the supporters of 
Alexei Navalny in Russia tried to register their party with the authorities at least five 
times from 2012 to June 2018 but failed (Meduza, 2018a). Thus, it seems that it can be 
harder to register a political party than to legalise as an NGO in Belarus or Russia. 
Consequently, some clearly political groups try to receive the status of an NGO. 
Examples from Belarus include the “Tell the Truth!” campaign, whose representative 
stood for the 2015 presidential election as one of few opposition candidates. Another 
organisation registered as an NGO in Belarus, the Movement for Freedom, has an 
observer status in the European People’s Party, which is currently the largest party in 
the European Parliament (The Movement For Freedom, 2018). Some scholars argue that 
such a form of political organising as a political party is “largely irrelevant” in Belarus 
(Charnysh & Kulakevich, 2016) not least because “politics” is removed from the 
electoral arena (Bedford, 2017, p. 404). Others suggest that parties should be viewed as 
the groupings of dissidents. For instance, Respondent 16, who unsuccessfully ran for 
every parliament and local elections since 2004, calls himself a “dissident” rather than a 
politician (personal communication, September 5, 2017). That might explain why the 
boundary between a civic organisation and a political party is blurred in Belarus.  
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Higher chances of been legalised as an NGO do not necessarily mean that civic 
organisations that are critical of the government are as strong in Belarus or Russia as in 
mature democracies. Civil society in these countries is often viewed as stymied and 
weak (Freedom House, 2019; Greene, 2014; Vaiciunaite, 2014). Some authors explain 
this with economic factors. They suggest that the structure of the economy in some 
post-soviet states deprives citizens of economic autonomy and thus stymies civic 
activity (McMann, 2006). Other authors explain the weakness of civil society with 
regime’s deliberate attempts to restrict civic activity (McFaul & Treyger, 2004; 
Vaiciunaite, 2014). These authors highlight such depredations as the co-optation of 
activist groups, legal challenges for NGOs, trade unions and political parties, as well as 
curtailing of independent broadcasting. The state-run media also attacks civic activity 
and accuse them of, for example, providing covers for espionage or otherwise serving 
foreign interests (Greene, 2014, p. 103). The law restricts the funding of civic groups, 
especially foreign.  
Another common restriction on political activism in authoritarian states is the limitation 
on freedom of assembly. In Russia, there is no official ban on political rallies. However, 
the restrictions on the assemblies are numerous. According to Russian law, organisers 
of demonstrations, rallies or other public assemblies must obtain a “sanction” (an 
authorisation) from local authorities (On assemblies, meetings, demonstrations, marches 
and pickets, 2004). If an authorisation is not obtained, an event is considered 
"unsanctioned." This means the police can use force to prevent people from gathering, 
leaders from public speaking, detain participants and use force. Organisers are punished 
with fines or arrests.  
In addition, it is difficult to disseminate information about the planned protests in 
Russia if they are not authorised. It is forbidden to post information about 
demonstrations and other types of collective action if they are not agreed with local 
authorities (On assemblies, meetings, demonstrations, marches and pickets, 2004). 
Distribution of information on social media about unsanctioned protests might, 
therefore, lead to the persecution of core campaign activists. Consequently, people who 
participate in mass demonstrations and protests in the two countries routinely become 
subjects of administrative or criminal persecution that sometimes leads to prison terms 
(United States Department of State, 2019a, 2019b). The restrictions on freedom of 
assembly are often explained with the fear of the elites that such actions can threaten 
regime stability and lead to regime change (Silitski, 2010; Stockmann, 2013).  
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Despite the restrictions, four large waves of pro-democracy protests happened in 
Belarus (three of them) and Russia since the proliferation of the internet in the second 
half of the 2000s. Three of them were linked to the elections, and one was associated 
with the Arab Spring events.  
First, the Ploshcha (“Square” in Belarusian) protest erupted in Minsk, the capital of 
Belarus, after the presidential elections when Lukashenka was selected for his third term 
in 2006. The protesters described that election as fraudulent. The collective action 
against the elections lasted for five days and resulted in the large-scale repression of the 
opposition (Bulhakau & Dynko, 2011).  
The second recent wave of the pro-democracy protests happened in Belarus in similar 
circumstances following the presidential elections of 2010. That time, the protests lasted 
for several hours and resulted in the detention of more than 1 000 people, including nine 
out of eleven presidential candidates (Tarkowski et al., 2011). Then more than 40 
opposition leaders were sentenced to years in prison (Tarkowski et al., 2011). The abuse 
of human rights prompted the EU to introduce economic and political sanctions against 
the Belarusian elite that lasted until the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 (Emmott, 
2016).  
Another wave of protests in Belarus happened just half a year after the 2010 elections 
following the events of the Arab Spring. This mobilisation was associated with 
decreased living standards and the proliferation of social media among the younger 
urban population (R. Balmforth & Makhovsky, 2011). These young people joined the 
“leaderless” movement called the “Revolution via Social Networks” (Tarkowski et al., 
2011). The initial rallies of the movement met no repression. However, after three 
weeks of collective action, some of the leaders were identified (or they identified 
themselves) and were repressed, along with many rank-and-file participants (Tarkowski 
et al., 2011). Perhaps the main difference between this and the previous protests was 
that the 2011 movement was largely unrelated to the established opposition structures, 
which prompted many observers to define it as “spontaneous” (Kazak, 2011). All three 
waves of protests did not result in any pro-democracy political or policy change in 
Belarus (Bulhakau & Dynko, 2011) or the emergence of a sustainable and long-lasting 
large-scale movement. 
Fourth, the 2011–12 “For Fair Elections” protests lasted in Russia for about eight 
months and became the largest wave of social movement activism since 1991 
(Gabowitsch, 2017). This movement erupted following the reports of irregularities 
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during the parliamentary election (Zvereva, 2016). The movement prompted the 
authorities to introduce certain changes to the political system of the country like the 
reform of the election procedures. The “For Fair Elections” movement were to a high 
degree inspired, followed and organised through the internet (Toepfl, 2017; Zvereva, 
2016). Perhaps this significance of the internet for the movement explains why the 
authorities started introducing new restrictive regulatory measures in 2012. That made 
some technologies used in the streets of Moscow in 2012 less effective (Lonkila, 2017). 
1.3.2 Four steps towards non-democracy 
Both Belarus and Russia are also called personalist authoritarian regimes (Escribà-Folch 
& Wright, 2015, p. 17), which highlights the role of authoritarian leaders in their 
political systems. These leaders, Aliaksandr Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin, have 
consolidated and enhanced their personalist rules since the 1990s. Both the current 
presidents of Belarus and Russia came to power through democratic elections. In both 
countries, the process of dismantling democratic institutions followed soon. In Belarus, 
democracy experienced a setback shortly after the election of Lukashenka in July 1994 
(Szostek, 2015). In Russia, Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999. Since then, the 
political regimes have pushed for new limits on many occasions from the dissolution of 
parliaments to rigged elections. The dominance of the two authoritarian leaders is 
another striking similarity between the two countries. 
Different theories try to explain why Belarus and Russia have turned into non-
democracies and were cemented as personalist authoritarian regimes over the past 20 
years. Many studies connect the rise of authoritarianism in Russia to the nature of its 
resource-based economy (Greene, 2014). Other scholarly research highlights the 
regimes’ ability to incorporate corruption into people’s everyday lives and the Russian 
imperial past and neo-imperial present (Inozemtsev, 2017). The latter argument is based 
on the assumption that “Russia feels itself to be a nation that must continuously expand. 
But a nation that cannot come to terms with its legal boundaries cannot sustain 
democracy” (Inozemtsev, 2017, p. 83). 
Belarus’ regime is often considered to be a product of Russian politics. Tolstrup (2015), 
for example, argues that the existence of the Belarusian authoritarian model is partly a 
result of the Russian intervention with the politics of this neighbouring country, 
particularly its election process. “The Kremlin collaborated with the regime in 
discrediting and harassing the democratic opposition” and “Russian businesses, 
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profiting from the close connections to the Belarusian dictator, provided ample financial 
assistance to his campaign,” says Tolstrup (2015, p. 684). 
Although some of these theories mention the media as one of the factors – normally 
secondary – of the sustainability of these regimes, the role of the media in the process of 
power consolidation remains unclear (Stockmann, 2013) or even neglected (Way, 
2005). It is also unclear why some authoritarian states are better able to use the media to 
their advantage than others (Stockmann, 2013, p. 243). Fuchs (2018) suggests a link 
between the success of the authoritarianism and the media. Authoritarian leaders do not 
need argumentative discussion, Fuchs argues. Instead, they appeal to emotions, anxiety 
and the authoritarian personality of their citizens that emerges as the response of 
external, predominantly economic factors. Authoritarian personality needs strong 
patriarchal leaders to shed people’s anxiety. Having access to the most powerful media 
makes the appeal of authoritarian personalities easier. This appeal can be combined with 
the attractiveness of the authoritarian ideology in a highly anxious society, such as a 
post-soviet one. It then provides fertile soil for the consolidation of power in the hands 
of strong leaders. The theory of the authoritarian personality in Fuchs’s reading 
demonstrates the role that the media can play in authoritarian power consolidation. 
I identify four stages of the development of the media systems in Belarus and Russia 
that facilitated the consolidation of power in the hands of authoritarian leaders. First, 
after coming to power, the future authoritarian leaders sought to establish their control 
over the most important mass media of their time – television and radio. It was the time 
before the internet proliferated wildly. Take the example of Russia. Four days after 
becoming the president in 2000, Putin sent police to raid the offices of the company that 
owned the leading television channel in terms of news service – the NTV (Greene, 
2014, p. 85; Kara-Murza, 2017). Kara-Murza (2017), who is a son of one of the 
founders of the channel, remembers that “NTV came under effective government 
control after a year-long campaign that deployed all the resources of the state to bring 
the unruly broadcaster to heel.” Since then, the channel belongs to the state-owned 
company Gazprom that extracts and sells gas and oil.  
During the first three years of his presidential term, Putin took control of all national 
television stations that covered politics (Way, 2005, p. 259). “The last privately owned 
nationwide television channel was taken off the air by order of Putin’s information 
minister in June 2003, with the official explanation that ‘the interests of viewers’ 
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demanded this step” (Kara-Murza, 2017). Taking control of national television stations 
was the first important political move by Putin. 
In Belarus, the local television and radio were monopolised under its president 
Lukashenka by his third year in power in 1997 (Way, 2005, p. 243). For years now, the 
standards of journalism as to fairness and balance of opinion are diminished in this 
country (Freedom House, 2016a). During the latest presidential election campaign, 
broadcast media devoted 86% of their political coverage to Lukashenka (OSCE, 2016). 
Similarly, Freedom House (2017) now argues that television in Russia, “which is still 
the leading source of news and information, often functions as a propaganda tool for the 
government.” This means that in these countries, the audience has almost no access to 
opposition views on television (Way, 2005, p. 243). These takeovers of key 
broadcasters affected the political coverage in both countries. 
Second, after the control of the main television channels was established, the takeover 
of other prominent political media followed. Newspapers were gradually forced either 
to change ownership or to shut down. Their journalists were prompted to look for jobs 
elsewhere or to leave the country. This story was similar across Belarus and Russia 
again. For instance, many prominent Russian journalists have left for Ukraine or the EU 
during this period. The Belarusian media professionals have gone to Russia, the EU or 
elsewhere, often in a status of political asylum seekers. Since then, “much of Belarus’s 
independent [of the government influence] press has been run out of business and 
forced to close” (Freedom House, 2007). This resulted in an overwhelming proportion 
of state-controlled media that covers issues according to the views of the authorities. In 
Russia, “meaningful political debate is mostly limited to news websites, some radio 
programs, and a handful of newspapers” (Freedom House, 2016a). A few remaining 
private media companies whose owners were not dependent on the ruling elites and 
normally chose a co-opting strategy to avoid a possible loss of their business. 
Third, the control over the main mass media channels has helped the emerging 
authoritarian leaders to remove their political opponents – prominent opposition leaders 
– and keep other ambitious men and women out of politics. This removal was needed to 
ensure that the next elections will be won without trouble for the regime. Media helped 
to justify this removal by overpowering the national political conversation. Some of the 
opposition leaders were forced to leave their country. Others were sent to prison like 
two businessmen, Andrei Klimau in Belarus and Mikhail Khodorkovsky in Russia 
(Robertson & Greene, 2017). The latter was a prominent supporter of different 
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opposition organisations and parties from the communists to the liberals. Khodorkovsky 
spent ten years in prison, and almost no one questioned the political motives behind his 
imprisonment by the end of his two prison terms.  
Some most stubborn people such as at least three leaders of the Belarusian opposition in 
1999 and a former deputy prime minister Boris Nemtsov in Russia in 2013 were 
removed from the political arena through their assassinations (Kara-Murza, 2017; Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2009). These assassinations helped the regimes to keep their 
grip on power (Robertson & Greene, 2017). The murders with clear political motives 
sent an unambiguous signal to critical citizens. The organisers and masterminds of these 
high-profile political assassinations remain unnamed (Kara-Murza, 2017; Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 2009). 
Fourth, traditional media like newspapers and radio cover these tragic events, along 
with many other political issues, in a specific manner. For instance, traditional media in 
Belarus, the majority of whom are controlled by the state, typically do not cover anti-
governmental protests or similar contentious processes (Miazhevich, 2017). Their 
coverage has silenced the critical issues and questions and overpowered the discussion 
in society. Miazhevich (2017) describes this strategy of traditional state-run media as 
“co-opting.” Government-controlled traditional media of Russia often use a conflict-
oriented, scandalous, extreme and divisive style of coverage (Robertson & Greene, 
2017) typical for many western tabloid media (Goscilo, 2013). Russian media 
specialists have been learning and practising this scandalous coverage for years 
(Pomerantsev, 2014). This type of coverage has gradually developed into a tabloid-style 
propaganda machine.  
The Russian amplified propaganda machine was deemed to manipulate public opinion 
during the problematic events such as the occupation of the Crimea in 2014 (Robertson 
& Greene, 2017). The state-controlled media covered those events using appeals to the 
audience’s emotions and ethnic pride and identity (Robertson & Greene, 2017, p. 96). It 
appeared to be a lucrative strategy for the country’s political leadership. Unsurprisingly, 
people in Russia who watched more state-television news increasingly supported Putin 
in 2014. Television remains the main source of news for Russians (Levada-Center, 
2018b). By contrast, citizens who mostly got their news from independent sources 
“were less likely to rally behind Putin” (Robertson & Greene, 2017, p. 95). These 
results of public support demonstrate a correlation between the support of Putin and his 
propaganda machine. However, from Robertson and Greene’s survey, it is not clear 
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whether there is a causal connection between support for Putin and the exposure to 
state-television news. Still, the effects of the television propaganda machine are 
considered to be substantial. 
 
Figure 1.1. Country scores (0 = free, 100 = not free) in the “Freedom of the Press” 
reports for Belarus and Russia in 1997 – 2017. Sources: Freedom House; Litvinenko 
(2019).  
As a result of the seizure of control over television and other traditional media by the 
governing elites, silencing of political opponents and the development of a scandalous 
propaganda machine, many people of Belarus and Russia live in a media cocoon of 
settled opinion. These people are often convinced that their countries can only survive if 
their current political leadership is in power. This has contributed to the people’s 
disillusionment with the established opposition organisations (Robertson & Greene, 
2017) and their perception of political opportunity structure (Stockmann, 2013). As 
Figure 1.1 shows, the levels of restriction on basic political freedoms have been similar 
in Belarus and Russia recently (Freedom House, 2016a, 2016b; Reporters without 
Borders, 2017; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). At the same time, it seems like 
the political system of Russia has been turning into a more restricted one over time, 
while the Belarusian system moves in the opposite direction though very slowly 
(Freedom House, 2019). 
This historical narrative demonstrates the dangers of state control of traditional media in 
countries that have no stable democratic institutions. Political institutions that would 
prevent power grab in the countries with a long democratic tradition could not stop the 
authoritarian consolidation in Belarus and Russia. This resulted in the emergence of 
authoritarian states in these countries just a few years after the previous authoritarian 
state they were part of – the Soviet Union – had collapsed. That is why the role of the 
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media should not be missed from the discussion about the reasons and consequences of 
the development of non-democratic political systems. 
It is hard to catalogue the full toolkit used by the Belarusian authorities in order to 
control the media in this brief background section. However, it is fair to say that this 
catalogue is “extensive” (Szostek, 2015), while the tale of “control and repression” 
(Sahm, 2009) is “depressing” (Szostek, 2015). Traditional media in Belarus were 
described as the “propaganda empire” long before the talks about a propaganda machine 
in the Russian context (Hill, 2005).  
The emergence of a similar propaganda machine in Russia has also affected Belarusian 
media because Russia tries to intervene in the politics of Belarus (Tolstrup, 2015) and 
traditional media of the two countries are closely interrelated (Szostek, 2015). The 
current relationships between Russia and Belarus are dominated by the political 
consequences of the annexation of Ukrainian Crimea by Russia and “New Russian 
Imperialism” (Kuzio, 2015).  
Belarus remains the only country of the Eastern Partnership, a community of six post-
soviet non-EU states located in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, free of military 
territorial conflicts. All other countries of the community are involved in conflicts over 
unrecognised breakaway territories. All these territorial conflicts also involve the 
Russian military. Belarus is considered to be one of the closest political and military 
allies of Russia (Pankovsky & Kostyugova, 2018). At the same time, the two countries 
had multiple economic and political disputes over the last 20 years (Szostek, 2015). At 
present, the Belarusian authorities recognise its dependence on Russia but also try to 
reduce Russian dominance by seeking support from European countries and the US 
(Pankovsky & Kostyugova, 2018).  
The Belarusian regime has accepted the Russian “pervasive” (Boulègue et al., 2018, p. 
2) dominance of the Belarusian media system. This dominance is mostly exercised 
through Russian television programmes that range from news to sports broadcasts and are 
watched by the majority of the citizens of Belarus (Laputska & Papko, 2018; Szostek, 
2015). According to the Belarusian government’s estimates, “Russian production 
currently occupies as much as 65% of Belarusian media space” (Kłysiński & 
Żochowski, 2016, p. 7). In 2016, 66% of Belarusians watched Russian television 
channels, either regularly or occasionally (Laputska & Yeliseyeu, 2016). 84% watched 
any television channel occasionally in 2017 (Ecorys, 2017, p. 19). Furthermore, 70.5% 
of Belarusians fully or partly trust messages in Russian media (Laputska & Yeliseyeu, 
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2016). Russian television is one of the main sources of information for Belarusians 
(Laputska & Papko, 2018; Szostek, 2015).  
The content of Russian television can potentially strengthen people’s anxiety and appeal 
to the authoritarian personality: 
Russian television (above all due to cable TV providers) is widely available and 
has a rich offer which is appealing to averagely and poorly educated Belarusian 
citizens, especially its long criminal series and soap operas. It successfully 
promotes such pathologies as: excessive drinking, corruption, violence and 
aggression in human relations (Kłysiński & Żochowski, 2016, p. 34) 
The dominance of Russian traditional media allows for “accidental influence” 
(Poczobut, 2016) of the Russian propaganda machine in Belarus. 
The dominance of the Russian-controlled media in the digital realm of Belarus is 
remarkable. The most visited social media platforms in Belarus are owned by a Russian 
oligarch (Table 1.1). Around half of the internet traffic that leaves Belarus goes to 
Russian websites (Doroshevich & Sokolova, 2017).  
Since the majority of citizens use the Russian language in daily life (Freedom House, 
2018a), Russian-speaking digital news sites receive a large portion of the traffic from 
Belarusian users (Freedom House, 2018a; Laputska & Papko, 2018). Some authors even 
argue that the internet in Belarus is part of the Russian “cyberempire” where Russian 
“cyberhegemony” is performed on the level of linguistics (Uffelmann, 2014, p. 278). 
Belarus has been part of the Soviet Union and, before this, the Russian Empire for 200 
years. This domination left cultural, media and political post-colonial legacy (Bulhakau 
& Dynko, 2011) that is tangible in both media and political spheres.  
1.3.3 Digital media 
The control of the media was instrumental in the establishment of the authoritarian 
systems in Belarus and Russia before the internet and digital media brought volatility 
and unpredictability to the political process. With the proliferation of the internet 
(Figure 1.2), active citizens started challenging the authoritarian systems in new ways. 
Following the establishment of the control over the main television stations, it took 
some time for the authorities of Belarus and Russia to understand the potential of digital 
media, specifically local social media platforms (Lonkila, 2017, p. 115). Thus, until the 
protest wave of 2011-2012, platforms provided an important “weakly regulated 
alternative to the biased broadcasting of Russian national TV channels” (Lonkila, 2017, 
p. 115). 
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Figure 1.2. Internet penetration in Belarus and Russia in 2000 – 2016, as % of the 
population. Sources: Internetlivestats.com; Litvinenko (2019). 
 
Social media platforms remain relatively unregulated in Belarus (Freedom House, 
2018b) except for some cases of political persecution for critical speech online. 
However, in Russia, the most popular social media platforms “have been placed under 
control of oligarchs loyal to the Kremlin” (Filer & Fredheim, 2016, p. 12). This 
“oligarchic control” model was first implemented in relation to the main television 
stations and print outlets in the 2000s (Filer & Fredheim, 2016, p. 12). Since 2012, 
oligarchic control has spread on digital media as well (Pallin, 2017). A corporation 
called Mail.ru controls the most popular Russian-speaking social media platform VK 
(Table 1.1). In 2014, VK attracted twice more visitors than, for instance, Facebook in 
Russia (Izvestija, 2015). Besides VK, Mail.ru controls the second and the sixth-most-
popular social media platforms OK and My World (Izvestia, 2015). This control makes 
Mail.ru the most powerful social media company in Eastern Europe. The owner of 
Mail.ru, Alisher Usmanov, is often described as an oligarch loyal to the Russian 
government (Higgins et al., 2018). VK removes users’ political content and share their 
data so the policy can persecute them (Meduza, 2016). These practices demonstrate 
Usmanov’s loyalty to the Kremlin. Private ownership of the most popular Russian-
speaking social media platforms helps the Russian government to control digital media.  
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Table 1.1 
The audiences of social media in Belarus and Russia 
Platform 
Russia Belarus 
Parent 
organisation 
Alexa  
ranking* 
Share of 
internet 
users** (%) 
Alexa 
ranking* 
Share of 
internet 
users*** 
(%) 
VK 3 65 3 58 Mail.ru (Russia) 
OK 7 63 10 32 Mail.ru (Russia) 
Instagram 11 23 15 26 Facebook (US) 
Facebook 17 23 23 18 Facebook (US) 
Twitter 50-1000 7 50-1000 7 Twitter (US) 
LinkedIn Filtered Filtered 50-1000 7 Microsoft (US) 
Note. *A platform position in the Top Sites ranking based on the Alexa traffic rank as of February 2019. 
Source: Alexa.com. 
**Internet users (18 and older) who answered the question “What social media do you use?” in December 
2017. More than one answer was possible. Source: Levada-Center (2018a). 
***Monthly internet audience (15 and older). Based on the studies conducted by gemiusAudience in 2017 
(VK, OK, Facebook, Twitter) and 2019 (LinkedIn and Instagram). Sources: HootSuite (2019); Infopolicy 
(2017). 
 
The oligarchic control model is also used by the Russian authorities to manipulate 
online news outlets. For example, “the two most popular online news portals, Gazeta.ru 
and Lenta.ru” (as of 2014) are owned by the same person, Aleksandr Mamut, who is 
also close to the Kremlin (Fredheim, 2015, p. 44; Pallin, 2017). He also owns a popular 
blogging platform, LiveJournal, and a prominent news aggregator and email service 
called Rambler (as well as Waterstones, the UK bookstore network). Fredheim (2015, p. 
44) argues that oligarchic control imposed multiple constraints on the political coverage 
by these outlets. The Belarusian internet audience prefers similar social media platforms 
to those popular in Russia (Table 1.1). Consequently, oligarchic control of the most 
prominent Russian-speaking digital platforms affects the internet audience in Belarus in 
a similar fashion as the television control affected Belarusian mainstem media. 
Oligarchic control in Russia is coupled with the internet filtering infrastructure, which is 
a common feature of many authoritarian states. In China, the internet filtering 
infrastructure is controlled by an organisation called the Propaganda Department 
(Stockmann, 2013, p. 244). In Belarus, the Ministry of Information controls the internet 
filtering infrastructure. In Russia, a crucial role is played by the government agency 
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called the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology 
and Mass Media that is better known as Roskomnadzor. The Ministry of Information 
and Roskomnadzor are in charge of filtering the websites that are blacklisted by the 
authorities on the grounds of “extremist content” (Sanovich et al., 2018). Typically, a 
website is filtered on the basis of court rulings in Russia and Belarus (Freedom House, 
2018b). However, provisions exist that do not require a legal process for blocking and 
offers no avenue for appeal (Freedom House, 2018c; The Human Rights Center 
‘Viasna’, 2018). While the list of the filtered websites or pages on VK in Belarus 
included just around 250 internet addresses (Ministry of Information of the Republic of 
Belarus, 2019), a similar list of Roskomnadzor in Russia contained millions of 
addresses as of March 2018 (Freedom House, 2018c).  
In contrast to China or Iran, popular platforms are subjects to only selective filtering 
both in Belarus and Russia. The only exception is LinkedIn, which is completely 
unavailable in Russia, as well as a largely unsuccessful (Burgess, 2018) attempt of 
Roskomnadzor to filter the Telegram messenger. Roskomnadzor explains the filtering 
of these two media with their violation of the Russian laws that required the storage of 
user data on local servers inside Russia or sharing information with the Russian security 
services (Meduza, 2018b). It seems like Roskomnadzor filters professional network 
LinkedIn in order to demonstrate to large players that the government is ready to start 
blocking sites if needed (Lunden, 2017). Telegram is filtered as a consequence of its 
prominent role in Russia politics (Burgess, 2018). At the same time, Roskomnadzor 
failed to achieve compliance of global platforms such as Facebook and Google with 
selective censorship requests (Interfax, 2017; Sanovich, 2018). Both commercial and 
selective technological controls of digital media seem to be of a larger scale in Russia 
than in Belarus. 
News websites in the two countries are also largely unfiltered except for a few news 
media outlets. The examples include pro-democracy news websites that are edited by 
political emigrants from abroad, as well as the sites of local anarchist or neo-Nazi 
movements. The most prominent examples of filtered digital news media are 
Charter97.org in Belarus and Grani.ru in Russia (Respondent 6, personal 
communication, August 7, 2017; Respondent 3, personal communication, January 17, 
2017). Despite filtering, some users in Belarus and Russia can access these websites. 
For example, on 24 January 2018, the authorities of Belarus started blocking access to 
Charter97.org, an independent from the government news outlet edited from Poland by 
political refugees (Freedom House, 2018a). The Ministry of Information accused the 
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outlet of “spreading banned ‘extremist’ content and other information that could hurt 
Belarusian interests” (The Human Rights Center ‘Viasna’, 2018). Over about a month, 
its traffic had fallen to the lowest level in a year. However, Charter97.org remained the 
11th most visited news media in the country according to the Alexa ranking (Figure 
1.3). 
 
 
Figure 1.3. The Alexa Traffic Ranking for Charter97.org in February 2017 – February 
2018. Screenshot from Alexa.com. 
Similar to Charter97.org in Belarus, access to Grani.ru has been officially blocked in 
Russia since 2014, but users can access the website. Grani was the name of an 
information program that was closed following Putin’s capture of the NVT television 
channel in 2001. Grani was first blocked in spring 2014, at the height of the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict (Sanovich et al., 2018). Since 2014, the editor-in-chief of Grani.ru 
lives in exile in Paris (Respondent 6, personal communication, August 7, 2017). In 
2017, the main themes that Grani.ru covered included such topics as the authoritarian 
regime, pro-democracy movements and political prisoners (Respondent 6, personal 
communication, August 7, 2017). To facilitate access to Grani, its editorial team 
(Respondent 6, personal communication, August 7, 2017) encourages Russian users to 
use VPNs, mirrors, as well as to follow its content on digital platforms such as Twitter. 
The selective filtering strategy of the government in relation to digital news media is 
thus similar to one employed for social media platforms. 
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The Russian and Belarusian states increasingly persecute people for their active political 
position expressed both offline and online. From 2011 to 2016, there were at least 999 
criminal cases related to users’ online activity like reposting content or posting texts, 
images and video in Russia (Gainutdinov & Chikov, 2017a). A large part of these cases 
is politically motivated, according to the human rights defenders’ report (Gainutdinov & 
Chikov, 2017a).  The growing number of social media users face lengthy prison 
sentences because they voice dissent online. For instance, in 2014, there were 132 cases 
of prison terms for social media posts in Russia. In 2016, this number grew to 298 
(Gainutdinov & Chikov, 2017a). In Belarus, no statistics of such prosecution is 
available. However, sporadic media reports suggest several dozens of them over the past 
five years.  
Twitter or Facebook, along with other global social media, is limited in its reach in 
Belarus and Russia. As Table 1.1 shows, the largest shares of internet audiences in the 
two countries are attracted by the local social media, VK and OK. VK was used by 
digital activists to distribute content critical of the Russian government (Gladarev and 
Lonkila, 2012). In Belarus, VK, along with OK, became “the most important platforms 
for the civic criticism” of the government in 2017 (Respondent 2, personal 
communication, May 30, 2017)2.  
VK or Vkontakte is a predominantly Russian-speaking platform. The features of VK 
resemble those of Facebook. It was founded by Pavel Durov, a Russian entrepreneur, 
two years after the launch of Facebook and bore “a striking resemblance to Facebook” 
(Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015, p. 37). Following the annexation of Crimea, Durov was 
forced to sell VK to Usmanov and leave the country (Bennetts, 2016). In a statement 
explaining his departure, Durov said he had been forced out of the country “over his 
refusal to co-operate with the security services, and that his company was now under the 
“full control” of Kremlin-friendly figures” (Bennetts, 2016). The same year, he founded 
Telegram, an encrypted platform that combines the features of a messenger like 
WhatsApp and social media like Facebook.  
OK or Odnoklassniki translates as “Classmates.” The original mission of OK was to 
help people to find their former classmates, so the target audience was, on average, 
older relative to that of VK (Enikolopov et al., 2018, p. 8). Consequently, VK is more 
popular among the younger audience than OK (Enikolopov, Makarin, & Petrova, 2018, 
p. 8; Figure 6.5). OK, along with VK, contains a timeline feature (see Table 4.7 for how 
 
2 All of the translations from Belarusian and Russian to English are performed by the author. 
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group pages were designed on VK and OK). Timelines are displayed by default when a 
user logs in. OK and VK have other common features with global platforms such as the 
Like button (or the “Class” button in OK), a list of friends, private messaging, different 
types of communities and posts.  
Table 1.2 
The default sharing mechanisms of VK, OK, Facebook and Telegram 
 Like Share Comment 
Facebook Yes Yes Yes 
VK Yes Yes Yes 
OK “Class button” that 
also affords sharing  
Share button Yes 
Telegram channels No Yes No  
Telegram groups No  Yes Yes  
 
At the same time, OK has more unique features compared to those platforms that 
dominate the social media market globally. For instance, if a user presses the Class 
button, this leads to automatic sharing of the “Liked” content on the user’s timeline, so 
all their friends can see this content. Other relatively unique features of OK are the 
“threads” and “trending topics” sections, as well as instant visibility of a user’s physical 
location like a town or area. First, the “threads” section is a collection of bookmarks to 
the highlighted posts on a page. Second, the “trending topics” section highlights tags 
from the posts of a page. Both are part of the default design of pages and make the 
navigation across them easier. Third, the platform design displays the city or village 
where a user lives next to their name. Consequently, when browsing a list of users, it is 
easy to find users from a specific location (Respondent 10, personal communication, 
September 6, 2017). These three features make OK a more unique social media 
platform.  
This background note demonstrated striking similarities between the political and media 
systems of Belarus and Russia. Both countries emerged from the Soviet Union as 
democracies but gradually went their ways down to autocracies. These authoritarian 
systems benefited from the ability to control traditional media. This, at least partly, 
explains why their authoritarian elites also try to take control of the most popular digital 
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platforms. Digital platform control is endorsed by the oligarchic elite and implemented 
through filtering of internet traffic and policy restrictions. However, this digital control 
is not as tight as the control of television or newspapers. These settings can be hardly 
called favourable to digital dissidents who need access to the media in order to appeal to 
citizens and put pressure on the government. Dissidents found themselves trapped 
between the authoritarian states that fully control traditional media on one side and 
oligarch-controlled local digital media companies on the other side. 
1.4 Methods 
The empirical results of the study are derived from analysis of interviews and 
participant observation, as well as content posted or arranged by digital activists. Initial 
informal observation of online activities on five social media platforms and nine expert 
interviews provided preliminary data that identified a sample and isolated the categories 
that the research could focus on. Following this, 24 in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
examined the attitudes and beliefs of activists, mostly communication coordinators and 
local leaders of the campaigns, and provided data about their use of digital media. 
Physical participant observation in seven locations and document analysis provided 
insights into the practices of activists. Finally, quantitative and qualitative content 
analysis of social media posts and pages helped to explain the nuances of these 
practices. Unlike many studies that use retrospective digital data, I collected social 
media posts during or immediately following the studied events. That data was then 
triangulated, and the results were summarised and visualised.  
A civic or political campaign is a long-term process that involves a series of 
communication events. In the analysis, I focus on the most contentious events from the 
four campaigns studied. These events are collective action and preparation for them. As 
I discuss in the literature review, the fear of collective action is one of the main factors 
that prompt an authoritarian government to implement censorship or other restrictive 
measures. I approach collective action as a breaking event or a crisis point whose study 
provides a background against which regime resilience can be tested (Cairns, 2017, p. 
8). I use the term a “critical event” to refer to such events. Critical events are key units 
of the analysis. 
1.5 Organisation of the study 
The dissertation is structured as follows. First, in Chapter 2, I review social movement 
studies, political communication studies and platform studies literature to provide a 
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theoretical background for analysis of the two country cases. Second, in Chapter 3, I 
discuss the methods I used to collect and analyse data. Third, in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I 
present and analyse the findings. I structure this analysis around the backgrounds of the 
studied organisations, their organisational (Chapter 4) and leadership structures 
(Chapter 5) and the mechanisms employed for information dissemination (Chapter 6). 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I summarise key conclusions and present the contribution of the 
study, as well as a discussion of the limitations and directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
This chapter discusses previous research that helps to understand how political 
organisation evolves with the advance of digital technologies, whether and how 
organised pro-democracy citizens can rely on digital media to adapt to repressive 
environments of authoritarian countries and what consequences this reliance has on the 
ability of these citizens to challenge authoritarian elites.  
The chapter starts with the definition of key concepts of the study. It then proceeds with 
the discussion of organisation and leadership in civic and political communities in the 
second section. This section focuses on both more traditional approaches to studying 
how digital activists build their structures and on recent theories of digitally-enabled 
organising and collective action. It aims to introduce the most relevant concepts that 
establish the link between political organising and digital media with a focus on 
organisational mechanisms, political action, collective action and leadership.  
The third section focuses on the role of digital media in fostering political change and 
the initial political and communication debates that developed around this issue. It 
revolves around the discussion of technological, social, cultural and commercial 
components of social media platforms. This section also provides a review of the 
theories that explain the use of digital platforms in the circumstances of the 
platformisation of society – “the rise of the platform as the dominant infrastructural and 
economic model of the social web” and political campaigning (Helmond, 2015, p. 1). 
The section concludes with the argument in favour of expanding the focus of platform 
studies beyond western contexts. 
The fourth section seeks to map out the types of response to digital engagement, 
expression of opinion and digitally-enabled collective action by authoritarian states such 
as Belarus and Russia. The authoritarian response to digital activism is observed in 
three forms: political persecution, censorship and surveillance. I conceptualise them 
under the umbrella term of digital dissidents’ challenges. The final section of this 
chapter summarises the literature review and highlights gaps in the literature.  
2.1 Definitions of the concepts 
The research project analyses practices of individuals or groups of people who attempt 
to make a difference to their societies. Their key instrument of change is a campaign 
that uses digital media. A campaign is “a series of interactions connected to each other 
from the thematic point of view and oriented towards a common aim” (della Porta & 
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Diani, 2006, p. 188). A digital political campaign is a campaign conducted in a 
computer-mediated environment that can be a part of larger campaigning efforts that 
involves interactions between political actors. Political digital campaign is “any 
organized digital operation that is designed for a political purpose” (Y. M. Kim et al., 
2018, p. 536). Digital activism is “political participation, activities and protests 
organized in digital networks” beyond mainstream politics (Karatzogianni, 2015, p. 1).  
A digital campaign is often built on the affordances of digital technologies that are the 
actions that technologies facilitate or make possible (Tufekci, 2017). Some authors like 
Nagy and Neff (2015) or Hutchby (2001) stress that affordances emerge through the 
relationships between technologies and actors who use them. Other scholars connect the 
concept of affordances to a practice approach that emphasises both possibilities as well 
as constraints associated with affordances (boyd, 2014). Couldry (2012, p. 37) defines a 
practice approach in communication studies as one that asks what people (individuals, 
groups, institutions) are doing in relation to the media across a whole range of situations 
and contexts. Many theoretical perspectives view media as a set of practices (Bräuchler 
& Postill, 2010). Some perspectives use the notion of practice to discuss one or more 
aspects of a given social phenomenon, while other studies try to answer what we mean 
by practice in different media contexts (Postill, 2017b).  
Shove et al. (2012) consider social practices to be made up of three interlinked 
elements: material, competence and meaning. These elements may exist outside of 
media practice, but the practice occurs when these elements are linked together. For 
example, to observe social media practice occurring, an individual might use a 
computing device (a material element) with some knowledge of how to use it 
(competencies) and the meanings that are attached to this activity. Mattoni (2012, p. 
159) develops this perspective on practice in line with social movement studies. She 
defines practices as creative instances that include interactions with media objects (like 
a phone) and subjects (like activists) and draws on how these subjects and objects are 
perceived and how the media environment is experienced and known.  
The use of practice as an analytical instrument allows distinguishing between the 
outcomes of digital political actions. In his study of “techno-political nerds,” pro-
democracy activists who operate at the intersection of politics and technology, Postill 
(2018, p. 179) emphasises that practices can be institutionalised and non-
institutionalised. The practices of “square movements” such as Occupy Wall Street or 
the Sunflower movement in Taiwan were often non-institutionalised. They were 
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transient, unsustainable practices. That means that many of the practices perished with a 
movement they were observed for. What exactly determines the sustainability of pro-
democracy movement’s practices is, however, not discussed in this pioneering work of 
Postill. 
When developing the concepts of affordances and practices, some authors suggest that 
the qualities and the features of media technologies are not fixed (Bräuchler & Postill, 
2010; Couldry, 2012; Lokot, 2016). These qualities reveal themselves in situated media 
use – specifics that are stressed by, for instance, the anthropological accounts of social 
media (Costa, 2017). The situated use of media represents the understanding of media 
as an environment where their users are active. I consider digital media as both an 
environment where political activists practice media use and the objects that possess 
their own action possibilities and opportunities. These characteristics are often dynamic 
and reveal themselves when media use is practised by humans. Therefore, comparing 
two popular concepts of digital media studies – affordances and practices – one may 
argue that the concept of practices is potentially as beneficial for the qualitative studies 
of communication as the concept of affordances. In this research, I use both concepts. 
The literature on social movements developed the framework of contentious politics 
that helps to analyse a political campaign in authoritarian settings. Contentious politics 
is traditionally understood as a set of actions conducted by a specific organisation that 
aims at opposing elites, authorities and opponents around their claims or claims of those 
they want to represent (Tarrow, 2011, p. 4). Tilly and Tarrow (2015, p. 8) used the 
framework of contentious politics to conceptualise several important notions that are 
extensively used by scholars of digital media and politics. One of key concepts that help 
to study contentious politics is collective action. Collective action is defined by Tilly 
and Tarrow (2015, p. 8) as “coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or 
programs.”  
Collective action is one of the main manifestations of social movements. Social 
movements are defined as “sustained campaigns of claim-making, using repeated 
performance that advertise that claim” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 237). Some approaches 
to social movements diminish the importance of campaign-as-organisation by viewing 
them as “interactions” rather than “groups.” For example, Bennett, Segerberg & Walker 
(2014) emphasise production and sharing of digital content as key mechanisms that 
produce “crowd organisation.” The definition of movements based on interactions was 
earlier proposed by Tilly (1979, p. 12), who argued that a social movement is an 
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interaction between authorities and spokespeople of the movement “for a given 
challenge to those authorities.” Directed by a similar logic, Sartori defined a political 
party, a formation that may emerge if social movements become more institutionalised, 
as a communicative institution (Sartori, 1976, p. 24). These definitions stress the 
importance of interactions in politics. Hence, being both more and less than 
organisation, social movements have porous boundaries. As McAdam (1986, p. 67) 
notes, it becomes “extremely difficult” to “demarcate those boundaries.” Therefore, 
some studies argue for shifting the focus of analysis to specific instances of actions 
associated with movements such as a repertoire.  
Many other authors argue that the concept of social movements is still suited for the 
analysis of political action beyond mainstream politics, including the circumstances of 
authoritarian states. In his study of the Russian political and social activism of the 
2000s-2010s, Greene (2014, p. 48) suggests that “civic society,” an approach often used 
to analyse activism in Russia, is too west-centric. Instead, he suggests using the theory 
of SMOs, which he also defines as the interactions between the authorities and activist 
spokespeople for a given challenge to those authorities. Such definition, Greene (2014) 
argues, allows not assuming what sort of actors the research will investigate. The 
concept of social movements defined through interaction can be used to analyse digital 
activism in authoritarian contexts.  
Social movements should be viewed in the context of national media and political 
systems. Here a media system is “a set of media institutions and practices understood as 
interacting with and shaping one another” (Hallin, 2016). As Hallin (2016) explains, 
media systems are embedded within wider social, political, economic and cultural 
systems. Therefore, media systems, as well as their social and political institutions, are 
easily affected by changes in other spheres, including those taking place under the 
influence of technological development. 
A key feature of the political systems of Belarus and Russia is their common definition 
as non-democratic or authoritarian regimes (I use these terms interchangeably). One of 
the most discussed aspects of such regimes is the way the elections of political 
leadership are conducted. The traditional way of defining non-democracy suggests that 
groups in control of the state do not lose elections in the normal course of events in such 
a system (Márquez, 2017, p. 2). To ensure that they do not lose elections, the groups in 
control intentionally impose barriers to prevent other groups from achieving influence 
over the direction of state policies and the political system. These barriers add to 
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structural constraints like the economic costs of competing for power. Some groups of 
critical citizens in non-democratic states do not compete for power through elections or 
similar institutional mechanisms or use elections as a political opening. Instead, citizens 
organise sustained campaigns of claim-making charged with “anti-authoritarian ethos” 
(Postill, 2018; Tufekci, 2017) - distrust authoritarian institutions – in order to advocate 
for pro-democracy changes and challenge authoritarian power. I define such sustained 
campaigns as anti-authoritarian movements. 
2.2 Organisation 
2.2.1 Communication repertoire and political opportunity structure  
Digital media affordances can reveal their potential through the practices of their use. 
For instance, the focus on how activists used different generations of media like the 
internet and television helped Chadwick (2013) to propose the theory of the hybrid 
media system. He uses the example of “38 Degrees,” an organisation that, according to 
the author, benefited from the transformation of the contemporary British media system. 
Chadwick defines this system as an example of the hybrid media system. “38 Degrees” 
navigated through this system successfully. It was able to organise quick mobilisation of 
its supporters basing their campaign on  
a blend of viral messaging across its online supporter networks, ongoing 
organizational capacity through online polling, a keen awareness of the policy and 
news cycles, and a degree of interconnectedness with the news values and temporal 
rhythms of older media. (Chadwick 2013, p. 193)  
According to Chadwick, the examples of the organisations that strategically blend 
newer technologies and the logic of traditional media are numerous. Digital activists 
who operated during the Arab Spring protests also embraced hybrid media logic that 
was reflected in their organisational structures (Dahlberg-Grundberg, 2015) and their 
information distribution strategies (Hussain, 2014). These examples illustrate 
Chadwick’s thesis about the rearrangement of today’s media system into the hybrid 
media system. This system is a result of the combination of new (or as Chadwick 
suggests “newer” media) and more traditional media practices, technologies and 
organisations. 
The blend which “38 Degrees” prepared in order to succeed in the mobilisation included 
messaging, polling, the performances that made use of the existed media system. A 
scholar of social movements would call this blend the repertoire of the “38 Degrees.” 
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The concept of repertoire is defined in the contentious politics framework by Tilly & 
Tarrow (2007, p. 23). According to this definition, a repertoire can constitute the whole 
set of practices both potential and “at work” that are employed by a movement. First 
proposed by Tilly in 1979, the idea of a repertoire of collective action draws an analogy 
with the repertoire of music or theatre performance. It refers to a set of means that is 
effectively available to a given set of people (Tilly 1979, p. 15). The concept of 
repertoire is therefore close to the concept of affordances since both are revealed 
through practice. 
Digital activists choose a repertoire like setting up websites, email lists, data 
visualisation platforms based on the attitudes and culture of their organisation, Kavada 
(2013) argues. The organisation’s internet culture refers to the cultural preferences of 
the members of the organisation (Kavada, 2013). These preferences can influence the 
strategic choices of activists like the choice of their communicative model. For example, 
in her analysis of two opposite tactics within the Global Justice movement in the UK, 
Kavada (2013, p. 91) defines two types of internet culture – broadcasting, which is a 
more top-down approach to communication with the public, and interactive. The latter 
is characterised by a more horizontal and dialogic process of communication. A 
communicative model of activists may be defined as a set of their communication 
repertoires. Thus, the concepts of repertoire, affordances and the organisation’s internet 
culture are closely linked. 
The concept of “political opportunity structure” which was also developed by Tilly 
together with Tarrow (2015, p. 49) links a political regime and repertoires of activists. 
Political opportunity structure describes the aspects of a regime that offer activists both 
openings to advance their claims and threats and constraints that caution them against 
making these claims (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 49). Such aspects include the stability of 
political alignments and a chance of split in elites, the openness to new political actors, 
the availability of potential allies and challenges and the extent to which the regime 
represses or facilitates collective claim-making. Threats and constraints can lead to 
repression, while during openings, dissidents may use an opportunity of a certain 
condition of a regime to start public actions. Political opportunity structure is a central 
concept in the analysis of dissidents’ chances to fulfil their goals according to a tradition 
of contentious politics. 
Political opportunity structure is a dynamic and complex feature of political regimes 
that can be calculated by activists in advance. Tilly & Tarrow (2007, p. 55) point out the 
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two properties that are important to take into account when calculating political 
opportunities in relation to collective action. They are the level of democracy and the 
capacity of a regime. Capacity refers to the governments’ ability to distribute 
population, activity and resources via regulation of benefits, taxes, traffic flows, natural 
resources and many more aspects of life. Democracy refers here to a certain level of 
political rights, the consultation of citizens and their protection. In non-democratic 
regimes, threats and opportunities co-occur, which requires calculations performed by 
the people who are willing to influence or challenge the regime. The calculations occur 
in relation to the choice of whether to seize an opportunity or to respond to a threat and 
protect themselves (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 58). The changes in political opportunity 
are reflected in the changes in the repertoire used by claim makers as well as regimes to 
limit this claim making.  
Media are crucial for the activists’ perception of opportunity structure – that is one of 
the reasons why non-democratic regimes try to control and manipulate media 
(Stockmann, 2013, p. 237). For example, Lynch (2011, p. 306) argues that the changing 
dynamics of information flows associated with the new information environment where 
digital and foreign media play an increasing role shifted the balance and the perception 
of opportunity structure during the protests in the Arab countries in 2011. According to 
this theory, the similar protest movements inspired by the Arab Spring in China were 
not successful as the Chinese regime handled better the synchronisation of information 
flows and persuasion of citizens, which affect the perception of opportunity structure 
(Stockmann, 2013, pp. 237–238). The dynamics of political opportunity structures are 
complex, and their character varies dramatically from one regime to another. 
The example of the “For Fair Elections” protest movement that was active in Russia in 
2011 - 2012 demonstrates the effect of the changing opportunity structure (Toepfl, 
2017). The 2011 parliamentary and the 2012 presidential elections opened an 
opportunity for opposition activists to claim the changes in the political regime through 
the protests. However, by the middle of 2012, the window for the protest was closed in 
Russia (Toepfl, 2017). It became harder for the leaders of the “For Fair Elections” 
movement to organise new protests. At the same time, the Russian political regime 
became more authoritarian. Many members of the movement, especially those who 
belonged to the formal structures of the “For Fair Elections,” were forced abroad, 
prosecuted or imprisoned. These changes in the opportunity structure and the response 
of the government became the main contextual factors that contributed to the decline of 
the “For Fair Elections” movement (Toepfl, 2017). This example shows that 
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opportunity structure is a highly dynamic set of political factors that influence the 
organisational logic of activist groups. 
2.2.2 Organisational mechanisms of social movements 
Such authors as Bennett & Segerberg (2013), Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl (2012), 
Chadwick (2013) and Wells (2015) closely studied the organisational logic of digitally 
engaged civic and political groups. However, many more studies of social movements 
and digital activism ignore the organisational layer of digital politics, the literature 
suggests (Bimber et al., 2012; Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Karpf, 2016). Internal organising, 
like the backstage practices of social media teams of digitally-enabled groups, is 
particularly overlooked in line with this attitude (Gerbaudo, 2017c; Treré, 2015). 
Karpf (2016) calls the elements of the organisational structures of digitally-enabled 
groups, such as strategy, reputation, growth and fundraising, “hidden variables” of the 
scholarly literature. In his study, Karpf focuses on the organisation of larger digital 
groups like petition platforms or election campaigns in the US. He notes that research 
into the organisational logic of such groups might be difficult, “messy and flawed” as 
the logic of many civic groups themselves (p. 175) but rewarding. At the same time, 
Wells (2015) suggests that there are still many civic bureaucratised organisations that 
approach the digital formally and turn digital platforms into a space for broadcasting. 
However, many of the mentioned authors like Karpf or Bimber and colleagues focus on 
successful collective action organisations rather than on those with mediocre results 
(Margetts et al., 2016, p. 72). Moreover, all of these authors do not test the results 
beyond the narrow Anglophone context. Nevertheless, these studies present a major 
contribution and allow us to learn about the organisation of the digital era in detail. 
Organisation of citizens who come together based on solidarity is traditionally studied 
using the concept of social movements. In western democracies, the 1960s and 1970s 
are typically described in the literature as a remarkable time when these units became 
the prominent agents of political communication. This period often provides the 
material for the comparison of radical events with more contemporary examples like the 
Occupy movement. However, as Tilly (1979) demonstrated, the concept of social 
movements and the phenomenon it represents is largely coming from an even earlier 
time - the nineteenth century. Thus, being a “nineteenth century creation,” a social 
movement is very much an accompaniment of development of the modern consolidated 
national state and various historical trends that followed it, like, for instance, the rise of 
the working classes or the growth of national electoral politics. That period saw a rise of 
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the groups of people “who voluntarily and deliberately commit themselves to a shared 
identity, a unifying belief, a common program, and a collective struggle to realize that 
program” (Tilly 1979, p. 10). This view of social movements as a united collective with 
a strong leader or bureaucracy that runs the organisation was quite dominant for a long 
time. 
The literature often discusses adaptability as a key feature of social movements. 
Adaptability results from the internal characteristics of a movement and a context. 
Gerlach (2001, p. 289) argues that the most common type of adaptable movement is one 
that represents a segmentary, polycentric and integrated network or a SPIN movement. 
These characteristics were determined based on the study of movements active in the 
US and the neighbouring countries in the 1960s. First, SPIN organisation consists of 
many diverse subgroups or segments – essentially independent cells which can combine 
to form larger configurations or divide to form smaller units (Gerlach & Hine, 1970, p. 
41). The proliferation of new segments takes place independently, unrelated to central 
decision-making. Second, SPINs have many centres of influence or leadership. Thus, 
they are polycentric (Gerlach, 2001). Third, these organisations constituted an 
integrated network rather than being a myriad of isolated instances. These three 
characteristics are the three pillars of the SPIN model of organising adaptive to 
authorities’ pressure. Gerlach and Hine (1970, p. 65) emphasise the ability of SPIN 
movements to adapt to the attempts of a ruling regime to suppress them. I discuss the 
thee elements of SPIN organisation in a greater detail in the following sections. 
Scholars use the SPIN model to compare, for instance, the perspectives on the recent 
anti-authoritarian uprisings in Iran and Egypt (El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2012) or to 
analyse the use of email lists by the digital activists of the “movement for alternative 
globalization” (Kavada, 2009). In particular, Kavada demonstrated that the use of email 
lists by the activists led to segmentation and “a polycentric model of power” in line with 
the SPIN theory. In addition, with the proliferation of digital media, the literature 
extensively examines the networked component of organisation that was explored in the 
pioneering work of Gerlach & Hine. “The potential of network forms of social 
organization” (Karatzogianni, 2015, p. 14) is commonly viewed as beneficial for 
movements including those acting in non-democracies.   
The proliferation of digital platforms among other factors prompted the discussion 
about the changing nature of social movements. In particular, the role of and a need for 
organisation in a digitally engaged civic organisation is actively discussed since the 
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internet became an important factor of a social movement lifecycle. Earl (2015, pp. 37–
38) emphasises five reasons why traditional social movements still need organisation. 
First, organisation helps to institutionalise movements. Second, organisation is needed 
to provide movements with leadership and to create a strategy. Third, collective action 
critically requires organisation. Fourth, organisation helps to elevate some of its 
members to the positions of spokespeople and thus to raise the profile of the entire 
movement. Finally, organisation helps social movements to cultivate a common 
identity. Earl (2015, p. 48) argues that movements that rely on digital media need a 
traditional organisation at least in three situations: (a) when offline events are supported 
by online activities; (b) when long-term struggles are necessary to achieve desired 
outcomes; and (c) when stable networks are critical to securing participation. Earl’s 
reasoning demonstrates that organisation is still a key feature of social movement. 
2.2.3 Organisational challenges in the digital age  
Many authors argue that the nature of social movements and collective action changed 
so much that it is time to redefine key aspects of the conceptualisation of social 
movements (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Castells, 2013, pp. 221–228; Gerbaudo, 
2017c). These authors specifically focus on new demands of the citizens towards 
political organisations. For example, Wells (2015) describes those citizens as “late 
modern” and highlights their scepticism of conventional institutions. Instead, late 
modern citizens demand non-hierarchical organisational coordination based on 
participatory decision-making (Bennett et al., 2017). However, such non-hierarchical 
structures that emphasise participatory components might have limited capacities in 
struggle for power with more vertical organisations (Tufekci, 2014; Wells, 2015). Thus, 
political activists face a new organisational dilemma: how to satisfy the late modern 
citizens’ demand and to build a structure that is capable of contesting actual power.  
Some authors suggest that “hybrid” organisational forms might provide a better solution 
to this dilemma (Chadwick, 2013; Karpf, 2014; Wells, 2015). These forms combine, 
among others, newer and older approaches to organisation and information distribution 
(Chadwick, 2013). For instance, Bennett et al. (2017, p. 2) suggest that hybrid 
organisational forms emerge as a result of the adoption of social media communication 
strategies by political parties in Western Europe, established and new alike. Still, it is 
not clear what exact features those hybrid forms have. 
Several recent theories discuss the features of hybrid organisations. Gerbaudo (2019) 
studied political parties across the Left-Right spectrum in mature democracies, such as 
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the Five Star Movement or Podemos, and defined them as “digital parties.” Digital 
parties are based on an infrastructure of digital assets located in the Cloud. They 
resemble a start-up company and use a forum-like infrastructure to facilitate the 
interaction between its supporters. Kavada (2019) broadens this conceptualisation. She 
suggests that digital parties are also “movement parties” because they are concerned 
with winning elections, as well as changing the system of representative democracy thus 
addressing the demands of late modern citizens. For example, digital movement/parties 
view their supporters as the source of policy ideas (Kavada, 2019, p. 209). Citizens’ 
demands require endless experimentation with new forms of party organisation and 
governance.  
Bennett et al. (2017, p. 12) propose the framework of a connective party that is an 
organisation in which “platforms and affordances are indistinguishable from, and 
replace, key components of brick and mortar organization and intra-party functions.” 
The connective party’s repertoire includes platforms for general communication such as 
party websites, social media and specialised applications for proposing, discussing 
political ideas and decision-making, as well as “operating system” platforms for 
organising the key technology outlays. According to the authors, some parties, mostly 
radically right-wing, consider this repertoire as a vehicle that can turn traditional parties 
into flexible technologically-enabled organisations that can engage with voters more 
easily. 
Another form of organising that adopts the set of social media repertoires, Postill’s 
(2018) techno-political nerds, “typically work in small teams” (p. 28) and organise 
themselves in the form of ad-hoc coalitions that combine individuals with diverse skills 
to pursue a political goal such as opposing laws or launching collective action. The 
combination of skills such as computing, law and media seems to be a key element of 
nerds’ organising. Nerds recruit manpower through crowdsourcing, the process of 
appealing to online volunteers to support the efforts of a nerd coalition. Crowdsourcing 
allows techpol nerds to scale up and to find evidence, resources or expertise across 
internet crowds. The coalition of techno-political activists described by Postill 
corresponds to the idea of a SPIN-style segmented and networked social movement. 
Based on their study of protest communities in a few western democratic countries, 
Bennett & Segerberg (2013) theorised an ideal type of the protest organisation in the 
digital era - connective action. According to this theory, more individualised and 
personalised styles of political participation and collective action in mature democracies 
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are parly explained by the increased use of media platforms that encourage users to 
personalise their online experience. People are ready to share various discourses rather 
than to join formal structures like organisations. Citizens not least demand more 
horizontal organisation as an element of this participation (Bennett et al., 2011). They 
try to disassociate themselves with popular social movements and their ideologies. In 
other words, people are still ready to join movements or a coalition of organisations but 
do it “on their own terms” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, p. 120).   Bennett & Segerberg 
(2013) argue that new types of digitally-enabled organisations could open the floor to 
various personal perspectives of actions without undermining organisations’ political 
capacities. “Crowd-enabled networks” (Bennett et al., 2014) that operate according to 
the connective action logic have a remarkable ability to form coherent organisation. 
This ability is reached through a peer-production mechanism that includes the 
production and dynamic integration of information content. 
Still, digital and connective parties, crowdsourced networks of techno-political nerds 
and even a crowd-enabled network have something in common with conventional 
bureaucratic organisation, Bennett et al. (2014, pp. 234–235) argue. To be considered 
coherent, a party or a movement should present at least “three fundamental capacities.” 
First, it should be able to mobilise resources such as material and symbolic goods. 
Second, an organisation should be capable of reacting to threats and opportunities. 
Third, as every organisation goes through the cycle of growth, change and, possibly, 
death, it should be able to develop new patterns of association internally. Thus, 
mobilisation, responsiveness and adaptation are three fundamental processes that 
distinguish a coherent protest-oriented organisation that rely on digital platforms. 
To sum up, scholars keep searching for an answer to the question of how exactly people 
organise themselves in the digital era. Recent conceptualisations of political organising 
address several trends observed for mature democracies: mediatisation of politics 
(Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999), the proliferation of digital platforms in political 
communication, growing demand for participatory political engagement and the 
radicalisation of voting behaviour in elections (Bennett et al., 2017).  
2.2.4 Organisation and political participation 
Similar to the forms of political organising, the nature of membership in a political 
organisation evolves drastically. In some cases, membership becomes blurred, and 
sometimes it is not easy to recognise the status of an individual who seems to be 
engaged in an online campaign (Margetts et al., 2016, p. 48). For example, Avaaz is a 
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large-scale “campaigning community” that defines a member as anyone who 
contributed to one of its many online activities such as donation and petition singing 
(Margetts et al., 2016, p. 49). Another prominent community, Anonymous is a “group” 
of hackers without leadership or possibility “to join”; however, wishing to do so is 
enough to be considered a member of Anonymous (Margetts et al., 2016, p. 50).  
Consequently, it becomes hard to define who political activists are and how to 
understand whether someone has been involved in political action. It is not least 
because political participation can occur in very light forms such as clicking or liking 
internet content. Some authors who study or comment on the matter derive their 
arguments from more traditional views on activism and social movements (e.g. 
Morozov, 2011; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). In contrast, other authors suggest widening or 
refocusing traditional definitions and approaches to activism thus paying more attention 
to new circumstances in which technology-enabled activities unfold (Halupka, 2016; 
Milan, 2015b; Neumayer & Svensson, 2014; Postill, 2014).  
In this section, I discuss how digital media shape the meaning of membership and 
political action. I start the discussion with the notion of political activism.  
The broadest definition of political activists can sound like “individuals and groups who 
work for political change” (Lamb, 2011). Indeed, many activists tend to unite in groups. 
And these groups can often be defined as a social movement. Social movements are one 
of the most established frameworks that help to study various sorts of activism. One of 
the fundamental components of traditional social movements is an act of collective 
action. Collective action serves as the basis of social movements (Tarrow, 2011, p. 7). 
However, contemporary digital activism does not always end up producing visible 
collective action or any other sort of physical manifestation of political activities.  
These activities can stay hidden for years from the eyes of those who do not follow the 
internet pages of activists, since the results of their work may be traceable only in 
virtual space. Political activists can engage in the construction of a sustainable base of 
online supporters, collecting donations, organising virtual collective actions like 
Twitter-storms (putting pressure on prominent users of Twitter with various messages 
coming from a defined circle of activists). Even if all these activities are important and 
effective, they, nevertheless, might stay unnoticed and unrecognised by the general 
public. It is also because the mainstream media are more prone to cover such visible and 
often theatrical collective action as street demonstrations or strikes rather than virtual 
Twitter-storms (Chadwick, 2013). Thus, the expectations of the physical presence of 
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activists are associated with the more traditional views on collective action and social 
movements. These views and expectations produce a confusion about the nature of 
contemporary political activism. 
Another confusion derives from different views on what political action is. In the digital 
space, the notion of “political” becomes modified compared to formal politics. For 
example, it is sometimes not clear whether mass symbolic acts on digital platforms like 
Twitter-storms are political actions or simple “clicktivism”? In fact, even large offline 
political street protests can and often do fail, while online acts of the same protest group 
might become successful in terms of their achieved goals. The impact of symbolic 
online political campaigns depends on many variables including elites and their 
opponents' cohesion, the willingness and the ability of states to enforce repression or the 
political opportunity structure (Tufekci, 2014). Still, some authors (Morozov, 2009) 
argue that it is not possible to attach the label “political” to some symbolic online 
activities. In response, other authors look for activist self-definition and self-expression 
(Neumayer & Svensson, 2014) and search for new frameworks (Halupka, 2016).  
The answer to the question about the presence of politics in online civic activity might 
depend on how we understand the “political” (Marsh and Akram, 2015, p. 640). For 
instance, Milan (2015a) demonstrates that the “political” is also developed on social 
media on the level of microinteractions, which are often invisible to the public. Halupka 
(2016) suggests that if we move beyond a narrow and a more traditional definition of 
the “political,” we will find a significant number of people involved in that broader 
version of politics. Halupka argues that many activities occur beyond contexts that are 
normally associated with the “political.” He proposes the notion of “information 
activist” that describes people who consume, aggregate and distribute information. Such 
activists inform others and like to be informed themselves, easily driving through the 
waves of the digital world. Information activists may either become involved in 
collective action themselves or inspire others to do so, thus, encouraging political 
participation. In the core of this “new wave” of political participation is the internet-
enabled practice of knowledge sharing (Halupka 2016, p. 10). From the activists’ point-
of-view, knowledge and information sharing are the practices that might influence 
policy and decision-making. The framework of “information activist” helps to escape 
the confusion regarding the nature of the “political” and to emphasise sharing practices. 
Postill (2018) develops this line of thought and argues that skills of political information 
management, along with law, politics, computing and art, are at the core of digital 
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politics. Postill defines active citizens who are concerned with authoritarianism and 
operate at the intersection of technology and politics as techno-political nerds. Postill’s 
nerds are ideologically diverse, pragmatic team collaborators and “staunch[ly] anti-
authoritarian” in their views. The examples include the Wikileaks founder Julian 
Assange and Edward Snowden, a former US National Security Agency’s worker, as 
well as dozens of influential personalities who shaped the Arab Spring, Taiwan’s 
Sunflower movement, the Gezi Park protests and other recent political movements 
(Postill, 2018, p. 121).  
Postill shows how techno-political nerds influence transnational political issues such as 
digital rights or electoral politics. For example, Postill (2018, p. 16) argues that the 
recent protest movements such as Occupy and the Arab Spring “were co-designed, 
launched, spread and remixed by crowd-powered teams of nerds” contrary to their 
“global media representations” as “spontaneous explosions of youthful outrage.” Some 
of techpol nerds are also described in Postill’s (2014) works as “freedom fighters” or 
“freedom technologists” as they are closely involved with the issues of democracy, 
human rights and freedoms across the globe possessing necessary technological and 
political skills.  
Karpf (2016) highlights a specific aspect of digitally-enabled activism that emphasizes 
feedback and listening to followers. The listening practices help to understand how to 
act more efficiently and adjust according to followers’ demands and expectations. “The 
capacity of civil organizations to more effectively listen” is one of the most crucial 
affordances associated with digital technologies, argues Karpf (2016, p. 1). The 
listening capacity includes recording and analysing data related to the audience of large 
advocacy organisations, as well as looking for the best ways to approach it online 
through testing. Karpf describes such listening practices as “analytic activism.” For 
instance, analytic activism allows for “narrow, precise targeting of the public” based on 
data analysis (Karpf, 2016, p. 159). At the same time, analytic activism seems to be 
rather expensive practices that are open primarily to well-financed civic organisations as 
activists need to have capacity, knowledge and resources to be able to use analytical 
instruments such as big data solutions.  
The theory of analytic activism demonstrates how the affordances of technologies 
enable gathering feedback and the proliferation of marketing strategies. An organisation 
that acts in the hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013) can use platforms to collect large 
quantities of data about social processes and to process this data in order to improve 
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organisational performance and to receive an advantage. However, the theory does not 
explain whether these styles of activism develop primarily from the actual need of 
organisations to use marketing and to listen to their followers or simply because some 
of activists possess necessary skills and capacity to analyse the data and then to use this 
analysis to build a marketing-like campaign. In addition, citizens of mature democracies 
are increasingly resistant to the professional of marketing techniques in parties’ 
communication (Bennett et al., 2017, p. 1658). Therefore, analytic activism can be at 
odds with the values of an organisation’s followers. 
What unites the concepts of nerd, analytic and information activism, as well as other 
similar frameworks, is that the types of activism cut across political ideology in non-
traditional ways. Similarly, the concept of anti-authoritarian movement identifies protest 
organisations that emphasise “participation, institutional distrust, horizontalism, ad hoc 
organisations eschewing formal ones” (Tufekci, 2017, p. 83). These movements are 
associated with distrust of authority and desire for participation (Tufekci, 2017, p. xiv). 
Tufekci’s examples of anti-authoritarian movements include the Gezi Park protests in 
Turkey, Occupy Wall Street protest in the US and the Egyptian revolution of 2011. 
Chrona & Bee (2017) highlight that anti-authoritarian movements are associated with 
pro-democracy protests in “neo-capitalist world such as the ones in the Arab states, 
Russia, Hong kong and Ukraine.” Rinke & Röder’s (2011, p. 1275) conceptualisation of 
anti-authoritarian movement includes “the anti-authoritarian challenge of power” and 
desire to contribute to regime change. Though these authors use the concept of anti-
authoritarian movement to build their argument, they mostly focus on these movements’ 
narratives and goals, but none of them seems to explain what makes anti-authoritarian 
movements different from traditional SMOs in terms of organising and leadership. 
The frameworks of cloud, information, analytic and nerd activists/freedom fighters are 
recent conceptualisations of the growing phenomenon of largely non-institutional digital 
politics. This domain of politics grew with the post-2008 protests and uprisings. The 
redefined concept of anti-authoritarian movement emphasises the pro-democracy 
element in the recent uprisings and large-scale protests. These frameworks highlight 
different aspects of digital activism including skills, practices and the role of platform 
affordances. They allow broadening the definition of political action and participation in 
the analysis of digitally-enabled political organisation.  
 
41 
2.2.5 Leadership 
The key aspect of political organisation is leadership (Gerbaudo, 2017c; Poell et al., 
2016; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). There are two dominant strands of research in relation to 
leadership in a protest-oriented organisation that uses technologies. First, many studies 
in the tradition of SMOs argue that protest-oriented organisations require traditional 
charismatic leadership that should control almost every process within the organisation. 
Second, theories like connective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) argue that the 
crowd drives contemporary protest-oriented organisations through self-motivated online 
sharing and traditional leadership loses its significance.  
The first school of thought is also affected by the intention of many digitally-enabled 
political organisations to build more leaderless and decentralised structures (Gerbaudo, 
2017c, p. 186). These were the intentions of such recently prominent protest 
organisations as the Occupy Movement or the Global Justice Movement (Kavada, 2014, 
pp. 7–8). Prior to Occupy, other social movements also tried to adhere to more 
horizontal and self-organised structures. Gerbaudo (2017c, p. 186) associates this quest 
for inclusiveness, decentralisation and transparency with the prominence of post-1968 
anti-authoritarian positions and techno-utopian cultures of many movements. Gerlach 
(1971) argues that organisations without single recognisable leaders can evade 
suppression by the authorities more easily. The intentions to build more decentralised 
and possibly leaderless structures can also allow an organisation to be more inclusive 
and listen to their members/followers better. 
Some authors emphasise that the affordances of digital platforms seem to be quite 
supportive of leaderless and horizontal social structures that many contemporary 
movements wish to establish. For example, Chadwick (2013, p. 44) assumes “the 
horizontal nature of social media communication” when explaining his theory of hybrid 
media systems. Discussions, open walls and online polling are examples of platform 
affordances that facilitate a more horizontal and networked style of organising when it 
comes to large-scale advocacy (Chadwick, 2013; Kavada, 2014). These affordances, if 
combined with the ongoing personalisation of politics, emphasise the leaderless 
character of many contemporary social movements (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; 
Castells, 2013).  
Other authors view leaderless as a rhetorical construction: a self-description and a goal 
of many digitally-enabled organisations rather than a reality (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; 
Poell et al., 2016). These organisations might promote such self-description to 
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“transcend traditional political alignments” to avoid the emergence of “celebrity 
leaders” or to avoid repression in non-democratic environments (Poell et al., 2016, p. 
1009). The opposite is also possible: journalists sometimes cannot “resist the 
opportunity to pinpoint a ‘mastermind’ or ‘leader’” (Coleman, 2014, p. 155) of a group 
despite an activists’ declaration that they have no leaders.  
In a similar fashion, some authors view horizontality as “a fallacy” (Levi, 2012 as cited 
in Postill, 2018) or “a fetish” (Hickel, 2012) that is only possible during the “square 
phase” of social movements (Postill, 2018). During that phase, movements turn urban 
squares into sites of deliberation and decision-making (Gerbaudo, 2017b). The post-
square phase of the movement would require scaling this horizontal decision-making up 
to millions of people who might not share the same values of the core activists who 
started the movement (Postill, 2018).  
If a protest community has no leaders, its square phase can suffer. For example, 
leaderless communities often struggle to select representatives for talks with the 
authorities or to consult bigger assemblies (Tufekci, 2014, p. 13). This disadvantage 
undermines the capacity of protest organisation. This capacity is defined in terms of the 
organisation’s ability to pose a threat to authoritarian elites. That is what happened by 
the end of the Gezi protests in Turkey in 2013 (Tufekci, 2014, p. 15). A similar situation 
was observed during the Euromaidan protest in Ukraine in 2013-14, which went on for 
five months without recognised leaders (Bohdanova, 2014, p. 140). It seems like many 
organisations that adhere to leaderless and non-hierarchical coordination principles 
might lack the capacity to struggle for political power. 
Many scholars agree that, despite the idealism about horizontality, informal hierarchies 
are persistent across all kinds of organisations that adhere to horizontal principles but 
use social media as communication channels (Gerbaudo, 2017c; Kavada, 2012; Poell & 
van Dijck, 2016). Poell & van Dijck (2016, p. 230) suggest that digital media “do not, 
as is often assumed, facilitate horizontal activist networks.” Rather, these media 
enhance the visibility of particular actors like as a spokesperson of a protest community. 
Indeed, the design of digital platforms like Twitter or Facebook, which are popular with 
these organisations, might clash with the intention of activists to build a more inclusive 
and leaderless movement (Kavada, 2015, p. 884). It is because somebody should write 
online using the name of the group, talk to the media, and, eventually, become 
recognised as part of the image of a movement.  
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For instance, Kavada (2012) examines how the technological architecture of platforms 
reorganises the bonding of members of an international advocacy organisation Avaaz 
and its control over own public image. All technological features, even the least 
noticeable ones, play their role in this process. For instance, Facebook’s Timeline page 
make the voice of page creators more visible and dominant compared to the voice of 
ordinary supporters of the organisation. Because a page creator dominates over the 
online representation and the discussion between supporters and members of the 
organisation, they can also maintain control over the organisations’ image (Kavada, 
2012). Thus, it is quite difficult to avoid the emergence of a potential leader if a 
movement relies heavily on digital platforms.  
Poell et al. (2016) define people who replace traditional SMO leadership as “marketing” 
or “connective leaders.” These leaders often play the roles of platform administrators 
and employ “sophisticated marketing strategies to connect users in online 
communication streams and networks” (Poell et al., 2016, p. 994). These strategies help 
marketing activists to drive their campaigns and to unite their followers using carefully 
crafted frames and messages. Gerbaudo (2017) describes the leaders of organisations 
that rely on platforms heavily as “digital vanguard.” Their leadership is informal but 
still struggles with emerging power relations associated with their invisible but 
influential administrators’ position. Finally, some political organisations like the Five 
Star Movement in Italy try to bring elements of participatory decision-making but 
remain non-transparent as to the process of internal organising. This opaqueness raises 
doubts about the actual goals of such organisations (Politi & Roberts, 2017) and could 
be viewed as an example of “phony participation” culture (Postill, 2018). 
These and other attempts to conceptualise the role of leadership in digitally-enabled 
community (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; Milan, 2015b; Treré, 2015) are unresolved in 
relation to wider perspectives. In particular, these conceptualisations rarely examine the 
post-Arab Spring non-democratic contexts where the issue of leadership might be 
perceived through different lenses. The organisation of communication and leadership 
on the platforms beyond Twitter and Facebook remains underexplored as well (Hall et 
al., 2018). What unites different approaches to leadership is an understanding that the 
traditional perspective on social movements does not explain the nature of coordination 
in a digitally-enabled organisation sufficiently. 
In authoritarian countries, the position of a political leader can be the least secure when 
an organisation is confronted with the repressive machine. Silitski (2005) describes the 
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strategy of the authoritarian rule in Belarus as a preemptive policy designed to prevent 
the spread of protest activities through society. One of the pivotal aims of this policy is 
to remove all democratic opposition political leaders from the political arena. Leaders 
who are removed include those who do not pose a serious challenge. For example, in 
1999, “some of the opposition leaders who were considered potential contenders for the 
Belarusian September 2001 presidential contest either died or disappeared” (Silitski, 
2005, p. 88). The fate of some of these people is unknown. Their disappearance still 
shapes politics in Belarus and seems to prompt would-be political leaders to have 
reservations about security. Consequently, Silitski conceptualises the regime in Belarus 
as preemptive authoritarianism. Gel’man (2015b) argues that a preemptive policy is a 
common feature of post-Soviet repressive systems including the Russian. Thus, both 
Russia and Belarus can be conceptualised as preemptive authoritarianism where civic 
and political leaders are targeted first by the authorities. 
An organisation that acts in a repressive environment can develop a pool of leaders, the 
SPIN theory argues. This multiplicity of leadership emerges through the process of 
segmentation within a movement. Gerlach (2001) defines this process as polycentricity 
of SMO. Many leaders emerge when the members of various segments of a movement 
develop personal or social cleavages and ideological differences. They also can be 
engaged in personal competition, or they might simply not know about the existence of 
other groups that nonetheless can be described as part of a larger movement. Moreover, 
a leader can emerge through a crisis when ad hoc solutions are needed (Gerlach & Hine, 
1970, pp. 41–55). According to the SPIN model, if an organisation is polycentric, it can 
create a pool of potential leaders in case the current ones are eliminated. “For every 
group or leader eliminated, new ones arise, making movements look like the many-
headed Hydra of mythology” (Gerlach, 2001, p. 303). Consequently, the processes of 
multiplication of leaders and segmentation are the “best insurance against effective 
suppression” for an organisation (Gerlach & Hine, 1970, p. 69).  
A helpful element of the SPIN model is its understanding of movement organisation as 
a network. SPIN organisation has many leaders who should manage diverse segments of 
the network. New segments are formed “from the splitting of an old segment, from 
proliferation by the gathering of new members under new leaders and from 
combinations” of these processes (Gerlach & Hine, 1970, p. 42). New segments remain 
connected to each other. Their connections or linkages are based on the personal 
relationship between segment leaders, as well as on wider associations or extra-group 
45 
linkages. Linkages allow a network of segments with various leaders to be described as 
a movement or an integrated network rather than a leaderless amorphous collective. 
Gerlach & Hine (1970, p. 38) also argue that leadership in this type of a decentralised 
organisation is “based on personal charisma rather than on the fulfilment of bureaucratic 
training requirements and progression up through ranked positions”. This type of 
charisma diffuses through the organisational segments. Gerlach & Hine (1970, p. 39) 
call this type of political leaders’ charisma “communicable” because it can be conveyed 
from a “charismatist” to another person. The communication inspires that other person 
to work on their own initiative. It also ensures that charisma – an important quality for 
successful leadership in many situations – can be “distributed” across multiple leaders 
of an organisation. 
The reviewed theories suggest that digitally-enabled organisations should come to terms 
with the fact that one or many people will eventually become an official or unofficial 
spokesperson for a group. In other words, whatever the attitude toward leadership is, 
organisations that rely on platforms will probably have multiple centres of influence. 
2.2.6 Collective and connective action 
Protest is a key manifestation of political action. Protest action is considered to be part 
of a large “repertoire of contestation” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). The processes of 
mediatisation of politics and platformisation of political communication have triggered 
a discussion about the nature of digitally-mediated protest as a type of collective action. 
Bennett & Segerberg’s (2013, p. 59) theory of connective action suggests that, in the 
digital era, protest organisation acts more like a facilitator of political action than 
anything else. According to this theory, the logic of connective action is adopted by new 
types of SMOs that learned how to provide “easily personalised action frames as a basis 
for technology-assisted networking” (Bennett & Segerberg 2013, p. 2) and to facilitate 
“crowd-enabled networks” (Bennett et al., 2014).  
For example, Bennett & Segerberg analyse two types of organisations that were active 
as protest communities during the G20 summit in London in 2009. They found that one 
of them – a coalition of more traditional types of rather radical organisations – was 
based on sharp ideologies and conducted old style “organization-driven” collective 
action. At the same time, another coalition of organisations used communicative 
mechanisms that allowed personal narratives of participants to become more visible 
during the protests. Simultaneously, interactions between the participants of the second 
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coalition became easier online. In the end, the coalition of various NGOs mobilised a 
greater number of participants and was covered by media more positively. Therefore, 
some protest communities that are digitally enabled allow participants to express their 
concerns directly and to self-organise in connective action using digital platforms.  
The connective action theory is criticised from several positions. First, many debates 
take place around the idea of personalised action frames. The critics discuss a variety of 
issues from the real extent of this personalisation processes to the valence of this 
phenomenon (Fuchs, 2014a; Tarrow, 2014). Second, the concept of connective action 
still does not explain all possible dynamics around the construction of the contentious 
organisation. For instance, the identity construction process is not clarified by the 
studies of Bennett & Segerberg. In addition, there is a more general criticism of scholars 
who argue that Bennett & Segerberg neglect how social movements are facing the 
powerful and sometimes repressive structures like police or media corporations (Fuchs, 
2014a) thus overlooking the “politics of platforms” (Milan, 2015b, p. 2). This criticism 
suggests that the framework of connective action does not fit easily with the traditional 
views on social movements and organisations (Karpf, 2014, p. 261).  
Kavada (2018) suggests that the contradictions pointed out by the critics of the 
connective action framework might be associated with the different understandings of 
the object of enquiry by social movement scholars. While Bennett & Segerberg (2013) 
study “the online crowds constituted on social media platforms, other researchers focus 
on core activists and their” strategies (Kavada, 2018, p. 109). Despite this 
misunderstanding, the connective action framework extends the knowledge about core 
activist as well. In particular, this framework demonstrates how different patterns of 
public communication of digital activists can be identified and compared. Thus, the 
analysis of the technological affordances and features used by an organisation can help 
to advance the understanding of the organisational capacity and digital engagement of 
different types of communities.  
Scholars who criticise the connective action framework often view digital platforms as 
the space for building the collective rather than space where personalised narratives 
flourish (e.g. Gerbaudo, 2014; Kavada, 2015). This view brings attention to the issues 
of group’s representation and interaction. First, the representational dimension of 
platforms reflects common agendas and identities of an activist group through various 
forms of content like text, images, video. For instance, pages of civic campaigns may 
reflect organisational culture, identity and values as a public display of campaign’s 
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connections with its supporters, critics and other organisations (Kavada, 2012). Thus, 
the representational dimension of platforms helps to study an activist group’s 
organisational representation. It also allows tracing how groups get organised and 
mobilised online as well as how different groups interact with each other (Bennett et al., 
2014). Second, the dimension of inner interactions allows exploring an organising 
process through the study of communication in an organisation. 
Social movement scholars also discuss the changing nature of collective action in 
relation to is the public perception of many pro-democracy anti-authoritarian 
movements as “spontaneous eruptions” of anger, indignation and other emotions 
(Postill, 2018, p. 121). Such perception was observed for the cases of, for example, the 
15M movement or Taiwan’s Sunflower movement. Studying recent digitally-enabled 
protest movements in Spain such as 15M, Flesher Fominaya (2015, p. 143) argues that 
“spontaneity” is a common frame “strategically deployed by social movement actors 
and help present grievances and claims as the popular will of the people.” Postill (2018, 
p. 121-123) argues that many pro-democracy movements across the globe were framed 
by the media in a similar fashion, especially during their early stages. However, the 
analysis of “the period of latency” (Flesher Fominaya, 2015) of a movement often 
demonstrates that “most new protest movements” are “carefully conceived, organised” 
(Postill, 2018, p. 121). A large-scale movement might be “unexpected” for external 
observers. Nevertheless, these movements are rarely spontaneous.  
The frames of spontaneity may emerge as a consequence of the “gulf in understanding” 
(Postill, 2018, p. 123) of collective action in the digital age. Most members of the press 
and the general public often see a protest as an inexplicable and spontaneous event that 
peaks, declines and dies out. By contrast, from a core activist perspective, a protest 
might be a carefully choreographed public performance of outrage (Gerbaudo, 2012). 
These are two different visions derived from the outsider and insider perspectives.  
The “spontaneity” frame can also be a result of strategic framing by activists (Postill, 
2018, p. 123). For example, one of the core activists of the Tunisian pro-democracy 
movement in 2011, Ali Bouazizi, added two “fictive elements” (Postill, 2018, p. 43) to 
his narratives of the episode that later triggered further events associated with the 
movement. He turned a school dropout victim into a university graduate. He also 
claimed a female police officer slapped him, which did not happen. Both fictive 
elements allowed Ali to bridge the protest frames for all Tunisians and mediatise the 
protest (Postill, 2018, p. 43).  
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Other examples of a narrative that can be strategically deployed (Flesher Fominaya, 
2015) by the spokespeople for a movement include the “people’s” or “ordinary citizens” 
movement narratives (Poell et al., 2016). These narratives discuss the organisation of a 
movement. Poell et al. (2016) suggest that the movement that deploys such narratives 
can be led by professionals such as connective leaders who employ marketing strategies 
to build organisations and mobilise followers. The narratives allow political activists to 
appeal to their followers. In addition, one can synthesise the theory of “ordinary 
citizens” and “spontaneous” narratives deployment with the representation of SPIN 
organisation as leaderless. This synthesis allows hypothesising that both frames can be 
employed in the organisations under pressure to avoid a certain level of publicity of 
their organising structures.  
2.3 Digital platforms as technological, commercial, social and cultural 
phenomena 
2.3.1 Digital technologies and pro-democracy change 
The project focuses on the countries where many critical citizens demand 
democratisation of political and media systems. Broadly, this refers to the transition of 
the political system to a more democratic one. The proliferation of digital media 
technologies and notable regime changes in the early 2010s reinforced the assumption 
that pro-democracy social and political change can be driven by emerging digital 
technologies (Postill, 2018, p. 11). 
To illustrate this assumption, I start with an overview of an early discussion about the 
role of digital media in democratisation. The earlier discussion about the democratic 
potential of digital media was launched by popular accounts in mostly non-academic 
literature (Treré & Mattoni, 2016) and later was much criticised for being deterministic 
(Fuchs, 2014, p. 202) and overly emotional (Tarrow, 2014, p. 468). In particular, many 
of the early accounts of the relationship between technologies and political actors were 
mostly concerned with the positive or negative roles of the internet in democratisation 
(Karpf, 2016). Authors like Diamond (2010) or Shirky (2009) approached the debates 
with the hope that new technologies would make a difference to any society, offering a 
more democratic and open place for discussion and deliberation. They also argued that 
with the dissemination of internet technologies, individuals and grassroots activists 
received powerful tools to influence the decision-making process and to resist 
suppression from the authorities in a non-democratic political system. Thus, many 
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commentators discussed technologies like social media as a “liberation technology” that 
would help spread democracy (Diamond, 2010). 
Other popular accounts (Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 2011a) dismissed many predicted 
democratic virtues of the internet and claimed that these virtues do not allow real 
engagement and participation in politics. For example, in his widely cited New Yorker 
magazine article, Gladwell (2010) claimed that actions facilitated by platforms such as 
Facebook could never engender the relationships that characterised the American social 
movements of the 1960s.  
The critics of these popular accounts of the role of the internet pointed out that they 
were deterministic and based on “a mixture of individual anecdotes and economic 
theory, rather than empirical evidence or research” (Margetts et al., 2016, p. 27). 
Meanwhile, the political implications of technologies have been studied long before the 
internet became a noticeable factor of political life in non-democracies. For example, 
MacKenzie and Wajcman (1999) showed that technologies operate, and are operated 
upon, in a complex social field. This and similar earlier studies have already dismissed 
the determinism of the idea that technologies directly generate social consequences.  
Debates about the role of digital media in fostering political change intensified in the 
wake of a series of popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East in 2010 and 
2011. These uprisings became labelled as the Arab Spring. Many authors positioned the 
usage of Twitter and Facebook during the Arab Spring in the centre of the discussion 
about those events. In particular, scholars have been discussing the role, the prominence 
and the implications of social media usage during these and similar protests (Filer & 
Fredheim, 2016, p. 5).  
Various authors point out several analytical fallacies of the debate, which could lead to 
wrong perceptions of the role of technologies and media in the political process. First, 
the early debate on the Arab Spring and similar protests in authoritarian countries were 
abstracted from political and technological contexts (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, p. 93). 
In particular, it was worth paying more attention to various kinds of actors who used 
technologies like activists, authorities, NGOs, foreign countries and companies (Bennett 
& Segerberg, 2013). Many studies of the political use of the internet, unfortunately, 
lacked such contextual features as the discussion of the traditions of activism and social 
movements.  
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Second, earlier accounts of technologically-driven political engagement often lacked a 
deeper understanding of the relationships between digital media and society (Mansell et 
al., 2007, p. 363). The link between the two can be found, for example, in theories of 
social movements. In particular, social movement studies suggest that digital activists 
should develop their cause around inherited cultural understandings to inspire people to 
collective action (Tarrow, 2011, p. 32). Moreover, these understandings are framed by 
the media that transmit the messages of activists and other actors like the government. 
Hence, the media engage in a complicated cultural framing processes that help or 
constrain activists. 
Another side of the relationship between digital media and society were extensively 
studied later from the critical digital media studies perspective. Fuchs (2014, p. 202), 
one of the most influential authors in critical digital media studies, suggests that society 
is shaped by but also shapes technologies. These relations can be observed on social 
media platforms, especially if platforms are used for political purposes. Milan (2015a) 
demonstrates how communicative actions have shaped the usage of social media by the 
Occupy movement activists in western democracies. At the same time, the activists’ 
actions were shaped by technologies as well, which demonstrates that technologies 
reflect the political and cultural dynamics of social life. This approach reflects 
MacKenzie & Wajcman’s (1999) argument that technologies do not directly generate 
social consequence. Thus, claiming that media technologies almost exclusively shape 
society – that some earlier commentators of the Arab Spring did – leads to technological 
determinism.  
Third, some authors did not ask important questions on digital politics. For example, 
Karpf (2016, p. 2) argues that the question about the good or bad qualities of new 
technologies in communication “was fundamentally wrong.” Rather, those inquiries are 
valuable that discuss, for instance, what strategies and tactics technologies afford 
activists to use. The strategies and tactics discussion allows us to assess the power of 
digital technologies in the political world. This is the power that governments are also 
keen to share. As Gunitsky (2015) noted, some earlier discussion about the role of 
digital media in politics did not pay sufficient attention to the abilities of a government 
to watch, censor and control online content. Therefore, many commentators on 
technological affordances did not have an answer to the question of what to do with the 
disruptive attempts of a government to prevent citizens’ initiatives for democratisation.   
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All in all, various episodes of the protests of 2010-2011 brought the discussion about 
the implications of the internet for democratisation to a new level. However, earlier 
accounts like those of Shirky (2009) or Diamond (2010) that preceded or immediately 
followed those protests look too simplistic now (Gunitsky, 2015). One of the most 
prominent questions in those days - “Will the revolution be tweeted?” - already seemed 
“ephemeral” in a few years after the events (Bennett & Segerberg 2013, p. 113).  
Fortunately, more nuanced debate and discussion dominate the literature on the political 
role of technologies these days. In recent years, the literature increasingly focuses on 
digital activists and their strategies, repertoires and practices (Shea et al., 2015). The 
scholarship and broader public seem to agree with the idea that not only does the 
internet influence society, but also society, powerful actors or individuals influence the 
internet in various contexts (Oates 2013). For instance, research has demonstrated the 
importance of norms and cultures of communication in determining the use of digital 
media. In addition, more recent episodes of the use of digital media and the internet 
have emerged such as 15-M movement in Spain (Flesher Fominaya, 2015) or the 
Euromaidan in Ukraine (Lokot, 2016). A variety of these episodes and the proliferation 
of digital media attracts growing attention from scholars.  
At the same time, it seems that the research that is concerned with how technologies 
facilitate pro-democracy changes requires a dialogue between social movement, digital 
politics and platform studies literatures. In particular, the phenomenon that I term as 
authoritarian digital politics is strewn across numerous literatures and hampered by the 
lack of a common conceptual language. To overcome this limitation, more attention 
should be paid to how politics and media work together. 
2.3.2 Digital platforms and their affordances and components 
2.3.2.1 Platform infrastructures 
Analysing the role of digital platforms in western societies, van Dijck and Poell (2015, 
p. 1) propose the framework of the “platform society.” The “platform society” is the 
global “ecosystem” infrastructure of all kinds of platforms whose interdependencies are 
structured by a common set of mechanisms. Platforms have become so prominent that 
scholars like Helmond (2015, p. 1) started using the term “platformisation” of the 
internet. Helmond (2015) suggests that the rise of the idea of the platform as the 
dominant infrastructural and economic model of the social web has its own logic. The 
logic of platformisation ensures the economic expansion of platform corporations such 
as Facebook and Google. It also leads to the “decentralisation of platform features” 
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around the internet (Helmond, 2015, p. 8). In other words, features such as the “like” 
button or the Timeline spread on other sites and apps, connecting them to the leading 
social platforms. The features of platforms become an integral part of social interactions 
on the internet.  
Platforms can be combined in various configurations. The most obvious configuration is 
the global infrastructure of platforms discussed by Helmond (2015) and Dijck et al. 
(2018). Platforms may also constitute specific communicative spheres (Khazraee and 
Losey, 2016) and create distinctive ecologies (Treré & Mattoni, 2016) that can be 
“inhabited” and directed by political actors. Studying how different platforms operate in 
combination can help to analyse political campaign dynamics and the ways each 
platform shapes activist communication. According to Poell (2014), this 
“infrastructural” approach can yield more accurate results in contrast to inquiries that 
focus on a specific platform and then trying to extrapolate observations about the whole 
infrastructure. 
Political actors can form their own digital media infrastructures or ecologies by creating 
and linking, for example, Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, websites, meme galleries 
and web TV services (Treré & Mattoni, 2016, p. 302). Rinke & Röder (2011) include 
three elements in their concepts of the media ecology of the Arab Spring protests: social 
media, transnational TV channels and emails. Treré & Mattoni (2016) discuss the 15M 
movement in Spain to demonstrate that its digital media ecology included elements such 
as email lists, messenger platforms, video and audio streaming platforms, social media 
and websites. The variety of media infrastructure configurations emphasises the 
“environmental role of media” (Cammaerts et al., 2013, p. 3) in relation to society and 
the political system. Thus, a communication infrastructure of digital activists can be 
defined as the combination of public and private communication spaces used by 
activists. 
Platform studies normally examine social media from two perspectives. On the one 
hand, platforms might be defined as emerging technological systems that are largely 
created to support the commercial logic of social media corporations. On the other hand, 
platforms are the sites of interactions where user actions take place. These perspectives 
produce various classifications of platform dynamics. Warfield et al. (2016, p. 2) 
highlight social and media components of this dynamics. The social component is 
normally focused on people, interactions and the ethnography of these interactions. The 
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media component is concerned with algorithms, surveillance and the relations between 
producers, distributors, contributors, designers and owners.  
Another typology is proposed by van Dijck & Poell (2015). They define the social 
component as “socio-cultural” and the media component as “techno-commercial” 
phenomenon of digital platforms. In her research focused on digital activism, Milan 
(2015b) highlights several dimensions that influence digitally-enabled activism. In 
particular, she argues that platforms change organisational patterns and opportunity 
structures of activist organisation. In this dissertation, I adapt van Dijck and Poell’s 
approach and discuss four dimensions of digital platforms: technological, commercial, 
cultural and social. 
2.3.2.2 Affordances of digital platforms and their technological components 
Platformisation alters political organisation, engagement and campaigning. Observers 
still get amazed by how, for example, groups of a few students might be able to perform 
a job of a whole traditional newsroom when gathering and distributing information by 
means of Twitter about large political campaigns and movements like the Gezi protests 
in Turkey (Tufekci, 2014, p. 11). Larger organisations also benefit from platforms and 
digital media. Studies of digital engagement emphasise three characteristics of the 
presence of internet technologies in activism: the internet allows activists to facilitate 
and coordinate their movement at a lower cost, doing it more quickly and at a larger 
scale (Earl & Kimport, 2011). The literature often calls these characteristics the main 
affordances of the internet. Furthermore, scholars repeatedly expand the list of 
affordances with new advantages like the access to a vast amount of open data or a 
possibility of the decentralisation of information and organisational hierarchies.  
Research in the use of digital platforms during large-scale protests demonstrates how 
their affordance shape organisational processes in social movements. For example, 
Lokot’s (2016) study of the Euromaidan protest in Ukraine demonstrates that the 
affordances of digital technologies expand opportunities for co-presence and witnessing 
of collective action, connect existing participants in new ways, as well as contribute to 
the emergence of “connected networks of individuals [that] could further develop into 
an active, sustainable civil society” (p. 299). These effects of digital affordances form 
the core of the concept of augmented dissent (Lokot, 2016, p.  290). This concept 
suggests that platforms and networks of protest participants are just the extension of the 
physical space where the real action takes place. In other words, digital platforms 
cannot be examined separately from the physical location of protest events.  
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Indeed, the coordination of political campaigning and mass protests became easier and 
quicker than it used to be, but platformisation also brings its challenges. For instance, 
the policy of platforms encourages users to reveal their real names when registering on a 
social media platform. The visibility mechanisms display those names to the outsiders 
to reflect a communicative act such as pressing the Like button on Facebook or VK, a 
Facebook-like Russian platform. These visibility affordances of digital media allow the 
police in an authoritarian state to monitor platforms and identify those users who 
express a critical political opinion (Lonkila, 2017, p. 122). Thus, visibility affordances 
help the authorities to surveil political opponents. Some other affordances related to 
surveillance and censorship are reviewed in the next section. These challenges of 
platformisation bring forward the idea that affordances could have both positive and 
negative consequences for digital activism. 
Another example from recent political events demonstrates how platform affordances 
are used to disturb political debates and to spread propaganda. In recent years, digital 
platforms became exposed to entities that only seem to be humans but have more 
similarities with technological user agents. These agents are also known as bots. They 
maintain profiles like humans and use platforms similarly to distribute information 
directed by a bot owner via posts and comments (Turovskij, 2014). The literature agrees 
that bots can be potentially influential, but to study them and understand their impact is 
“phenomenally difficult” (Karpf, 2017). Karpf (2017) expresses a popular among the 
scholars of digital politics opinion that the effect of propaganda that uses trolls are bots 
might be much less extensive than the numbers suggest. 
Nevertheless, some studies provide evidence to demonstrate the impact of such 
disruptive instruments as bots. In particular, the evidence suggests that the political use 
of bots was more prominent in non-democratic countries before their use spread in 
democracies (Filer & Fredheim, 2016; Sanovich, 2018). For instance, automated 
content spread by bots polluted the online space in Russia, argue Filer & Fredheim 
(2016, p. 10). This automated pollution reduces the utility of social platforms for 
activists and ordinary citizens, they claim. Already before 2012, the efforts of human 
bloggers have become substituted by automatic bots in Russian-speaking countries. For 
example, during the 2011-12 “For Fair Elections” protests, the use of Twitter became 
quite difficult for opposition activists. Whenever an activist made prominent use of a 
particular hashtag, spam bots would immediately swamp it (Paulsen & Zvereva, 2014). 
In line with this observation Filer & Fredheim (2016, p. 1) conclude that social media 
platforms likely do not fulfil any political function across national context. Rather, the 
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online space might be dominated by the pre-existing relationships between the state and 
offline domestic media. According to this theory, the existing status quo in traditional 
media just migrates to and pollutes the internet with pro-government propaganda, once 
again restricting the space for free speech. 
2.3.2.3 Commercial, social and cultural components 
Within the study of communication and media theory, much attention is traditionally 
dedicated to the issues of ownership, commercial control and similar topics of the 
economy. These issues are often studied through the lenses of a political economy 
approach. Authors who study digital platforms in the tradition of political economy 
regard them as the illustration of the power relationships between individual consumers 
and institutions that produce technologies or content (van Dijck, 2013b, p. 27). For 
example, the propaganda model of Herman and Chomsky (2008) describes how a small 
number of profit-oriented media companies have come to dominate the global media 
production. It demonstrates how media become controlled by non-media commercial 
entities and governments.  
Commercial control on digital platforms is implemented through platform algorithms 
and their design. The algorithms and the design shape the meaning production and 
social interactions on platforms (Milan, 2015a; van Dijck, 2013a). In addition, the 
technological infrastructure of platforms allows social media page owners to curate their 
content on platforms through settings, policies and the general logic of platformisation 
(Heyman & Pierson, 2015; Milan, 2015b; Schwartz, 2015). Commercial logic normally 
directs all these control processes.  
It seems that total commercial control over the most important platforms has spread all 
around the world. At the same time, as Poell and van Dijck (2016, p. 232) suggest, 
social media platforms became so important to civic activists that they need to pass 
through those commercial platforms sooner or later. “That is the reality today’s citizens 
and activists have to live with” (Poell and van Dijck, 2016, p. 232). Thus, instead of 
criticising commercial platforms, Poell and van Dijck suggest shifting the critical 
discussion to other issues like technological and commercial mechanisms that shape 
these processes. At the same time, we need to stay critical about attempts of big 
companies to claim the label “public” or “independent” when referring to technological 
and commercial spaces they construct online. In other words, the critical analysis of 
digital platform companies and their policies also should also propose solutions to those 
issues. 
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The social science perspective on technologies views digital platforms as “producers of 
sociality.” This perspective allows investigating how platforms enable social 
connections and allow personal narratives to be performed as much as they are 
performed through face-to-face interactions (Milan, 2015b, p. 1). Therefore, platform 
content is one of the keys to studying digital representation and interaction. Content 
posted on and transmitted through platforms is part of the social and cultural 
infrastructure of platforms (van Dijck, 2013b). Hence, studying content helps to 
examine the social consequences of digital media usage.  
The use of features like Timeline to post content often becomes crucial for political 
engagement. Alaimo (2015) analyses the content of the Facebook Arabic Page “We are 
all Khaled Said” that was prominent during the Egyptian revolution in 2011. He 
evaluated the postings by the page owner and found that the content of the page 
consisted of sophisticated, coherent and substantive posts (p. 5). The posts were also 
“deeply action-orientated” and were “clearly crafted” to inspire, convince and exhort the 
users who access the page prior to and during the revolutionary period. This political 
content contributed to informing and emotionally supporting the users and was 
associated with the triggering of the further events related to the Egyptian revolution. 
The analysis demonstrated that the content that appeared on the Timeline of potential 
supporters of the pro-democracy changes in Egypt played an important role in the 
political processes.  
Besides content, two other important mechanisms shape interactions on platforms, 
which include visibility and emotional connectivity (Poell & van Dijck, 2016). These 
mechanisms can motivate or even compel many social actors – including activist groups 
and state institutions – to reconsider their representation and positioning in society (van 
Dijck & Poell, 2015, p. 1).  
First, social platforms enhance the visibility of actors and their content making “the 
invisible visible” (Meikle, 2016, p. 94). For example, Twitter “allows for the high 
visibility of a small number of users with many followers” (Duguay, 2016, p. 289). 
These popular users can become a connection point between the political cause and a 
larger audience. At the same time, a political cause like a protest may help ordinary 
users of Twitter to rise to prominence (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013). That is what was 
happening during the Arab Spring protests in Egypt. During these protests, as Gerbaudo 
(2016) argues, that platform visibility mechanisms facilitated the development of new 
hierarchies within the protest movement.  
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The mechanisms of visibility on social platforms shape how people think of their 
communication practices. This means that visibility mechanisms like other affordances 
may play positive as well as negative roles depending on the political context (Margetts 
et al., 2016, p. 152). For instance, during the Arab Spring users who joined the protests 
groups on Facebook at their initial stages were comparatively less secure than those 
who joined later. These first joiners’ names, pictures and other data could become 
associated with the open opposition to the state. Later, when the number of participants 
of the movement grew, more people could join it with a lower risk of persecution 
(Margetts et al., 2016, p. 70). This demonstrated the growing support for the opposition 
to the government in Egypt. Thus, the platform visibility played both a positive and a 
negative role in these events in the circumstances of an authoritarian country. 
Second, Papacharissi (2014) argues that digital platforms become useful instruments for 
persuasion and engagement as they help to disseminate less reasoned but more 
emotional content. She points on “affect” as a catalyser of this engagement and political 
discussion that might follow the dissemination of emotional content. People can feel 
more empowered, Papacharissi suggests, when they can see how their opinion makes a 
difference to others. In that process, affective stories become the inevitable resource of 
initial engagement that make people more engaged and feel connected. Nevertheless, as 
Duguay (2016) argues, digital platforms often reduce users’ expression and 
homogenises it to fun and emotions. This reduction leaves less room for customised 
creativity. Hence, the connection of platform users which is based on emotions – or 
“emotional connectivity” (Poell & van Dijck, 2016, p. 232) – is not always an entirely 
positive consequence of digital media usage. 
Other researchers highlight the rational side of people’s interactions with digital 
platforms rather than their emotional side. Margetts et al.’s (2016) research is an 
example of this approach. Their study is inspired by the pre-internet social movement 
studies and social psychology, which increasingly view people as rational individuals 
(Margetts et al., 2016, p. 25). It highlights the importance of social information in 
individuals’ communication practices. They define social information as real-time 
information provided by platforms that help users to make the calculation and decide 
whether to participate in politics through signing a petition, sharing news, joining a 
group or taking part in offline collective action (p. 12). For instance, the decision to 
participate in a donation campaign or to sign a petition online is associated with what 
updates people see about these actions in real time. Such features like the list of the 
most popular or trending campaigns on a petitions website increase the number of 
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signatures petitions receive (Margetts et al., 2016, p. 98). “Small changes to the 
platform design […] can have unanticipated consequences” leading to the increase or 
decrease in participation numbers (Margetts et al., 2016, p. 76). However, Karpf (2016, 
p. 62) argues that Margetts et al. base their claims on the wrong assumption that 
different platforms have similar affordances. Karpf argues for the differentiation 
between the affordance of, for instance, social petition sites and the affordances of 
Twitter. 
2.3.3 The assumption of platform universality and local platforms 
A relatively small number of inquiries into the political use of social media is concerned 
with more than one platform. Even a smaller number of studies manage to move beyond 
the Western or the Silicon Valley (van Dijck et al., 2018) contexts of platforms like 
Facebook or Instagram into the different platform societies (van Dalen et al., 2015; Filer 
& Fredheim, 2016, p. 3; Meng and Rantanen, 2015). Some of those studies that try to 
engage with non-western contexts still do it through the lenses of western platforms that 
are not necessarily used that extensively. For instance, Spaiser, Chadefaux, Donnay, 
Russmann, & Helbing (2017) focus their analysis of political interactions on Twitter 
during the "For Fair Elections" movement in Russia, a period when “Twitter was not 
that relevant for the Russian Internet users” (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2015, p. 14). By 
the time of the launch of the movement, only 1.6% of Russians used Twitter compared 
to 23% of those who used VK (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015). This type of sampling 
strategies reminds about the observation made by Rantanen (2002) regarding the 
scholarship of media and communication in the 1990s. Then the scholarship was 
“largely based on its false assumption of universality – how media and communication 
operate everywhere in a similar way” (p. 128). Perhaps, the assumption of universality 
is still a relevant characteristic of platform studies. 
Most of the research into digital activism on OK or VK is concerned with collective 
action and the use of the platforms during the mentioned above the “For Fair Elections” 
movement (Greene, 2014; Toepfl, 2017). Beyond this, the Russian culture, digital 
literature and the specifics of online language are the main focuses of the internet 
studies in Russia (Gorham et al., 2014, p. 4). Unfortunately, these locally produced 
studies are less informed by recent developments in international research of 
communication technologies (Gorham et al., 2014, p. 4). They also tend to perceive 
Russian internet (a.k.a. “Runet”) as a “unique” digital object similar to some other 
Russia-related objects of social science inquiry like politics or literature. Such “unique” 
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objects often presented by the scholars of Russia as ones “which cannot be understood 
through the prism of research frameworks developed in other countries” (Gel’man, 
2015a).  
Just like in Russia, some scholars that study the media in China tend to “emphasize the 
so-called Chinese characteristics” (Xinning, 2001, p. 68). In another authoritarian 
country, Iran, some researchers argued that blogs and messaging services formed a 
distinctly Persian communicative sphere over the past decade (Khazraee & Losey, 2016, 
p. 51). By “deprovincializing” (Acharya & Buzan, 2017, p. 361) the studies of locally 
designed platforms and by travelling beyond national or regional contexts, we can 
attempt to overcome this assumption of “uniqueness.”  
Until recently, the researchers that were concerned with issues related to predominantly 
Russian-speaking platforms usually focused on something that they call “the 
blogosphere.” That is the community of bloggers and commentators that are mostly 
concentrated around the Russian-owned blog platform LiveJournal (e.g. Bodrunova & 
Litvinenko, 2016; Gorham, Lunde, & Paulsen, 2014; Koltsova, Koltcov, & Nikolenko, 
2016). LiveJournal played a significant role in the "For Fair Elections" movement 
(Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015), which partly explains this attention to the blogosphere.  
Different arguments explain why LiveJournal became an important platform for the 
Russian-speaking internet. A cultural argument suggests that during the "For Fair 
Elections" movement, texts were more important than video, while professional writers 
and prominent journalists played a noticeable role. Bodrunova and Litvinenko (2015, p. 
18) argue that this was a consequence of the “traditional textocentricism” of the Russian 
culture – the relative importance of long texts that occupy a prominent position in the 
cultural production. Think of the lengths of Tolstoy’s War and Peace, for instance. 
Indeed, the LiveJournal blog space was more convenient for longer texts than any other 
popular platform. By contrast, the argument that follows the architecture-focused 
approach explains the popularity of LiveJournal in Russia with its affordances for 
anonymity (MacLeod, 2009). Indeed, the platform did not require its users to reveal 
their real names, and many popular bloggers who used it became famous under 
pseudonyms. The extensive focus of the researchers on LiveJournal became of more 
peripheral importance after 2013 when the “For Fair elections” protests faded. Popular 
Russian authors, as well as politically active publics, have moved to Facebook, as well 
as VK (Filer & Fredheim, 2016) and, as I show in the analysis, Telegram, leaving 
LiveJournal aside as a less important platform.  
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The popularity of VK is also explained with cultural argument. Some studies suggest 
that VK fits values and expectations of local users in the predominantly Russian-
speaking countries better than the global social media like Facebook or Twitter (Baran 
& Stock, 2015). Another strand of research suggests that in the Russian-speaking 
internet, Facebook rose as the “online communicative milieu for the ‘thinking 
community’” (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2016, p. 120). Bodrunova & Litvinenko (2016) 
point out that the cultural practices of VK usage are different if compared to how people 
use Facebook besides their visual similarity. These differences in how platforms 
enhance cultural norms can be associated with their policy and community standards 
but also with certain worldviews and interests of platform owners (Milan, 2015b, p. 2) 
that they mount in technologies. 
At least up to 2013, local Russian-speaking platforms such as VK and OK contained 
less political content and were less significant space for dissemination of critical 
political information (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015) than global platforms. By contrast, 
Facebook was used extensively by the organisers and the participants of the protests – 
mostly by pro-democracy orientated citizens (Gabowitsch, 2017). The reasons for this 
state of affairs remain unclear (Lonkila, 2017, p. 124). Lonkila (2017, p. 124) explains 
the politicisation of global platforms with the presence of prominent figures of the 
Russian political and cultural life on global rather than local platforms. These prominent 
people are trusted by internet users who lack confidence in formal institutions.  
Audience studies explain the difference between Russian VK and Facebook. They argue 
that VK is simply easier to use than Facebook if a typical internet user from Russia is 
concerned (Baran & Stock, 2015). Gladarev and Lonkila (2012) argue that the design of 
VK seems to be well suited for the established cultural practices of the Russian-
speaking countries. They point out differences in the construction of sociability on those 
two media platforms. Since personal social ties traditionally play an important role in 
post-Soviet societies, it is possible that domestically designed VK plays its socialising 
role better than western-designed Facebook. In other words, one’s Facebook friends and 
one’s VK friends in the Russian-speaking countries are two different types of friends 
(Lonkila, 2011). The platform architecture-focused research suggests that Facebook-
style platforms are independent of norms and values which drive their users. This 
suggestion is based on Dencik and Leistert's (2015, p. 43) study of the algorithms of 
Facebook and similar platforms. Still, both culture-oriented and architecture-focused 
research should be grounded in the context of platform users.  
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Platform studies literature that focuses on Belarus is even scarcer. Few studies are 
concerned with the political use of social media platforms in this country. It would be 
fair to say that almost no research that covered that topic in Belarus was published in 
peer-reviewed journals or books (Chulitskaya, 2017). A few publications that do cover 
the issues related to the political use of digital platforms in Belarus are mostly 
descriptive (e. g. Niadzvietski, 2011). Thus, Belarus remains “largely overlooked and 
little explored” (Miazhevich, 2017) in communication and media scholarship.  
Beyond the issues of political communication and social media, the literature that 
covers political and social processes in Belarus is largely concealed from the 
anglosphere behind a language barrier. Belarus “possesses hidden histories that rarely 
escape into the outside world” suggests Norman Davies (Davies, 2012, p. 239), one of 
few British scholars who studies Belarus. This lack of research into Belarus is, however, 
compensated with a wealth of the policy and analysis reports on the political and social 
issues of this country.  
This little amount of research might be explained by the difficulties of communication 
in the political environment of this country. Just like Russia (Gel’man, 2015a), the 
government of Belarus restricts academic freedoms (The Quality of Higher Education: 
National Endeavours in the European Context, 2017). More than any other discipline, 
the studies of politics suffer from authoritarian restrictions elsewhere in the world 
(Huntington, 1988). At the same time, the issues associated with the use of platforms for 
political purposes are often contentious. Therefore, one can argue that it is relatively 
problematic to study the use of digital media for pro-democracy social and political 
change as a scholar based in Belarus or Russia. Hence, little research into the topic is 
available. 
2.4 Repressive digital politics 
2.4.1 Forms of repressive digital politics  
Groups that compete for power and influence in the political process are interested in 
gaining access to traditional mainstream media. However, in non-democratic countries, 
access to the mainstream media is often highly restricted even for moderate critics of the 
regime. Moreover, traditional media like central news agencies, newspapers or 
television stations often strengthen the regime (Rod & Weidmann, 2015) rather than the 
opposition. Wilson (2005, p. 43), for instance, argues that the authoritarian regimes of 
Eastern Europe stand, among other things, thanks to the culture of information control. 
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This control is mostly pervaded over traditional mainstream media for the regime’s 
benefit. 
In these circumstances, opposition actors can and do turn to the internet platforms that 
allow interacting with a large audience (Lonkila, 2017, p. 122). The use of digital media 
allows the opposition to overcome the control mechanisms imposed on traditional 
media by the government and to introduce fast “peer-to-peer” communication channels 
that facilitate the distribution of information. Indeed, earlier research of non-
democracies suggests that political activists benefit from the penetration of the internet. 
For example, Stein (2016a, p. 936) found that higher levels of internet penetration 
correspond to more mass anti-government actions in authoritarian countries. Thus, the 
internet is often the main public communication channel for anti-authoritarian 
movements. 
After a brief period of uncertainty following the proliferation of digital platforms, 
politicians and governments both in democracies and autocracies started tightening their 
grip on the internet. Many non-democratic regimes like China, Vietnam, Iran, Belarus, 
Uzbekistan, Russia, Cuba and Venezuela eventually learned how to control and to use 
the internet to consolidate their power (Gunitsky, 2015; Rod & Weidmann, 2015; C. 
Walker & Orttung, 2014). Research on that topic argues, for instance, that some 
authoritarian regimes learned how to co-opt social media and how to use technologies to 
harass critical citizens (Gunitsky, 2015; K. E. Pearce, 2015; Stein, 2016b). These 
studies claim that just as technology affords opportunities for those living under 
authoritarianism, it also affords opportunities for those in power. Those opportunities 
rarely come from the 
capacity to engineer technological systems alone. Instead, the state plays a more 
elaborate role in curating competing stakeholders to collaborate and cross-pollinate 
their expertise across sectors. (Liang et al., 2018, p. 3)  
This and other arguments in similar studies into non-democracies are often quite 
pessimistic. Such studies conclude that digital platforms “may increase possibilities for 
the state to control its citizens” (Lonkila, 2017, p. 121) and help to form the system of 
“effective media control” (Walker & Orttung 2014, p. 72) that is built by authoritarian 
governments in order to expand their “claims to legitimacy while undermining potential 
alternatives.” 
Many of these pessimistic conclusions are made based on the study of the governmental 
policies and the processes among the political elites. If a researcher relies too 
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extensively on policy analysis, they risk succumbing to the state-centric approach and to 
view authoritarianism as necessarily a state-level phenomenon (Glasius, 2018). This 
approach dominates the analytical literature on the technologies and media in regimes 
like the Chinese (Stockmann, 2013) or Russian (Walker & Orttung, 2014). A great part 
of the literature on the Russian-speaking media considers actors such as activists, 
journalists and politicians merely as the functions or the objects of the government 
media policy. This makes the representation of those actors similar to black boxes.  
Different factors could explain this “black box” situation. The most obvious are ones 
that refer to methods and data collection: it can be difficult to access the data needed for 
an actor-centric study, especially when it comes to an authoritarian state (Goode & 
Ahram, 2016). Thus, researchers often rely on reports, surveys of questionable 
reliability and policy documents. Hence, they look at the situation on the ground from 
the point of view of the state. As Goode and Ahram (2016) argue, the overreliance on 
the positions and documents produced by the authoritarian governments is harmful to 
research. 
Fortunately, some studies help to reveal deeper mechanisms related to individual 
practices of internet use. They examine the preferences of social media consumption of 
people who join the anti-governmental protests (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2016), how 
ordinary users of social media turn into leaders of digitally-enabled protest movements 
(Poell et al., 2016) or citizens’ strategies and tactics of overcoming the limitations of 
internet use (Gunitsky, 2015; Meng & Rantanen, 2015; K. E. Pearce, 2015).  
Nevertheless, many important research questions remain unanswered. In particular, few 
studies attempt to provide a framework for the systematic analysis of the response of 
authoritarian regimes to online activities and explain why a particular type of restriction 
has been used (Sanovich et al., 2018, p. 4). Digital dissents’ response to online 
restrictions and their strategies and practices in relation to overcoming these restrictions 
remain scarcely researched. Morozov (2011b), Roberts (2014) and Sanovich et al. 
(2018) propose their classification of strategies employed by autocrats to combat online 
opposition. Morozov (2011b) distinguished between technological and socio-political 
responses on digital political activism. Technological responses include Internet-
filtering, while socio-political responses range from employing automated accounts 
such as bots to destroy online communities to physical attacks on outspoken dissidents. 
Roberts (2014) emphasises the differences between the effects of the use of online tools 
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to control digital dissidents. She focuses on censorship (fear to speak or to listen) and 
access restrictions (that are discussed as “friction or flooding” of traffic).  
Based on the analysis of the response by the Russian state, Sanovich et al. (2018) 
propose to distinguish between restrictive measures such as filtering of web-pages and 
the engagements of the state in online activities to shape the formation of opinions. 
Their classification contains three forms of such repressive digital politics - offline 
action, technical restrictions on access to content and online engagement. Offline action 
refers to policy restrictions such as changes in the law, the ownership structure or 
intimidation and persecution. Technical restrictions on access to content include various 
forms of censorship, such as filtering or DDoS attacks. Finally, online engagement 
forms involve creating content to engage with users. 
Sanovich et al.’s (2018) classification of the forms of repressive digital politics seems to 
be the most encompassing for the contexts of countries such as Belarus and Russia. 
However, it can be improved to highlight the user’s point of view on the challenges of 
digital activism. First, it might be not very important for a user whether a restriction 
such as a blocked webpage is the result of offline or online action. For ordinary users, a 
blocked webpage is a form of censorship that does not allow them to access the 
information they require. Thus, the differentiation between “offline” and “online” forms 
may be irrelevant. However, one exception remains. It is based on a monopoly of the 
state on the legitimate use of violence (Ackland, 2013). Persecution such as 
imprisonment can hardly be experienced by a user online. Therefore, I focus on 
persecution as the sole type of the offline form of repressive digital politics.  
Second, Sanovich et al. do not discuss surveillance as one of key forms of digital 
politics in authoritarian states though they mention how “elaborate” surveillance 
systems has become. In the meantime, authoritarian regimes such as the Russian apply 
legal and illegal methods to monitor dissidents’ movements and to intercept their 
electronic communication. The state also organises covert audio and video surveillance 
(Gainutdinov & Chikov, 2017b). Surveillance is a key form of repressive digital politics 
that often remains overlooked.  
Finally, Sanovich et al. discuss the third option for the authoritarian regime, online 
engagement, in detail. The Russian government exemplifies how this option is used. It 
obtained skills of eliminating the unwanted opposition and started providing 
information that favours their regime and thus manipulates political discourse online 
(Bradshaw & Howard, 2018; Filer & Fredheim, 2016). In Russia, various techniques 
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that promote a required ideological position on social media were developed over the 
years (Spaiser et al., 2017, p. 1). As discussed in previous sections, by polluting the 
online space with bots and spam, the authorities disempower regime critics and 
manipulate public opinion on social media. However, online engagement is a new form 
of authoritarian politics and is not present on all the platforms used by digital dissidents, 
which I discuss later. Therefore, Sanovich et al.’s (2018) classification has its 
disadvantages. 
I propose an updated classification of the forms of repressive digital politics. I use the 
term the three challenges of digital dissidents to refer to these forms. They are 
censorship and surveillance, as well as offline actions such as persecution. In the 
following sections, I focus on the forms that are allowed by the affordances of digital 
media – censorship and surveillance. In the results chapters, I use the results of this 
study to argue that in order to study the three challenges of digital dissidents, we need to 
address them from a user’s point of view.  
2.4.2 Censorship 
Censorship is defined as a restriction on access to and distribution of alternative 
messages (McQuail, 2010, p. 44). Political censorship practices involve filtering of 
web-traffic (Hussain, 2014), criminalisation of access to alternative information 
(McQuail, 2010), as well as multiple practices of self-censorship when media 
professionals such as journalists, or ordinary users, restrict their political expression on 
the topics perceived as “sensitive” (Stockmann, 2013). Censorship is a form of control 
that effectively prevents activists from the creation of “peer-to-peer” communication 
channels (Rod & Weidmann, 2015). Censorship also makes it harder to access 
alternative messages or leads to the persecution of activists. In the following sections, I 
discuss how censorship is implemented in non-democracies.  
Fear and disbelief are common feelings experienced by citizens in authoritarian states. 
These feelings are the results of the limitations on political participation, e.g. 
persecution and control imposed by authoritarian regimes to deactivate society 
politically. For instance, self-censorship in Chile in the 1980s resulted from the reliance 
of its authoritarian regime on massive intimidation (Rosenberg, 1987). Consequently, 
citizens in such regimes as the Chilean perceive self-censorship as a strategy that helps 
to avoid political persecution and surveillance.  
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Self-censorship has many consequences. Censorship is one of the reasons why it is 
difficult to measure political opinions in authoritarian states. Citizens of such countries 
fear to discuss their political preferences. In China, studies have demonstrated a 
response bias among survey participants to politically sensitive questions (Birney et al., 
2017; King et al., 2004). Another consequence of self-censorship is observed for the 
communities of media professionals. Stockmann (2013, p. 39) argues that the Chinese 
media are supposed to remain apolitical. As a consequence, media professionals in 
China are prevented from “critically interrogating the broader social and political 
structure” (Stockmann, 2013, p. 39). Therefore, self-censorship in authoritarian states is 
related to emotions, as well as structural constraints on their media and political systems 
that are imposed by the state.   
Self-censorship also affects ordinary citizens’ discussions online. In line with Milan’s 
(2015a) theory of microinteractions as political acts, the theories of peer production 
networks (Bennett et al., 2014) and of nano-level actions (Lonkila, 2017) emphasise the 
importance of citizens’ participation in online content (co-)production along with their 
reaction to it in the form of likes and shares. Ordinary users produce and help to 
circulate content. Their actions eventually can help to create political momentum for 
collective actions offline. However, if citizens are restricted by structural constraints or 
their emotions, they can self-censor themselves and not participate in networks of 
content producers. Indeed, in an authoritarian state that imposes constraints on 
expression, such a tiny act as “tweeting may be a very brave act” (Tufekci, 2017, p. 
xxvii). By contrast, Lonkila (2017) argues that nano-level activities can hardly be 
restricted due to their ambiguity and frequency. Still, the literature largely agrees that 
self-censorship affects political participation negatively.  
Whilst citizens can practice self-censorship and restrict their self-expression including 
“nano-level” actions such as likes and shares (Lonkila, 2017), they still can turn to 
digital media in search of critical political information posted by other citizens 
(Robertson & Greene, 2017). That is when filtering efforts of the authorities become 
important. Filtering of web-traffic allows the authorities to restrict access to unwanted 
content (Lonkila, 2017). Another way to restrict this access is to remove it by forcing 
the platform owners to follow the rulings of the authorities in non-democracies such as 
China and Iran. One of the most common types of content that is removed frequently is 
messages that cover collective action, planned or happened (Khazraee & Losey, 2016; 
King et al., 2014). Filtering and platform cooperation with the regime seem to be the 
most common ways to impose censorship online. 
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Sanovich et al. (2018) argue that three factors influence the ability of autocratic 
governments to filter web-traffic. First, governments should control critical internet 
infrastructure. Second, they should prepare to filter online content. Third, the state 
should possess financial and human resources to do so. Cairns (2017, p. 4) argues that 
in order for digital censorship efforts to be successful, they should be less visible and 
obvious so not to harm authorities’ reputation and balance political risks. These 
preconditions are fulfilled on a different scale by such authoritarian states as China, 
Iran, Turkey, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Belarus and Russia (Sanovich et al., 
2018) 
At least up to 2018, one of the most advanced digital filtering infrastructures is being 
implemented in China (Cairns, 2017) – a place where “the authoritarian practices 
routinised” (Karatzogianni, 2015, p. 50). The massive infrastructure of the “Great 
Firewall of China” (GFC) was first designed in 2003 to censor online content. The GFC 
became a symbol of the political control of the internet (Sanovich et al., 2018). King et 
al. (2014) estimate that around 13% of all social media posts in China get censored. Not 
every page or website is banned in China. Instead, the Chinese regime can temporarily 
relax or increase censorship control. This strategy of “selective censorship” (Cairns, 
2017) is partly a result of balancing the factors of regime reputation and the threat to the 
regime. The research into the digital censorship strategies of the most advanced 
authoritarian regimes demonstrates that pro-democracy activists should balance their 
counter-censorship efforts and take into account regime costs to impose censorship and 
the authorities’ fear of collective action. 
The Chinese authorities have built their mechanism of digital censorship with the 
involvement of the commercial interests of IT companies that agree to help the 
government to censor and filter unwanted critical content. Such companies potentially 
lose profits because of their inability to access some blocked global services and 
platforms without specific technological arrangements like VPN (Hornby et al., 2018). 
However, their earnings are also substantial. Take an example of another country that 
engages in controlling the infrastructure and blocking online content actively. The 
Turkish government, along with helpful media corporations, has been “increasingly 
controlling broadcast media via political and financial pressure” (Tufekci, 2014, p. 3). 
Such corporations consider their political loyalty, which is reflected in the editorial 
policy of their outlets, like a key that gives access to other economic areas with more 
valuable commercial contracts from the government (Castells, 2013; Tufekci, 2014). 
The examples of Turkey and China demonstrate that, in authoritarian countries, 
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censorship is a consequence of the cooperation between the regime and large loyal 
companies.  
Loyal commercial organisations not just help non-democratic governments in their 
censorship efforts. They also assist the ruling elite in consolidating political power, 
legitimising the regime and receiving secretive feedback from citizens. For instance, 
Stockmann & Gallagher (2011) showed that the gradual privatisation of the Chinese 
media industry in the 1990s and the 2000s did not thwart the ruling party’s authoritarian 
legitimacy. On the contrary, “changes in management, financing, and ownership 
combined with new technologies” left the Chinese media in the orbit of the party line 
regarding coverage of certain issues and further stabilised the political system 
(Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011, p. 22). The state uses media to guide public opinion 
on critical issues, but it also uses media to obtain societal feedback (Cairns, 2017, p. 2). 
Political economy research into China demonstrates that the privatisation of media 
companies in a modern authoritarian state made its media more credible in the eyes of 
citizens and, therefore, more persuasive (Stockmann, 2013, p. 23). The example of 
China contrasts an assumption which is popular in democratisation theories that market 
competition plays a facilitating role in destabilising authoritarian regimes and erodes the 
regime’s legitimacy (e.g. Lawson, 2002, p. 205). Instead, market reforms can help the 
regimes to prevent pro-democracy changes. 
Having learned how to use media to enhance its legitimacy and stability, the Chinese 
regime has started supplying knowledge about internet control and surveillance to other 
authoritarian regimes, like the Belarusian or the Russian. For example, following the 
events of the Arab Spring and mass protests in Belarus labelled as the “Revolution 
Through Social Networks” in 2011, the Belarusian authorities have been actively 
engaging data, equipment and practices with their Chinese counterparts (Hall, 2017). 
This exchange helped the government to introduce digital censorship.  
Russia also takes an example from the Chinese experience of digital censorship 
(Soldatov & Borogan, 2016). Russian executives responsible for drafting internet-
filtering legislation have met Chinese experts and officials responsible for filtering 
including Fang Binxing, the so-called father of the Great Firewall. Both countries 
started drafting the most recent restrictive filtering legislature simultaneously at the 
beginning of 2016. The drafts of the laws that required foreign companies including 
social media to store their citizens' data inside the country were adopted in Russia a few 
months after the Chinese president Xi called for the building of “internet sovereignty” 
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(Jie, 2015; Zenovina, 2016). Censorship technologies are implemented across different 
types of authoritarian regimes, and those regimes also learn from each other. 
2.4.3 Surveillance  
Digital political censorship and filtering are often linked to another form of the 
authoritarian response - surveillance. Fuchs (2015, p. 395) defines surveillance as 
practices that try to bring about or to prevent certain behaviours in groups or individuals 
by gathering, storing, processing, diffusing, assessing and using data. The issue of 
surveillance makes apparent the difference between dissident groups in non-
democracies and civil society organisations. In contrast to civil society that seeks 
engagement with the state and tries to influence it, dissidents have traditionally been 
described as “a civil society in conspiracy” that create “networks of sympathy” and a 
“parallel polis” (Greene, 2014, p. 45). Authoritarian elites try to learn about these 
parallel networks and prevent them from developing, which leads to a need in 
surveillance practices. That is how surveillance becomes part of everyday life for many 
digital dissidents. 
The Chinese examples of digital political surveillance are notorious once again. The 
infrastructure of the GFC provides mechanisms for surveillance of internet users. The 
practice of surveillance ultimately induces self-censorship at various levels of society. 
In recent years, the Chinese authorities pay more attention to big data as a strategic 
resource for maintaining authoritarian control (Shih-hung, 2018). The terms like “Data-
in-Party-control” and “Cloud Dictatorship” are coming into use. The authoritarian state 
implements these innovative monitoring, blocking and filtering measures to disconnect 
citizens from global information flows, to monopolise them domestically (Stockmann, 
2013, p. 237) and to surveil the population. 
China also supports Russian efforts to handle and analyse vast amounts of data about its 
citizens. The Russian government cannot buy surveillance equipment from western 
companies because of sanctions (Soldatov & Borogan, 2016). Just like in China, the 
Russian state also implements systems of surveillance, which is partly motivated by 
political goals (Soldatov & Borogan, 2015), though the evidence is scarce. A report by 
digital rights advocates suggests that the authorities in Russia organised “a complex 
system of monitoring and surveillance of civic activists” (Gainutdinov & Chikov, 
2017b). Russian surveillance is directly connected to the state monitoring activities on 
digital platforms. This monitoring sometimes results in convictions or punishments for 
citizens’ actions online (Lonkila, 2017, p. 122).  
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State surveillance could be addressed by visibility management mechanisms such as 
those that allow anonymising an internet user (Youmans & York, 2012). Historically, 
anonymity has been the norm on the internet (Zajácz, 2013). It is still common for some 
social media platforms to conceal the identities of the administrators of pages by 
anonymising them automatically. An example of Facebook pages, which are one of the 
most common mechanisms of organisational representation on social media, 
demonstrates how the norm has been in decline. The default settings of Facebook pages 
do not publicly reveal the name of page administrators, who are often the spokespeople 
for groups associated with a page. However, Facebook, as well as most of the other 
popular social media, cooperates with the national states and might provide the name 
upon a government’s request. For instance, to open a criminal case against a particular 
user, the Russian police just needs information about the IP-addresses used to access an 
account on social media (Gainutdinov & Chikov, 2017b). Thus, the internet anonymity 
norm has progressively come under pressure, and authoritarian governments have learnt 
more about the spokespeople for opposition groups on digital platforms theory 
surveillance mechanisms.  
2.5 Summary of the literature review and research questions 
In Chapter 2, I reviewed three overlapping literatures that have advanced knowledge of 
digital platform use by political organisations. They are platform studies, social 
movement studies and digital politics. In what follows, I summarise the discussion of 
the literature review with the emphasis on the gaps that I identified. After this, I present 
the research questions that emerged from this literature review. 
2.5.1 Platform studies, digital politics and social movement studies 
First, platform studies literature is concerned with the consequences of the 
platformisation of society. Platformisation facilitates decentralisation of platform logics, 
politics and features around the internet. Consequently, the features that emerge from 
one platform, such as the “Like” button, are disseminated across many third websites. 
Digital platforms can be discussed from four perspectives: technological, commercial, 
cultural and social (van Dijck and Poell, 2015). The social and cultural components 
emphasise users’ practices, interactions, representations, as well as the content they 
create, share and interact with. The study of the technological and commercial 
components of platforms helps to decode algorithms back into social action and to 
demonstrate how commercial control, organisation and ownership of platforms affect 
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social action. In addition to these components, scholars of digital platforms highlight 
three phenomena - visibility, temporality and emotional connectivity – that shape 
platform use. Visibility helps political actors to remain prominent but also enhances the 
development of new hierarchies within an organisation. Temporality signifies the 
changes in the temporal dynamics of social interactions on digital platforms. Emotional 
connectivity helps political actors to gather support online by publishing framed 
appeals.  
The pressures of platformisation mean that political actors should be ready to adapt and 
to meet the restrictions of platform design and policy. In return, political actors seeing 
an opportunity to become part of the global communication infrastructure (Bivens & 
Haimson, 2016; Helmond, 2015) and to preserve or gain power (Chadwick, 2013, p. 21; 
Gunitsky, 2015). The elites might be slower in this adaptation than their opponents, but 
they eventually start using digital technologies as well. Consequently, society becomes 
vulnerable to control by the elites and other structures including those that own 
platforms. These structures are often directed by political interest and commercial logic. 
Political and economic control of platform interactions is made possible by the specifics 
of the architecture of online communication spaces. Political elites and platform owners 
impose their control on digital interactions through such mechanisms as algorithms (e.g. 
by defining how the Timeline is formed or how bots are deployed), designs (e.g. what is 
visible to whom) and settings (e.g. what opportunities for the control of own data a user 
has). Consequently, control becomes less direct and apparent. For instance, the state no 
longer needs to tell people what to say or not. Rather, to enhance regime stability, it can 
establish its control over the content of conversation through platform owners who are 
vulnerable to any changes in commercial regulations and informal mechanisms, as the 
examples of China and Russia showed. The crucial argument of platform studies is that 
the largest platforms are driven by the commercial logic of their owners (Milan, 2013; 
Stockmann, 2013; Tufekci, 2014; van Dijck, 2013b). However, the recent cases of non-
for-profit platforms such as Telegram are studied less extensively in this respect. 
The mechanisms of this less direct type of digital control are quite obscure, and its 
precise effect on social and political systems is not clear yet. For instance, scholars keep 
debating whether the deployment of bots has any effect beyond the immediate 
obfuscation of political discussion (Vasilkova et al., 2018). The mechanisms of the 
deployment of digital censorship are also a disputed subject. Some authors suggest that 
digital censorship is imposed in a more straightforward way when political elites 
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attempt to censor speech online (e.g. Walker & Orttung, 2014). Others argue that digital 
censorship is a more dynamic process and depends on the issue, the political climate 
and elite preferences, among other variables (Stockmann, 2013). Even less is known 
about active citizens’ strategies of overcoming digital censorship on social media. 
Digital politics literature discusses the extent to which platforms can drive political 
change. Two types of schools of thought typically drive this democratisation debate. 
The first school suggests that social media platforms likely do not fulfil any political 
function across national contexts in non-democracies. Rather, the online space has 
become part of the system of “effective media control” (Walker and Orttung, 2014, p. 
72) that is dominated by the pre-existing relationships built upon restrictions on 
freedom of speech, persecution of the political opposition and surveillance (Filer & 
Fredheim, 2016; Gunitsky, 2015; K. E. Pearce, 2015; Stein, 2016b). For instance, 
political activists in authoritarian states who use platforms may be vulnerable to state 
surveillance that helps to identify them. Following the identification of activists, the 
state may try to persecute them, which spreads political fear that contributes to the self-
censorship of other active citizens. Thus, the affordances of platforms increase 
possibilities for the state to control its citizens. 
The disadvantage of some of digital politics literature is that it focuses exclusively on 
the effects of the political environment on digital media. Such state- or policy-centric 
literature approaches the response of the state to the disruptions caused by digital 
platforms asking questions about the policy restrictions imposed by the authorities and 
how these restrictions affect media owners and other elite actors. At the same time, non-
elite actors like political activists rarely become the focus of the inquiries into the 
relationships between politics and digital media in this context. Thus, state-centric 
approaches present platforms as black boxes or mere powerful tools for mobilisation 
(Milan, 2015b).  
The second school of thought in the democratisation debate pays more attention to an 
actor-centric rather than a state-centric approach and suggests that political activism still 
benefits from the proliferation of digital media despite the increased control. This 
school of thought argues that the main affordances of digital media allow for collective 
action at a lower cost, doing it more quickly and at a larger scale. These affordances 
extend offline networks of activists and enhance them and thus “augment dissent” 
(Lokot, 2016). Moreover, the affordances of digital media allow political activists to 
listen to their audience and to adjust their strategies accordingly (Karpf, 2016). The 
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affordances provide activists with an opportunity to control their visibility and content 
(Youmans & York, 2012; Zajácz, 2013). By examining how activists combine platform 
affordances, we can analyse the factors that determine the sustainability of their 
practices. However, one should always distinguish between the affordances of different 
platforms as they are not universal. 
Many of the theories I rely on in this research are developed in the tradition of social 
movement studies. The research into activism through the lenses of SMOs can help to 
avoid the common pitfalls of studying non-democratic countries (Greene, 2014). In 
particular, social movement theory recognises the importance of the political context. It 
helps to highlight what shapes the processes of democratisation, organisational 
development or digitally-enabled collective action. Therefore, social movement studies 
add important nuances to the narratives of democratisation and political participation 
literature. 
Political participation, along with social movement literature, is concerned with a broad 
shift in how political organising unfolds and how leaders of digitally-enabled political 
groups emerge. Some authors discuss the emergence of “hybrid” organisational forms 
that help political actors to contest power in the digital age (Bennett et al., 2017; 
Chadwick, 2013; Karpf, 2014; Wells, 2015). A few authors propose more nuanced 
conceptualisations of effective organising that results from the adoption of digital 
communication strategies. They include the concepts of digital party (Gerbaudo, 2019), 
nerd politics (Postill, 2018), analytic activism (Karpf, 2016), connective action (Bennett 
& Segerberg, 2013) and connective party (Bennett et al., 2017), as well as the modified 
SPIN model (Gerlach, 2001). For instance, Postill’s (2018) concept of “nerd politics” 
highlights the importance of skills, crowdsourcing and organisational segmentation for 
political activism. Similar to the models of nerd politics and SPIN organisation, the 
connective action theory emphasises the significance of the response to external 
conditions, long-term adaptations and resource mobilisation for SMO.  
Likewise, the conceptualisations of political action and political activism in the digital 
age also vary. The theory of cloud activism argues that the “political” is hidden on the 
level of micro-actions in the digital space (Milan, 2015a). “Staunch[ly] anti-
authoritarian” techno-political nerds (Postill, 2018) work on backstage and lead the 
collective action of thousands of people as digital platform administrators. Marketing 
activists (Poell et al., 2016) also operate on backstage using their professional marketing 
and branding skills and techniques. Though these concepts explain how political 
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activism functions on digital platforms, they often do not elaborate on activists’ 
motivations, trajectories and internal organising mechanisms.  
The issue of organisation is closely related to leadership. Many recent digitally-enabled 
organisations appeal to a broader audience by their promise to build leaderless and 
horizontal structures (Gerbaudo, 2017c, p. 186). However, examples of techno-political 
nerds, marketing activists and digital vanguards (Gerbaudo, 2017c), who often perform 
the roles of spokespeople for their allegedly leaderless organisations, demonstrate that it 
is difficult to avoid the emergence of leaders if a movement relies heavily on platforms 
(Kavada, 2012). Indeed, those spokespeople and administrators may become dominant 
actors in an SMO (Gerbaudo, 2017c). While some authors suggest that the affordances 
of platforms are supportive of the leaderless structures ideal (Chadwick, 2013, p. 44), 
others argue that leaderless can be just the rhetorical construct (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; 
Poell et al., 2016). Rather, the narratives of a leaderless or horizontal organisation can 
be “strategically deployed” (Postill, 2018) to avoid a leader’s persecution in the difficult 
circumstances, for example, of preemptive authoritarianism (Silitski, 2005). What unites 
different approaches to leadership is an understanding that the traditional perspectives 
on social movements do not explain the nature of organising and connecting in a 
digitally-enabled organisation sufficiently.  
Before concluding the discussion of the literature, I point out two common features that 
most of the reviewed studies miss. First, many studies of the democratic potential of 
digital media were not assessed for other countries except a few western democracies. 
These studies often focus on democratic English-speaking countries or are based on 
English-language content and sources (della Porta, 2013; Filer and Fredheim, 2016; 
Meng and Rantanen, 2015). This is ironic because the current discussion around the use 
of digital platforms for political change received one of its largest impulses from the 
2009-2012 protest events in non-democracies. Unfortunately, the later developments in 
these countries seemed to be disregarded by many students of digital politics and social 
movements.  
Second, similar criticism may be applied to the sampling of digital platforms in many of 
the reviewed studies. These studies’ conclusions were often observed only for Twitter 
or Facebook but are not tested for other social networks. This implies that the 
assumption of platform universality drives many of the reviewed theories. However, by 
focusing exclusively on one type of sources or contexts, we risk disregarding the 
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complex variety of the uses of media (Filer and Fredheim, 2016, p. 14) in different 
contexts. 
2.5.2 Three challenges of digital dissidents  
The literature review also allows to identify and classify common challenges faced by 
activists from opposition and dissident groups that rely on digital platforms in non-
democracies. They are persecution, surveillance and censorship.  
First, repression is the most common type of reaction of authoritarian states on protest 
activities (Cai, 2010; della Porta, 2014; Grimm & Harders, 2018; Sika, 2019). The 
Belarusian and Russian states continuously persecute dissident organisations and 
activists (Gainutdinov & Chikov, 2017b; United States Department of State, 2019a). 
Activists can be arrested, prosecuted, jailed and, in a few cases, even lose their lives. In 
2017, the European Court of Human Rights issued a record number of rulings 
concerning the violation of human rights in Russia (Belarus is not even a member of the 
Court). Every fourth decision of the Court was made in relation to Russia (Council of 
Europe. Committee of Ministers, 2018). As recently as 2017, thousands of people were 
arrested and tried for participation in protests and other political activity in Russia and 
Belarus (Amnesty International, 2017, 2018). The leaders of these protests are often the 
first targets. For example, Alexei Navalny spent some 60 days in jail in 2017. The chief 
of staff of his campaigning organisation, Leonid Volkov, spent 65 days in jail in the 
same year. Thus, the persecution of leadership is a significant challenge faced by digital 
dissidents. 
Second, authoritarian states apply legal and illegal methods to monitor dissidents’ 
movements and to intercept their electronic communication. The reports by local human 
rights groups suggest that the states increasingly place their political opponents under 
surveillance. “The Russian state had, in recent years, organised a complex system of 
monitoring and surveillance of civic activists, independent journalists and the political 
opposition” (Gainutdinov & Chikov, 2017b). The state tries to intercept electronic 
communication by using covert audio and video surveillance. In particular, surveillance 
practices are enabled by platform algorithms and internet service providers (ISPs) that 
are used to monitor and filter web-traffic.  
The security services of the two countries monitor web-traffic by using an elaborate 
system of digital surveillance called SORM (Aliaksandrau, 2013). The government 
requires every ISP and all social media platforms operating in Russia to install SORM 
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monitoring equipment (Ahmed et al., 2018, p. 59). Soldatov & Borogan (2015) argue 
that this mass system allowed the monitoring of phone calls or web-traffic. In addition, 
surveillance on digital platforms is promoted in conjunction with market logic 
(Helmond, 2015; Stockmann, 2013; van Dijck, 2013b). In Russia, the most popular 
social media platforms such as VK and OK “have been placed under the control of 
oligarchs loyal to the Kremlin” (Filer & Fredheim, 2016, p. 12). In contrast to large 
global companies such as Google or Microsoft, these pro-Kremlin owners of digital 
platforms implement all the surveillance technologies required by the state. Surveillance 
is one of key challenges faced by digital dissidents. 
Third, digital dissidents face censorship. Mainstream traditional media like television, 
radio and most newspapers do not broadcast the points of view of digital dissidents in 
Belarus and Russia. When the state censors traditional media, activists should find an 
alternative way to approach their audience (Stein, 2016b, p. 23). An obvious solution is 
to turn to digital platforms. However, in contrast to earlier periods, many authoritarian 
states have recognised the potential of the internet and put multiple constraints on the 
dissemination of alternative information online (Gunitsky, 2015). In addition, the police 
monitor some platforms and prosecute people who share political content on local 
platforms (Meduza, 2016). Hence, dissidents are limited in their means of information 
dissemination, and this affects their capacity for attracting new followers. 
2.5.3 Research questions 
I focus on active citizens who oppose restrictions on political organising and who 
combine their media, political and technological skills and resources to advocate for 
pro-democracy changes in authoritarian states. These citizens are neither crowds nor 
atomised dissidents. They are part of anti-authoritarian movements. Anti-authoritarian 
movements use digital media platforms to organise themselves, select and protect their 
leaders, as well as to distribute their messages. These are the key organising and 
information processes in such movements. These processes are shaped by two important 
contextual factors: authoritarian digital politics and the mechanisms of digital platforms. 
The mechanisms of platforms are studied from the perspective of their affordances - the 
actions that digital technologies facilitate or make possible (Tufekci, 2017). Thus, the 
central concepts of my study are the use of digital media, the forms of organising and 
leading and the mechanisms of information distribution. Together they constitute the 
main research question of the dissertation: 
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How does the use of digital media influence the forms of organisation and leadership 
and the mechanisms of information distribution in anti-authoritarian movements?  
The processes of political organising are affected profoundly by the rapid 
transformation of political and media systems. Some of those processes contribute to the 
emergence of new combinations of organisational and leadership forms (Bennett et al., 
2017; Gerbaudo, 2018; Postill, 2018). These combinations change media and politics 
across many countries. Hence, the first additional question that directs the examination 
of these forms is:  
1. What forms of organisation and leadership emerge in anti-authoritarian movements 
that rely on digital media? 
In the context of authoritarian digital politics, active citizens can both benefit and suffer 
from the affordances of digital media. For example, activists can enhance their visibility 
and perform their activities faster and at a larger scale by using digital platforms (Earl & 
Kimport, 2011). However, the authoritarian state also uses affordances to establish its 
control of the online realm, to impose censorship on activist content and to monitor 
political opponents (Gunitsky, 2015; Oates, 2008). In order to consider how the use of 
digital media influences the organising and information processes in anti-authoritarian 
movements, the affordances of these media should be identified. Thus, the second 
additional question addressed by the dissertation is: 
2. What are the affordances of digital media that shape the processes of political 
organising and information distribution in an authoritarian political context? 
Third, activists do not normally use just one platform to organise and distribute 
messages. They combine digital platforms in larger structures that I define as 
communication infrastructures. To understand how anti-authoritarian movements can 
successfully combine platforms and their affordances, the study asks: 
3. What is the role played by different platforms in the communication infrastructures of 
anti-authoritarian movements? 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
In this chapter, I provide the rationale for selecting the cases and choosing data 
collection methods for this mixed-method research: in-depth interviews, participant 
observation and a set of content analysis methods. I also describe how I drew the 
sample, collected and analysed data. Finally, I discuss methodological challenges, 
limitations and ethical dilemmas. 
I started this project in an attempt to develop my previous analytical and practical work 
in the field of digital activism. I hoped to investigate several cases of political 
campaigning on social media platforms in authoritarian countries. My aim was to 
explore how political organisation evolves with the advancement of digital technologies 
with a specific focus on authoritarian settings that are characterised by state 
surveillance, censorship and persecution of activists. I was engaged in this topic since 
my BA studies in political science and throughout my practical involvement in media 
work and civic organisations in the region.  
I chose to expand my study to Belarus and Russia, two countries with similar media and 
political conditions. As I demonstrated in Chapter 1, Belarus and Russia have rather 
similar technological and digital media settings, as well as many characteristics of 
political systems and cultural features.  
3.1 Selecting the cases  
Many studies analysing the relationships between digital platforms and social 
movements focus on particular groups during particular periods of times with the 
emphasis on critical events such as massive protests (Baron, 2014, p. 127). At the point 
of choosing Belarus and Russia as the main national contexts of my research, I did not 
specify what activist groups I would study. I was looking for groups that used digital 
platforms actively. Such groups should have initiated a campaign with a clear aim at 
influencing the public agenda, decision-making process and, possibly, at triggering a 
systemic change in their political systems. Such campaigns could potentially provide 
enough data for the analysis of organising and communication under repressive 
pressure. 
When the second year of my PhD project had just begun, two significant events 
happened in Belarus and Russia. First, the Anti-tax movement, perhaps the largest 
movement in the last two decades, emerged in Belarus. Second, shortly after the Anti-
tax movement grew as a significant political power, Russian activist Alexei Navalny 
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published on YouTube an investigation and a report into the Russian prime minister 
Dmitry Medvedev’s alleged corruption. This investigation helped to mobilize many 
thousands of people across Russia for the largest in many years protest campaign (Kara-
Murza, 2017). These events have defined my project. 
I started to follow two groups behind these events. The first group was well-resourced, 
innovative and experienced: Navalny’s anti-corruption professionals in Russia. The 
second group was the activists of the Anti-tax campaign in Belarus, who were much less 
advanced in their knowledge of technologies and politics. This group is also known as 
the movement of “social parasites.” Despite this knowledge gap, the two groups 
displayed a similar ability to shape the public agendas of their countries. These two 
organisations also managed to challenge their political regimes. This challenge has 
partly resulted in similar repressive responses from the governments.  
The two cases were large-scale and long-term political campaigns. I was specifically 
interested in the initial protest stages of these campaigns in February and March of 
2017. This interest was associated with the results of the mobilisations that were 
described as the most geographically dispersed series of protests in Belarus 
(Herasimenka, 2017) and Russia (Kara-Murza, 2017; Kashin, 2017) since the early 
1990s3. Thus, the Anti-corruption and the Anti-tax organisations became one of the 
most significant political events of their countries in 2017. Therefore, an opportunity to 
collect in-depth data about their organising structures and digital infrastructure was a 
rare one for the places where political life is highly restricted.  
The selected cases yielded unexpected outcomes and represented exceptions to the 
recent rule of pro-democracy campaigning failure in their countries. Greene (2014, p. 
105) suggests that studying the exceptions to the rule can yield a better understanding of 
the rule itself. According to Patton (2002, p. 232), such unusual or extreme case 
purposeful sampling approach helps to learn lessons about the outcomes that are 
relevant to improving more typical conditions such as other cases of political 
campaigning. Therefore, my study uses the extreme case purposeful sampling approach 
because it helps to observe unusual patterns of contentious political campaigning. 
I realised that Navalny and the Anti-tax organisations were the two units for analysis 
that fit the research design and goals of my project well. When the spring of 2017 came, 
 
3 A number of large-scale protest mobilisations happened in Belarus and Russia during and immediately 
following the events of the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement in 2010-2012. The mobilisations in 
Belarus and Russia were partly inspired by those events (Bulhakau & Dynko, 2011; Karatzogianni, 2015). 
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I immediately seized the opportunity and went first to Belarus and then to Russia to 
explore the two organisations. I was lucky because the periods of my visits appeared to 
be the peaks of the campaigns’ activities. This subsequently made the spring and the 
summer of 2017 the most active periods of my fieldwork. 
To the author’s knowledge, the organisations have not been systematically analysed in 
the social movement or digital politics literature so far. To address this gap, I chose 
descriptive cases study as the main approach to the analysis (Patton, 2002, p. 447) of the 
organisations. The case study approach fits the goal of a focused, detailed investigation 
of the two movement-like organisations well. Snow & Trom (2002, p. 147) define case 
study as  
(a) investigation and analysis of an instance or variant of some bounded social 
phenomenon that (b) seek to generate a richly retailed and “thick” elaboration of 
the phenomenon studied through (c) the use and triangulation of multiple methods 
or procedures that include but are not limited to qualitative techniques. 
When studying SMOs, the research design based on case study can help to “generate 
richly detailed and holistic accounts of” such movements, their actions, events 
organised by them and their communication processes (Snow & Trom, 2002, p. 151). 
My research project is focused on several cases that are bounded by a common theme of 
digitally-enabled political campaigning in non-democratic settings. It examines the 
nature of the activists’ organising and interactions within a limited period in relation to 
several social phenomena such as state censorship, persecution, surveillance and 
platformisation of politics. The project triangulates several methods that, according to 
Snow & Trom, allows a detailed and holistic understanding of the studied phenomena. 
Therefore, my research strategy contains all the main elements of the case study 
approach that follows Snow & Trom’s definition. 
Case study is often associated with inductive research (Lofland, 1996). As it became 
evident from my literature review, the central aspects of this research project – the 
practices of the backstage use of digital media for organising and communication – have 
not been theorised extensively enough for the circumstances of an authoritarian regime. 
This means a solid theoretical basis that could be tested through a deductive approach is 
not available in my case. Therefore, my approach to the study is necessarily inductive. 
Inductive research can contribute with a theory that evolves from the previous case 
studies of similar phenomena and other theories within social movement studies, digital 
politics and platform studies. 
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3.2 Choice of methods, data collection and analysis 
In this section, I discuss the choice of each method of my study and demonstrate how I 
used them. Despite the variety of the literatures on digital activism, knowledge about 
the use of digital media by activists and dissidents in non-democracies is scarce. My 
inquiry into the use of digital platforms was one of the first such studies related to the 
Anti-tax and the Anti-corruption campaigns of 2017 in Belarus and Russia. Therefore, 
fact-finding and description were needed before I could take the challenge of 
exploration (King et al., 1994, p. 15). The choice of my methods is directed by this need 
for descriptive inference. My interesting in activist backstage practices are directed by 
the debates on the role of formal organisation and on the ways to address censorship and 
surveillance. Hence, I hoped to gain insight into the backstage workings of the activist 
communities, revealing, when possible, hidden layers of their organisational processes, 
communication infrastructures, as well as strategies and tactics of dealing with the 
challenges of authoritarian communication space and of promotion of pro-democracy 
ideas. 
Specifically, I was interested in gaining insights into the process of organising, which is 
often a more difficult object to study than organisation. Moreover, taking into account 
the environment where the campaigns were conducted, organising is also a secretive 
process. I tried to reveal this process as much as possible, taking into consideration the 
ethical issues and my own safety.  
Following the suggestion of Snow & Trom (2002, p. 153) for the case study research, I 
stayed open and flexible to the adoption of different methodologies depending on the 
exigencies of the field. From the beginning of my project, I intended to employ several 
research methods. The use of multiple or mixed methods is “a recommended strategy 
both for studying new media and for investigating social movements” (Kavada, 2007, p. 
98). When the data gathering opportunity opened in the spring of 2017, I adopted a 
predominantly qualitative research strategy that would suit the inductive and 
explanatory nature of my study. This strategy should also allow me to examine complex 
political processes associated with the two organisations and to focus on their core 
members. In general, a more qualitative approach is typical for the studies of the core 
members of social movements (Kavada, 2018). Therefore, the choice of methods 
derives both from the research questions and the most appropriate approaches to the 
study of the field. 
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In terms of chronological order, I employed the methods in the following way. First, I 
searched for the pages of the two organisations on social media platforms to identify 
their internal communication and organising spaces as well as pages that broadcasted 
their messages to their external audience. During this stage, I also tried to determine the 
movements’ possible core activists to contact them later for interviews. This allowed me 
to select the platforms and activist pages for the analysis. Second, I started monitoring 
those pages closely, making fieldnotes and identifying possible key users of the pages. 
Third, I used this information, along with the data from preliminary expert in-depth 
interviews that I started recording at this stage, to determine the final sample of content 
to analyse as well as an initial sample for in-depth interviews. I then collected social 
media data and started looking for contacts of people identified in my sample during the 
previous steps. Fourth, during the fieldwork, I conducted interviews as well as some 
participant observation when possible. Finally, upon returning from the fieldwork, I 
collected supplementary materials to perform features, textual and network analysis as 
well as analysis of documents.  
3.2.1 In-depth interviews  
I chose in-depth, qualitative interviews with activists involved in the coordinating and 
disseminating information about the two organisations as a key method of gaining 
insight into their internal workings. Specifically, I focused on the core activists 
responsible for the overall organisation nationally and locally, as well as on people who 
managed digital platform accounts of the two organisations. I also included in the 
sample rank-and-file activists involved in the dissemination of information on social 
media. 
In-depth interviews are useful in studies that attempt to explore, discover and interpret 
complex social processes. They permit the emergence of themes and meanings that are 
not anticipated by a researcher (Blee & Taylor, 2002, p. 94). Along with other 
qualitative methods used in my project, qualitative interviews are common in studies 
that are focused on practices of digital activism (e.g. Mattoni, 2013), affordance of 
digital platforms (e.g Lokot, 2016) and organising (e.g. Toepfl, 2017). While 
quantitative methods are “difficult to use for the purpose of collecting information in 
nondemocracies settings,” qualitative methods, interviews, in particular, might be easier 
to conduct in such settings (Reny, 2016, pp. 910–911). For instance, when studying 
protests, the scholars interested in non-democracies often do not have access to detailed 
and transparent police reports or other unbiased data about protests (Reny, 2016, p. 
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915). In these circumstances, interviews with witnesses of protests might be the only 
way scholars can get limited access to alternative narratives. 
In relation to my research, interviews open a path for the exploring activists’ 
perceptions, motivations, strategies as well as obtaining data about their organising and 
information dissemination processes. By analysing interviews, I hoped to learn how 
activists perceive and explain their organisational and platform choices, the 
development of their communities, how they engage in the communication with the 
public online. Interviews also informed about the general architecture of the activists’ 
online campaigns. Information biases that might be associated with interviews are 
reduced by the mixed-methods design of this research. In addition, I tried to make the 
sample of interviewees as comprehensive as possible and representative of potential 
interpretations. For example, when seeking to confirm information received from 
several public leaders of the movements, I also tried to receive separate accounts from 
rank-and-file activists who had different levels of practical knowledge and skills about 
the same events or phenomena. This helped to increase the validity of the data. 
I conducted in-depth interviews in two stages. First, I organised a number of pilot expert 
interviews and several interviews with rank-and-file activists. The expert interviews 
were preliminary in nature with a reduced set of questions asked. “Pilot projects are 
often very useful, especially where data must be gathered by interviewing,” suggest 
King, Keohane, & Verba (1994, p. 22). The pilot interviews were aimed at 
understanding the background of the studied processes, national media and political 
contexts and building the sample for the second, main stage of interviewing as well as 
for other methods. I used pilot expert interviews to find new contacts and to improve 
my contextual understanding of the political and media environments of the two 
counties. Specifically, I focused on the interviewees’ perceptions of the state’s control 
of the online realm. I also asked about possible activists’ response to the state’s 
strategies and tactics to control it. This data substituted the missing links between the 
literature review, mostly based on the studies of other political contexts, and the 
practices of digital dissidents in Belarus and Russia. I also used these pilot interviews to 
alter the research questions and to design interviews with campaign participants. 
Following each interview, I revised the interview guide to reflect new issues revealed 
during the previous conversations. Thus, during this stage of interviewing, I was able to 
shape the research design of the fieldwork. 
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Nine expert interviews with media professionals, political analysts, ICT security and 
NGO experts from Belarus and Russia helped me to map the field and the context of 
digital media, political system and the recent history of local social movements. I 
selected participants for expert interviews through purposeful sampling based on my 
prior knowledge of their background, their knowledge of the media and political 
contexts of Belarus and Russia and recommendations of other experts. This first stage 
involved the experts who have worked with media, civic and political organisation in 
Belarus and Russia for more than 10 years. They all had experience as activists, but, at 
this stage, I approached them as experts. Most of the experts interviewed for this sample 
followed the Anti-tax and the Navalny organisations closely. 
The second stage of the interviewing process was the main set of interviews. I started it 
when I obtained enough data from the participants in the first stage of interviews. As I 
have already noted, interviews may be easier to conduct in non-democratic settings than 
most of the other methods. Nevertheless, it was still difficult to access some activist 
interviewees. Several strategies helped me to gain this access. First, my position as an 
insider to the field, especially in the case of Belarus, helped me a lot. For example, 
when communicating with potential interviewees, I used the Belarusian language rather 
than Russian. The users of this language are considered to be marginalised and 
oppressed group in Belarus (Belarusian Language Society, 2012)4. Lokot (2016, p. 89) 
notes that when doing research of activism in the post-soviet area, the choice of a native 
language instead of Russian can help to demonstrate to interviewees that a researcher 
“understands many of the contextual cues easily.” My language also served as proof of 
my independent credentials.  
Second, in Russia, in contrast to Belarus, I represented myself as a foreign researcher 
from the UK only. Reny (2016, p. 918) suggests that oppressed groups in non-
democratic societies are more likely to be open when speaking with a foreign researcher 
“than the ones who are fully co-opted by the political system.” Indeed, the status of a 
foreigner and my accent gave me an opportunity to present myself as a neutral novice in 
Russian politics. 
Third, following another advice by Reny (2016, p. 918), I tried to make some of my 
communication more informal. Informality also helped me to build rapport with people 
who previously went through painful experiences in other interviews. When I came for 
 
4 I am also a user of this language.   
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the interview with one of the Anti-tax activists who spent several years in a Belarusian 
prison for his political activity, it seemed like the activists first felt very uncomfortable 
when talking to me. For the first time in many years of conducting interviews, I felt like 
a policeman questioning a suspect. This situation required turning the conversation 
towards a more natural direction, which resulted in a successful interview. 
Fourth, the location of the interviews was also vital. Many of them took place not in 
Belarus or Russia but in Lithuania. This allowed me to build trust with the interviewees 
as many of them often travel to Lithuania and consider this country a safer place where 
sensitive meetings can take place. I took part in a few of these meetings in Lithuania. 
Finally, I was persistent in attempts to access organising structures. For instance, I tried 
to connect with the coordinators of the central social media team of the Navalny 
organisation for a long time. It was at the height of its campaigning and a busy time for 
these people. The campaigners casually refused interview requests from the leading 
world media during that period. Only after attending several events organised by the 
core activists and interviewing its less prominent members, did I receive a chance to 
communicate informally with the key coordinators who, after all, finally agreed to give 
me an interview. 
When selecting the participants for the main stage of the interviews, I used a 
snowballing approach to sampling, which is a typical sampling technique when 
interviewing activists in non-democracies (Art, 2016). Snowball sampling is an 
effective strategy when members of a small and defined community know each other, 
but are hard to reach (Mosca 2014, p. 409), can hide their identities and are less 
formally institutionalised (Blee, 2013, p. 624). Probability or random sampling could 
have been more representative and generalisable. However, this type of sampling was 
hard to envision in the circumstances of a small overall population of potential 
interviewees. In addition, my goal in doing interviews was not generalisation as much 
as an in-depth understanding of the organising practices and informal contexts. 
Combining the interview data with other data sets and other studies later helped me to 
extrapolate results (Weiss, 1995). Thus, my sampling approach to the interviews was 
purposeful snowball sampling. 
This strategy of sampling suggests an initial selection of a small group of activists in 
accordance with specific criteria. To identify this group, I used the expert interviews, 
my personal network, the analysis of publications in media as well as campaign 
materials. Personal communication with activists from this small group helped me to 
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add to my sample further. At the end of each interview, I asked all the individuals I 
interviewed about their suggestions for potential interviewees. That is how the snowball 
sampling helped to reach less prominent activists. Table 3.1 introduces the affiliation of 
the interviewed persons. 
Table 3.1 
Anonymised 
name 
Date of 
the 
interview Affiliation 
Respondent 1 
March 13, 
2017 
A leading human rights advocate and political activist, a 
leader of a human rights organisation. Before 2015, they 
spent almost five years in prison for his activism. 
Respondent 2 
May 30, 
2017 
A researcher of a Ukrainian origin. They have been 
studying the use of social media by Russian and 
Ukrainian political activists during 2011-2013 protests in 
these countries, was part of a large social movement, and 
now is an expert in the Belarusian civil society and works 
for a large regional NGO. 
Respondent 3 
January 17, 
2017 
A digital security expert and a researcher who works with 
NGOs in non-democratic countries. Their experience 
involves working with Belarus, Ukraine and Central 
Asian countries. 
Respondent 4 
May 19, 
2017 
A political scientist, legal program coordinator a large 
NGO in Belarus. They specialise in the study of freedom 
of associations and were part of several dissident 
movements.  
Respondent 5 
January 18, 
2017 
Head of a large NGO. They are a person with a long-term 
experience of international human rights advocacy with a 
focus on Belarus 
Respondent 6 
August 7, 
2017 
A media activist and a monitoring specialist. They work 
for probably one of the most prominent human rights 
organisations in Russia. They monitor judicial 
proceedings that can be qualified as political persecution. 
In particular, they focus on the cases related to people 
who participated in anti-government rallies and were 
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persecuted for political posts on VK. They are also 
involved in a unique news website officially blocked in 
Russia and whose editor is located in Paris. This site is in 
the top-3 most influential news sites blocked in Russia. 
They were part of several prominent dissident 
movements. 
Respondent 7 
August 4, 
2017 
Co-chair of a prominent movement that played a crucial 
role in the previous waves of the protests in Russia 
Respondent 8 
January 21, 
2017 
A digital and media expert, editor-in-chief and co-
founder of a prominent web-magazine. They consulted 
many Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian NGOs as to 
their online presence and security and was part of several 
dissident movements.  
Respondent 9 
March 13, 
2017 
A digital security expert who consults and teaches 
Belarusian and Russian activists. They travel to consult 
activists as far as Chechnya in Russia  
Respondent 10 
September 
6, 2017 
A member of the REP and the UDP. They are an activist 
from a small town in Belarus where they collected 
signatures to abolish the tax. They were one of the first 
activists who started the signature collection, and, as a 
result, contributed to the creation of a horizontal network 
of campaigners in the provinces. They also organised 
several large political actions related to the campaign.  
Respondent 11 
May 24, 
2017 
An activist, journalist, dissident. They spent several years 
in the Belarusian prison and were released from prison 
following Lukashenka’s attempt to improve relations 
with the EU. They are one of the leaders of an anarchist 
movement in Belarus. They actively took part in the 
Anti-tax campaign, both in protests and online activities. 
Respondent 12 
September 
9, 2017 
One of the first and most popular political YouTube 
bloggers in Belarus. They took part in many gatherings of 
the Anti-tax campaign. Following the campaign, they 
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were arrested and spent about 45 days in jail on different 
charges.  
Respondent 13 
September 
7, 2017 
A veteran journalist, they worked together with another 
interviewed activist. They participated in many rallies of 
the Anti-tax campaign and were detained when a 
crackdown on the campaign started. 
Respondent 14 
January 1, 
2018 
An administrator of the “Parasites” and “Social 
Dependents” group (PASD) on VK, which became one 
of the most prominent groups on social media dedicated 
to the Anti-tax movement.  
Respondent 15 
May 18, 
2017 
Press-secretary of one of the organisations that were part 
of the Anti-tax organisation 
Respondent 16 
September 
5, 2017 
One of the former leaders of one of the key organisations 
that contributed to the Anti-tax campaign. They were 
brutally detained by the police and spent the last 15 days 
of the campaign in jail. They were also one of the most 
active politicians who used the internet for political 
campaigning in Belarus since 2004. 
Respondent 17 
May 18, 
2017 
The head of one of the prominent organisations that 
contributed to the Anti-tax movement and one of the 
most prominent activists of the Anti-tax campaign. They 
were detained for a number of days following their 
participation in one of the demonstrations of the 
campaign. 
Respondent 18 
September 
6, 2017 
An activist of the Anti-tax campaign and the movement 
of the Belarusian election observers. They also a member 
of one of the key organisations of the Anti-tax 
movement. They actively worked online to promote the 
Anti-tax campaign and participated in its rallies 
Respondent 19 
September 
7, 2017 
The most prominent pollical blogger on YouTube in one 
of the provinces of Belarus, and one of the most 
prominent in Belarus. They were detained during the 
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Anti-tax campaign, which he actively covered on his 
blog.  
Respondent 20 
April 24, 
2017 
A political activist, journalist and social media platforms 
specialist at one of the media that covered the Anti-tax 
campaign. They were located in Minsk and were 
responsible for the media's content coverage on digital 
platforms during the Anti-tax campaign 
Respondent 21 
September 
1, 2017 
They call themselves a “civic-social” activist. They were 
one of the key figures behind the platform infrastructure 
of the Anti-tax movement. They were also involved in 
many other civic projects in Belarus and Ukraine. 
Respondent 22 
September 
2, 2017 
A human rights defender, a lawyer of a prominent Anti-
tax organisation and a legal organisation which focuses 
on human rights defence and advocacy in the legal 
dimension.  
Respondent 23 
August 14, 
2017 
A volunteer who was responsible for the YouTube 
content of one of the offices of the Navalny organisation. 
They coordinated the efforts of the local campaign in 
video production such as weekly programs and small 
news features.  
Respondent 24 
April 24, 
2017 
An activist from one of the local towns in Russia who 
coordinated the organisation of the 26 March Anti-
corruption rally in that town. This town became one of 
few places where the Anti-corruption campaign rallies 
were officially agreed with the local authorities. 
Respondent 25 
June 11, 
2017 
The head of the Navalny campaign in one of the Russian 
provinces during the protest campaign of the 26th of 
March. Besides working with Navalny’s organisation, 
they were also involved in the issues of political 
prisoners in Russia and human rights campaigning in 
Belarus. They worked and volunteered for different 
NGOs in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
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Respondent 26 
August 14, 
2017 
The head of a local Navalny office in one of the Russian 
provinces, an activist for his political campaigns since 
2013  
Respondent 27 
August 14, 
2017 
The social media specialist of a local Navalny office in 
one of the Russian provinces. They were responsible for 
the social media pages of a local campaign. They joined 
the organisation in February 2017.  
Respondent 28 
August 10, 
2017 
The coordinator of the Navalny campaign in one of the 
Russian regions. They are a close associate of Navalny 
since 2012. They came with the idea of the first regular 
YouTube show of the campaign. 
Respondent 29 
August 10, 
2017 
The deputy coordinator of the Navalny campaign in one 
of the Russian regions 
Respondent 30 
August 15, 
2017 
A leader of the Navalny organisation 
Respondent 31 
August 15, 
2017 
A leader of the Navalny organisation 
Respondent 32 
May 25, 
2017 
Head of the Navalny organisation in a Russian province 
Respondent 33 
May 25, 
2017 
Head of the Navalny organisation in a Russian province 
 
When I started the snowball sampling of activists, I first turned to experts and 
practitioners related to the media industry and campaigning. This allowed me to start 
with a broader picture and then try to build a more in-depth depiction of their 
organisational structure. After this, I focused only on the population affiliated to the two 
organisations such as its public leaders, regional coordinators, social media specialists 
or rank-and-file activists. 
The type of an actor and their perceived direct knowledge of coordination and social 
media operations of the organisations served as primary criteria for the selection of 
interviewees. Besides experts, I aimed at including three types of activist actors. Table 
3.2 presents their classification. I included in the sample at least three representatives of 
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each type. These types of actors represent different levels of a possible organisational 
hierarchy, as well as diverse levels of engagement with digital platforms. Still, all of the 
interviewed activists were related to the organising or dissemination of information 
through digital platforms. I also ensured that I included major actors associated with the 
organisations. In this respect, the structures of the samples for the Anti-tax and the Anti-
corruption campaigns were different due to the differences in their organisational 
models. The Anti-corruption campaign initially looked like a vertically integrated 
organisation with easily identifiable coordinating structures.  
By contrast, the Anti-tax campaign was more fluid and indefinite in its organisational 
model. It made the task of identifying its coordinating structures much harder. 
Therefore, I initially tried to interview representatives of all the actor types involved in 
the Anti-tax campaign and then focused on less institutionalised actors such as local 
vloggers or more covert groups such as anarchist communities. These less 
institutionalised actors appeared to be specifically active in information dissemination. I 
also interviewed the representatives of the key organisational members of the initial 
Anti-tax coalition (the United Civic Party and the Belarusian Social Democratic Party 
(Hramada) and the Movement for Freedom), which was the only formal structure 
emerging during this campaign (Appendix 4). Overall, my interviews of the participants 
of the Anti-tax campaign involved representatives of seven organisations and groups. 
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Table 3.2 
Types of the interviewees 
Type of actor Examples 
Leader of an 
organisation/branch/
office 
‐ The coordinator of the Navalny organisation in a Russian 
province;  
‐ One of the leaders of the Movement for Freedom (Belarus).  
Social media 
coordinator 
‐ The social media coordinator of the Navalny organisation in 
a Russian province;  
‐ Social media coordinator of an organisation that was part of 
the Anti-tax campaign; 
‐ Head of the social media unit of the Navalny organisation. 
Local digital activist 
of an organisation 
‐ An activist of the Anti-tax campaign in a Belarusian 
province;  
‐ An activist of the Navalny organisation in a Russian 
province;  
‐ A popular political YouTube vlogger and one of the most 
prominent activists of the Anti-tax campaign in South 
Belarus.  
Media and/or 
political expert 
‐ A media activist, journalist and human rights expert from 
Moscow;  
‐ A digital security expert who consults Belarusian and 
Russian activists;  
‐ Head of a human rights NGO. 
 
After fulfilling these minimum criteria, I proceeded with the interviews until I realised 
that the interviewees started providing similar information and narratives as the 
previous ones. After the final interview showed that the topic was saturated (Blee & 
Taylor, 2002), I stopped the interviewing process.  
In terms of geographical representation, I specifically focused on the diversity of the 
Russian case. Russia is a very big country with different media patterns of the 
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population depending on the region. Thus, the Navalny organisation sample included 
activists from six regions across Russia: St Petersburg in Northern Russia, Rostov-on-
Don in Southern Russia, Moscow and Nizhniy Novgorod in Central European Russia, 
Ufa in the Ural region on the border between the European part of Russia and Siberia 
and Chelyabinsk in Siberia.  
The resulting sample consists of 33 interviews with the leaders of both organisations, 
ordinary activists who collaborated with the organisations, as well as experts and 
professionals. It includes 13 interviews with the representatives of the Anti-tax 
organisation, 11 interviews with Navalny organisation’s representatives and nine expert 
interviews. The interviews lasted from 20 to 110 minutes. Interviews were conducted 
between January 2017 and January 2018. Most of the interviews were conducted in the 
Russian or Belarusian languages face-to-face as part of the fieldwork in Belarus, Russia 
(the summer of 2018) and in Lithuania. The interview venues were usually chosen by 
the interviewees. I recorded the interviews using a digital voice recorder. The identity of 
the interviewees was not disclosed to protect them. Verbal consent was received from 
all of them and was recorded using a digital voice recorder. I did not ask for written 
consent, as this procedure could jeopardise the security of my interviewees. Therefore, 
while the written consent form was prepared prior to the fieldwork (Appendix 2), I did 
not use the form and explained the issue of consent verbally. See Table 3.1 for the full 
list of the anonymised names of the interviewees. 
Based on the literature review and some preliminary analysis of the activists’ 
communication materials, I designed a semi-structured interview guide that I followed 
during the interviews. Depending on the level of an interviewee’s involvement in an 
organisation, the questions in the guide were tailored prior to each interview to 
emphasize the particular aspect of their practices and experience with an organisation 
(see Appendix 1 for the indicative interview questions). My guide was enriched with 
new issues emerging from previous interviews.  
My questions were focused on the personal background of activists, their involvement 
in the groups, as well as practices of their use of internet platforms. I aimed at gathering 
more information to explain how the use of social media platforms by activists 
contributed to the outcome of their campaigns. I asked the interviewees about their 
perception of their main challenges; their strategies of overcoming those challenges; 
their use of digital platforms; their organisational structures and involvement in the 
protest organisation; their perception of the outcomes of those protests; their personal 
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experiences, motivations and backgrounds. I also asked whether they followed the other 
studied organisation and what other potential interviewees they can recommend. A 
typical interview included my self-presentation, explanation of the research, discussion 
of consent and the request for permission to use a voice recorder. 
The transcripts of all the interviews were prepared based on the need to extract data 
from the interviews and the attitudes of the interviewees to the discussed problems. The 
interviews were transcribed in MS Word. The transcripts are not included in the thesis 
but could be provided upon request. The transcripts were uploaded on NVivo software 
and analysed using thematic analysis. The main categories for the analysis were 
identified based on the literature review and were enhanced and improved by each new 
interview coded. I began analysing data as “it is being collected” (Blee & Taylor, 2002, 
p. 110), which provoked corrections in the interview guide, the direction of sampling 
and the themes and categories of the analysis.  
I followed the coding guidelines for inductive social movement research advised by 
Mattoni (2014) in relation to the study of social movements. These guidelines allowed a 
more systematic analysis of the interview transcripts. This approach to coding involves 
three coding methods: open coding, axial coding and focused coding. First, during the 
sessions of open coding, I broke down the texts into small segments. Each segment 
received several codes based on the theoretical themes emerging from my study. 
Second, when my research entered a more advanced stage, I recombined the segments 
into a broader grouping around the same analytical category. These broader groupings 
can be generalised into four theoretical categories presented in many studies: 
“conditions, interactions, strategies/tactics and consequences” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). 
The use of the NVivo software helped me to perform this second method of coding. 
Third, I moved to another level of abstraction and elaborated more general categories 
that acquired a significant role in my analysis.  
For example, after open coding of some of the interview transcripts with the Russian 
digital activists and experts, I realised that the Telegram platform has facilitated specific 
interactions between actors who were looking to develop strategies and tactics to 
overcome the challenges of authoritarian political communication. Therefore, I focused 
on the different codes associated with the use of Telegram. I was already aware that 
Telegram facilitates a different style of interaction than other platforms. However, it 
was only during axial coding when “the interactions on Telegram for organising” 
emerged as a relevant concept. This concept helped me to link public attention that this 
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platform received recently to coordination and information circulation. “The 
interactions on Telegram for organising” later emerged as a core category of my study 
that described the linkages between different groups of the Navalny organisation as well 
as a category that explained many of its practices. Therefore, during the focused coding 
process, I elaborated a more general category as one of the core categories of the 
research that otherwise might not be emphasized.  
3.2.2 Participant observation 
The use of digital platforms is at the centre of my research. Both organisations were 
active users of multiple platforms ranging from conventional and well-known in 
western countries, such as Facebook and YouTube, to more local platforms OK, VK 
and Telegram. I aimed at getting a comprehensive picture of the organisations. 
Therefore, to understand how they work together, I had to study the key practices 
associated with this variety of platforms. Van Dijck (2013b, p. 26) suggests that “if we 
restrict our perspective to one or two specific elements or one or two specific platforms 
[…] - we can hardly grasp the mutual shaping of social media.” She suggests applying 
“integrative analytical approach” to the study of the variety of platforms used by 
political actors. Hence, I analysed the platform pages of the two organisations as part of 
their digital communication infrastructures with the methods that could help to build an 
integrated picture of their use and would require fewer resources.  
One of the methods that help to build an integrated picture of platform use is participant 
observation. This approach usually requires a physical presence in the field. However, 
my research is focused on the organisations that are significant political phenomena 
happening in primarily online settings of digital platforms. Thus, in addition to physical 
locations, my research field is digital platforms as well (Hine, 2012). These 
considerations led me to the research design that combines offline ethnographic 
observation with my virtual presence on the platforms of the studied organisations. 
Therefore, before the interviews, I conducted short periods of informal observation of 
online activities of the two studied organisations and, during the fieldwork, physical 
observation.  
This online participant observation and the fieldwork in Russia and Belarus lasted for 
seven months before, during and after the protest of February - September 2017 in both 
countries. I chose the offline sites for observation based on the locations of the 
campaign offices in the case of Russia and on the opportunity to observe the actions of 
the activists related to the Anti-tax campaign in the case of Belarus. The online sites for 
96 
observation were chosen according to the criteria discussed in Section 3.2.3 of this 
chapter. 
I studied this online field remotely based on my previous experience in local 
communities that are managed by activists. This online observation approach has 
recently become more widespread (Postill, 2017) as technologies offer new ways of 
engaging with the emergent research environment (Pink et al., 2016). For instance, Gray 
(2016) discusses “following” rather than “researching” the protest movement in Russia 
in 2011-2012 by means of text, images and video materials. That is how she describes 
her experience as an anthropologist who followed the protests online: 
I could see through their photos and videos, I could perceive through their 
descriptions, and I could triangulate among their tweets to get depth perception 
around the action as it unfolded. And beyond this, I obtained an assemblage of 
interpretations that are culturally informed, rich testimonies to the creative ways 
that Russians use irony and humor, literary and historical allusion. (Gray, 2016, p. 
508) 
This remote approach is not just about the opportunity to access a field, often in real 
time, which is otherwise not available physically due to reasons like the safety of doing 
research in possibly hazardous locations. Remote fieldwork often helps to observe 
familiar things from a different perspective. This approach creates a more productive 
engagement with objects of our interest (Gray, 2016). At the same time, I followed the 
basic conventions of participant observation such as “watching what happens, listening 
to what is said, asking questions” (O’Reilly, 2005, p. 2) but “in mediated contact with 
participants rather than indirect presence” (Pink et al., 2016, p. 3). Watching thus 
became digitally tracking of activist infrastructures while listening happened mainly 
through reading and making sense of communication (Pink et al., 2016, p. 3). Thus, 
remote observation aided the process of studying the specifics of communication spaces 
where activists interact every day. 
Observation also opened a way for collection of both qualitative and quantitative data 
such as basic metrics of the activists’ platform presence (Patriarche et al., 2014, p. 154). 
In addition, it allowed me to explore contexts, to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
organisations’ internal workings and made it easier to find people to interview. 
Moreover, following observation and interviews, remarkable textual and visual 
fragments of campaign materials were identified in order to be analysed by 
supplementary methods. 
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I started my observation of the Anti-tax campaign in February 2017 when its first 
collective action happened and finished in March 2017. I started observing the Navalny 
organisation three weeks after the launch of the Anti-tax campaign when the activists 
published a video investigation that contributed to the mobilisation for its rallies. The 
observation of the Navalny organisation lasted until the end of my physical fieldwork in 
September 2017 with breaks in May, June and July. I observed and recorded the content 
published on the accounts of the two organisations on digital platforms. The detailed 
discussion of these accounts and their content is presented in the following section. 
During the process of observation, I kept fieldnotes about the observed platform 
interactions. In addition, based on the recommended practices of online observation 
(Hine, 2012, p. 46), I archived those interactions making screenshots. I discuss the 
process of making screenshots in the following sections. All the collected text and 
visual data were saved and archived during the period of the study. 
Online observation was conducted on VK, OK, Telegram, YouTube and Facebook. The 
offline observation was conducted in Moscow, St Petersburg, Minsk, Vilnius, Brest, 
Homel and Nizhny Novgorod. I used every opportunity to meet a person of interest 
when they became available, so I travelled extensively. I observed and participated in 
some of the campaigners’ meetings, workshops, informal discussions and events. Still, 
my offline observation was limited. For security reasons, I could not observe public 
events such as rallies or other interactions of the campaigners with the public outside of 
their offices. Thus, in Russia, I conducted my observation inside the campaigners’ 
offices. In Belarus, the Anti-tax organisation had no offices, and few formal structures 
were available for physical observation. Therefore, in the case of this country, I 
restricted my participation almost exclusively to the online space. Still, I observed a few 
organisational meetings of the actors related to the Anti-tax campaign in Vilnius, 
Lithuania. This was done for my preliminary informal observation. 
Based on the data received from participant observation such as fieldnotes, as well as 
the lists and tables of relevant communities and platforms features observed, I was able 
to proceed with the analysis of the organisations using other methods. I used the tables 
and lists organised during my observation to design the use and samples for content 
analysis. Observation, thus, became a first step in the analysis of the studied phenomena 
and contributed to the description of the process for case study. I used the fieldnotes to 
produce an in-depth case study description (Patton, 2002, p. 438) of the backgrounds 
and organisational operations of the two organisations. This description helped to open 
up a world where the activists live and act. The observation data also helped me to 
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describe and analyse their collective action, and the Navalny campaigns’ organisational 
culture. The episodes I recount through the dissertation and all the quotations without 
references come from many hours I spent as a participant-observer with the 
campaigners in Belarus and Russia. 
3.2.3 Content analysis: Features analysis, textual analysis, analysis of 
documents and social network analysis 
The methods that involve analysis of content - features analysis, analysis of documents 
and social network analysis - provided supplementary datasets. I discuss their choice, 
design and sample less extensively than the other two methods that were more central to 
the research. I approached the analysis of content through both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to study media. 
I analysed the content of the activists’ pages on digital media to explain some findings 
of the previous stages of the study, namely the role of platforms in the process of 
organising, to trace organisational linkages and to follow the flows of information. I 
also analysed social media content to examine the online context of the interviewees 
and clarify some of their assumptions and statements. Since I study essentially political 
organisations, some of the interviewees might act like politicians during the interviews, 
presenting reality in light of what they believe suits them best. Content analysis helped 
me to clarify and double check some of their statements and perceptions. 
3.2.3.1 Selection of platforms 
In summer 2017, it was relatively easy to identify what platforms the Navalny 
organisation used, who its public leaders were and what time period I should focus on. 
The names of its leaders were published elsewhere in the media, while the organisation 
advertised on its website all possible public accounts on social media platforms – VK, 
Twitter, OK, Facebook and YouTube. It was a bit more challenging to determine their 
platform(s) for internal communication and organising. I realised that Telegram was 
important for the organisation for the first time when I tried to reach out to its leaders to 
interview them. I soon figured out that Telegram was the best way to reach these 
people: once you had their mobile numbers (which were often available in the public 
domain), you could find them on Telegram. The activists of the organisation were quick 
in their response to my requests on Telegram – in contrast to usual communication on 
email or other messengers. Thus, I added Telegram to the scope of my research in 
Russia. 
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The time frame of the Navalny organisation that I analyse covers the period from 2 
March 2017 (the date when the anti-corruption investigation was published in Russia) to 
17 March 2018 (18 March 2018 was a day of the most important political event of the 
period – the presidential election in Russia). I specifically focus on the first stage of 
Navalny’s campaigning that year – the Anti-corruption campaign between 2 March 
2017 to 25 March 2017 (the last day of the preparations for its first series of national 
rallies on 26 March 2017). 
The Anti-tax campaign in Belarus looked more cryptic. As I discuss in the results 
chapters, this campaign was dubbed as “leaderless” by the media, many of its activists 
and some experts. It was also not clear from media publications how the information 
about it was circulated. It had neither a website nor easily identifiable pages on social 
media. I had to “reverse engineer” that campaign online to understand its origins and its 
main organisational mechanisms. I used search engines to determine the scope of the 
analysis and the sample of social media pages, activist groups and individuals to include 
in the study. These search engines were Google, Yandex, as well as those embedded in 
social media platforms. For instance, I used search services like Google Image Search to 
locate the sources of campaign materials such as images, texts and discussions of the 
campaign. These services helped me to identify users and groups that initially discussed 
the possibility of protests online.  
This approach helped to determine the scope of the analysis of the Anti-tax campaign, 
the platforms OK, VK and, to a lesser extent, Facebook, as well as the period of the 
study, from 19 January, when the preparations for the first protest rally were announced 
by one of the campaigning groups, to 24 March, the last day of preparations for the last 
big rallies of the campaign. Later, the interviews confirmed the relevance of my sample. 
Still, my sampling strategy primarily relied on search engines results rather than on 
public or experts’ opinion. According to Earl (2013), this strategy provides insight into 
examples of activism that are less noticeable in media and literature. The strategy was 
helpful because I was aiming at revealing the internal workings of the campaigns rather 
than reproducing their public images that could be carefully engineered by their leaders. 
3.2.3.2 Features analysis 
First, I analysed the social media pages of the two organisations as part of their digital 
communication infrastructures using features analysis. Features analysis is the 
examination of the features of digital platforms. It “focuses on recording the occurrence 
of particular features or characteristics” of platforms (Kavada, 2012, p. 36) and helps to 
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study the development of digital activists’ and their campaigns’ representation from the 
perspective of the design and architecture of digital platforms (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2013; Foot & Schneider, 2006). Features analysis also allows describing the process of 
engagement of activists with their audience. Interactive features “enable people to do 
things pertaining to engagement with the protests beyond the basic” reading or 
navigating pages (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, p. 67).  
A feature of a platform is a unit of analysis. The examples of the features are links, 
opinions polls, forums and discussions. These features were considered as an artefact 
that mediated the relationship between a user and a campaign. In addition, the relevant 
content like texts or images about the purpose of use of the features, as well as the 
interaction of users about them, were collected and examined where this helped to 
understand how the features were used. Thus, features analysis allowed collecting data 
about the appropriation of the design of digital platforms by activists. 
In the circumstances when the access to the internal organising documentation of the 
campaigns was restricted for security purposes, features analysis provided an 
opportunity to aggregate data about their internal organising. In addition, I primarily 
worked with platforms that were relatively rarely studied by scholars of digital 
platforms. Few automatic instruments of data collection were available for these 
platforms. The advantage of features analysis is its reliance on manual coding. 
The scope, the sample and the study periods of features analysis reflect the protest 
phases of the Anti-tax and the Anti-corruption campaigns. Features analysis was 
focused on four platforms: VK, OK, Telegram and Facebook. The features were 
analysed based on the snapshots of the campaign pages that were collected using Zotero 
and NVivo software. These snapshots depict the full timelines of the OK, VK and 
Facebook pages and groups linked to the organisations. The features of Telegram were 
studied without snapshots since Telegram groups or channels could not be viewed in an 
internet browser.   
The sample of features analysis contains the snapshots of 95 pages (see Table 3.3). One 
snapshot covers all the posts of a page over the studied period. The Russian Anti-
corruption campaign VK page sample was collected on 25 March 2017, which was the 
day prior to the 26 March rallies. I tracked the organisation pages from the page 
“Navalny Team” on VK5. This was the main page of the Anti-corruption campaign on 
 
5 https://vk.com/wall-55284725_272730  
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VK. VK was the only platform where the anti-corruption campaigners have built that 
extensive network. Other platforms, as I later learned during the interviews, were not 
consistently used across different regions of Russia. For instance, Facebook might be 
more popular in the European part of Russia, while OK is popular in Siberia. Each page 
advertised an Anti-corruption rally in one location in Russia. After coding the VK 
pages, I removed seven of them because their administrators announced the cancellation 
of the Anti-corruption rallies in their locations. Most of them were later deleted from 
VK. Thus, the working sample of the Anti-corruption organisation contained 88 VK 
pages. This analysis also helped to determine the exact number of cities where the anti-
corruption rallies took place on 26 March.  
The subsample of the Anti-tax campaign contains 5 pages that represent the three main 
groups of the Anti-tax campaign on three key digital platforms. These main groups were 
determined based on the observation of the campaign, search on Google and platforms, 
as well as independent media publications. This sample was later confirmed with the 
activist and the experts during the interviews. These materials were collected and 
archived on 24 March 2017 except for the REP trade union pages. This was the day 
prior to the last large-scale protests of the Anti-tax campaign. The pages of the REP 
trade union were collected between 27 March and 8 April 2017. I collected the REP 
pages after I identified the significance of this organisation for the campaign. The first 
post of the Anti-tax dataset for every page is 16 February 2017 – a day prior to the first 
large rally of the campaign in Minsk.  
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Table 3.3 
The sample of features analysis 
Case Belarus Russia 
Period of analysis 16.02.2017 - 24.03.2017  (37 days) 
14.03.2017 - 25.03.2017  
(12 days) 
Estimated number 
of posts 1 800 2 100 
Pages  
 The PASD VK 
 The Party of Parasites FB 
 REP OK 
 REP VK 
 REP Facebook 
 88 VK pages dedicated to 
the 26 March rallies 
Examples of 
features analysed  
 Type of a page 
 Discussion options 
 Links to other pages 
 Type of a page 
 Discussion options 
 Links to other pages 
 Possibility to post as a user 
 Specific features of the 
design 
 
It was essential to collect this data prior to the rallies as a police crackdown on the 
campaigns was possible and the pages, partly or totally, could be removed. Indeed, a 
day after I collected the data, the counter-terrorism police searched the Navalny federal 
organisation office in Moscow and confiscated its servers. In addition, almost all the 
posts of the REP trade union that I have collected were later removed by the 
administration of the OK platform. Moreover, I could not predict the outcome of the 
campaigns and did not know whether any additional rallies or other collective action 
would take place later. 
Later I learned that I covered all the extent of the active protest stage of the Anti-tax 
campaign in my sample. At the same time, the Navalny organisation continued for more 
than a year with four additional series of protests. The use of digital media during other 
series of protests was not very different for the Navalny organisation except for the 
diminished role of VK and the extensive use of the Telegram messenger. I explain the 
design of the textual analysis of Telegram messages in the next section. Therefore, one 
of the advantages of this dataset is that it is not retrospective. Retrospective datasets are 
common in the analysis of political interactions on digital platforms. However, as I 
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demonstrated, if I relied on a retrospective dataset, a substantial part of the sample 
would not be available for the analysis. 
These two sets of pages from the two organisations can be constructed because they 
represent the period when the organisations started active mobilisation for their first 
rallies. During the analysed periods, both organisations started emerging in some or 
another configuration. This emerging status made the organisations look similar – more 
similar than perhaps in any other periods of their development. After 26 March 2017 – 
the day of the first rally of the Anti-corruption campaign when my sample ends - the 
organisation switched its focus and attempted to build a more permanent and centralised 
structure. Thus, I analyse the two organisations during the periods when they were 
considered by the public as emerging phenomena. 
The design of a codebook for features analysis was based on theoretical sampling and 
the results of the previous stages of case study. Kavada (2012) used features analysis to 
record the display of connections of platform pages. I adopted a similar focus but 
directed my analysis towards the connections between the pages of the same 
organisation. I also recorded the occurrence of other features of the platforms to capture 
the campaign’s organisational and content strategies. I analysed three types of platform 
artefacts or their features: types of content, interactive content and types of actions. The 
examples of the studied features include the elements of page walls, discussions and 
external links sections. Features analysis also helped me to quantify some elements like 
the number of links to analyse the linkages between the pages of the organisation and to 
build a sample for network analysis. Thus, the codebook contained 18 variables with 
mostly dichotomous measures that mainly assessed a function of content. The coding of 
the pages of the Anti-tax campaign was simple and straightforward since its sample 
contained only five pages.  
I used features analysis of the organisations’ pages to build case studies of their public 
representation and the affordances used by them. I also used this method to analyse the 
linkages between the segments of organisations to conclude on the nature of their 
organisational structures. Finally, I used features analysis to demonstrate how the 
figures of less visible leaders like page administrators shape the collective voices of a 
digitally-enabled movement (Kavada, 2015).  
3.2.3.2 Textual analysis  
The second supplementary method I used was textual analysis. This method was 
employed to analyse some textual fragments of the cross-platform content produced by 
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the campaigners and their supporters. It also helped to describe the process of 
engagement of the activists with their audience. I built three samples for textual 
analysis.  
First, to analyse the content of the Anti-tax campaign, I collected posts from five OK, 
VK and Facebook pages (Table 4.6) (1 800 posts) for the period from 16 February 2017 
to 24 March 2017. I collected these materials on 25 March 2017 and, for the REP trade 
union, on 8 April 2017.  
Second, to analyse the content of the Navalny organisation across different platforms, I 
focused on two hashtags - #Navalny2018 and #strike. While the former was used for the 
whole period of campaigning by the organisation, the latter emerged in December 2017 
to advertise the #strike campaign of the organisation. I collected all the public posts that 
contained these hashtags dated from 14 March 2017 to 16 March 2018 on 17 March 
2018 across two platforms - VK and Instagram. The core activists identified these 
platforms as key social media for the #strike content dissemination. 27 898 posts were 
collected. 
The firth and second samples were collected with the Popsters commercial framework 
(popsters.us), which allows accessing APIs of VK, OK, Instagram and Facebook to 
store the following metrics for any page: the numbers of shares (for VK, OK and 
Facebook), comments and likes (classes), as well as the type of the content of each post 
collected.  
The analysis of these posts was straightforward. I calculated the natural logarithms of 
the volumes of the posts and shares for the two samples (Figures 6.6 and 6.11). This 
allowed me to identify the critical periods of information dissemination activities for the 
campaigns. These periods were defined based on the maximum volume of the posts 
during the period.  
The last sample focused on the use of the Telegram platform by the Navalny 
organisation (Belarus’ activists did not use it extensively). I was not able to locate 
examples of studies that used content analysis approaches to research Telegram and 
explained their methods in detail. A few studies that approached the subject with this 
approach did not explain their process of codebook design and other features of their 
methodology (e.g. Prucha, 2016; Shehabat, Mitew, & Alzoubi, 2017). Indeed, the 
platform has only recently emerged as a significant tool of political communication in a 
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few countries by the time of my fieldwork. Therefore, the scarcity of research on the 
matter rendered experimentation an absolute necessity.  
I collected the sample of Telegram messages posted in the period from 6 October 2017 
to 17 March 2018. To collect data, I joined 12 Telegram groups and channels created by 
the coordinators of the Navalny organization in the studied Russian provinces, so the 
Telegram textual analysis sample mirrored the interview sample. I also collected the 
posts of the main channel of the organisation (the “Navalny Team”). This sample, 
however, represents only a fraction of the Navalny organisation’s Telegram accounts. 
The links to these public channels and groups were available on the campaign profiles 
on VK and other public pages of the organization. Rostov-on-Don’s Telegram group 
was private, so I excluded it from the sample. I informed the coordinators of the local 
offices of the organization about my intention to read the content of the channels and 
groups before I started data collection.  
To store the selection of posts, I created my own Telegram channel. The Telegram 
platform allows sharing posts from groups in own channels. Hence, my channel became 
a private depository of the collected texts, images and videos posted by the followers 
and the coordinators of the campaign. The information shared on these channels also 
includes .doc, .pdf and .xls files. I collected all the available documents from these 
channels.  
Due to time constraints, I did not read and analyse all the posts appearing on the 
selected channels and groups. Instead, I focused on the critical periods of the campaign 
activity, after August 2017 when most of the Navalny offices established their presence 
on Telegram. I chose the wave of protests on 7 October 2017 as an exemplifying critical 
event to analyse with textual analysis because it was related to the presidential 
campaign, was not the largest but a more “routine” one. Thus, the third sample 
comprised the posts appeared on the 12 Telegram groups and channels between 6 and 7 
October 2017 (the day before a protest and during it). The sample included 4 144 posts 
– normally short chat-style messages, so it was not difficult reading them all.  
I undertook a close reading of these materials and took notes about the posts, identified 
their main themes and thematic patterns in the text as well as its sources (Altheide & 
Schneider, 2013, pp. 111–112). I focused on the following themes: the perception of 
Telegram affordances, the discussion of organizing in the Navalny campaign, visibility 
of the leadership and coordination during protest events. This approach allowed me to 
isolate the practices of the Telegram used by the campaigners and to build the topology 
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of the groups and channels. Thus, I analysed how collective action was coordinated by 
the Navalny organization, who coordinated it and what their public representation on 
the messenger was. 
3.2.3.3 Analysis of documents 
I also collected all the available documents and statements of the organisations. Most of 
those documents were produced by core activists. These documents included, for 
instance, statements of the initial coalition of the Anti-tax campaign or electronic files 
collected during the analysis of the Telegram groups and pages of the Navalny 
organisation. 
I also watched all the YouTube shows called “Stab” (Headquarter) and “Navalny 20:18” 
produced by the Navalny organisation in the period of my observation. These two 
shows were hosted by Leonid Volkov and Alexei Navalny – the official leaders of the 
Navalny organisation. Since I did not interview them, almost 96 hours of those videos 
helped me to document the perceptions and attitudes of those two leaders and to obtain 
valuable information about the organising. For instance, “Stab” focused mostly on the 
everyday organisational operations of the campaign. In their shows, the leaders 
discussed the organisation matters openly and regularly as a way of coordinating their 
supporters. In addition to these two programs, I also watched 30 hours of other 
YouTube shows prepared by Navalny’s campaigners and posted on their YouTube 
channels. These shows discussed such issues as the cybersecurity of their operations, 
the strategies of avoiding persecution and surveillance, the campaign’s agenda, the 
events related to its local offices, its anti-corruption investigations and other issues 
relevant to the research framework of my dissertation.  
I documented the selected episodes of the watched shows and transcribed them in my 
research diary. I also documented several blog posts prepared by the Anti-tax leaders, as 
well as media reports about the campaign. Finally, I subscribed to the main email list of 
the Navalny organisation and some of its Telegram groups where the supporters 
discussed organisational matters. The information obtained during the analysis of 
documents contributed to my observation of the campaign operations. 
3.2.3.4 Social network analysis  
Finally, social network analysis (SNA) was used to analyse mutual connections between 
the sampled pages of the Anti-tax campaign and other protest-related pages on the VK 
platform. SNA allowed me to trace the connections or “links” between these pages. The 
analysis of “linked” pages and groups is a common way to examine the network of 
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digitally-enabled social movements (Zhang & Lee, 2018). Such links can influence 
information exchange between the groups (Kavada, 2018). Network analysis allows 
illustrating how social movement actors create new linkages that, in turn, can influence 
“the subsequent development of protest” and other activities (Diani, 2002, p. 175). The 
shape of a network “can tell us a lot about the nature of a movement at a given point in 
time” (Diani, 2002, p. 174). The primary purpose of analysing online content with SNA 
was to reveal the links between the pages of the Anti-tax campaign on VK and to 
observe the attitudes and interests of their administrators. 
I focused SNA on the PASD group of the Anti-tax campaign on VK. It was easier to 
trace these links on VK rather than on other platforms such as OK or Facebook due to 
the architecture of the platforms. I traced the links to other VK pages from the “Links to 
other pages” section of the PASD group based on the screenshot saved in April 2017. 
This period of data collection is chosen based on the logic of and preliminary analysis 
of the data related to the Anti-tax campaign. I collected the data for SNA immediately 
when I realised this data could help me to analyse the campaign. The PASD group was 
the only Anti-tax campaign page on VK that had an extensive list of links in this 
section. I traced the connection between nodes up to the third level. Then I built a graph 
using the Gephi software. The graph depicted the links between the pages of VK 
affiliated with the PASD. I triangulated the results of the analysis of the graph with the 
interview of the PASD administrator to analyse the segmentation in the campaign.  
In summary, this mixed-method research design reflects the research questions and the 
main categories identified in the literature review. The design allows approaching the 
objects of the study from different angles and producing a focused, detailed 
investigation in the tradition of theoretical discovery. The chosen methods were first 
used to describe the campaigning phenomena and the main limitations of the context 
and then to analyse the response of the studied actors to those limitations. It allowed 
looking at strategic organisational practices of the two campaigns and explaining their 
consequences both from the perspectives of the platformisation of political process 
globally and the local pro-democracy struggle.  
3.3 Triangulation of the national cases 
After collecting and analysing data, I triangulated them. Triangulation is “testing for a 
hypothesized relationship among the same variables with a variety of methods” 
(Neuendorf, 2017, p. 38). The triangulation of methods allows for more detailed and 
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multivocal analysis than any single methodology (Snow & Trom, 2002). “Triangulation 
of methods ultimately produces stronger theories than multiple replications and 
permutations of the same method,” suggest Klandermans, Staggenborg, & Tarrow 
(2002, p. 319). I started with a qualitative exploration of the topic before using some 
quantitative methods. Such design allows generalising qualitative findings to a sample 
gathered during the quantitative phase (Ayoub et al., 2014). Therefore, the design of the 
triangulation in my project is exploratory. 
The methods of interviews, participant observation and content analysis are commonly 
used in different disciplines like media studies, political science and other social science 
disciplines. This diversity of methods helped me to draw on the analytical apparatus of 
the mentioned disciplines to build multi-layered models based on the collected data. 
However, as van Dijck (2013b, p. 43) notes, vocabularies and methodologies of these 
disciplines are often mutually incompatible. This incompatibility complicates matters of 
such an interdisciplinary approach. In addition, it can be challenging to synthesize data 
collected through different methods. To avoid the complications associated with the 
multi-disciplinary and multi-method design of my study, I remained conscious of which 
type of data every method generates and on what level of analysis it focuses.  
3.4 Methodological implications and challenges 
The research project employs the case study approach to the enquiry into digital 
campaigns conducted by political movements. Movements are often difficult to study 
because they can represent an amalgam of groups of various structures with different 
ideological positions and fluid membership. In her study of the use of the internet by 
social movements in the 2000s, Kavada (2007, p. 97) suggested that to study “the 
internal processes of such an inherently chaotic and mutable actor” is a challenging 
process. Nevertheless, the major methodological challenges of my project are associated 
with other issues. The first challenge was the primary method of the data collection for 
the case studies, which is interviews, a method that requires building trust and getting 
personal information about the participants. The second challenge was the locations 
where many interviews and participant observation took place, Belarus and Russia. 
When addressing both challenges, I had to be, as Kavada (2007) suggests, both 
resourceful and experimental. 
Many scholars of social movements that were reviewed in this dissertation conduct their 
studies in western democracies where movements rarely face the challenges similar to 
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those discussed in the research. Authoritarian states are often challenging locations to 
examine politics and media. The project design required several trips to Belarus and 
Russia, meeting respondents who can be under surveillance, under types of repression 
or be agents of the regime themselves. These respondents may conceal their opinions 
about the regime and political process for fear of repression or violence. Moreover, their 
communication can be influenced by the fear of regime surveillance or ordinary 
paranoia (Goode & Ahram, 2016, p. 826). In addition to this, seemingly simple tasks 
such as getting in the country or observing informal processes out on the streets can 
become obstacles (Goode & Ahram, 2016, p. 824). These and other potential obstacles 
make investigating authoritarian regimes a task that forces difficult choices upon the 
researcher with regards to their own and their informants’ safety. These choices, as 
Goode & Ahram (2016, p. 828) argue, are similar to those faced by people doing an 
investigation in countries in the midst of civil war. 
The experience of contemporary students of authoritarian regimes suggests that the use 
of multiple forms of data from open sources, careful observation and awareness of 
opportunity help to tackle these challenges (Markowitz, 2016). Ahram and Goode 
(2016) suggest adopting a reflexive approach to the study of authoritarianism. Reny 
(2016) argues that qualitative methods like semi-structured interviews and ethnographic 
research are especially valuable methods in these circumstances since authoritarian 
regimes tend to falsify statistics and other data often used in quantitative studies. These 
methods help to immerse in the relevant communities, find reliable collaborators and 
develop creative ways of collecting information (Reny, 2016, p. 909). In other words, as 
Art (2016, p. 975) put it, “scholars of authoritarian regimes need to think more like 
detectives.” 
My previous experience of working with and living in the studied countries gave me an 
advantage in this detective-style endeavour. This experience allowed presenting myself 
more like a local or an insider rather than an outsider when required. I did not 
necessarily know people I wanted to engage with before my project started. However, I 
knew some people who might have known other activists. This knowledge also made it 
easier to navigate the complex network of power relations in these countries and to get 
into the relevant communities of activists. This was especially true in the case of 
Belarus, where I have been involved in media, student and human rights communities 
over an extended period of time. In Russia, it was more difficult for me to navigate 
media and activist networks as I had relatively little experience in this country before. In 
addition, I had personal connections with some groups of activists in the studied 
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countries that were established during my previous research and work in the field. 
Nevertheless, as I discovered during the fieldwork, while getting access to core activists 
of the Navalny organisation was not that difficult, accessing some covert leaders of the 
Anti-tax campaign in Belarus was a more challenging task. The insider status and 
experience helped me to develop trust and rapport with my interviewees. 
For example, I used my insider status to gain access to the leader of the “Parasites” and 
“Social Dependents” group (PASD) of the Anti-tax campaign. It had the largest number 
of followers compared to other Anti-tax pages and became one of the most prominent 
groups on social media dedicated to the campaign. The leader’s social media profile was 
hidden under the name of "Robin Good." Only after the police identified him and 
attempted to persecute him seven months after for the Anti-tax campaign stopped, did I 
have the opportunity to meet the leader of the group. Still, I could not contact him 
directly because I knew that his electronic devices were controlled by the police. I was 
thus afraid to send him direct messages as I thought his accounts might be monitored as 
well. Instead, I wrote a request to a person with whom he had established a security line. 
Shortly after this, I was informed that he would contact me. On 1 January 2018, I 
received a call from a person who told me that he was the admin and he was ready to 
meet me. He gave me a time and place of the meeting. It all indeed looked a bit like a 
detective story at times. 
To gain more access to and understanding of the internal workings of the opposition and 
dissident groups in Russia and Belarus, I attended and observed several meetings and 
events organised by such groups. I do not name these meetings and events for security 
reasons because their organisers often tried to protect the places where they took place 
and the names of its participants. Since I intend to keep this manuscript in the public 
domain, I do not disclose the details of these meetings. These contacts helped me to get 
in touch with potential interviewees.  
My local experience and knowledge made it potentially more difficult to maintain a 
critical distance from the objects of my study. On the one hand, I continually 
emphasised my methodological protocol to keep this distance. I also maintained a 
temporal distance when, upon returning from the fieldwork, I disconnected myself from 
the studied campaigns. I also attempted to remain objective and avoid normative 
engagement – a common fault when studying non-democratic regimes (Goode, 2016). 
To sharpen my awareness of my possible bias, I kept a research diary during the 
fieldwork. The diary helped me to reflect on this dialectic between being an insider and 
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an outsider. I also used it during the analysis of the data. This, combined with an honest 
approach to my interviewees, helped me to maintain a critical distance from the study 
objects. 
At the same time, scholars recognise that it is hard to keep a distance in places similar to 
the ones I study, especially when the proximity to actors can bring additional benefits in 
terms of contacts and data. Indeed, an insider-outsider dialectic is an issue that might be 
observed in many types of social research (Blee & Taylor, 2002, p. 97). Therefore, 
maintaining a balance between objectivity and engagement is the strategy that can bring 
a maximum benefit for the research in the circumstances of a non-democracy. 
3.5 Research ethics 
This study is primarily focused on the internet. Consequently, when designing the study, 
I followed the recommendations on research ethics in digital space. In particular, I 
followed the recommendations of the Association of Internet Research on ethical 
decision-making (Markham & Buchanan, 2012). When presenting, analysing or 
discussing data, I used only public information. Fuchs (2017) suggests that several 
codes of ethics consider information public if its producers, e.g. users, cannot 
reasonably expect to remain unobserved. The regulation of the studied platforms, e.g. 
Facebook Data Policy (Facebook, 2016), normally defines such information as any 
information open to anyone. Therefore, I expected that the studied activists perceive the 
information they published on VK, OK, Facebook and Instagram as open to anyone, as 
well as any discussions following this information such as social media posts as public. 
Information published by ordinary participants in semi-public groups might be 
perceived a bit differently by their authors. To address this issue, I decided not to cite 
any information published by ordinary users on those groups. I studied only those 
groups that were associated with the branches whose leaders I interviewed. They were 
aware of my interest in their groups and did not express any concerns. 
To protect ordinary users who discussed or reacted to this information online, their 
identities were anonymised. This helped to prevent tracing the study data back to users’ 
private information and to protect their confidentiality during the dissemination of the 
results of the study. I also ensured that any data related to them was secured and stored 
on encrypted drives.  
I anonymised all the sources who had relation to dissident movements in Belarus and 
Russia to protect them. I also provided an option for the participants of the study to 
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withdraw from it at any moment until its results were published or presented publicly. 
In addition, if any participant expressed concern associated with my study, I was 
prepared to remove any mentions of them. No such requests were received though.  
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Chapter 4 Political organisation in authoritarian settings 
The dissertation analyses how the use of digital media influences the forms of 
organisation and leadership and the mechanisms of information distribution in anti-
authoritarian movements. It focuses on how the activists of anti-authoritarian 
movements respond to attempts of the state to control the online realm through 
surveillance, persecution and censorship. To trace this response, the dissertation 
analyses two key elements of activists’ practices: how they organise and how they 
distribute alternative information by using digital platforms. This chapter seeks to 
analyse the forms of organisation and leadership that emerge in anti-authoritarian 
movements that rely on digital media. 
The following three chapters present and analyse data on the Anti-tax and Navalny 
campaigns in Belarus and Russia. I focus on crucial points of its campaigning in 2017 
and early 2018, the periods when these organisations spread throughout many 
Belarusian and Russian provinces and were a force behind the largest waves of political 
protest in the countries during that period.  
Chapter 4 consists of three sections. In the first section, I present the background of the 
campaigns. I base this presentation on the data obtained during participant observation 
and interviews. In the second and third sections, I discuss the organisational structures 
that were adopted by campaigners and their perception by the media, the authorities and 
the public. This analysis is based on interviews, textual analysis of the materials that 
were disseminated by activists, as well as SNA and features analysis of their VK 
communities. 
4.1 The background of the Navalny and the Anti-tax organisations 
4.1.1 The Navalny organisation: three campaigns in one year 
4.1.1.1 Alexei Navalny and his team  
Prior to 2017 – the year I cover in this chapter – a 40-year Russian lawyer Alexei 
Navalny had tried his hand at different areas of political activism and media. He was a 
popular political and anti-corruption blogger, a public policy adviser for a local 
government, a leader of an unregistered party, even a television host (Kramer, 2012; 
Lenta.ru, n.d.). He also ran as a candidate for the 2011 Moscow major election, 
finishing second that race (Englund, 2013). 
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Plenty of people have joined Navalny. Some of them, like the prominent Russian civic 
activist Leonid Volkov, first joined him before the Moscow major election (Respondent 
28, personal communication, August 7, 2017). Others did so after following several 
years of his anti-corruption campaigning (Respondent 28, personal communication, 
August 7, 2017). Many of those experienced activists came to the 2017 campaign from 
an organisation called the Anti-Corruption Foundation (“Fond Borby s Korruptsiey” or 
FBK in Russian) (Respondent 30, personal communication, August 15, 2017). 
Established by Navalny and his fellow activists in 2011 (Anti-Corruption Foundation, 
n.d.), the Foundation became prominent in Russia for its work revealing the corruption 
and other unlawful behaviours of the top politicians and business figures (Lokot, 2018). 
What unites this core team of Navalny is its members’ experience of digital 
campaigning and organising of protest movements. One these movements, the 2011–12 
“For Fair Elections” protests, was inspired, followed and organised mainly through the 
web with a particular focus on Facebook (T. Balmforth, 2011; Bodrunova & 
Litvinenko, 2015; Toepfl, 2017). Though the movement largely failed (Gabowitsch, 
2017), Navalny, Volkov and other core members of the studied campaigns gained 
experience and skills of digital platform campaigning during those events. These people 
enhanced their skills further when they joined other political or civic campaigns. For 
example, Volkov ran for local elections and attempted to build a political party 
following the failure of the 2011 protest movement. Navalny expanded his media 
experience and continued his anti-corruption investigations. Respondent 28, who later 
became the head of the Navalny campaigning in one of the Russian regions, participated 
in several elections as both a manager and a candidate (Respondent 28, personal 
communication, 9 August 2017). These and other people joined Navalny’s campaigning 
in 2017 to create his core team. 
4.1.1.2 Three campaigns 
The 2017 year should have become the most prominent and ambitious year in 
Navalny’s campaigning when he raised the profile of his activities. That year, he and his 
supporters launched three successive campaigns (Table 4.1). It all started when the core 
of Navalny’s activists increased the efforts of the FBK (the Anti-Corruption 
Foundation) to conduct their investigations and to demand an end to the government 
corruption. In March 2017, the FBK published a video about the unregistered properties 
of the Russian prime minister. This video became the media cornerstone that was used 
by the campaigners to mobilise and organise protests on 26 March 2017, just three 
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weeks after its publication. In geographic reach, these protests were the largest that 
Russia has seen since the early 1990s (Kara-Murza, 2017). I refer to this campaign as 
the Anti-corruption campaign. 
Second, the organisation launched a grassroots campaign that demanded to register 
Navalny in Russia’s March 2018 presidential election. By the end of June 2017, the 
Navalny 2018 nomination campaign or the presidential campaign became the sole 
campaign associated with the Navalny organisational structures. It aimed to promote 
Navalny’s figure in this election. However, both campaigners and independent 
observers had doubts about Navalny’s prospects to be included on the ballot 
(Respondent 6, personal communication, August 7, 2017; Respondent 32, personal 
communication, May 25, 2017). Soon after the announcement, the election authorities 
reported that they would probably bar Navalny from running on the grounds of his 
suspended prison sentence — on what Navalny claimed was a trumped-up charge. At 
the beginning, the campaigning staff was hardly different from the FBK people. 
Moreover, until April 2017, it was difficult to distinguish the presidential campaign 
from the Anti-corruption campaign.  
Third, after the presidential bid of Navalny failed in December 2017, the Navalny 
presidential campaign was transformed into the Voters’ #strike campaign. This boycott 
campaign aimed to discourage citizens from voting in the presidential election. By 
doing so, the voters would diminish the election and their expected winner, Vladimir 
Putin. They would also protest the refusal of the election authorities to register Navalny 
as a candidate. To further delegitimise the election, the #strike campaign asked its 
followers to become election observers to monitor the procedures on voting day (Albats, 
2018a). These observers would register any violations and falsifications of the election 
procedures and publicise them. This would prove that the election was fraudulent, and 
the resulting new presidential term of Putin would in effect be illegitimate. Ultimately, 
the #strike campaign was a proactive way to boycott the election. It could also help to 
improve the voting procedures if enough observers would turn to the polling stations. 
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Table 4.1 
The three campaigns of the Navalny organisation in 2017 
Note. aThe anti-corruption activities of the advocacy NGO FBK continued after this period 
(Lokot, 2018), but the Navalny organisation did not focus on them as much as in spring 2017. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The main symbols of the three campaigns of the Navalny organisation in 
2017-18  
 
  
Name of a 
campaign Period Dates of protests Demands 
1. Anti-
corruption  
March 2017 – 
June 2017a 
26 March 2017 
12 June 2017 
Oust the prime minister and 
other “corrupt” officials 
2. Navalny 
2018 
nomination  
April 2017 – 
December 2017 
12 June 2017 
7 October 2017 
Register Navalny in the 
2018 presidential election  
3. Voters’ 
#strike  
December 2017 – 
March 2018 
28 January 2018 Free and fair elections 
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Table 4.2 
The four protest waves of the Navalny organisation in 2017-18 before the presidential 
election 
Date 
Localities 
involved Main claim 
Participants in 
total Detained 
26.03.2017 88a 
To investigate the corruption 
allegations against the prime 
minister 
37 000 - 88 000b 1666-1805b 
12.06.2017 154c 
To investigate the corruption 
allegations against the Russian 
elites 
50 000 - 98 000c 1769c 
07.10.2017 80d 
To investigate the corruption 
allegations against the Russian 
elites including president Putin 
2 560 - 21 520d 321d 
28.01.2018 46-118e Organize fair elections 5 000 - 88 000e 350e 
Note. For the discussion of the author’s research on the number of localities, see the features 
analysis section in Chapter 3. 
aAuthor's research. bMeduza (2017a). cMeduza (2017b). dMeduza (2017c). eYunanov (2018). 
 
Out of these three campaigns, in this chapter, I mainly focus on the period when the 
Anti-corruption campaign gave momentum to the next Navalny 2018 election 
nomination campaign in March 2017. It was one of the crucial moments for Navalny’s 
supporters as they managed to gather at least 37 000 people nationwide, according to 
the police (see Table 4.2).  The presidential bid of Navalny was noticed by the public 
when, during the four weeks of March 2017, the number of registered supporters grew 
almost two-fold, and the number of people who were ready to nominate him for the 
presidential bid grew from about 130 000 to 272 000 (Volkov, 2017d). To be registered 
as a candidate, Navalny needed 300 000 signatures. Thus, this period between the Anti-
corruption and the election nomination campaigns was a crucial time frame when 
numerous branches of his organisation proliferated around the country. I study how 
these campaigns gained momentum and steadily evolved from a group of several people 
located in an office on the outskirts of Moscow to an organisation that included more 
than 70 offices. When discussing “the Navalny organisation,” I refer to the people and 
structures associated with these three campaigns. 
At first glance, the Navalny organisation looked like a hierarchically centralised group. 
The centre of the campaign was located in Moscow and was called “the federal 
headquarters” or “the federal office.” The headquarters were based in the office of the 
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FBK and had developed from its unit. Since December 2016, it has grown into a large 
structure. Navalny’s chief-of-staff Leonid Volkov headed the structure. Volkov was the 
author of the campaign strategy. He hired the regional coordinators and organised their 
work. He also coordinated fundraising activities and financial operations. Volkov spent 
around half of this working time every day doing those tasks (Volkov, 2018e). The 
federal headquarters consisted of several teams including a video team, a social media 
team, lawyers, finance managers, designers and an IT team. These people gathered 
together in the federal office at least once a week to discuss and to plan the tactics and 
tasks. 
Before the protests of 26 March, the campaign had opened around 15 regional offices 
with paid staff (Respondent 30, personal communication, August 15, 2017). The offices 
were initially needed for the second stage of campaigning – to demand Navalny’s 
registration as a presidential candidate and to collect signatures for his candidacy around 
Russia (StopDesign, 2018). They were also expected to coordinate local organising and 
mobilising citizens for rallies and election observation in March 2018 (Respondent 32, 
personal communication, May 25, 2017). After the attempted presidential bid of 
Navalny turned to be unsuccessful, the offices received another main task: to mobilise 
people for the #strike campaign. When I started visiting Navalny’s offices in August 
2017, the 2018 presidential campaign was represented in 74 locations (Figure 4.2). Most 
of them had from two to four people of paid staff, but some were run exclusively by 
volunteers. These volunteer-run offices were called the “people’s offices.” In Figure 
4.2, the people’s offices are marked with a red circle. Offices with paid staff are marked 
with a red pin. 
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Figure 4.2. The map of the Navalny offices and the boundaries of the eighty-five federal 
subjects of the Russian Federation as of August 2017. Source: Navalny.com 
 
In terms of geographical reach, the three campaigns of Navalny proliferated beyond the 
typical centres of the pro-democracy protest movements (Gabowitsch, 2017) – the cities 
of Moscow and St Petersburg. Russia is a vast country located across 11 time zones and 
consisting of 83 federal regions. Almost all of its political life is centralised in Moscow. 
The Navalny organisation mobilised populations of many regions when its offices and 
the series of protests expanded across all but a handful of them. Guardian journalist 
Walker (2017), who has lived in Russia for many years, observed that this kind of 
“enthusiastic, grassroots campaigning […] has been absent from Russia in recent 
years.” Figure 4.3 demonstrates that the Navalny organisation became even more local 
with time. At the beginning of his campaigning, 35% of all of those registered on the 
main website of the campaigns, Navalny.com, as his supporters (ready to nominate him 
for the election) were living - Moscow or St Petersburg. By the end of its presidential 
campaign in December 2017, this number dropped to 15%. This shows that the Navalny 
organisation’s support grew primarily by means of the smaller towns. 
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Figure 4.3. The location of Navalny’s supporters who registered on Navalny.com: 
Moscow and St Petersburg (red – lower level), 20 largest other cities (blue – middle 
level) and other regions of Russia (grey – upper level). Source: the Navalny 
organisation.  
 
4.1.1.3 People of the campaigns 
A person who approached the locations of the Navalny campaign in the summer of 
2017 could see its staff and volunteers – normally young people in their mid-20s – 
working together in a large bright room designed as an open space. Activists had almost 
nothing on the tables but laptops and smartphones. Occasionally visitors could come in; 
they were other activists engaged in campaigning or other supporters of Navalny. They 
often wore white t-shirts with a Navalny campaign logo. Visitors would receive 
campaigning materials, get instructions from the coordinators and be sent “on the 
ground” to disseminate those materials. Nevertheless, in general, it was calm and 
peaceful in the offices. 
Every office had at least two or three paid positions: a coordinator, a lawyer and a social 
media specialist. Larger cities had more than six paid positions (Respondent 32, 
personal communication, May 25, 2017). The coordinator of an office was selected 
through a competition organised by the federal headquarters. These people often worked 
till late, “six days a week, almost 11 hours a day6” (Respondent 32, personal 
communication, May 25, 2017). At the height of the second – the presidential campaign 
– there were more than 350 campaign coordinators and staffers across the country 
whose average salary was $475 (Volkov, 2018e). The average monthly wage in Russia 
in June 2017 was about $700 (Trading Economics, n.d.). 
 
6 This and further interview quotes were translated by the author. 
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The numbers of unpaid supporters – volunteers – were much larger. Volunteers were 
people who agreed to help the campaign. Twenty days after the anti-corruption protests 
of 26 March, the campaign had 89 093 registered volunteers. By August 2017, about 
140 000 people registered as volunteers associated with one of its 74 offices (Navalny, 
2017d). By the end of the campaign in December 2017, 200 000 people joined as 
volunteers and 706 000 “supported” Navalny as a candidate in the upcoming election. 
The core team received $5.2 million in donations with a median donation of about $9 in 
this period (Osborn, 2018). These numbers were constantly highlighted by the Navalny 
campaign “to show that there are hundreds of thousands of people who support him in 
Russia” (Respondent 29, personal communication, August 10, 2017). Therefore, the 
campaign was built around a clear plan that involved the construction of a regional 
network. However, the plan has never been entirely fulfilled since many unexpected 
factors, such as the detentions of activists, interfered with the process. 
4.1.2 The Anti-tax campaign: Two months of rallies and repression 
The Anti-tax campaign in Belarus is another example of digital activism in authoritarian 
settings that represents an exception to the rule of pro-democracy campaign failure. This 
campaign aimed at abolishing a new tax popularly known as the tax on “social 
parasites.” The tax targeted officially unemployed people (Amnesty International, 2018, 
p. 90). The campaign used digital platforms to disseminate information about its cause, 
to spark discussion, to mobilise individuals for actions like signing petitions and, 
finally, to encourage followers to join protest rallies. 
Just as in Navalny’s campaigns in Russia, protest rallies were the main public 
manifestation of the Anti-tax campaign (Crabtree et al., 2017). Following about two 
months of the campaigning that focused on signature gathering for the petitions to 
abolish the tax on unemployment, the involvement of lawyers and human rights 
defenders, as well as viral discussions and videos posted on digital platforms, the first 
protest rally of about 2 500 people erupted in Belarus’ capital Minsk. In two days after 
the Minsk rally, the protests spread to five other cities (Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3 
The Anti-Tax rallies in February-March 2017. Sources: Shmygov (2017), Author's 
research, Crabtree, Fariss, & Schuler (2017) 
  
These first rallies happened on the deadline of the payment of the tax. The tax targeted 
citizens who had not worked in the past six months and not paid other taxes. The 
payable amount was about $230 a year, which was about 60% of an average monthly 
salary at the start of 2017 (Belarus in Focus, 2017). According to the tax authorities, 
470 000 people out of 9.5 million citizens of Belarus should have paid the tax, but most 
of them refused (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2017b). Many citizens considered 
the requirement to pay the tax on the unemployed unlawful or impossible to fulfil. 
The tax affected different groups of society, many of whom lived in smaller towns, 
where the level of unemployment was worse than in big cities (Erickson, 2017). The 
requirement to pay coupled with the country’s economic problems developed over the 
years, as well as the failure of the state to support the living standards (Erickson, 2017). 
These long-term economic troubles contributed to triggering of the protest.  
As Table 4.3 demonstrates, the campaign manifested itself in the form of at least 32 
rallies that covered 16 cities. In addition to the abolishment of the controversial tax, the 
protesters gradually started demanding the improvement in living standards and 
political changes. In response to the political demands, president Lukashenka, who had 
ruled the country for 22 years by the time of the first rally, declared that the campaign 
was part of a plot against him. Consequently, the campaign became associated with 
extensive state repression unseen in this country for several years (Miller, 2017). By 31 
Place Date
Number of 
participants Place Date
Number of 
participants
Minsk  17-02-2017 2500 Brest  12-03-2017 100
Homel  19-02-2017 2000 Babrujsk  12-03-2017 650
Mahileu  19-02-2017 400 Minsk  15-03-2017 1750
Hrodna  19-02-2017 100 Mahileu  15-03-2017 500
Brest  19-02-2017 100 Hrodna  15-03-2017 1000
Vitebsk  19-02-2017 300 Mazyr  18-03-2017 30
Homel  21-02-2017 300 Kobryn  18-03-2017 30
Vitebsk  26-02-2017 3000 Svietlahorsk  18-03-2017 25
Brest  26-02-2017 300 Slonim  19-03-2017 300
Babrujsk  26-02-2017 400 Baranavichy  19-03-2017 70
Baranavichy  26-02-2017 300 Minsk  25-03-2017 3000
Brest  05-03-2017 1000 Homel  25-03-2017 500
Maladzyechna  10-03-2017 1000 Hrodna  25-03-2017 150
Pinsk  11-03-2017 350 Brest  25-03-2017 200
Rahachow  12-03-2017 300 Vitebsk  25-03-2017 100
Vorsha  12-03-2017 1000 Minsk  26-03-2017 100
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March 2017, 941 cases of detention and other forms of persecution related to the 
campaign and its protests were recorded by human rights defenders (Spring96, 2017). 
The Anti-tax campaign became one of the most significant political events of the 
country that year.  
4.2 Traditional structures and organisational narratives 
In this section, I discuss the organising process in Navalny’s Anti-corruption campaign 
in Russia and the Anti-tax campaign in Belarus. Organising is one of the most 
significant aspects of the political process, which is, however, relatively rarely studied 
(Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Karpf, 2012). The Anti-corruption campaign and the Anti-tax 
Coalition of parties and NGOs were the first stages of organising by the two structures 
when they emerged as sources of collective action that challenged the Russian and 
Belarusian authorities in February and March 2017.  Their analysis shows how the 
campaigns had to build its networks in hostile circumstances beyond their countries’ 
political centres. 
4.2.1 The emergence and decline of the traditional organisation – the 
Anti-tax Coalition 
In Belarus, to coordinate the actions and progress the cause of Anti-tax campaigning, 
several political structures that were critical of the government tried to organise in a 
traditional form of a political coalition (Table 4.4). All interested “more or less active 
subjects of political life” were invited to join (Respondent 17, personal communication, 
May 18, 2017).  
In January 2017, the representatives of the Coalition gathered at Respondent 17’s office 
(Respondent 17, personal communication, May 18, 2017). The Coalition had no formal 
membership and structures (Respondent 17, personal communication, May 18, 2017). 
The position of Respondent 17 seemed to allow him to coordinate some of the activities 
of the emerging coalition informally and to determine, for example, the place of its first 
meeting. Most of the organisations involved called themselves political parties. 
However, as I discussed in Chapter 1, the border between a civic organisation and a 
political party is blurred in Belarus. This means that sometimes there is a little 
difference between a group of dissidents, a civic association concerned with political 
issues and an opposition political party. Therefore, the legal status of an organisation in 
question is less important than its position towards a contentious policy. 
124 
Table 4.4  
The founding members of the Anti-tax Coalition in January 2017. Source: Author’s 
research, IK (2017b) 
Name* 
Organisational 
status Legal status 
The Belarusian Independent Trade Union 
of Radio-Electronic Industry Workers 
(REP)  
Trade Union Registered 
The Belarusian Christian Democracy 
(BChD) 
Political party Unregistered 
The Belarusian Left Party "A Just World" Political party Registered 
The Belarusian Party of Workers Political party Unregistered 
The Belarusian Social Democratic Party 
(Hramada) 
Political party Registered 
The Belarusian Women's Party 
"Nadzeya" 
Political party Unregistered 
The Greens Party Political party Registered 
The Movement for Freedom NGO Registered 
The "Our House" campaign NGO Unregistered 
The United Civic Party (UCP) Political party Registered 
Note. *See Appendix 4 for the background of the organisations   
  
At its first meeting, the Anti-tax Coalition decided to collect signatures for the petition 
demanding to abolish the contentious tax. In the following six weeks, the Coalition 
collected at least 47 000 signatures (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2017d). The 
petitioners submitted them to the authorities but received no reaction (Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 2017b). Despite this, Respondent 17 considered the petition 
gathering process “a massive success” (personal communication, May 18, 2017). 
Activists from other organisations also observed a high level of interest in the anti-tax 
petition (Karnievich, 2017).  
Analysing the dynamics of signature gathering, the involved organisations started 
thinking that protest was inevitable. The activists attempted to direct possible collective 
action in order, as they say, to take care of the security of those who might protest the 
tax. “We took a fundamental decision that we would submit the applications” to receive 
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the authorities’ approval for the Anti-tax rallies. “This was a question of people’s 
security,” said Respondent 17 (personal communication, May 18, 2017).  
Participation in any anti-government political campaign in Belarus poses significant 
risks for the people and organisations involved. Participants may be detained or 
persecuted in other ways (Novikau, 2015). Indeed, the previous experience of large-
scale collective action in Belarus was quite painful for many politically active people. 
For example, following the post-presidential election protests of 2010, riot police 
arrested at least 600 people, including seven of the nine candidates that ran against 
president Lukashenka (Ash, 2014). During the rallies against election rigging four years 
earlier, at least 700 detentions were recorded during the six days of the protests (Ash, 
2014). In 2017, “the risk of losing a job or going to prison is quite high for any potential 
rank-and-file protester, let alone a committed opposition activist” (Moshes, 2017, p. 2). 
The law criminalises the announcement of an intention to hold the protest via the 
internet before official approval. Violations are punishable by up to three years’ 
imprisonment (United States Department of State, 2019a). Therefore, many individuals 
were involved in the organised of the Anti-tax campaign could potentially violate the 
law and risk their freedom. 
Some organisations that have joined the campaign were not registered with the 
authorities (Table 4.4). To be unregistered and still perform activities like gathering 
signatures, mobilising people for protests or any other type of public campaigning was a 
criminal offence in Belarus until June 2019 (The Human Rights Center ‘Viasna’, 2019). 
At the same time, many civic groups remain unregistered because the authorities often 
refuse pollical and civic organisations that are critical of the government legal status. 
This restriction on campaigning represents one of the main challenges of political 
organising in Belarus. 
Initially, Anti-tax activists addressed this challenge by attempting to receive the 
authorities’ approval for the planned collective action, thus, legalising it. This would 
give the emerging movement more credibility in the eyes of its followers and would 
protect the followers from state repression. Therefore, one of the first tasks for the Anti-
tax organisation was to receive an authorisation for their rallies. 
Defying the government ban on the rallies was a watershed moment for the Anti-tax 
Coalition, and this decision led to the split within it. The founding members of the 
Coalition have never met again to discuss the campaign (Respondent 17, personal 
communication, May 18, 2017). The split resulted in the disappearance of a structure 
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that could produce a hierarchy within the Anti-tax campaign. Consequently, the protest 
stage of the campaign was not coordinated on the national level by any central office.  
Despite the split in the capital, in some localities, members of the organisations that 
were part of the Coalition continued working together. For example, in Homel, the 
members of the UCP party worked together with the REP trade union, the largest 
independent from the state union (Kazlou & Alfer, 2012), as well as the Movement for 
Freedom, to gather signatures and to provide legal support. This local mini-coalition 
also organised unifying actions such as a small demonstration in front of the court on 17 
February 2017 during the trial on a person who was asked to pay the tax but refused to 
do so (see Appendix 3). In Brest, the leading local opposition organisation, the 
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Hramada), cooperated with the UCP and the 
Movement for Freedom (see Appendix 4) to promote collective action (Respondent 17, 
personal communication, May 18, 2017). Hence, the former Anti-tax Coalition still 
partly functioned on the local level supplying organisational forms with cross-group 
linkage. 
Such cross-groups linkages were previously reported in some other suppressed 
movements. In an organisation where there is no central office through which 
information and authority can be channelled, such linkages can tie the whole into a 
potentially flexible network along with other mechanisms such as personal ties (Gerlach 
& Hine, 1970, p. 63). I explore how these linkages worked for the Anti-tax movement 
in the following sections. 
4.2.2 The challenge of mobilising for collective action in authoritarian 
settings  
“Don’t Call Him Dimon,” also known as “He Is Not Dimon to You,” was a 45-minute 
investigation video which featured Alexei Navalny as a narrator. The video revealed the 
corrupt financial links of Dmitri Medvedev, the prime minister and a former president7 
of Russia (Figure 4.4). Navalny was presented to the audience as “the author of the 
video” rather than an activist or a politician. The head of the Navalny campaign in 
Moscow Nikolai Lyaskin (Kreml i glemrok, 2017) says that “When we were working 
on ‘Don’t Call Him Dimon,’ Alexei told me ‘Dimon will take it all! It will get an 
Oscar!’” The video indeed received a decisive attention of the Russian internet 
audience. 
 
7“Dimon” is a variant for Dmitri  
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The video was published at the beginning of March 2017 on YouTube and disseminated 
through Navalny.com, which later became the main website of the campaign. Only on 
YouTube, the video had been viewed more than 26 million times as of September 2017. 
This is a significant number since Russia was a country of no more than 50 million 
YouTube users at that time (We Are Social; Hootsuite, 2018, p. 132). At the same time, 
YouTube rather than television was the primary source of news for young Russians by 
this time (Goncharov, 2017). The video entered the IMBd database with a rating of 9.2 
of 10 and voted by 2,619 users (IMBd, n.d.). In total, every third Russian adult had 
heard about the video according to a research centre independent of the government 
(Levada-Center, 2017). “Dimon” had become the largest investigation of Navalny’s 
anti-corruption organisation in terms of viewership by 2017. 
Figure 4.4. The feature image of the “Don’t Call Him Dimon” investigation video. 
 
Activists and observers suggest several reasons for the “Don’t Call Him Dimon’s” 
success. First, the record viewership might become possible because the audience that 
has access to YouTube in Russia grew rapidly in the years before the video’s 
publication. In recent years, fast and cheap internet became much more accessible in the 
Russian provinces.  
Second, the video narrative was convincing and simple. Its language could be described 
as informal and direct. “This film speaks the language of a consumer. It is simple, easily 
assimilable,” said one of the first regional activists that joined the core team of Navalny 
Respondent 25 (personal communication, June 11, 2017). Indeed, the content of the 
video was immediately turned into memes (Figures 4.5, 4.6), “the viral units of digital 
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communication that flourish on user adjustment and replication” (Karatzogianni et al., 
2017, p. 108). Navalny’s organisation has been practising meme creation for a long time 
(Karatzogianni et al., 2017). For example, Medvedev’s sneakers allegedly bought on 
corrupted money and a yellow duck (Figure 5.1) from his alleged undeclared house in 
Italy became the symbols of the prime minister’s illegal property. These convincing and 
simple symbols were widely featured in the online discussions of the Navalny followers 
as well as during the subsequent anti-corruption rallies. 
 
Figure 4.5. A meme published in the VK Anti-corruption campaign page for Stary 
Oskol on the day when the 26 March protests were announced. It reads “- Why does 
Navalny bully me? Let him get off my back, tell him!” “- That’s ok… Just ban him and 
don’t pay attention” 
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Figure 4.6. A picture used as an avatar of the Anti-corruption campaign page for 
Ryazan.  
Finally, the video focused on corruption rather than on more contentious issues like the 
democratic deficit, the president’s powers or the nature of the Russian authoritarian 
political system. The discussion of corruption is often an accepted way to criticise civil 
servants, primarily local, in some authoritarian states (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). 
Hence, raising the corruption problematics might attract a large audience that perceives 
the anti-corruption struggle as apolitical. Such less contentious problematics can even 
help to create a successful political movement (Bennett et al., 2017) like the currently 
ruling party Five Star in Italy (Politi & Roberts, 2017). Halupka (2014) notes that the 
level of politicisation of an issue is determined by the context in which it is viewed. The 
issue of corruption can be placed in a purely economic context, depicting corrupt 
officials as greedy individuals. At the same time, located in the broader context of other 
corrupt politicians from a ruling party, corruption can be placed in a contentious 
political context.  
The Navalny core campaigners gradually placed corruption in the context of other 
problems of the political system, claiming that it is not just the prime minister who is 
corrupt, but that the system promotes corruption. For example, at the beginning of the 
Anti-corruption campaign, Navalny’s communication linked the revealed corruption to 
the prime minister and other prominent top politicians and business figures. However, 
president Putin was mentioned in this context as a somewhat neutral judge who should 
“give answers” and “respond” to the corruption allegations. However, in summer and 
autumn of 2017, the rhetoric of the campaign became harsher, while the link between 
corrupted Russian officials and Putin became more apparent from the communication of 
campaigners. The campaign website Navalny.com started publishing articles with the 
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titles like “Putin and prosecutors guard Swiss bank accounts” (24 August 2017) or 
“Putin-Chaika-Agalarov-Trump” (11 July 2017) (Chaika and Agalarov were accused of 
corruption by the FBK). In his blogs on the website, Navalny discussed “The workshop 
by V. V. Putin on how to steal” (9 June 2017). This contextualisation of the corruption 
stories politicised the audience that followed the campaign communication. 
The simplicity and less contentious nature of the narrative, its meme-making potential 
as well as the growing internet audience in Russia have helped to increase the attention 
to the “Dimon” investigation. The publication of that video signified the launch of the 
Anti-corruption campaign to oust the prime minister. By relying on the anti-corruption 
agenda and directing their media message to a younger audience, the Navalny campaign 
turned to their “base first,” which is a technique commonly used by campaign 
professionals in democracies (Powell & Cowart, 2003, p. 74). The video was tightly 
integrated into campaign communication and was published with additional links that 
could direct potential supporters to the campaign network. For example, a copy of the 
video published on VK contained a periodically updated list with links to about 100 
local protest campaign pages. The “Dimon” investigation helped the Navalny campaign 
to reach a wider audience beyond traditional gatekeepers of the Russian media system, 
mainstream TV, and to mobilise followers for the series of collective action. 
On 14 March 2017, 12 days after the publication of “Don’t Call Him Dimon,” the 
campaign posted another video and text where Navalny (Komanda Navalnogo, 2017) 
announced the protests planned on 26 March. 
13 million people watched the FBK's investigation of the corruption schemes of the 
Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev. This is 9% of the country's population. 
And what kind of reaction did we see from the authorities? Medvedev banned 
Navalny on Instagram. The press secretaries for Putin and Medvedev say they do 
not want to comment on the claims of a criminal. In any developed country, the 
publication of such information would lead to the resignation of the government 
and numerous arrests. 
 Well, then, we should walk out and become a little more visible. 
 On 26 March, we go to marches and rallies to demand clear public answers 
regarding the corruption of Russia's top officials.  
In the video, Navalny justified the necessity of the protest by focusing on the 
authorities’ “silence” (Putin and Medvedev’s photos appeared on the screen at this 
moment) and the need to “claim at least some answers as to the corruption allegations of 
the prime minister” (Navalny, 2017b). In his eight-minute speech, Navalny mentioned 
that after the first video was published, he and “9% of the Russians” who watched the 
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video have been claiming those answers from Putin and his government “on the 
internet.” Instead, Medvedev banned him on Instagram after “Dimon” was published 
(Navalny, 2017b). Thus, it was the time to claim the answers “in the streets.”  
 
Figure 4.7. The screenshot from the video announcing the 26 March protests.  
 
  Similar to Anti-tax campaigners, the anti-corruption activists in Russia quickly 
faced a typical limitation on collective action in authoritarian states - the difficulty of 
organising public rallies. For example, during the #strike campaign of Navalny that 
started nine months after the Anti-corruption rallies, many activists including Navalny 
and his head of staff Volkov were arrested for the violation of “the Law on Assemblies 
[…].” This law also landed Lyaskin, who was restricted from leaving Moscow by the 
criminal investigation related to the previous election campaign he helped to run, in jail. 
Lyaskin just retweeted a video with Navalny which invited citizens to come to a rally. 
The post contained 19 words “Watch this great video. Our numbers are growing, and 
we are better. Let's just meet and talk more. 28.01.” The court considered this cryptic 
retweet as “the violation of the procedure of arranging a demonstration.” For a 19-word 
tweet, Lyaskin spent 15 days in jail. 
Knowing about the limitations on collective action, the Moscow campaign staff tried to 
protect themselves and to seek the authorisation of local authorities when organising the 
Anti-corruption rallies. This was a challenging task for two reasons. First, the core team 
of the campaign was in Moscow and had a relatively small network beyond the capital 
at that moment (Respondent 30, personal communication, August 15, 2017).  
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Second, the authors of the protest event applications could face coercive response of the 
authorities such as arrests and long prison sentences, a response that is common in 
Russia following the 2011-12 protest movement (Gabowitsch, 2017, p. 246). For 
example, one of the volunteers who applied for the authorisation for the rally on 26 
March in the city of Taganrog in the Russian South later cancelled his application. “He 
was intimidated. He withdrew and removed” the page about the rally created by him on 
VK (Respondent 25, personal communication, June 11, 2017). As a result, the rally in 
Taganrog was cancelled. In neighbouring Rostov, some local activists were afraid of 
joining the campaign of Navalny as they had been fined for protest activities before. In 
another big city, the applicants for a rally were taken by the police from their homes and 
jailed following the second Anti-corruption rally on 12 June (Respondent 26, personal 
communication, August 14, 2017). Thus, local activists in Russia could fear higher fines 
or even jail terms associated with an attempt to organise a rally.  
Just like in Russia, the Belarusian authorities tries to prevent the spread of protest 
activities through society. In the 1990s, they introduced the preemptive policy of 
leader’s “disappearance” (Silitski, 2005). These days, political and civic leaders still 
disappear from the Belarusian political arena by force. The example of the REP 
independent trade union is notorious. The REP seemed to be the most radical in terms 
of repertoire among the organisations that launched the campaign. It was one of the first 
to announce the protests: “If […] the people’s voices will remain unheard,” the head of 
the union Hienadz Fiadynic said in an interview after the union had started collecting 
signatures for the petition, “There will be just one way out – we will prepare a mass 
street action” (Charter97, 2017a). 
Fiadynic suggested that the aim of the signature gathering operation was to give people 
a chance “to self-organise […] But we will do nothing from above” (Drakakhrust, 
2017). In addition to signature gathering, the REP provided legal advice to many 
hundreds of people who planned to contest their obligation to pay the tax bill 
(Respondent 22, personal communication, September 2, 2017). The vision of the trade 
unionists was that the REP should provide an environment to inspire others for action 
that would not be controlled by anyone but the people themselves (Drakakhrust, 2017). 
Therefore, Fiadynic presented his organisations’ role in the campaign as a supportive 
one.  
It seems that the government recognised the role of the REP in the Anti-tax campaign 
and used its traditional preemptive policy to isolate its leaders. Three months after the 
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movement faded but the controversial tax was still discussed in the government, the 
police arrested several officers of the trade union including Fiadynic, its head. The trade 
union activists were accused of tax evasion.  
Consequently, Fiadynic along with another member of the union was found guilty of tax 
evasion. He was sentenced to four years of restriction of liberty without imprisonment, 
which trade unionists described as “de facto imprisoned in their flats” (Ivanou, 2019), 
and forced to step down as chairperson of the REP. The Observatory for the Protection 
of Human Rights Defenders, a group of the World Organisation Against Torture, 
described the trial of Fiadynic as “politically motivated” (Human Rights Defenders, 
2018). Respondent 21 was detained for 10 days in connection to the Anti-tax rallies in 
April 2017. In total, union members spent 225 days in jail as a consequence of the Anti-
tax campaigning (Ivanou, 2019). Some observers (e.g. Smok, 2017) and trade unionists 
(Ivanou, 2019) suggest that the authorities performed these moves against the REP to 
remove the leadership of the union, so it could not contribute to further protests. The 
Belarusian authorities slightly delayed their preemptive policy this time, but they 
seemed to be determined to ensure that the leadership of the trade union is isolated from 
political life in case trade unions start posing a serious challenge again. 
4.2.3 “Leaderless” and “ordinary citizens’” movements 
A possible strategy for dealing with the preemptive policy is to present a civic campaign 
as horizontal, leaderless and spontaneous thus protecting its real leaders from 
persecution or even death. Indeed, just as many recent social and political movements in 
authoritarian states, the Anti-tax campaign was dubbed as “leaderless” by the media, 
many of its activists and some experts. That is how, for instance, a journalist of the 
English version of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty described the initial stages of 
the protests:  
The protests that broke out in Minsk and other cities in February were, by all 
appearances, driven not by Belarus's traditional opposition but by genuine 
grassroots anger. (Whitmore, 2017) 
In other words, the journalist alleged that the mobilisation had nothing to do with 
Belarusian dissidents. The extensive journalistic account of one of the first campaign 
protests in Vitebsk on 19 February (Matveyeva, 2017) makes us feel what it was like to 
be part of something “leaderless”: 
134 
There were no specific [...] organisers of the action. People [...] simply stood and 
got frozen, not knowing what to do next. Many admitted that they attended a street 
demonstration for the first time. People asked each other: “So what?! We will stand 
for a while and then break up, and that's it?”  
The interviewed participants of the Anti-tax rallies from other towns also had an 
impression that the campaign “was not controlled by the opposition” (Respondent 19, 
personal communication, September 7, 2017) and, “in contrast to the previous protests, 
was not organised from above” (Respondent 13, personal communication, September 7, 
2017). That was how dissident Respondent 1 (personal communication, March 13, 
2017) perceived the rallies in smaller towns like Pinsk: 
Take a look at our [rallies]. Indeed, people are gathering. But there are no leaders. 
There are simply no local political structures, trade unions, nothing. Drat! People 
are gathering, and this is bloody hell, like in Pinsk. What’s going on? Where are all 
the activists? 
Respondent 18’s experience of the first Anti-tax rally in Brest: 
No one really said: Let's go to the square [to protest]. This was not planned at all. 
How did we all get there? […] It was unexpected because we got used to the fact 
that nobody participates in anything. We did not intend to participate [in the rally] 
as a party - each [of our party activists] came on their own when they were 
available.  
 It was fun because, when you approached the location, you realised that 
something was happening there: a lot of people were around somehow. I inspected 
the corners of out Lenin Square [the location of the rally], I was interested. […] 
Near each exit [of the squire, I saw] people who just stood and looked at the 
square. These were clearly not just passers-by. They were at least sympathetic. 
(Respondent 18, personal communication, September 6, 2017) 
Respondent 18’s group was one of the largest opposition organisations in that province. 
It later contributed to further protests there.  
Other activists also suggested that the campaign had no organisational structures and 
was as spontaneous as one can imagine (Respondent 12, personal communication, 
September 9, 2017; Respondent 22, personal communication, September 2, 2017). The 
REP trade union coordinator Strizhak (2017a) formulated the view of many Anti-tax 
activists: 
The structures of the opposition, civil society and political parties played an 
important role in the development of the protests, but they were not their initiators 
and coordinators. We [traditional politicians and activists] could ride this wave, but 
that does not mean that we had the strength to raise it. 
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The leaders of the political parties that were part of the former Anti-tax Coalition and 
some civil society experts expressed quite the opposite view. In the interviews, they did 
not reject the leaderless narrative of several rallies in places like Vitebsk or Brest. 
However, they claimed that the campaign organisation was based at large on the 
existing organisational structures of various political groups like the Hramada or the 
REP. For instance, Respondent 17 (personal communication, May 18, 2017), who was 
instrumental in organising the signature gathering phase of the campaign by the 
Coalition, highlighted the role of the party structures and the unions in organising the 
campaign. Respondent 4, a program coordinator at one of the largest coalitions of 
NGOs in Belarus, (personal communication, 19 May 2017) suggested that these 
conventional structures were interested in supporting a myth about the leaderless 
representation of the protests: 
All those who look at them [the Anti-tax rallies] from a distance, they just believe 
in this representation of the rallies as spontaneous. In this sense, the organisers 
have achieved their goal. That is the positioning of the protest as spontaneous. 
[This was] a campaigning trick. 
According to the “myth” camp, the conventional political structures did not highlight 
their significant role because they tried to avoid state pressure and a preemptive policy. 
It should be noted that I interviewed the mentioned participants of the campaign after it 
was basically stopped and dissidents like Anatol Liabedzka were jailed and then 
released from the prison. Thus, they had little reason to continue supporting the opposite 
narrative about a leaderless movement. 
Despite a common perception, I argue that the Anti-tax campaign was not controlled 
and coordinated by any bureaucratic structure during either its protest or pre-protest 
stage. Before the protest stage, the main activity of the campaign was mainly concerned 
with collecting signatures. In fact, there were several petitions and several groups of 
activists who collected signatures to abolish the “tax on social parasites.” The signatures 
for different petitions were gathered by the local branches of the UCP, the REP, the 
Socialist Hramada party and local activists like Respondent 10, who lived in one of the 
large regional centres of the country (Respondent 10, personal communication, 
September 6, 2017; Respondent 18, personal communication, September 6, 2017; 
Respondent 21, personal communication, September 1, 2017). Moreover, each of those 
large structures had several petitions created by different local groups. 
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For example, Respondent 10 (personal communication, September 6, 2017) drafted a 
petition and started collecting signatures independently from the REP and the UCP 
despite being a member of both: 
I have already decided that something needs to be done. But how to fight? Attract 
some attention. But how? To go the streets with a poster? […] But I knew that it 
might provoke some sanctions from the police. I decided to go the streets to collect 
signatures for the abolition of the decree. I drew the attention on social media […]. 
Journalists saw [posts about me on Facebook and did an interview]. And then it 
went like a snowball. […] My phone was ringing nonstop. I received calls from the 
all over the country: "Where to sign? We oppose this decree!" 
By the time Respondent 10 created the petition, similar petitions were drafted by local 
activists in other places including Mahileu, a city nearly 400 km away from Respondent 
10’s town (Respondent 10, personal communication, September 6, 2017), and in 
Ivacevicy, a town 80 km to the south of Baranavichy (Respondent 19, personal 
communication, September 7, 2017). Ten days after Respondent 10 launched the 
petition, the REP trade union in Homel drafted another one with similar demands and 
started gathering signatures nationally (Dascynski, 2017; Respondent 21, personal 
communication, September 1, 2017). Different petitions addressed the same 
government structures. This diversity of petition gathering initiatives demonstrates that 
the activists of the Anti-tax campaign were not bounded by one central authority and 
focused their initiative primarily on the sectors where they happened to be local leaders. 
At the same time, these activists were united by fundamental beliefs regarding the tax 
on social parasites. 
Like the signature gathering phase, the protest phase of the campaign was influenced by 
several groups with different visions of how mass protest mobilisation should look like. 
Some of them like the “Tell the Truth!” campaign, an opposition organisation that was 
not part of the Anti-tax Coalition but supported the idea of the cooperation with the 
government, organised the meetings in halls instead of rallies on the street or 
participated in only those rallies that were officially authorised (IK, 2017a). Other 
organisations were more radical and ready to defy the protest ban. For example, the very 
first rally of the campaign, the “March of Outraged Belarusians” in Minsk, was jointly 
announced by the REP trade union and prominent dissident Mikalai Statkevich, who 
was released from prison less than two years before these events (Respondent 4, 
personal communication, 19 May 2017). Finally, some members of the Coalition whom 
I could not name due to the concerns for sources’ safety tried to work together 
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(Respondent 21, personal communication, September 1, 2017) to apply for an 
authorisation for rallies in the provinces such as Homel and Brest (AJA, 2017). 
The formal groups that were at the core of the Anti-tax campaign (see Appendix 4) 
could not be viewed as united under a single organisational framework for at least four 
reasons. First, the campaign had no card-carrying members or any sort of formal 
membership. The Anti-tax Coalition was a fluid structure that received different 
configurations over the course of the events. Different publications of the same media 
organisation, the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, reported the varying configurations 
of the Coalition on different days of January 2017. Moreover, the Coalition itself ceased 
to be a significant player before the start of the protest phase, and it was not replaced by 
any structure that would attempt to unite the groups involved with the Anti-tax 
campaign. 
Second, none of the leaders of the aforementioned organisations knew about all the 
local or platform-based groups that considered themselves as participants in the 
campaign. For example, some of the interviewed leaders of the Anti-tax campaign did 
not know about the most prominent VK page of the campaign that attracted more 
followers than any other page that focused on the campaign agenda (Respondent 10, 
personal communication, September 6, 2017; Respondent 17, personal communication, 
May 18, 2017). Similarly, some prominent local activists of the campaign such as 
Respondent 12, who streamed live video from one-fifth of all the Anti-tax rallies, 
became known to political leaders of the UCP and the BChD only after the first 
collective action (Respondent 12, personal communication, September 9, 2017).   
Third, the leaders of the different groups quite clearly disagreed on the methods of 
collective action organising. “Each structure had its own vision” of collective action, 
said one of the local leaders Respondent 10 (personal communication, September 6, 
2017). While more radical organisations such as the REP trade union were ready to defy 
the protest ban, more moderate groups such as the Tell the Truth! tried to act only if 
authorisation was received (IK, 2017a). The same town could witness several Anti-tax 
protests on the same day. For instance, in Brest, one of the Anti-tax rallies was driven 
by the Socialist Hramada, and another Anti-tax rally organised by an anarchist group 
started at the same location immediately after the previous rally finished. Respondent 18 
(personal communication, September 6, 2017), who participated in the rallies, described 
those two events:  
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[The leader of the local branch of the Hramada party] Maskousky said [to come] at 
12 pm, and we came at 12 [for a rally]. […] Other groups of activists also [decided 
to come] at 12. And they all later met in one place. […] While the anarchists 
decided: "Oh, we shall come at 13". And they came later.  
Fourth, none of the leaders or groups could speak for the campaign as a whole. During 
just one day on 17 January, four different organisations, the UCP, the REP trade union, 
the Movement for Freedom and the Tell the Truth!, independently announced four 
different actions related to the campaign such the gathering of signatures, collective or 
legislative actions (Dascynski, 2017). In particular, the 17 February rally in Minsk was 
announced by only two structures, the REP trade union and Statkevich’s allies. 
Simultaneously, the organisations like the Movement for Freedom and the BChD 
decided to draw the Minsk citizens to another rally planned almost a month later, on 15 
March. Both actions eventually took place.  
These four reasons demonstrate that, from its launch in January 2017, the Anti-tax 
campaign was far from a centralised framework. Instead, it looked like a fragmented, 
many-headed structure (Gerlach & Hine, 1970) whose temporal unity was a function of 
an external political opportunity (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Political opportunity structure 
– an aspect of a regime that offers activists an opening to advance their claims – was 
favourable because of the economic situation in Belarus. Following the collapse of the 
oil price and commodity markets in 2015, Belarus’ economy experienced a decline 
(Foy, 2018). This decline also affected living standards, which may have resulted in 
growing dissatisfaction with the authoritarian policies of the government. Following 
several weeks of collective action, the campaigners started demanding not only the 
abolition of the contentious tax but also a solution to the socio-economic crisis and even 
Lukashenka's resignation (Miller, 2017). Therefore, the Anti-tax activists utilised a 
political opportunity and used their individual initiative and leadership capacity, rather 
than any centralising organisational framework, to attempt to change the government 
policies and advocate for pro-democracy changes. 
In Russia, the Navalny movement emphasised that it was also not led by any centralised 
leadership as well. Just 11 days before the March 25 Anti-corruption demonstrations, 
Volkov, the head of staff, did not expect many people to come: “If 20 or 10 people join, 
it will be still good” (Volkov, 2017b). Seven days later, when the scale of the upcoming 
rallies became apparent to the core activists, Volkov called the protests “unprecedented” 
and the “largest since 1991” – the collapse of the Soviet Union (Volkov, 2017c). 
Indeed, most of the interviewed provincial activists noted that their cities have rarely 
139 
seen collective political action of such a scale. “Our [normal] max level [of an anti-
governmental demonstration] is 500 people,” says Respondent 26, who was a 
coordinator in one of the largest Russian cities (personal communication, August 14, 
2017). During the 26 March protests, at least 1 500 people came to support the 
campaigns’ anti-corruption agenda in that city (Respondent 26, personal 
communication, August 14, 2017). In total, at least 37 000 people came to the streets of 
88 Russian cities that day (see Table 4.2). This shows that the core activists of the 
Navalny organisation were surprised with the scale of their first collective action. 
Following the first protest episode of March 2017, the Navalny movement gradually has 
referred to its organisational structures as “ordinary citizens’ movement.” For instance, 
Volkov (2017h) claimed that the movement was “strong because of our self-
organisation and horizontal network” [emphasis added]. This allowed, according to 
Volkov, to avoid a collapse of the campaign following the detentions of its core 
activists. Even in jail, the leaders tried to take part in the groups’ interactions. They do 
not reveal how exactly they did it, but leaders like the chief-of-staff Volkov managed to 
send messages to their followers from jail. These words were signed by Volkov and 
were distributed on the Telegram channels of the presidential campaign on 12 March 
2018:  
They stupidly believe that the work of the headquarters [the local offices of the 
campaign] can be hindered by sending Volkov, Navalny, Lyaskin […] or whoever 
else to jail. They do not understand that the headquarters are all of you [emphasis 
added]. And that everyone cannot be put in jail anyway. (Novosti Shtabov 
Navalnogo, 2018) 
The Navalny organisation might have needed the “headquarters are all of you” rhetoric 
to represent the organisation as a people’s movement or a movement of “ordinary 
citizens” rather than of core paid activists. Nevertheless, the principle of Navalny’s 
“ordinary citizens’” movement could contradict practice as it often happens in 
organisations that heavily rely on digital communication to organise (Poell & van Dijck, 
2016; Shaw & Hill, 2014). In addition, the perception protests as unexpected and 
spontaneous is often a prevailing narrative in characterising many contemporary 
movements like the Arab Spring or 15M in Spain, as well as earlier actions such as 
student sit-ins in the US in the 1960s (Flesher Fominaya, 2015). Journalists and 
observers might describe the protests as spontaneous because such events often do not 
have visible or recognisable organisational structures. 
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As in Russia, the publicly cultivated organisational narratives of the Belarusian Anti-tax 
movement were problematic. None of the interviewed activists recognised the presence 
of an observable bureaucratic organisation that would fully control and coordinate the 
protest stage of the campaign. In addition, the independent media of Belarus and the 
interviewed activists alike did not mention the presence of a charismatic leader that 
would alter the dynamics of the campaign. In the minds of many observers, the only 
alternative to a leader-centred or a bureaucratic organisation is no organisation at all 
(Gerlach & Hine, 1970, p. 33). That was perhaps how the myth of a leaderless Anti-tax 
movement could emerge.  
I argue that journalists and the local authorities did not detect an organisation behind the 
Anti-corruption and Anti-tax rallies initially, and both campaigning groups used this 
myopic view for their advantage. Instead of following this myopic view, I propose to 
characterise the campaigns during their protest stage as a third type of organisation, 
which is contrasted to the leaderless and the bureaucratic types. This third type of 
organisation used the narrative of a spontaneous and leaderless movement to address the 
limitations on political organising in an authoritarian environment. In the following 
sections, I discuss the two features of this third type: segmentation and pseudonymous 
leadership. 
4.3 The growth and the segmentation of the movements 
4.3.1 Features analysis of the 26 march protest pages 
Analysis of rally organising by the Navalny organisation helps to reveal the structure of 
an anti-authoritarian movement. The Russian local authorities initially authorised the 26 
March anti-corruption protests in most of the 88 Russian cities (Table 4.5). Most of the 
permissions for those protests were requested by ad hoc leaders who might have never 
met and talked to the Navalny core team before and had no previous connections with 
the campaign (Respondent 30, personal communication, August 15, 2017; Respondent 
25, personal communication, June 11, 2017). Having no previous experience of rally 
organising, many of these new local leaders were guided by a simplified explanation of 
the Russian law on rallies posted online by the Navalny organisation. 
Local activists “self-organised and created [VK] pages themselves. They checked 
out how pages were created in cities where there were offices. [They] copied 
pictures, the names of a group. This is not difficult - you do not need any special 
knowledge” (Respondent 24, personal communication, April 24, 2017). 
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The local volunteers who tried to organise Anti-corruption rallies focused on the two 
goals: obtaining official permission from the authorities and building their base on 
digital platforms. They created pages on VK and other platforms about the coming 
protests and gathered social media teams to support those pages. These teams could 
include as much as five people. They became the page’s administrators and, where no 
other Navalny’s representatives operated, local spokespeople for the protest movement 
because they communicated with their potential participants on behalf of the movement.  
Gerbaudo (2017c, p. 186) notes that “[s]ocial media teams constitute an intriguing 
object of study, because they allow exploring the important but largely invisible 
organisational structures.” This is partly because such teams often remain “a sort of 
half-secret known only to those deeply involved in the activist community” (Gerbaudo, 
2017c, p. 192). Another reason for the elusive character of social media teams in an 
activist organisation is their wish to remain anonymous. The organisers of 33% of the 
26 March VK protest pages anonymised themselves. I discuss the anonymity 
arrangement of the local ad hoc leaders of the Anti-corruption campaign in the next 
Chapter. The investigation into the network of social media teams helps to map on the 
organisational structures of the Anti-corruption campaign and to explain its remarkable 
growth prior to the 26 March rallies. 
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Table 4.5 
Features analysis of the 26 March protest pages  
The Anti-corruption pages Total % of the sample (see Note) 
Overall numbers   
Anti-corruption pages created 
by the Navalny organisation 
staff 
32 36 
Design features   
Non-administrators can write 
on the wall of a page 
43 49 
The discussion feature is 
enabled (known as VK forums) 
25 28 
Pages which contained 
additional features (e.g. a 
modified header image, avatar, 
additional sections enabled 
such as “music”) 
22 25 
Rallies   
Anti-corruption rallies 
authorised as of 25 March 
2017 
11 13 
Note. 88 (N) pages of the Anti-corruption campaign were analysed with features analysis. There 
were the pages that did not announce the cancellation of a local Anti-corruption rally by 26 
March 2017.  
 
The hardly recognisable protest network sparked by the Anti-corruption campaign grew 
rapidly. A day after the protests were announced, the campaign community already 
consisted of about 50 VK pages. Each distributed information about local rallies. Thus, 
a day after the FBK disseminated a call for the 26 March protests, 50 new campaign 
pages emerged across Russia. By 22 March, there were 95 such working pages in total, 
which meant 95 campaign segments from Vladivostok near Japan to Kaliningrad on the 
Baltic sea were involved in the campaign. Across this vast space, the Navalny 
organisation had only seven offices by the time when it announced the Anti-corruption 
protests (Volkov, 2017b). Several paid coordinators were hired in other provinces, but 
their offices were not functional, and social media teams were not gathered yet. 
According to my analysis, the campaign staff created only up to 32 of the pages 
dedicated to the Anti-corruption local protests in the provinces (Table 4.5). While some 
of the protest pages disappeared or their administrators failed to deliver a rally, many 
remained active after 26 March. 
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If one managed to trace this elusive collection of protest pages around the largest 
Russian social media platform, they would observe a quite coherent network with 
similar content and design. Most of the content posted on the Anti-corruption campaign 
pages was information about Navalny’s investigations and the practicalities of the 
upcoming rallies. Regarding design features, many Anti-corruption VK pages contained 
links to the guidelines on protest organising, discussions about protest events and a 
board where users debated politics.  
The local activists received no formal advice or instructions as to how to design the 
public pages of the rallies (Respondent 30, personal communication, August 15, 2017). 
Still, local pages reposted many images and texts that were distributed through the main 
VK page administered from FBK’s office in Moscow. Prime minister’s memes and 
collages were the main features of those images. Some of those images and other 
materials were localised and personalised by local organisers by adding to them, for 
instance, the name of a town where a rally should take place. Only 25% of the pages 
from the Anti-corruption VK network contained specific features of the design such as 
an unusual page header, a section with music files or a name of the page that contained 
no link to the Anti-corruption process (see Table 4.5). Despite no formal advice being 
received from the federal office, local Anti-corruption activists managed to maintain a 
largely coherent organisational image across its local campaign pages.  
In SPIN theory terms, the proliferation of the Anti-corruption pages on VK and groups 
associated with them can be viewed as the initial segmentation of the Navalny 
organisation in the regions of Russia. While the core campaign team in Moscow felt 
unprepared, unofficial segments that supported the Anti-corruption campaign and the 26 
March mobilisation started proliferating independently from the centre of the campaign 
in the places where the Moscow core team had no formal representation. Most of these 
local segments were initially not subordinated to and controlled by the core team in 
Moscow (Respondent 30, personal communication, August 15, 2017). The choice of a 
format of collective action, the repertoire of action, the fundraising and other 
organisational activities were left to local activists (Respondent 25, personal 
communication, June 11, 2017). Thus, the resulting organisational campaign network 
can be described as segmentary. 
The core team chose to rely on local activists, who were largely unknown to them, to 
organise the anti-corruption rallies. Following six weeks after the publication of the 
video, the campaign attracted 50 000 new volunteers (Volkov, 2018a). Ultimately, these 
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people became the main force of Navalny’s presidential bid – the second campaign of 
his organisation in 2017, while many segments of the Anti-corruption campaign were 
turned into central cells of this second campaign. This was one of the remarkable 
consequences of the success of the FBK’s YouTube materials and the use of digital 
media affordances. The segmentation allowed the campaign to create a scarcely 
traceable initial organisational network structure. This might explain why both 
journalists and local authorities that sanctioned the rallies perceived the 26 March 
protests as spontaneous. Instead, the scale of the protests was a partial result of 
segmentation and proliferation of the units of the Anti-corruption network triggered by 
the investigation that was being prepared by the FBK for many months.  
4.3.2 Features analysis and SNA of the Anti-tax campaign pages 
In contrast to the case of the Navalny network, the cells of the Anti-tax campaign 
formed around the local branches of civic and political organisations like those that 
were part of the Anti-tax Coalition, as well as anarchist groups and platforms pages that 
covered the campaign (Table 4.6), both nationally and locally. These pages could 
represent an organisation that was part of the Coalition, like in the case of the REP trade 
union pages, or they could be independent of any previously known organisation. In this 
section, I examine the process of segmentation in the Anti-tax campaign based on its 
representation on social media platforms. 
The prominent participants of many rallies of the campaign such as Respondent 21 
(personal communication, September 1, 2017) or Respondent 12 (personal 
communication, September 9, 2017), one of the most popular political bloggers at the 
time of the protests, believed that platforms were its central organising mechanism. 
Table 4.6 demonstrates that the design of the campaign on three out of five of its main 
digital platform pages (for discussion of the sampling strategy, see Chapter 3) contained 
few unifying features. 
In particular, all of the pages associated with the Anti-tax campaign had different titles, 
header images and avatar images. Some of them had the discussion option enabled, 
some of them did not. Some of the pages contained additional features such as a music 
section or reviews by users, while others looked very basic and minimalist. They were 
also branded differently (Table 4.6). Some of the administrators adopted pseudonyms or 
anonymised themselves, while others did not. The pages’ administrators hardly ever 
made any effort to represent the campaign as a united and coherent organisation. 
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Instead, on digital platforms, the campaign looked more like a combination of 
seemingly unrelated civic groups. 
Table 4.6 
The design features of the five main Anti-tax campaign pages as of April 2017 
Note. aThe architecture of Facebook did not allow accessing the names of the administrators as sometimes 
VK and OK did. Thus, I assumed that the administrators of the Facebook pages anonymised themselves 
unless their names were stated in the “About” sections of the pages. 
 
 
 
Name of the Page The Party of Parasites PASD
Platform Facebook VK Facebook VK OK
Number of followers 4785 6202 4047 881 2795
Type Page/community Page/community Page/community Page/community Group
“Links to other pages” 
section Not present
59 links to other VK 
pages (a link to the REP 
VK page)
Not present
7 links to pages 
and sites of the 
same organisation
Not present
Discussion options "Community posts" Discussions enabled Disabled Discussions N/A
Non-administrators can 
write on the wall N/A No N/A No No
Additional  features Reviews by users No No DocumentsMusic No
Administrators  adopted 
pseudonyms/hidden 
identitiesa 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes
The REP trade union (3 pages)
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Table 4.7 
The front design of the five main Anti-tax pages 
The Party of Parasites 
(Facebook) PASD (VK) The REP (Facebook) The REP (VK) The REP (OK) 
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To trace the ties of the main pages of the campaign to other possible cells and a wider 
organisation network, I used the “Links to other pages” section. The “Links to other 
pages” section is important because it is one of few platform footprints that can show 
the ties between the cells. In contrast to OK and Facebook, this section is a default 
design feature of any VK page. VK was the leading digital platform in Belarus in terms 
of registered users in 2017.  
The sample contains two Anti-tax pages on VK. First, the “Links to other pages” 
section of the REP VK page that covered the campaign from the perspective of worker 
and human rights. It contained only seven links that led to the REP own website and 
pages on other platforms (Table 4.6). The REP network did not demonstrate ties to 
other Anti-tax groups. 
Second, the “Parasites” and “Social Dependents” group (PASD) page, which had the 
largest number of followers compared to other sampled pages, contained a list of 51 
links to VK pages. The PASD page was a predominantly Russian-speaking political 
community that existed before the campaign under a different name. Then, it had had 
around 200 followers and focused on other contentious political issues, according to the 
PASD administrator (Respondent 14, personal communication, January 1, 2018): 
There was a page called «Vybory – duryboly» [Elections are Scam]. On its avatar, 
there was a motto: “2015 Elections, are there elections?” By that time [of the Anti-
tax campaign], it has already outlived itself […], and I reshaped it into the 
“Parasites.” 
At the beginning of January 2017, an administrator of the community changed its name 
and chose a new and single aim for the page – “to oppose the tax” on social parasites 
(Respondent 14, personal communication, January 1, 2018). The community shared 
news about the campaign and other political information related to Belarus. It also 
informed about the actions of the campaign. The PASD contained an extensive amount 
of links to other pages on VK concerned with political issues. I focused on this page to 
trace possible ties between the Anti-tax cells on the VK platform. 
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Figure 4.8. The SNA analysis of the linked pages to the PASD group.  
 
Figure 4.8 and Table 4.8 present the results of the Social Network Analysis (SNA) of 
the PASD links according to the state of the network by the end of the campaign in 
April 2017. Nodes are pages listed in the “Links to other pages” section. Edges are links 
directed to a linked page.  
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Table 4.8 
The pages linked to the PASD group with the highest degree value  
Page 
VK 
handle 
Administrators’ 
visibility* Description In-degree Out-degree Degree 
The PASD tuneyadc
i_i_izhd
evenci 
Pseudonymous The most followed page on VK dedicated to the issues of the 
Anti-tax campaign exclusively 
5 46 51 
STOP LUKA stopluka Real names/ 
Pseudonymous 
A highly politicised community critical of the authorities. 
“Luka” is a nickname for LUKAshenka 
3 9 12 
Chrustalnyj Sasut belsasut Anonymised A political page critical of the authorities with many memes 
and entertaining content 
4 3 7 
DVIŽ (BASTA!) dvizh_b
el 
Pseudonymous A page linked to anarchist groups many of whom were active 
during the protest phase of the campaign 
2 4 6 
The community 
of pidgin 
language poets  
saotrap Real names/ 
Pseudonymous 
A page that posts political satire in the form of poetry critical 
of the Belarusian authorities 
2 3 5 
We support 
independent 
Belarus  
mzv.bela
rus 
Anonymised A political page that covers broad issues, critical of the 
government 
3 2 5 
Belarusian fun 
and comix 
bel.gum
ar 
Anonymised A page posts fun pictures that cover the news related to 
Belarus 
3 2 5 
I ♡ Belarus love.bela
rus 
Anonymised A patriotic page with the picturesque images of Belarus 3 2 5 
Only SHOS1 l_l_loc Anonymised A page that covers political news.  2 2 4 
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Note. *I considered an administrator’s name as pseudonymous if it had in a non-Slavic form 
(e.g. “Helga Tre”) and a real if it was in the form characteristic of the Russian or Belarusian 
tradition (though it could still be a pseudonym). Some pages had several administrators. It was 
possible that a foreign citizen with a foreign name was an administrator of one of those pages. 
However, it would be highly unusual since pages had some portion of their content in the 
Belarusian language. 
1"SHOS" is an ambiguous anti-Lukashenka abbreviation which usually stands for "let him die" 
(“SHob On Sdoh” in Russian). 
 
Table 4.8 shows that most of the pages had no more than 9 connections to other pages 
and groups. Besides their critical stance towards the authorities, the pages had several 
similarities. First, all pages but the Belarusian fun and comix and I ♡ Belarus covered 
the Anti-tax campaign by posting news, photos and videos related to it. I determined 
this by using the native search engine of VK. Second, all of the pages had ties with 
other politicised VK page that were often critical of the authorities. However, the level 
of in-degree of the pages related to the Anti-tax was not higher than five. That means 
that the pages were reluctant to demonstrate their ties with other VK pages publicly. 
At the same time, the administrators of the pages established private, undisclosed 
linkages. For example, the administrators of DVIŽ (BASTA!) and Chrustaĺnyj Sasut 
“constantly sent messages” to the administrator of the PASD regarding content 
distribution (Respondent 14, personal communication, January 1, 2018). The PASD 
administrator also exchanged messages with the administrators of other pages from his 
network about the content to share. In addition to the private linkages with mostly 
anonymous or pseudonymous administrators of the anti-government VK pages, the 
administrator of the PASD had pre-existed links to one of the key public organisations 
of the Anti-tax campaign, the REP trade union. Respondent 14 was the union activist 
during the 2016 presidential elections (Respondent 14, personal communication, 
January 1, 2018). Thus, the personal linkages between the administrators of the VK 
pages that distributed campaign content and pre-existing linkages to the major Anti-tax 
groups seemed to be stronger than the administrators displayed publicly. In other words, 
the administrators of the most connected pages of the PASD network tried to downplay 
the ties between their pages. 
While all of the pages that were central to the PASD network were critical of the 
government and seemed to be supportive of the Anti-tax campaign, there is no evidence 
that they formed a political network or a coalition. Instead, the pages remained 
essentially independent units that exchanged the campaign content – the process 
151 
 
coordinated privately, as the network analysis and the interviews suggest. Hence, 
similar to the case of the Russian anti-corruption movement, these pages represented 
formed a segmented organisational network used to share political content.  
4.3.3 Dynamic segmentation as a successful organisational strategy 
Despite being segmented, neither the Anti-tax campaign in Belarus nor the Anti-
corruption campaign in Russia completely fulfilled all the criteria of a segmented social 
movement in SPIN terms. For instance, the Navalny campaigns segmented mainly 
before or during collective action. During later periods of the normal flow of events, the 
organisation was a rather bureaucratised structure that would be described by the SPIN 
model as more traditional. Nevertheless, this model is a theory of social movements 
acting in the pre-platform media environment. In other words, the model’s original form 
does not accommodate all the features of digitally-enabled organisation such as the 
opportunity to reinforce the ties between different segments by using the linking 
features of platforms, like the “Links to other pages” section on VK. Moreover, the 
SPIN model suggests that the recruitment process in movements “flows along the lines 
of pre-existing, significant social relationships” (Gerlach & Hine, 1970, p. 97). 
However, the two studied organisations were able to recruit new participants even if 
they had no significant social relationships to the core activists. This disparity between 
the SPIN model and the empirical observations indicates the need for move advanced 
conceptualisations of organising in digital authoritarian settings. 
When the Navalny organisation entered its second phase of campaigning, the 
presidential campaign, its network was transformed. The federal campaign office 
bureaucratised the administration of the campaign pages. At the same time, the local 
offices began receiving greater support, as well as additional resources and tools from 
the federal office. In exchange, the local offices partly lost their autonomy and were 
unified under the brand of the Navalny presidential campaign. Schneider (2019, pp. 12–
13), who has studied local governments, uses the term recentralisation to describe a 
similar process on the state level when devolved local authorities lose powers in 
exchange for resources.  
The last episode of the Navalny organisation’s campaigning in 2017-18 that was studied 
in this dissertation, the #strike campaign, also contained elements of dynamic 
segmentation. As I show later, by this time, Telegram, an encrypted messaging 
platform, superseded VK as the main platform used to coordinate Navalny’s networks. 
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The network’s coordinators considered Telegram as a safer organisational tool due to its 
features and architecture. This new coordination network remained partly segmented, 
especially during critical events, as Figure 5.8 illustrates.  
Initially, segmentation helped the Navalny organisation to proliferate quickly in the 
provinces, avoiding the persecution of its new local leaders. Following this, the 
organisation recentralised its segments as it accessed resources needed for the Navalny 
presidential campaign and distributed these resources across the local segments. During 
protest events, the network segmented again because the organisation’s public leaders 
were often isolated and local segment administrators had to take control of coordination. 
Thus, this research suggests that the focus on “the strong hierarchy inside his campaign” 
(Dollbaum et al., 2018) within the Navalny organisation might be misleading because 
this hierarchy can be transformed quickly.  
Finally, after the period of the presidential elections ended in March 2018, the network 
of the Navalny organisation became segmented again, waiting for further political 
opportunities. Half a year later, in September 2018, this network consisted of around a 
half of the original “Navalny offices” (‘Shtaby Navalnogo’, n.d.) that continued 
“campaigning on regional political” issues (Volkov, 2018d). They pursued a relatively 
autonomous political agenda. These offices were also “free to choose any topic to 
campaign on […] and to find resources for it.” Volkov (2018d) believed that this 
localisation of the campaign was its main outcome: 
Our regional political network is our main outcome. […] No one believed that 
anyone would hand out leaflets on the streets of Komsomolsk-on-Amar, join a rally 
in Murmansk and march to protest in Kaliningrad. 
 [The current] strategy is to find the points that are the most problematic for the 
authorities and to create pressure there. The pressure would push the authorities to 
make mistakes, which would grow our political capital and make the life of the 
authorities more difficult. 
The statements by the movement’s leaders suggested that, in spring 2018, the Navalny 
organisation became much less controlled from the federal office than it had been in 
2017. In the morning after the presidential election, Alexei Navalny (2018b) posted on 
his website: “These ‘elections’ are one of the episodes of the struggle. We realised this 
earlier and concentrated on building a structure. And we created it despite enormous 
pressure.” That was how Volkov (Kanygin, 2018) presented the main outcome of the 
campaigning in 2017: 
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Before the launch of the campaign, we did not have a regional network, and 
everyone thought that all politics could only take place in Moscow […]. We have 
demonstrated hundreds and thousands of bright political activists in the provinces 
who are absolutely self-directed, independent, self-sufficient, who carry out 
absolutely stunning creative, inventive, strong, bold actions. 
The core activists of the Navalny organisation planned to carry on with their pollical 
activities further, i.e. by contesting local elections when the political opportunity arises, 
and considered the remaining offices as the ground for these activities. Thus, the 
Navalny movement’s organisational structure was not completely centralised or 
segmented but was hybrid and dynamically adaptable to the current goals and 
circumstances. In other words, the hierarchical and network forms of organising 
coexisted (Karatzogianni, 2015, p. 14) in the Navalny case. 
In contrast to the Navalny organisation, the Anti-tax movement was not organisationally 
dynamic and failed to develop the institutional capacity to struggle for real power and, 
thus, to build a “sustainable organisation” (Bennett et al., 2014). Instead, after its basic 
claim was fulfilled, it had largely dispersed under the pressures of state repression and 
other factors by April 2017. By 31 March 2017, 941 cases of detention and other forms 
of persecution related to the campaign and protests had been recorded by human rights 
defenders and journalists (Spring96, 2017). None of its later claims, including demands 
to resolve the socio-economic crisis and calls for Lukashenka's resignation (Miller, 
2017), were addressed by the authorities. The Anti-tax campaign achieved the policy 
change it demanded but did not adapt its organisation dynamically and failed in the long 
run.  
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Chapter 5 Political leadership in authoritarian settings 
In this chapter, I focus on the issue of leadership in the Anti-tax movement Navalny’s 
presidential campaign. I discuss how their leaders approached the challenges of 
surveillance and persecution by managing their visibility on social media and 
coordinating collective action. This analysis is based on interviews, textual analysis of 
the materials that were disseminated by the campaigners and their conversations on the 
Telegram messaging platform, as well as features analysis of campaign communities on 
VK and participant observation.  
In the first section, I discuss how the activists of the organisations perceived and 
approached the issue of surveillance. By analysing the communication in their 
campaigns, I isolate the notion of a segment leader, as well as its denomination – a 
pseudonymous segment leader. In the second section, I analyse who the multiplicity of 
leadership, as well as a canny use of platform affordances, helped the two anti-
authoritarian movements to address the issue of persecution. In the third and fourth 
sections, I examine the role of the single charismatic leader of the Navalny movement, 
as well as its organisational culture.  
5.1 Surveillance 
5.1.1 The emergence of segment leaders 
On the first day of my fieldwork in Moscow, I rushed into the local office of the 
Navalny presidential campaign. It was located on the ground floor of an ordinary 
apartment complex quite far away from the city centre. Before this moment, I followed 
the campaign online for many months. I also knew that the activists had to change the 
location of their Moscow office several times as the police put pressure on the owners 
of the buildings where the offices were located. On my way to the office, I was carefully 
looking around me: where could the agents of the police that might be spying on the 
office be placed? Would they record my face and add me to their database of Navalny’s 
supporters?  
The office had white walls and white furniture that reminded of simple IKEA-style 
design. On one of the walls, there was a large sign “Navalny 2018.” Upon arrival, I was 
met by the volunteers who immediately tried to register me on their supporters’ 
database. I told them that I was not a Russian citizen and came here to learn about their 
campaign rather than to join it. The volunteers, who were mostly in their early twenties, 
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received my request with surprise and suspicion: “If you cannot be a volunteer, what are 
you doing here?”  
Suddenly, more people started arriving in the office. They were mostly young males 
who looked like students. New visitors were registered in the database and then invited 
to take a chair. In about ten minutes, the training event had started. It was about the 
election observation. The suspicious volunteers forgot about me, and I started listening 
to a trainer who talked about the fun of election monitoring in Russia. Soon I received a 
chance to break the barrier with the volunteers and to talk to their leaders who appeared 
more welcoming. They agreed to an interview with me for the next day and allowed me 
to stay in the office for a while to observe. I did not blame these people for their 
suspicion for I knew how challenging it might be to avoid surveillance in an 
authoritarian state.  
During my observation of the Navalny organisation in the summer of 2017, I also 
noticed that its activists had almost never used their smartphones to talk. The Moscow 
office of the organisation is a good example. I spent about eight hours a day for three 
days in this office and found that no one made calls using a mobile network or a 
landline.  
I know that my phone calls are wiretapped. We all assume that everything is 
audible here [in the office]. Completely. If we have something very important [to 
discuss] [...], no one speaks out. We all leave our telephones inside [the office] and 
go out to discuss stuff on the street to avoid phone surveillance. (Respondent 26, 
personal communication, August 14, 2017) 
The report by a local human rights group supports the concerns of the activists. “The 
Russian state had, in recent years, organized a complex system of monitoring and 
surveillance of civic activists, independent journalists and the political opposition” 
(Gainutdinov & Chikov, 2017b). As a consequence, when activists call each other using 
a mobile network, they fear the Russian special services might wiretap them.  
Just like in Russia, the Belarusian government is one of those regimes that have 
implemented a complex system that enables state surveillance of internet traffic 
(Freedom House, 2016a). This system is partly developed by Russia and China and is 
used to filter or to suppress political content on the internet (Åström et al., 2012). 
Belarusian political activists are aware of these practices. For example, Respondent 10, 
an activist of the Anti-tax campaign from a local town in Belarus (personal 
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communication, September 6, 2017), believed that he was constantly watched, 
especially before and during the critical days of collective action:  
I feel they are wiretapping me. I do not know how. But I believe they control me 
somehow. I am hundred per cent sure that they are watching me on social media. 
[…] But I am ok about that. 
I heard such worries from several Anti-tax activists, which makes me believe that 
Respondent 10 was not just paranoid about surveillance. They did not take any actions 
to tackle this. According to an experienced activist and journalist Respondent 11, who 
spoke at the first Anti-tax rally in Minsk, digital security negligence is a common 
attitude among politically active people, who “do not know what TOR is, do not know 
what VPN is, and who pays for this. They are fined, their pages are hacked, and KGB’s 
hackers are doing anything with them” (Respondent 11, personal communication, May 
24, 2017).  
Digital security expert Respondent 9 (personal communication, March 13, 2017) said 
that organisations were more reluctant to improve their security practices to avoid 
surveillance than individual activists. The expert also observed that those who witnessed 
how the state can use digital surveillance to persecute activists were often more 
interested in learning about digital security. Another prominent digital security expert 
Respondent 3 (personal communication, January 17, 2017) argued that political activists 
were more worried about losing access to pages they administered or inability to 
promote their content due to the commercialisation of digital platforms rather than their 
privacy and possible surveillance or other forms of repressive politics.  
A few Belarusian activists, like Respondent 21 (personal communication, September 1, 
2017), did address the issue of surveillance by following the advice of security 
specialists: “I do care about my safety […]. I monitor the situation with access to my 
accounts, change passwords, complex passwords.” Many activists simply tried to avoid 
email and social media platforms associated with Russia: “We do not use anything that 
has ‘Ru’ [Ru is the domain zone for Russia]” in its name, like VK or Mail.ru, said 
Respondent 19, a political vlogger who used YouTube to mobilise citizens for protests 
(personal communication, September 7, 2017).  
The activists of the Navalny organisation also “realised” that if they exchange messages 
on VK, “they can be read everywhere” (Respondent 31, personal communication, 
August 15, 2017). They were afraid of surveillance on this platform that is owned by 
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Alisher Usmanov, a Russian businessman who maintains close connections with the 
government. Usmanov was featured in “Don’t Call Him Dimon” investigation several 
times as a businessman who allegedly bribed the prime minister. The activists also 
criticised him later using memes and other content. Still, the campaign used VK actively 
for its public communication. The campaigners explain this public role of VK by its 
popularity among young Russians: “The Navalny movement is a youth movement. 
Thus, VK is a natural choice for the Navalny network” (Respondent 31, personal 
communication, 15 August 2017). Respondent 31 also added that VK was the primary 
platform for public communication of the Anti-corruption campaign.  
Still, surveillance was one of the major concerns of many activists. As I have 
demonstrated earlier, the Russian local authorities could not initially identify an 
organisational structure behind the few novice individuals who applied for a sanction 
for a small anti-corruption rally in their town in March 2017. Segmentation helped the 
Anti-corruption campaign to solve temporarily one of the dissident’s challenges – 
restrictions on freedom of assembly such as persecution of protest leaders. However, in 
many places, the local governments recalled their authorisations for rallies several days 
after they were issued. For example, this post on the Anti-corruption VK page in 
Kostroma announced the recall in this way (Figure 5.1):  
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Figure 5.1. The post on the VK anti-corruption page in Kostroma that announced that 
the authorisation for a rally was recalled.  
Translation: 
ATTENTION ATTENTION!!!! maximum repost! 
This is the organiser! 
As you know, our application for a rally was denied, I don’t have the right to call 
you for anything, but, I can and will offer to walk past the lonely protestors [a 
picket-person]! 
Tomorrow, at 16:00 on October Square, we are going for a walk! 
According to the "rumours", there will be a picket with a banner, consider them a 
mark. 
(According to rumours, there will be protestors on Susaninskaya Square and on 
Mira ave.) 
VERY IMPORTANT: DO NOT BRING ANY FLAGS, POSTERS ETC. 
OTHERWISE!!!!! 
THE WALK WILL END UP IN THE LOCAL POLICE STATION! 
Also, the organisers look for several not shy people who can stand up for 
themselves. 
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Only 15% of all rallies announced by the campaign VK pages were authorised as of 
March 25 (Table 4.5). Thus, the campaigners had to post similar announcements in 
other groups too. It seems like the federal government of Russia realised that the 
novices were the activists of a large emerging movement – an organisation whose 
nature they perhaps could not yet understand, but they felt it could pose an important 
challenge to the authorities.  
Still, the government could try to identify, monitor and, consequently, persecute only 
some of those novices – activists who applied for an authorisation for a rally. Some of 
those people were indeed key organisers in local campaign segments. For example, the 
official applicant for the 26 March rally in one of the Russian cities was Respondent 26, 
the paid coordinator of the Navalny organisation. Being part of Navalny’s campaigns 
for years, Respondent 26 formally joined the Anti-corruption campaign just a month 
before these events (Respondent 26, personal communication, August 14, 2017). The 
authorities refused to authorise the rally and, following its success with about 1 500 
people attending, tried to detain Respondent 26. The process of securing authorisation 
for a rally could help the authorities to reveal the identities of local campaign leaders.  
Three months later, when preparing the second rally of the campaign on 12 June 2017, 
Respondent 26 did not apply for an authorisation. Instead, Respondent 26 found rank-
and-file activists for this role, so Respondent 26 “would not be excluded from the 
campaign” as a result of possible detention. “If you are put in jail, we do not work” – 
Respondent 26 explains the logic behind this approach (Respondent 26, personal 
communication, August 14, 2017). By contrast, the Respondent 26th rank-and-file 
activists were later detained.  
Another official local coordinator of the Anti-corruption campaign, Respondent 25, 
asked two activists who joined the protests groups “after they watched the video of 
Navalny” (personal communication, June 11, 2017) to apply for the authorisation for a 
rally in this city. After a successful rally, the two activists were brought to court and 
fined with about $200 fines. Respondent 25 was not prosecuted. Such division of labour 
between real leaders and organisers on paper was typical for at least some other Russian 
regions where the campaign proliferated. 
Many leaders of the campaign segments managed to avoid persecution during the 
preparation for the 26 March rallies and after them because the authorities might not 
realise their significance. These leaders were vital figures of the campaign because they 
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were the administrators of its segment digital platform pages. I define these figures as 
independent segment leaders. Segment leaders are the administrators of campaign pages 
that recruit new followers and connect central and local leadership with followers. I 
discuss these two functions of segment leaders in the following sections. In some 
regions where the campaign managed to launch its offices before the 26 March rallies, 
the role of segment leaders was played by paid regional office coordinators. However, 
in the majority of Russian regions, their role was taken by volunteers who had no formal 
link to the core Navalny team in Moscow. In both cases, segment leaders were real local 
leaders of the Anti-corruption campaign. Finally, in a few locations, the role of a 
segment leader was delegated to paid office staff. 
The critical feature of a digital segment leader of the Anti-corruption campaign was 
their knowledge of and ability to use the affordances of digital media to protect their 
identity and to avoid surveillance. Figure 5.2 depicts a typical section of a VK campaign 
page featuring the digital segment leader and other personalities of a local segment. This 
section contains names and links to the profiles of the administrator and other users 
related to the segment in Arkhangelsk. Ivan Ivanov, the administrator, is most certainly 
a fake identity. Their profile picture (Figure 5.3) is a cat, their page contains only one 
post, which is a repost of the photos from the protest rally, and the name of the 
administrator is the most typical Russian name. The profile has no photos, and it was 
not updated after March 2017. By contrast, a user described as “a rally organiser,” 
Valeri Shpiakin, was not an administrator as his name was not part of the section 
“Organisers.8” Shpiakin did not conceal his identity. He was a person who applied for 
authorisation and could be prosecuted first if the police chose so. Thus, Shpiakin had no 
reason for hiding his identity behind a nickname as the local authorities and, therefore, 
the police had known it already. 
 
8 In the section “Organisers”, the design of VK displays a link to the profile of the “owner” of a page. 
Only the owners have full administrator’s rights. Section “contacts” could be filled with the links to the 
profiles of any other users who may or may not be administrators.  
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Figure 5.2. A fragment of the Anti-corruption campaign page in Arkhangelsk and its 
translation [with my comments].  
 
Figure 5.3. The profile of Ivan Ivanov, probably, a fake identity of the digital segment 
leader of the Anti-corruption campaign page in Arkhangelsk. 
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Ivan Ivanov is an example of an independent segment leader who was identified as an 
administrator of a campaign page but concealed their identity by adopting a nickname 
or a pseudonym. Up to 33% of segment leaders concealed their identities in a similar 
fashion. Therefore, many of the digital segment leaders of the Anti-corruption campaign 
should be characterised as pseudonymous leaders. Some of these pseudonymous 
segment leaders adopted several additional practices to protect their identities. They 
used VPNs when accessing VK and “fake” phone numbers that could be purchased on 
the internet for several dollars to register their pseudonymous accounts on VK. The 
adoption of visibility management affordances allowed the pseudonymous segment 
leaders of the Anti-corruption campaign to reduce the impact of state surveillance.  
Just like the administrators of the March 26 Anti-corruption VK pages, some activists of 
the Anti-tax campaign addressed the issue of surveillance by negotiating their online 
visibility. An administrator of the PASD group Respondent 14 is an example of a 
campaign leader who carefully negotiated his visibility. Respondent 14 was not a 
publicly known figure. In addition, Respondent 14 was not a member of any political 
organisation that formed the Anti-tax Coalition in January 2017, although he had been 
involved in the election monitoring organised by the REP union. Moreover, Respondent 
14 (personal communication, January 1, 2018) neither claimed a leadership role nor 
agreed to call himself an activist: 
I don’t like to be singled out. […] People do not want to say that they are, for 
example, somehow involved [in the Anti-tax campaign]. I thought for a long time 
why do we have the only politician like that - Lukashenka. [It is because] many 
[potential civic leaders] are just afraid to show their worth. 
As the pseudonymous page administrators of the Anti-corruption campaign in Russia, 
administrator Respondent 14 concealed his identity by using a pseudonym. Respondent 
14’s pseudonym was Robin Hood (Figure 5.4). Respondent 14 used this name to log in 
VK and to administer the PASD page. The PASD’s information section contained 
contact details of only one person – Robin Dobry [Robin Hood]:  
Robin's page is just like an image, like a character. For me, the character of Robin 
Hood is clear to everyone. This was the man who struggled against the regime. 
(Respondent 14, personal communication, January 1, 2018) 
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Figure 5.4. The profile of an administrator of the PASD page.  
Deseriis (2015, p. 168) argues that pseudonyms are an experimental form of subjectivity 
on the internet. By using the pseudonym, Respondent 14 (personal communication, 
January 1, 2018) concealed Respondent 14’s identity to avoid surveillance and 
persecution:  
I realised that this is a system. First of all, we have these people who somehow 
stick out, organisers of [campaigns] like me, they are constantly being pushed 
back, trampled down. That is why many are just afraid to declare themselves. 
[Dissident] Statkevich speaks out, and he is being sent to prison and so on. 
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Some other administrators of the Anti-tax pages also concealed their identities. For 
example, the administrator(s) of the Party of Parasites on Facebook, another prominent 
page of the campaign, did not reveal their identities for a long time (Respondent 4, 
personal communication, 19 May 2017). As of February 2019, their identities were still 
unknown to the public, although the page continued to function. It now focuses on other 
contentious issues like the security situation in the region. The administrators of another 
Facebook page dedicated to the Anti-tax cause in Maladzyechna, a town 100 km from 
Minsk, also preferred to hide their identities more than a year after the events. I 
managed to identify one of the persons behind the page. Maladzyechna was their native 
town. I contacted the person, but after accepting an interview request and confirming 
their role as an administrator, they later stopped answering my messages. Thus, many 
administrators of the campaign pages such as Respondent 14 tried to avoid the fate of 
dissidents like Statkevich, who spent years in prison. 
The persecution-cautious administrators did not “declare themselves” publicly either by 
adopting pseudonyms or by staying anonymous. As with the leaders of Navalny's Anti-
corruption campaign, I suggest that these people were pseudonymous or anonymous 
independent segment leaders of the Anti-tax campaign. It seems that the administrators 
of social media pages were the largest division in the population of campaign segment 
leaders. It is possible that there were segment leaders who did not administer any page 
and were not using social media to post public content or work with the audience. 
However, this study cannot reveal this layer of segment leadership due to the limitations 
of its design and focus on the digital aspects in the Anti-tax campaigning and 
mobilisation. 
Other administrators of the campaign pages did not actively manage visibility. Such 
leaders often shared information on their own account rather than using pseudonymous 
profiles. The case of Illia Mikulic is notorious. He administrated a regional page of the 
Anti-tax campaign in a town of Niasviz in western Belarus. This page had just about 35 
subscribers. The page shared information about the campaign such as the 
announcements of a rally planned in his town. Mikulic’s real name was stated in the 
section “contacts” of the page. Following the announcement of the rally, he was briefly 
detained by the police (AT, 2017). According to independent media reports, the police 
asked him to remove his VK page or to give up his administrator password. Mikulic, a 
26-year-old unemployed activist who was not a member of any organisation (AT, 
2017), refused to follow the order and was charged with organising an unlawful protest 
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event. This administrator, who refused to hide his name, was later forced to leave 
Belarus. Those little-known local administrators of smaller pages who revealed their 
names could be tracked and prosecuted more easily. I define this type of administrators 
as public segment leaders. 
Many pseudonymous and public segment leaders of the Anti-tax organisation, just as 
new leaders of Navalny’s Anti-corruption campaign, were never part of any political 
organisation before. Experienced political activists Respondent 11, who spent many 
years in prison on political charges, noted that the Anti-tax protests “produced many 
grassroots, ad hoc leaders” (personal communication, May 24, 2017). This ad hoc 
character was one of the defining features of segment leadership in both cases.  
5.2 The visibly management and persecution 
5.2.1 2000 days in jail 
Following the organisational success of the Anti-corruption campaign and its 
mobilisation in Spring 2017, the Navalny structures transformed into a large 
organisation. Many of the segments that emerged during the preparation for the anti-
corruption rallies were absorbed into a new campaign that demanded the registration of 
Alexei Navalny as a presidential candidate. At this stage, the authorities might try to 
reveal the real identities of pseudonymous segment leaders by monitoring the 
organisation’s activities closely. However, by this time, the organisation moved its 
coordination from VK, a platform highly exposed to surveillance, to Telegram. This 
messenger platform contained elements of social media and was considered as the most 
secure popular digital platform in Russia in 2017.  
“Better do not go with us – we do not want you to be arrested!” These words I heard 
from Respondent 28 when I first met him at the Navalny office in one of large Russian 
cities in August 2017. The presidential campaign was in full swing. Fortunately, 
Respondent 28 allowed me to stay in their office and observe the campaigners for some 
time. Still, I did not do it for as long as I would have liked to. I knew about the risks of 
attacks on the offices. Campaign premises were raided by the police, pro-Putin activists 
or provocateurs from time to time. I also never followed activists outside when they 
tried to distribute campaign materials on the streets or to organise an event to attract 
people’s attention. I was not paranoid about state security. Though I realised that if the 
campaigners did not want to see me following them on the streets, they had a good 
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reason for it. A couple of weeks after I finished my observation and left that city, 
something bad happened to Respondent 28 that I cannot describe so not to identify him. 
Physical intimidation and violence against the leaders of the Navalny organisation were 
a common practice by the time of my visit. This is, for example, the experience of 
Respondent 26 (personal communication, July 8, 2017), who was the main organiser of 
the protests of 26 March in one of the Russian towns: 
After [the protests of] 26 March, when they jailed [Navalny’s chief of staff] Leonid 
Volkov [...], I was at home. I had helped the detainees. I had sat with the phone, 
called, texted. A good friend of mine wrote to me: ‘[Respondent 26], they'll come 
for you now, leave.’ I got dressed, and there was a knock on the door - it was very 
scary. [...] I thought: ‘Oh my god, there is a child with me, 13 years old.’ I did not 
open the door. They were police officers. 
On that day, Respondent 26 believed that they escaped the arrest. But they were 
detained later, along with other 21 out of some 70 regional coordinators of the Navalny 
presidential campaign, following the rallies on 7 October 2017.  
Five out of six of the regional coordinators of the Navalny organisation I interviewed 
were detained at least once during their campaigning in 2017. Detentions were normally 
associated with collective action. Alexei Navalny – a person whom authorities saw as a 
central figure of the organisation – also spent some 60 days in jail in 2017 according to 
my calculations based on media reports. Volkov spent 65 days in jail the same year 
according to the federal office. By the time Navalny was officially barred from the 
presidential election, the staff of his organisation had spent more than 2 000 days in jail 
and were fined more than $170 000 in total (S. Walker, 2017). Public leaders of activist 
groups are often the first targets for persecution in Russia. 
5.2.2 The functions of segment leaders 
Volkov and other leaders of the Navalny organisation liked to emphasise that despite 
the numerous arrests of its official leadership, the presidential campaign was not halted. 
They explained it by the “horizontal” nature of their organisation. Contrary to what the 
core leadership implied, I found that the Navalny organisation was directed by a limited 
circle of individuals rather than by “all of you,” as Volkov (Novosti Shtabov 
Navalnogo, 2018) claimed. 
First, many VK pages of the 26 March protest network created by independent segment 
leaders had been gradually absorbed into a centralised structure controlled from 
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Moscow. These VK pages became entirely controlled by Respondent 31 (personal 
communication, August 15, 2017). This happened when, after the success of the 26 
March protests, the Navalny organisation increasingly became dominated on local 
levels by regional office coordinators, who were appointed by Volkov’s appointees 
(Volkov, 2017h).    
Second, the main reason for establishing control over the content and administration of 
VK pages was, according to the core Moscow activists, the fear that independent 
segment leaders might publish controversial content that could provoke a scandal in the 
pro-government “propaganda” and damage the reputation of the whole network. Such a 
scandal, according to Respondent 31 (personal communication, August 15, 2017), 
happened in the city of Volgograd. On 22 March 2017, a local segment leader published 
a meme picture (Figure 5.5) on their VK page. This happened after unknown people 
thrown green liquid into Navalny’s face: 
This happened just before we opened an office [in Volgograd]. There was a public 
page [of the 26 March protests] in Volgograd which we had not fully controlled 
[…]. Accordingly, the content was not agreed with us. […] People published a 
seemingly harmless [picture] of the Motherland [The Motherland Calls is part of 
one of the most venerated Russian Second World War memorials] in green colour, 
with the context that She expresses her solidarity with Alexei Navalny, solidarity 
with the fact that the lawlessness things are happening in the country […]. But the 
media covered [the story] upside down, saying that we supposedly do not respect 
the monuments. 
Figure 5.5. Alexei Navalny after an attack on him and the meme of the Motherland 
Calls sculpture published on the Volgograd 26 March VK page. 
The case of the Motherland Calls meme shows that the administrators of its digital 
infrastructure shaped Navalny’s “ordinary citizens’” movement.  
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Third, the examples of such formations as Avaaz or Toronto’s 2014 WorldPride suggest 
that administrators of social media pages can play the role of organisation’s 
spokespeople, and this role enhances the administrator’s visibility and power (Kavada, 
2012; Poell & van Dijck, 2016; Shaw & Hill, 2014). Spokespeople are individuals who 
communicate with the external population on behalf of an organisation. Spokespeople 
combine one of the most powerful figures in digitally-enabled movements (Gerbaudo, 
2017c; Kavada, 2012; Poell et al., 2016). Similar to spokespeople for other movements, 
many of Navalny organisation’s segment leaders performed such tasks as writing, 
editing and scheduling posts on social media pages. Many of them also helped to 
produce additional media materials, attracting new followers to the media pages, 
administrating content on those pages by editing or removing texts and photos including 
users’ comments. Finally, depending on a platform, just like movement spokespeople, 
segment leaders had powers to remove a user from a conversation using their admin 
rights. In doing so, they ultimately shaped the communication and consequences of anti-
authoritarian movement. 
Effectively, many of the activists of the Navalny organisation who had admin rights 
became its local spokespeople. Thus, many segment leaders had additional functions 
that made them influential connectors of the presidential campaign by communicating 
its messages, connecting its different parts, administering its social media accounts and, 
finally, recruiting new followers. This means that the segment leaders of the Navalny 
organisation were responsible for a large amount of organisational work conducted on 
an interjacent, middle organisational level, connecting its often absent (or imprisoned) 
federal leadership with the local follower base.  
For example, one of the activists of the Moscow headquarters Nikolay Kasyan had often 
introduced himself to people who would like to join the presidential campaign simply as 
an “administrator of five Moscow Telegram chats.” The campaigners created these 
chats or groups to administer the ongoing tasks in different areas of Moscow, which is a 
city of more than 10 million people. Kasyan’s role as an administrator of those groups 
turned him into a spokesperson for the Navalny organisation in the locations he was 
responsible for. The administrator/spokesperson continued recruiting and coordinating 
the campaign volunteers when his own coordinators – Respondent 28 or Volkov – were 
unavailable since placed in jail. Thus, the functions of segment leaders included 
recruitment of new volunteers, as well as connecting central and local leadership to 
followers. 
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Therefore, the Navalny organisation was not directed by horizonal people’s structures. 
Equally, it was not a movement fully managed by few core activists located in Moscow. 
I argue that the administrators of social media pages, whom I defined as segment 
leaders, played a key role in leading this organisation during both initial and later phases 
of its development.  
5.2.3 Three levels of leadership in an anti-authoritarian movement 
5.2.3.1 Core leadership in the Anti-tax campaign 
Alongside the Russian case, the Anti-tax campaign contained a level of leadership that 
consisted of prominent civic and political activists. I defined them as core leaders. Core 
leader managed platform pages but also represented the campaign and negotiated with 
the authorities. By contrast to most of segment leaders, public leaders were often well-
known to journalists and the police before the campaign. They had immense experience 
in organising, information distribution and appealing to the audience. Moreover, such 
leaders did not just focus on one segment like Mikulic on Niasviz or Respondent 10, a 
pioneer of the signature gathering stage. These public leaders travelled extensively to 
take part in local collective action across different segments.  
  
170 
 
Table 5.1 
The types of leadership in the Anti-tax campaign 
Leadership 
level  Example Visibility 
Time of the 
first 
detention Role in the campaign 
Core leader Anatol 
Liabedzka 
Public March 2017 - reinforce the ties between 
segments through travelling 
- administer platform pages  
- represent a campaign in 
the media 
- negotiate with the 
authorities 
- coordinate collective 
action 
Independent 
segment 
leader 
Illia 
Mikulic 
Public March 2017 - administer platform pages 
- reinforce the ties between 
segments 
Ihar 
Kleshyk 
Pseudonym
ous/anonym
ous 
December 
2017 
- administer platform pages 
- reinforce the ties between 
segments (privately, when 
discussing content through 
messaging) 
 
Anatol Liabedzka, the chairman of the UCP, was one of the most prominent 
representatives of the category of core leaders. Liabedzka was a member of the last 
parliament elected in free and fair elections more than 20 years before these events 
(Respondent 15, personal communication, May 18, 2017). In 2010-11, Liabedzka spent 
108 days in probably the worst prison in the country, the detention centre of the KGB, 
where he was tortured. Liabedzka acted as a “journalist and a media personality” in “a 
changing media landscape” (Respondent 15, personal communication, May 18, 2017). 
Some journalists believed Liabedzka was one of few top opposition politicians who 
were successful on social media (Drakakhrust, 2017b). Liabedzka claimed that he 
manages his social media accounts on his own, constantly experimenting with the ways 
of building a larger audience. One of the most popular posts he produced during the 
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campaign advertised the signature gathering process9. This OK post received about 18 
000 comments.  
Just as pseudonymous and anonymous administrators of the PASD and the Party of 
Parasites, Liabedzka administered several platform pages that were prominent during 
the initial protest period of the campaign. For instance, one of the announcements of the 
first local campaign rally in Homel was placed on his personal accounts on OK and 
Facebook a day before it had been scheduled to happen (Figure 5.6). The announcement 
contained a photo of the recent Anti-tax demonstration in Minsk and the words: 
“HOMEL, Sunday – 19 February, 12.00, the Uprising square. The march of non-
parasites. Come together!” This announcement quickly attracted one of the largest 
audiences associated with any post about this rally, according to my extensive search for 
similar announcements using Google, Yandex and the native search engines of VK, OK 
and Facebook. The Homel rally subsequently became the most attended local collective 
action of the campaign (see Table 4.3). The skill of administering platform pages was 
pivotal for all the types of leaders in the Anti-tax campaign.  
Figure 5.6. Two of Liabedzka’s posts announcing the Homel Anti-tax rally. Facebook 
(left) versus OK (right). The screenshot was taken on 28 February 2017 by the Author. 
The Anti-tax campaign held their collective action in different locations throughout 
Belarus (Table 4.3). Public core leaders of the campaign such as Liabedzka or a vlogger 
Maksim Filipovich travelled widely to participate in, often to talk at and cover those 
 
9 18 January 2017. Available from https://ok.ru/profile/571712101017/statuses/66395687461017  
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collective gatherings. Invitations to visit the rallies were often coming from previously 
unknown people. That is how, for instance, Respondent 17 (personal communication, 
May 18, 2017) was invited to participate in the rally in Pinsk, one of few anti-
government rallies the town had witnessed since the country’s independence: 
These were people who contacted us through social media. They were not activists 
of political parties. However, they expressed a desire to do something, to organise 
something. […] They wrote to me: 
 “Anatol, would you visit us?” 
 “Yes,” I replied to them, “I can come, but if you start doing something there.” 
 “What can we do?” 
 I told them that there you had a banner to advertise a rally which you could 
share on your social media network we did not know much about. 
Perhaps one of the most recognisable public leaders of the campaign, popular vlogger 
Filipovich had visited about a fifth of the gatherings of the campaign in a short period 
and was prevented from further travelling only by the detention that lasted until the 
protests faded. During his visits, Filipovich conducted YouTube live streams from the 
rallies. Just as Filipovich, other public leaders like Respondent 19 and Respondent 21, 
streamed from the rallies they attended. Such video streams by public core and segment 
leaders became the major source of information about the campaign events for many 
users, said Respondent 2 (personal communication, May 30, 2017), who is an expert in 
political activism in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. The streams by journalists also 
informed a large audience. For instance, just three streams of the first rally of the 
campaign in Minsk by three independent media on 17 February attracted more than 1 
million views in total on YouTube (NN VIDEO TV, 2017; Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, 2017c; TUT.BY, 2017). 
The YouTube streams also helped to coordinate participants on the ground (Respondent 
1, personal communication, March 13, 2017; Respondent 9, personal communication, 
March 13, 2017) and became a factor in the choreography of Anti-tax gatherings 
(Gerbaudo, 2017a). Many of ordinary participants who wanted to speak up during the 
gatherings surrounded the streamers as there no stages or sound equipment during those 
unauthorised rallies normally. This generated large crowds around  d those with 
cameras (Bylina, 2017). The streams by travelling core leaders, along with journalists’ 
Live broadcasts on YouTube, helped to coordinate and choreograph the gatherings of 
the Anti-tax campaign.  
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Therefore, core leaders performed the roles of platform page administrators and 
spokespeople for the campaign. In addition, these leaders also reinforced links between 
different calls/segments of the campaign when they travelled to support protest rallies. 
The SPIN theory defines such extensively travelling leaders of a segmented 
organisation as travelling evangelists. Their function is to articulate and reinforce the 
ties between the organisation’s cells (Gerlach & Hine, 1970, p. 57). The travelling 
evangelists of the Anti-tax reinforced the ties between the campaign segments. 
By contrast, the pseudonymous segment leaders seemed to be not particularly interested 
in shaping the choreography of assembly by sharing streams from rallies on their pages. 
For instance, out of 103 posts shared on the Party of Parasites Facebook page, only two 
contained a video stream, content analysis showed. The PASD page on VK shared no 
streams at all. Perhaps segment leaders did not want to increase the chances of 
compromising their identities. Still, some pseudonymous segment leaders did travel to 
attend some of the rallies. Here is, for instance, the testament of the PASD’s 
administrator who was then totally unknown to the police:  
I participated in the 17 February [rally] in Minsk. First, I really like the parades of 
that kind, because they have some kind of energy. […] You understand that you are 
not alone in this fight. It helps very emotionally too. […] I was also at the 25 
[March rally] at the time of crackdown, when people were arrested. I saw people 
being dragged away [by the police]. These are terrible things […] ... just awful. 
And I also went to Pinsk. I have a friend there. But I will not talk about him - I do 
not want to set up. (Respondent 14, personal communication, January 1, 2018) 
It was difficult to trace all the leaders of the Anti-tax campaign for several reasons. 
First, some of these leaders, like the administrators of the Party of Parasites, approached 
the challenge of surveillance seriously and tried to conceal their personal identities. 
Second, there was no formal membership or structures that could produce any hierarchy 
within the campaign. Third, there was no single campaign website or a list with all the 
links to the campaign pages like in the case of the Navalny organisation. These three 
reasons also meant that it was more difficult for the authorities to identify some leaders. 
Segmentation and pseudonymous visibility helped to protect the identities of some of 
the leaders.  
5.2.3.2 Visibility of segment leaders 
During my observation, I realised that Telegram group administrators such as Kasyan 
gained a relatively high level of prominence in the local Moscow office of the Navalny 
organisation. Groups and channels are the two most common ways of public interaction 
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on Telegram. Groups look similar to the 1990s-style internet chats where the 
administrators are just one voice among many others. The only difference between an 
administrator and ordinary Telegram users is that the former can block, add or remove a 
user from a group. This effectively meant that Kasyan could decide whether a person 
joins the campaign or not. Therefore, the role of an administrator of Telegram groups 
gave activists like Kasyan specific powers.  
Table 5.2  
Summary of the administrating features of Telegram groups and channels 
Feature Channel Group 
Administrators are 
automatically anonymised 
Always Sometimes 
Followers can post No Yes 
How to contact 
administrators 
No contact options 
provided 
Most often contact is 
possible 
 
The voices of the administrators of Telegram public channels are even more dominant 
due to the design features of the platform (Table 5.2). Channels turn Telegram into 
social media as they function similarly to a page on Facebook though users normally 
cannot comment or like the posts on a channel. A user can establish their own public or 
private channel to share information with an unlimited number of anonymous 
subscribers. Platform design often presents the administrators of a social media page or 
a group as authoritative and distinct personalities that shape the voice of the 
organisation (Kavada, 2015). This is perhaps unavoidable as the design of platforms 
shapes people’s interaction (van Dijck, 2013b). On Telegram, the default settings 
facilitate the exclusive domination of administrators over their channels.  
The design of Telegram does not allow other users to comment and to like posts or to 
write anything on a channel. The rules also do not allow contacting the administrators of 
a channel. This broadcasting style of communication (Kavada, 2013) makes Telegram 
function similarly to video-sharing platforms like YouTube rather than to more 
interactive social networks like Facebook. On YouTube, a user cannot post a video on 
another user’s channel. Comments under videos could also be switched off by a channel 
administrator. By contrast, Facebook default settings allow every user to post private 
messages to the administrator of a page and to comment on its newsfeed. Therefore, the 
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design of Telegram encourages a broadcasting style of communication in contrast to 
two-way interactions that are characteristic of some other popular social media 
platforms.  
The figure of Kasyan demonstrates that the administration features of Telegram are 
associated with the rearrangement of power relations. The communication power 
relations within the Navalny organisation were asymmetric, which is a common feature 
of social movements (Melucci, 1996). The administrators of Telegram groups were less 
visible but were empowered by the ability to add or to remove users from the groups. 
By contrast, the administrators of channels were loud and dominant anonymous 
broadcasters who did not engage in any conversation with their followers. The 
administrators of Telegram channels broadcast posts to its audience without any 
feedback. This makes the voice of those segment leader who played the role of a 
spokesperson on Telegram even louder and more dominant than on other platforms.  
Segment leaders should reconcile their amplified voices with the challenge of leaders’ 
persecution. Preserving anonymity could be one of the solutions to the challenge of 
persecution (Youmans & York, 2012). However, many popular social media like VK 
cooperate with the Russian government and might provide information about its users 
upon a government’s request. The Telegram owners were aware of this policy as they 
have encountered tracking and surveillance by the Russian government themselves. The 
owners have mastered an image of Telegram as a trusted space where leaders could 
remain anonymous if they want to. In contrast to other platforms, Telegram claims that 
it has never supplied the national states with information about its users (Rowan, 2016). 
In addition, the administrators of all Telegram channels are automatically anonymised. 
This means that the authorities might not identify a spokesperson for a specific channel 
easily. Respondent 31 (personal communication, 15 August 2017) suggested this: 
Telegram became popular in Russia precisely because of the recent laws [the 
legislature that made monitoring and surveillance more widespread and easier to be 
organised by the special services]. People have realised that their messages can be 
read elsewhere, and Telegram is the only platform that guarantees complete 
anonymity at the moment.  
The campaigners perceived Telegram as a safer and more secure communication space 
where segment leaders could be anonymised or hide behind a pseudonym and could act 
effectively as the leaders of the organisation. Indeed, compared to multiple reports about 
the arrests of the organisation’s leaders, little is known about the detention of the local 
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Telegram administrators during the presidential campaign. The database on digital 
persecution and internet freedom in Russia by Agora, a leading monitoring organisation, 
contains only one criminal case associated with the use of Telegram in 2017: a man was 
posting “terrorist propaganda messages” on a private group called “Revolution-
Kaliningrad” (International Agora, 2018). By comparison, the database of 950 entries 
contains at least 90 mentions of criminal and administrative persecution for posts on VK 
and more than 50 mentions of Twitter in the same context. Therefore, Telegram seemed 
to be a more secure space for anti-authoritarian movements than other popular digital 
platforms. 
In contrast to the Anti-corruption campaign pages on VK, it is hard to quantify the 
anonymity level of Telegram group administrators in the Navalny presidential campaign 
due to the difficulties in the analysis of data on messaging software. Nevertheless, we 
know that the administrators of the Telegram channels of the presidential campaign 
were anonymous by default. In addition, many administrators of local Telegram groups 
were pseudonymous.  
Ufa case  The visibility management strategy depended on the position of a leader in the 
organisational structure. Figure 5.7 demonstrates the difference between approaches to 
visibility by the two administrators of the Telegram group of the Navalny presidential 
campaign in Ufa. Liliya Chanysheva, a regional office coordinator, was well-known to 
the authorities and did not need to conceal her identity. From September 2017 to May 
2018, the police detained her three times for 50 days in total, according to the media 
reports. Another admin of the same group, @FredSM, called themselves Fedor with no 
further information presumably available to track him. 
Similar to the pseudonymous segment leaders (PSLs) of the Anti-corruption campaign, 
many segment leaders of the presidential campaign like @FredSM concealed their 
identities. These pseudonymous administrators, some of whom also played the role of 
spokespeople for the organisation during critical events, were found in all the groups of 
the offices of the Navalny organisation that are part of the sample (for the case study of 
five offices, see Table 5.3). This image of the pseudonymous users contrasted with the 
majority of ordinary followers of the groups and channels that used the credentials 
which seemed real. 
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Figure 5.7. The two administrators of the Ufa Telegram group: a regional office 
coordinator with a public profile (left) and a pseudonymous segment leader (right).  
 
One of the key functions of segment leaders in the Navalny presidential campaign was 
to coordinate and to interact with followers of the campaign Telegram network. This 
network consisted of hundreds of groups and channels operated by some 70 local 
offices of the Navalny presidential campaign. The links to these public channels were 
available on the campaign profiles on VK and other accounts of the local offices. These 
channels also posted information about public events like lectures, the meetings of 
volunteers, meetings with core activists, content about the campaign in other regions, as 
well as general news often critical of local and federal governments (Figure 5.8).  
First, every office had a main channel that published its news. Second, offices 
established public working chats for followers and volunteers, “where people could 
write, share opinions and communicate” (Respondent 28, personal communication, 
August 10, 2017). Links to these chats were circulated on offices’ channels so everyone 
could join. In addition, private working chats were established for a more secure 
interaction among selected volunteers. Finally, flood chats were designated as spaces 
for discussing all matters not related to the campaign such as politics.  
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Figure 5.8. A section of the Navalny network on Telegram. The edges reflect the flow of content between the channels.  
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Table 5.3 
Coordination of the supporters of the Navalny presidential campaign on Telegram 
during the collective action on 7 October 2017 
Office Was a rally 
authoriseda 
by local 
authorities? 
Example of a 
PSL (a name 
and a 
nickname) 
Example of the 
messages sent by 
PSLs during the 7 
October 2017 
rallies 
Other 
coordinating 
mechanisms 
on Telegram 
St Petersburg No no name 
@rulezz 
 
“Do not break the 
police ranks – turn 
away and move 
along.” 
St Petersburg 
protest 
channelb 
Moscow  No Dmitry 
ViperAnry 
@ViperAnry 
“break up” [to 
announce the end 
of the collective 
action] 
Moscow 
protest groupb 
Ufa No Fedor Ufa 
@FredSM 
“This is what one 
should write in the 
witness’ account in 
case they are 
detained.” 
 
N/A 
Nizhny 
Novgorod 
Yes Fossil 
@FossilOwl 
* 
The main 
channel of the 
Nizhny 
Novgorod 
office  
Chelyabinsk Yes barck 
@barck * 
N/A 
Note. This table focuses on the Telegram groups of five offices; though, in this dissertation, I 
analyse the work of six offices. I could not access Rostov-on-Don’s Telegram working 
group because it was private. 
aAccording to the Russian law, all protest rallies should be authorised by local authorities. 
The Navalny organisation always attempted to do so, but their applications were often 
rejected, which effectively made a rally illegal. This case study includes the offices in three 
cities out of six studied where the rallies were not authorised but still went ahead. 
bA group or a channel was administered by segment leaders related to a local office.  
*The PSLs of this office mostly posted photos. That was perhaps because the rally was 
authorized, detentions were not expected, and the collective action did not require 
coordination by a PSL. 
 
These numerous channels and groups were connected in a network through 
hyperlinks and sharing mechanism (Figure 5.8). The office level groups and 
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channels often posted links to each other that would allow volunteers to join them 
and, thus, become part of the presidential campaign. The federal level channels 
shared posts from office channels. Then, the posts were further disseminated across 
channels and groups in other regions, thus exposing followers in different localities 
to campaign issues and news from across the country, uniting them under one brand 
of the “Navalny team.”  
Local working chats were crucial during critical events like campaign rallies. The 
federal leaders and local coordinators were often isolated in jail during such events. 
The police also detained many regional office coordinators before or during the 
rallies. Using push notifications, PSLs tried to coordinate collective action (Table 
5.3). For instance, on 7 October 2017, the police raided the campaign office in one of 
the Russia towns. Respondent 26, the head of the office, and other core town 
activists were isolated before and during the rally. However, the rally went ahead 
though the public leadership of the campaign could not coordinate it. In response, 
PSLs assumed the coordination of the collective action.  
PSLs used Telegram channels to inform the rally participants about the police’s 
movements. The following texts by “no name,” a pseudonymous segment leader, 
that was posted on the St Petersburg presidential campaign Telegram working chat 
on 7 October 2017 illustrate the communication related to this coordination of 
collective action. When the detentions of the public leaders of the protest in St 
Petersburg started, “no name” reacted in the following way: 
 
“The logic is clear. Knock out all who can somehow coordinate actions for the rally 
on the 7th.” Source: https://t.me/navalny2018spb/8382  
On 7 October, “no name” became the leading coordination voice on the St 
Petersburg working chat: 
 
181 
 
“People are marching from The Field of Mars to Vosstaniya square10. While people 
are walking, they are not detained.” Source: https://t.me/navalny2018spb/10479  
 
“Do not break the police ranks – turn away and move along. While you are walking, 
you are not been detained” Source: https://t.me/navalny2018spb/10488  
 
“Friends, we had a great time congratulating the grandpa11. Special police forces 
are concentrating, let leave them with nothing – break up” Source: 
https://t.me/navalny2018spb/10592  
 
 
10 Curiously, the name of this square in the centre of St Petersburg is translated as “Uprising Square.” 
11 7 October, the day of the rally, was Putin’s birthday. 
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“ATTENTION FBK, the Navalny office are [sic] not the organisers of the action 
which is taking place on Manezh Square now. We are witnessing people’s initiative 
and self-organisation. […] Those who are interested can bring them blankets, hot 
tea and powerbanks. And in any case, do not fall for provocations. By the way, 
Petersburgers are now gathering at Palace square for a night rally. […]” Source: 
https://t.me/navalny2018spb/10848  
After analysing these and similar conversations on Telegram groups during the 
critical events of 7 October 2017, I offer the following observation: PSLs such as 
“no name” played a role of collective action coordinators on Telegram. Similar to the 
segment leaders of the Anti-corruption campaign, these leaders concealed their 
identity and played the functions of the administrators of the Navalny organisation’s 
pages before and during its collective action.  
During the normal flow of the events, another, public type of local leaders was more 
visible and dominant than pseudonymous segment leaders. These public leaders such 
as regional office coordinators could also play the role of a segment leader though I 
believe it was unlikely. The analysis of the leadership visibility in the Navalny 
presidential campaign are summarised in Table 5.4. It demonstrates that the 
presidential campaign had three levels of visibility of its leaders as a protective 
measure against surveillance. From the studied cases, it was unclear if any member 
of the federal leadership or office leadership of the campaign played the role of a 
segment leader or, indeed, had any influence over pseudonymous or public segment 
leaders during critical events.   
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Table 5.4  
The leadership in the Navalny presidential campaign 
Level Example Visibility 
Symbolic 
role Functional role 
Federal leader  Alexei 
Navalny 
Eponymous Charismatic 
personalitya 
- contribute 
strategically 
- reinforce the ties 
between segments 
through travelling 
Core activists 
of the federal 
office 
Respondent 
30 
 
Public The face of 
the campaign 
when the 
federal leader 
is absent 
- reinforce the ties 
between segments 
through monitoring 
- oversight of the 
administration of 
platform pages 
- communicate with 
federal media 
- coordinate collective 
action 
Regional 
office 
coordinator 
Respondent 
26 
Public Represent the 
campaign on 
the local 
level 
- local level everyday 
organising tasks 
- negotiate with the 
authorities 
Independent 
segmentb 
leader 
Nikolay 
Kasyan 
(Moscow) 
Public Unite 
followers  
- administer platform 
pages 
- recruit new followers 
- connect central and 
local leadership with 
followers 
@FredSM 
(Ufa) 
Pseudonym
ous/anonym
ous  
Unite 
followers 
during 
critical events 
- administer platform 
pages 
- coordinate during 
critical events 
- connect central and 
local leadership with 
followers 
Note. aFor the discussion of the symbolic role of the federal level leader, see Section 5.3. 
bIndependent segment leaders, normally volunteers, could coordinate and administer pages 
related to a Federal region of Russia, like Moscow, or just cover a portion of this region, like 
a district of Moscow. They might also specialise in one or many platforms. By contrast, 
office coordinators were responsible for the whole region, were almost always paid, and 
should oversee all the platform operations in all the segments in the region they covered. 
184 
 
5.2.3.4 The limitations of the visibility mechanisms 
Still, the visibility mechanisms have their limitations. One of them comes from the 
physical surveillance done on behalf of the special services. Few days before the 
launch of Navalny’s #strike campaign, Vitali Serukanov, deputy coordinator of the 
Moscow office of the campaign unexpectedly dropped off the organisation. From a 
fierce supporter of Navalny, Serukanov momentously turned into his prominent 
critic. In December 2017, he started accusing the organisation of financial 
manipulations, lying to supporters and building a “bureaucratic” “sect” (Azar, 2018). 
The organisation responded with a suggestion that Serukanov might be an agent of 
the FSB, the Russian special service. As of November 2018, Serukanov’s name 
continuously appears in the publications of pro-government media where he 
criticises Navalny. He also writes a book about his time in the Navalny organisation. 
I personally met and interviewed Serukanov during my fieldwork four months before 
he defected. The story of this Navalny’s core activist who was accused of the 
cooperation with the special service demonstrates that the affordances of digital 
platforms can hardly prevent physical surveillance once the target is known. 
Like in Russia, the leaders of the Belarusian Anti-tax campaign did get persecuted. 
Just as the public leaders of the Navalny organisation, almost every interviewed anti-
tax activist was persecuted in relation to the campaign. Core and local leaders 
became the first targets when the crackdown started. In March, a car with 
Respondent 17 was stopped by the police on his way to Brest where they planned to 
attend a rally. Respondent 17 was not arrested but was forced to continue to the 
destination, about 300 km, by hitch-hiking in order to get to the rally on time 
(Respondent 17, personal communication, May 18, 2017). However, Respondent 17, 
along with the leaders of the Movement for Freedom and the BChD (see Appendix 
4), was detained later when they attended a rally in Maladzyechna, 100 km from 
Minsk, on 10 March 2017. That was how these three public leaders were isolated 
until the end of the campaign.  
After the Maladzyechna rally, the government started implementing its preemptive 
policy (Silitski, 2005) by actively detaining and persecuting the leaders and rank-
and-file activists (Figure 5.9). Both real and perceived core leaders were targeted. 
Respondent 16 (personal communication, September 5, 2017), who was a former 
leader of a key coalition member was beaten and detained by the policy a few days 
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after the detentions in Maladzyechna. “They took me not as an organiser of the 
protests of social parasites. I was detained because I was […] a recognised public 
figure. And such people are detained,” said Respondent 16. Indeed, Respondent 16 
played a minor role in the campaign since Respondent 16 had just lost the internal 
elections for the position of the chairman of the coalition member and left the 
organisation. Respondent 16 was also preparing for their parental leave as their son 
was due in two months. The Belarusian authorities implemented a preemptive policy 
in relation to public leaders or those who might replace those leaders, targeting core 
leaders first.  
 
Figure 5.9. The persecution of the activists and the participants of the Anti-tax 
campaign rallies in March 2017. There were rallies early in February with few 
arrests that are not reflected here. Source: Shmygov (2017).  
Pseudonymous leaders like administrator Respondent 14 who did not want to be 
recognised as the leaders of the campaign managed to avoid persecution during the 
collective action phase. In fact, some of them, such as the administrators of the Party 
of Parasites page, seemed to have never been identified by the police. Other more 
discrete administrators such as the REP trade union activists were also not 
persecuted in contrast to Respondent 21, who was a well-known public figure 
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(Respondent 4, personal communication, May 19, 2017; Respondent 21, personal 
communication, September 1, 2017).  
Respondent 14’s identity was revealed in December 2017, eight months after the 
campaign faded, the police came to their house and seized all his electronic devices. 
Respondent 14 was accused of selling drugs on the internet. This approach to 
intimidate critical citizens is spread in authoritarian states. For instance, the 
anonymous administrator of “one of the most popular Telegram channels in Russia,” 
StalinGulag, had to reveal his identity after the police accused him of making a fake 
bomb threat and searched his house (Soshnikov & Reiter, 2019). In summer 2019, 
Ivan Golunov, an investigative journalist, was has been charged by the Moscow 
police with attempting to distribute drugs in large quantities. However, after several 
days of public pressure, his case was shut down due to a lack of evidence (Meduza, 
2019). Administrator Respondent 14 was later called for a police interview where 
they were pressed to recognise that Respondent 14 was an administrator of the 
PASD page.  
Almost immediately after this, Respondent 14 agreed to an interview with me. It was 
the first long interview they gave as an administrator of the PASD. By the time we 
met, Respondent 14’s case was still investigated, and Respondent 14 was worried 
about his future, thinking about emigrating. Crucially, pseudonymous visibility 
helped Respondent 14 to keep administering one of the key campaign pages in 
February and March 2017, while many of the public leaders had already been 
isolated. 
In addition, visibility management on social media could hardly help to avoid 
physical surveillance. A year after the Anti-tax campaign ended, then 20-year-old 
secretary of the REP trade Union Yuliya Yukhnovets recognised that she had been a 
paid agent of the Belarusian KGB and had reported about the Union activity during 
the Anti-tax campaign (Tolkacheva, 2018). Such physical surveillance practices 
seem to be inevitable. 
5.2.4 Types of leadership in anti-authoritarian movements 
Based on their functions, the leaders of the two movements can be broadly divided 
into three types (Table 5.5). First, both organisations had public core leaders known 
across the country. They were normally located in the capitals and represented the 
campaigns in the media, reinforced the ties between their segments and coordinated 
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collective action during critical events. Second, the main role of independent 
segment leaders was to administer the platform pages of a campaign. These leaders 
could be both known to the public and the authorities. They could also be secretive, 
anonymous or pseudonymous users of social media. Finally, the eponymous leader, 
who was also public, was present only in the Navalny organisation. 
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Table 5.5 
Leadership in the Navalny organisation and the Anti-tax campaign 
Leadership 
level  Visibility  
Paid as an 
activist? Role in the Navalny organisation Role in the Anti-tax campaign 
Federal leader Eponymous Unpaida - contribute strategically 
- reinforce the ties between segments through 
travelling 
N/A 
Core leader/ 
Core activist 
of the federal 
office 
Public Paid - reinforce the ties between segments through 
monitoring 
- oversight of the administration of platform pages 
- communicate with federal media 
- coordinate collective action 
- reinforce the ties between segments through 
travelling 
- administer platform pages  
- represent a campaign in the media 
- negotiate with the authorities 
- coordinate collective action 
Regional 
office 
coordinator 
Public Paidb - local level everyday organising tasks 
- negotiate with the authorities N/A 
Independent 
segment leader 
Public Mostly 
volunteers but 
some paid 
- administer platform pages 
- recruit new followers 
- connect central and local leadership with followers 
- administer platform pages 
- reinforce the ties between segments 
Pseudonymous
/anonymous 
Predominantly 
volunteers 
- administer platform pages 
- coordinate during critical events 
- connect central and local leadership with followers 
- administer platform pages 
- reinforce the ties between segments (privately, 
when discussing content through messaging) 
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aNavalny claims that he receives an income as a consultant lawyer, not as a leader of his 
eponymous organisation (Navalny LIVE, 2018). 
bExcept for several regional offices of the Navalny organisation, which are shown as circles 
in Figure 7.2. 
 
The core activists of the Anti-tax and the Navalny organisations may endorse an 
image of a spontaneous, horizontal, leaderless or ordinary citizens’ movement as a 
method of protection of its pseudonymous segment leaders – the powerful 
administrators of social media pages and groups whose position lied in-between the 
federal leadership and the base. In other words, the narratives of the “ordinary 
citizens” along with the visibility arrangements on Telegram and its anti-surveillance 
affordances helped to protect these segment leaders from persecution, thus adapting 
to another challenge faced by digital dissidents. 
The leaders of the Navalny and the Anti-tax organisations also varied in their public 
visibility and prominence. I identified two types of visibility for these leaders. First, 
some leaders remained highly prominent on digital platforms and during offline 
collective action and were well-known to the public and the police. I defined such 
leaders as public. Well-known dissidents and politicians such as Anatol Liabedzka, 
the chairman of the UCP, or Respondent 21, the coordinator of another prominent 
organisation, did not hide their identities when disseminating information. They 
serve as examples of the core leaders of the Anti-tax campaign. Many of these 
leaders were among the first to be persecuted by the authorities. In contrast to public 
leaders, the second type of leaders – pseudonymous or anonymous – actively 
managed their platform identities. These leaders were platform page administrators 
who did not “declare themselves” publicly and instead adopted pseudonyms or 
stayed anonymous because of surveillance concerns. Such pseudonymous 
independent segment leaders controlled two of the five key platform pages of the 
Anti-tax campaign. In the Anti-corruption campaign of Navalny, about one-third of 
the administrators, located mostly in the regions, adopted pseudonyms or 
anonymised themselves, as features analysis demonstrated. The emergence of 
pseudonymous and anonymous segment leaders was an organisational arrangement 
observed in both studied cases. 
Pseudonymous or anonymous segment leaders were especially active during critical 
events such as protests. For example, the Navalny organisation maintained the 
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capability to administer its digital platforms without interruptions during these 
events. The use of pseudonyms or anonymised platform profiles also helped to 
ensure a constant supply of new leaders, should the police isolate any. For instance, 
Respondent 14, an administrator of the PASD, was supported by a few other 
anonymous administrators and so, if he were isolated, other administrators could 
continue updating the page. In addition, the same profile could be used by several 
segment leaders if needed and, therefore, visibility management by segment leaders 
helped them to provide effective coordination for collective action. 
The theories of digital politics and social movements help to explain the multiplicity 
of leadership in the two organisations. First, the studies of digitally-enabled political 
and civic organisations suggest that the administrators of platform pages of such 
organisations will likely emerge as spokespeople or informal leaders in their 
communities (Gerbaudo, 2017c; Kavada, 2015; Poell & van Dijck, 2016). The 
algorithms, design and affordances of platforms facilitate this leadership emergence. 
Indeed, in both organisations, most of the leadership positions at the segment level 
were associated with the administration of platform pages. Similar to many other 
organisations that rely on digital platforms, platform affordances amplified the voice 
of the administrators. This amplification of administrators’ voices and subsequent 
power redistribution is a common feature of digitally-enabled organisations (Kavada, 
2015; Poell et al., 2016). In other words, platform administrators used the 
affordances of digital media to facilitate the redistribution of power and the 
refashioning of relations with core leaders, thus multiplying leadership types.  
Second, independent segment leaders, those who assumed the function of collective 
action coordinators or spokespeople for the movements, were not in charge all the 
time. During the normal course of events when no collective action was happening 
or imminent, other types of leader coordinated the everyday operations of the 
organisation. In the Navalny campaign, local office coordinators were responsible 
for the everyday tasks of the regional offices. They also assumed another important 
function: conducting negotiations with the authorities. Such negotiations might 
involve seeking an authorisation to organise a rally or the registration of local 
structures. In the Anti-tax campaign, the core leaders negotiated authorisation for 
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rallies with the local authorities. Hence, both organisations required a pool of leaders 
to sustain them during different periods of their activities.  
5.3 Charisma 
In this section, I use social movement theories to discuss the symbolic role of the 
federal level leader of the Navalny organisation. I found that Navalny was not a 
bureaucratic but rather an inspiring leader who exercised a special type of charisma. 
This and next section are not matched by data gathered about the Anti-tax movement 
because this movement did not have a recognisable charismatic leader, and its 
settings did not provide for an opportunity to observe its organisational culture. 
5.3.1 Limitations of the traditional understanding of charisma 
Alexei Navalny spent in jail around 20% of his public campaigning time in 2017. 
Nevertheless, both the Anti-corruption and the presidential nomination campaigns 
were able to function and organise collective action. How does his absence 
correspond to many media reports that portrayed Navalny as the main factor that 
altered the dynamics of organisation’s activities and the whole pro-democracy 
movement in Russia? For example, Russian pro-government media focused their 
coverage of the Anti-corruption campaign on the single figure of Navalny though 
reporting often ignored the campaign or portraited it negatively (Osborn, 2017). 
Moreover, foreign media such as NPR describes how Navalny “runs his nationwide 
opposition network from a desk” in his Moscow office (L. Kim, 2018). Al Jazeera 
(Ragozin, 2018) called Navalny “super-efficient” and “charismatic.” Charisma was a 
common quality attributed by the media and observers to the figure of Navalny. 
The stereotypical model of a charismatic leader attributes the success of a movement 
to a single charismatic leader who controls everything (Gerlach & Hine, 1970, p. 
39). Such a leader is like “the hub of a wheel with the spokes as inner circle disciples 
and the rim as the larger circle of followers” (Gerlach & Hine, 1970, p. 39). The 
Russian personalistic authoritarian regime perhaps also based its actions in relation 
to Navalny on the stereotypical premise that Navalny was that charismatic “hub” 
crucial to the everyday operations of the organisations’ “wheel.” And if a hub is 
removed, a supposed leader-focused organisation will be broken. This premise can 
explain Navalny’s multiple jail terms.  
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As Gerlach & Hine (1970, p. 39) point out, many studies of political groups and 
social movements “have been hindered by the limitations of this [stereotypical] 
model.” Governments might share a similar view and try to suppress social 
movements by jailing or overwise removing their single charismatic leader. 
Nevertheless, as Gerlach & Hine note, such persecution can only enhance leaders’ 
importance by making them a martyr. In addition, Snow (1987, p. 161) demonstrates 
that movements based in part on this stereotypical charismatic authority “run the risk 
of diluting that very authority […] as they expand” and their operations become 
more complex. I argue that this simplistic notion of a single charismatic leader was 
also used to portrait the leadership in the Navalny organisation. 
First, Navalny was not involved in the majority of everyday bureaucratic operations 
of the Anti-corruption or presidential campaign. He was instead taking part in 
strategic decision-making, convincing and “inspiring” others. For instance, it was 
Navalny who insisted on the organising of the successful rallies on 26 March 2017, 
although many core leaders did not believe in their success (Respondent 31, personal 
communication, August 15, 2017). However, Navalny did not take part in internal 
organising like weekly meetings of the core activists (Respondent 26, personal 
communication, August 14, 2017). The staff management such as appointing or 
firing regional office coordinators was performed by the chief-of-staff Volkov rather 
than Navalny (Volkov, 2017g). Thus, in terms of everyday bureaucratic operations, 
Navalny was not the most important personality of his organisation.  
Second, charisma in the Navalny organisation was not a static attribute of one 
person. It looked more like a communicable quality that exists on an interpersonal 
level. According to Gerlach & Hine (1970), who drew on the work of Emmet (1958), 
this type of charisma can be conveyed from a “charismatist” to another follower via 
an act of communication. This communication inspires that other follower to work 
on their initiative to move a campaign further; for example, to recruit new members 
to an organisation. Therefore, I follow Snow (1987) and Gerlach & Hine (1970) to 
define the type of the charisma exercised by Navalny as communicable. 
5.3.2 Communicable charisma 
Communicable charisma is a feature of some social movement organisations. Snow 
(1987) demonstrates how communicable charisma was distributed in Nichiren 
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Shoshu, the Buddhist movement active in the United States of America in the 1970s. 
As Nichiren Shoshu grew geographically, some of its new followers could not access 
its central charismatic leadership personally. To address this communication issue, 
the principal movement’s leadership would travel to communicate with the leaders 
of movement sub-groups. The meeting with the principal was supposed to empower 
local leaders "with a degree of moral authority that they would not have otherwise" 
(Snow, 1987, p. 161). The closer a sub-group leader approached the principal 
leadership, the higher the degree of their empowerment was.  
Communicable charisma was also spread in the Black Power Movement in the US in 
the 1960s. According to Gerlach & Hine (1970, pp. 40–41), many participants of the 
Black Power, which constituted diverse groups including the Black Panther Party, 
fitted the definition of a charismatic leader. Many of those future leaders assumed ad 
hoc leadership first during crisis events like rallies and demonstrations. An 
unexpected demonstration could lead to the emergence of an ad hoc leader who 
remained in the centre of a local movement group for a long time after the crisis. 
Communicable charisma helps to enhance leadership in emerging geographically 
diverse movement-like organisations such as the Navalny organisation. 
Similar to the Black Power, many leaders of the Navalny organisation raised to high 
ranks after organising a local anti-corruption campaign in March 2017. Such new 
leaders were often not active politically before but were inspired by the 
communication of Alexei Navalny in his videos and writing (Respondent 25, 
personal communication, June 11, 2017; Respondent 23, personal communication, 
August 14, 2017). Navalny’s communicable charisma, which was a product of work 
of many people in Moscow including the investigative and video teams, was 
distributed with the help of digital platforms and empowered the local leaders of the 
organisation. 
Following the exposure to the media materials in March 2017, the new local leaders 
tried to organise an anti-corruption rally in their city. After organising the rally, 
many of these ad hoc leaders stayed with the Navalny organisation for the 
presidential campaign as independent segment leaders. By this time, a formal office 
of the presidential campaign would be established by the federal headquarters with a 
subsequent visit of Navalny. Navalny tried to pay a visit to every local office. This 
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would often become the only occasion when he participated physically in the activity 
of that specific branch and interacted with his local followers personally. Like in the 
case of Nichiren Shoshu, the segment leaders of the Navalny presidential campaign 
could be empowered by meeting Navalny in person. This was how communicable 
charisma was physically distributed across the network of the organisation. 
Most of the leaders of the Navalny organisation can be broadly divided into two 
types depending on how they raised through the ranks. The first type is people who 
often joined an ad hoc leader or volunteers during crisis events and viewed its 
campaigning as a struggle. Respondent 23 is an example of the first type of people. 
Respondent 23 joined the Anti-corruption campaign after watching the video about 
the corruption of the prime minister. Thus, Respondent 23 followed an act of 
communication of charisma. Eventually, Respondent 23 himself became the leading 
figure of the organisation’s local YouTube channel in one of large Russian cities. He 
viewed the Navalny campaigning as a struggle against the authoritarian regime: 
In many respects, I might not agree with Alexei [Navalny]. But at the same 
time, I perfectly understand that Alexei's struggle is not the struggle between 
Navalny and Putin. This is not the struggle of the opposition against power 
structures. It is the struggle of civil society against the authoritarian regime. 
(Respondent 23, personal communication, August 14, 2017) 
People like Respondent 23 seemed to be ready to go to jail, to experience all kinds of 
pressures and deprivations to achieve campaigns’ goals. This type of “struggle” 
activists might not be around just because they followed the communication of 
Navalny – though many seem to have been affected by his communicable charisma – 
but because they believed that political changes in Russia were possible, and they 
could contribute to them. Some of these “struggle” activists seemed to believe that 
Navalny was the person who could bring those changes. 
The second type of organisation activists is normally paid staff who obtained status 
in the campaign hierarchy as professionals such as social media specialists or 
lawyers. They were selected through submitting CVs, an interview process and other 
typical ways of recruitment. These “bureaucratic” people normally had some level of 
commitment but seemed to approach the campaign as just another job. “I am a 
professional and want to help the campaign on a professional level,” said the social 
media coordinator of one of the Navalny offices (Respondent 27, personal 
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communication, August 14, 2017). She is an example of the professional or 
bureaucratic type of activist. Both types of leaders co-existed together within the 
campaign structures.  
A coordinator of a regional office should often combine both the qualities of the 
“bureaucratic” and “struggle” activists. To get to the top of the local hierarchy of the 
organisation, a person should first be selected based on merit. The ability to 
demonstrate leadership qualities was one of the requirements for the regional office 
coordinators (Respondent 25, personal communication, June 11, 2017; Respondent 
26, personal communication, August 14, 2017). At the same time, all of the 
interviewed coordinators had previous experience in civic organisations and anti-
government political struggle in Russia. Similar to “struggle” activists, office 
coordinators were often attracted to the organisation not by the personal qualities of 
Navalny but because he was the symbol of the radical political change: 
I want to see changes in Russia - yes. And Navalny, of course, is not an ideal 
candidate, there are some moments there that many may not agree with, but [he 
is] changes. […] It is important that people understand that they can influence. 
And they can change Navalny if he does not like him. (Respondent 25, personal 
communication, June 11, 2017) 
The organisation had invested in the charisma of its coordinators. Navalny would 
mention some of them in his public communicative acts like VK posts. The 
coordinators of the offices also accrued communicative charisma when, for instance, 
they had taken the roles of the hosts of regional YouTube shows filmed by many 
offices. This charisma helped office coordinators to organise their local campaigns. 
I suggest that in the hierarchy of the Navalny organisation (see Table 5.4), Alexei 
Navalny occupied the position of an eponymous leader who gave his name to the 
organisation that emerged from the FBK at the beginning of 2017. Eponym is an 
ancient Greek word that means “giving one's name to a thing or person” (‘Eponym, 
n.’, 2018). Navalny’s main role in that organisation was symbolic rather than 
functional though he occasionally contributed to strategic decisions. He was a 
charismatic figure who became the source of communicable charisma that was 
distributed by means of digital media such as YouTube and through travelling across 
the country. Navalny’s charisma gave the authority to future segment leaders who 
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joined the organisation during its rapid growth following the Anti-corruption 
campaign. 
The studies of startup companies argue that the idea that the success of a startup is 
primarily associated with a stereotypical charisma of a single “superstar” leader is a 
“moribund myth” (Ensley et al., 2006). These studies show that another type of 
leadership often dominates in such organisations. This type is called “shared 
leadership” – “a simultaneous, ongoing, mutual influence process within a team” that 
is characterised by the emergence of official as well as unofficial ad hoc leaders (C. 
L. Pearce, 2004, p. 48). Similar to startups, the case of the Navalny organisation 
demonstrates that stereotypical charismatic leadership is not a necessary 
precondition for success. Instead, it is communicable charisma that can empower 
political activists, such as the local leaders of a movement, to attract and coordinate 
followers. 
5.4 Not least a struggle: a startup culture in the Navalny 
organisation 
In this section, I analyse the organisational culture of the core activists of the 
Navalny movement. Analysis of this culture helps to explain some of the 
campaigners’ practices and to clarify why the anti-authoritarian movement of 
Navalny stood out ideationally and organisationally.  
36-year-old former IT professional Leonid Volkov was at the centre of the hierarchy 
of the Navalny organisation as its chief-of-staff. He performed many duties 
traditionally assigned to several people in organisations with a similar purpose 
(Powell & Cowart, 2003) such as the campaign manager, the field director, the 
finance director and the IT-director. Volkov normally conducted interviews with 
candidates for the positions of regional offices coordinators. He also could dismiss 
regional leaders, a right he used quite often. Other core activists describe him as “a 
very technical man” who “organises production process brilliantly” (Respondent 26, 
personal communication, August 14, 2017). Volkov has a PhD in Computer Science 
and an experience of running one of the largest Russian IT-companies. It was not a 
surprise when, at some point, he started calling the organisation “a political startup.”  
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Leaders with a business or IT background are common in many areas of activism. 
For instance, Wael Ghonim, one of the brightest leaders of the Egyptian revolution 
of 2011, a man who established the page “We are all Khaled Said,” writes that 
marketing and business skills were “vital to his online activism” (Ghonim, 2012). 
Similar to Volkov, Ghonim spent many years in IT companies as a manager. Just 
like Volkov, he was an enthusiast of new technologies from his early days “always 
seeking ways to develop and innovate” (Ghonim, 2012). Prior to the Egyptian 
revolution, Ghonim worked for Google as a regional head of marketing. He later 
started applying many aspects of this leading internet company’s philosophy to his 
political activism. Other core activists of the Navalny organisation like Respondent 
32, the office coordinator in one of the largest cities of Russia, also had an 
experience of running a large business. Respondent 32’s business, which they left in 
2011, employed about 300 people (Respondent 32, personal communication, May 
25, 2017).  
There is also an unmistakable taste of corporatist philosophy and marketing spirit in 
the production process facilitated by Volkov. In his texts and vlogs, he compares the 
Navalny movement to “a large fast-growing corporation,” constantly talks about 
business-processes, managerial positions and people’s donations as investments. 
Similarly, Respondent 26 compares the organisation to a McDonald’s chain. Like the 
American fast-food chain, Navalny’s offices are run according to a single plan, they 
are branded similarly and organised based on a model of a “franchise”, says 
Respondent 26 (personal communication, August 14, 2017). Volkov seems to be a 
technocratic entrepreneur who believes that there could be one single rational 
solution to any campaigning challenge. One just needs another hackathon or more 
programmers to find this a solution. Volkov believes in the capability of e-
democracy to overturn the anti-democratic trajectory of the political process in 
Russia. In 2011, he co-authored a book about e-democracy in Russia titled “Cloud 
Democracy.” The book outlined how technologies can improve the control of the 
election process by citizens. Volkov, thus, may be described as a rational techno-
optimist who adheres to many techno-libertarian principles (Gerbaudo, 2017c). 
In 2012 in Russia and one year later in Iran, Volkov had the opportunity to 
implement his ideas about the election process in practice. He coordinated the 
198 
 
alternative electronic voting systems designed to rate the leading opposition 
politicians in their respective country (Toepfl, 2017). The Russian opposition used 
this voting system to elect the “Coordination Council of the Russian opposition” to 
sustain the Russian protest movement of 2011-12. Volkov was the man behind the 
technological side of the system. Those alternative elections to the Coordination 
council were financed by other IT-entrepreneurs like one of the founders of Yandex 
platform (often described as “Russian Google”), the late Ilya Segalovich (Toepfl, 
2017). However, most of the Russian opposition Council members were prosecuted 
within a year after it was established. Some of them were jailed, some left the 
country, one – Nemtsov – was killed. 
Volkov now calls many of his views presented in his “Cloud Democracy” book as 
overly optimistic and naive. According to him, new forms of organisation enabled by 
technologies associated with the ideas of e-democracy still has prospects in Russia. 
However, they should be discussed in association with the idea of overcoming the 
state propaganda machine and reaching the citizens using the internet (Volkov, 
2017f). 
Similar to its chief-of-staff, many core activists of the Navalny organisation believed 
in a rational solution to almost any policy problem. Several examples illustrate this 
belief. First, when the authorities decided to block their websites, the activists sought 
a rational technological solution to this challenge. As described in Chapter 6, they 
turned to the creative IT-specialists who looked for breaches in the internet protocols 
and to members of IT-community who, despite working for the government, might 
covertly support the organisation. Second, to overcome the pressure of pro-
government trolls and bots, the organisation turned to new tools developed by its 
supporters to show the evidence of that pressure. When Navalny’s video started 
disappearing from the Trending section of YouTube, the organisation used the 
specially designed framework to demonstrate the attacks of bots on the organisation 
video streams. Third, one of a few occasions when a public event was held in the 
main federal office was a hackathon – a gathering of IT-specialists who volunteered 
to design the organisation’s technological infrastructure. This obsession with 
technological solutions accompanied Volkov and his core-team in organising a large-
scale experiment of political engagement which the Navalny organisation represents. 
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Navalny, the Yale-educated lawyer and former “stock market analyst,” shares many 
of Volkov’s meritocratic and optimistic views on technologies (Gabowitsch, 2017). 
Navalny also supports an idea of e-democracy (Toepfl, 2017), though it seems that it 
mostly means for him that the elections are organised with the employment of the 
internet and digital platforms. 
Core activists of the Navalny federal office were quite reluctant to define themselves 
as “activists,” “politicians” or dissidents. “We are who we are – the team of Alexei 
Navalny,” says Respondent 30 (personal communication, August 15, 2017). At the 
same time, people who coordinate the organisation explain their motivation to work 
for Navalny despite the pressure from the government in rather individualistic and 
pragmatic terms. That is how Respondent 30 explains his way to activism: 
It all started in university. […] I was confronted with the fact that there is no 
natural selection happening at my university [emphasis added]. For example, 
people who have money but do not have brains […] were placed in better 
positions. They do not even study; they just go to college. […] They just give 
money to their teachers, pass the exams and get the best jobs. At the same time, 
people who grind away at their books - they understand that it is a bit unfair and 
that in a normal country it should not be so that a person who is not created for 
work in the economic sector would work in the economic sector. I was knocked 
down by this injustice a little bit, and I began to listen to those people who 
opposed it, in particular deceased Boris Nemtsov (personal communication, 
August 15, 2017). 
Respondent 30 is not the only member of the organisation who shares these 
meritocratic views on society. Respondent 31 (personal communication, August 15, 
2017) says that he, as well as many people around him, wants “to make difference 
for oneself” to make his country a better place to live and to create a family, to raise 
his children. Respondent 31 says that the alternative to this sort of pragmatic 
activism is emigration from Russia – a thing he thinks about quite often. Thus, it 
seems that the commitment of the members of the core team of Navalny was mostly 
associated with a pragmatic and individualistic position as to their own and country’s 
future. 
Technological optimism was a prominent feature of the leadership in the Navalny 
organisation. The combination of technological optimism, a startup-like culture and 
marketing techniques of its core activists made the organisation stand out 
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ideologically and organisationally. These characteristics define their organisational 
culture. Consequently, when developing its internal structures, the leadership seemed 
to be more concerned with building a startup culture rather than with emphasising 
the struggle for power in an authoritarian regime. 
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Chapter 6 Information distribution and censorship 
The Anti-tax and the Navalny organisations found ways to address the challenges of 
persecution and surveillance of their followers. Still, the campaigners had to face the 
third significant authoritarian challenge – censorship.  
Wilson (2005, p. 43) argues that the authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe persist, 
among other things, thanks to a culture of information control. This control is mostly 
wielded on traditional mainstream media. For example, the Russian government 
controls and restricts dissemination of political content on the most popular 
traditional media in the country: television and radio (Fredheim, 2015). Russian 
national television largely ignored the figure of Navalny and his organisation 
(Osborn, 2017). Due to this control, pro-democracy activists were “forced” online 
(Albats, 2018b) to reach citizens by circulating information on the internet. Activists 
who resist the authoritarian regimes also experience self-censorship and the filtering 
of their websites. 
This chapter focuses on how anti-authoritarian activists faced censorship on digital 
media. Specifically, I discuss the choice of digital platforms for information 
distribution. In the final section, I turn to the mechanisms of information 
dissemination invented and used by activists. This discussion is based on the 
interviews with leaders and rank-and-file activists, participant observation, features 
analysis and textual analysis.   
6.1 Communication infrastructure and analytic activism in the 
Navalny presidential campaign  
Communication infrastructure is the combination of public and private 
communication spaces used by the activists to organise, coordinate, unite followers 
and disseminate their messages. The communication infrastructure of the Navalny 
organisation ranged from YouTube channels with thousands of political streams to 
hundreds of local groups on Telegram. The organisation has meticulously created 
and used these pages and groups to connect with its followers. The website 
Navalny.com aggregated some links to the pages and groups thus uniting them in a 
network. In addition to links on other pages and groups, the website published the 
investigations of the FBK, as well as some other political videos and posts signed by 
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Alexei Navalny. Navalny.com also provided followers with access to newsletters by 
collecting followers’ emails. The resulted email lists also became part of the 
communication infrastructure of the organisation. The core activists used data 
collected through Navalny.com, as well as across the country through the regional 
offices, to feed the analytic component of its infrastructure. Thus, accounts, pages 
and groups on social media and messaging platforms, websites, email lists, as well as 
analytic data-gathering and analysis, comprise the communication infrastructures of 
the Navalny organisation.  
 
Figure 6.1. Subscribers of the main Russian television channels on YouTube and of 
“Alexei Navalny” YouTube channel as of 15 November 2017, in million users.  
The pages and groups that were part of this infrastructure had at least 1 million 
followers in total by the end of 2017, according to the author’s calculations. For 
instance, Navalny’s YouTube channel had more subscribers than the YouTube 
channels of major Russian television stations in 2017 (Figure 6.1). That number 
placed Navalny in the top of Russian social media celebrities. Navalny referred to 
the organisation’s channels on YouTube as an “underground television” that his 
organisation “is forced to produce” (Albats, 2018b). Otherwise, he would be “much 
happy to [talk] on a ‘normal’ television” (Albats, 2018b).  
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YouTube and other platforms like Telegram were needed to overcome the traditional 
media censorship by reaching out to the audience, to cover organisation’s activities 
and to mobilise this audience (Respondent 30, personal communication, August 15, 
2017). According to Navalny, his organisation aimed at addressing and mobilising 
the majority of citizens of Russia who “has had no [political] knowledge because of 
the total censorship in the media and the silence of the government” (Navalny, 
2017c). The use of YouTube accounts is an example of how the Navalny 
organisation used platforms to overcome censorship.  
Before discussing Navalny organisation’s approach to censorship in detail, I explore 
how its presidential campaign collected and analysed information. To conceptualise 
the organisation’s approach to information, I use Karpf’s (2016) idea of analytic 
activism. I demonstrate that Navalny’s presidential bid was a case of analytic 
activism and of the extensive use of big data to monitor activities and people. The 
discussion of analytic activism helps to examine information dissemination and 
communication infrastructure in anti-authoritarian movements.  
Poell et al. (2016) link technological solutions in activism and the growing 
importance of technologically-savvy campaign spokespeople to marketing strategies 
employed in business. These spokespeople rely on feedback from their followers to 
“pre-structure” and “anticipate” followers’ actions (Poell et al., 2016, pp. 1009–
1010). The practices of receiving feedback and listening to followers in order to 
understand how to act better are spread among large NGOs in the US and some 
western countries (Karpf, 2016). Karpf describes such listening practices as “analytic 
activism.” The theories that discuss marketing and analytic strategies do not explain 
whether these styles of activism develop primarily from the actual need of 
organisations to use marketing and to listen to their followers or simply because 
some of activists possess necessary skills and capacity to analyse the data, as well as 
to build their campaigning around marketing techniques. The use of marketing 
techniques and big data analytics by the Navalny organisation throw light on this 
uncertainty. 
The Navalny organisation was enthusiastic in exploring the opportunities for analytic 
activism – one of the first in Russia and perhaps in the region of Eastern Europe. The 
capacity to develop analytic activism in their organisation was related to the profiles 
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of some of its key figures. The chief-of-staff, for example, has a background in 
marketing and IT. The organisation has also attracted several prominent IT 
professionals like a security expert Vladislav Zdolnikov. In total, up to 15 people 
have worked on IT projects in the organisation at different stages. The organisation’s 
reliance on IT professionals explains why it has progressed on the path of analytic 
activism.  
The main data framework of the presidential campaign of Navalny was nicknamed 
the “Long-awaited” or “Divine Analytics”. This framework was created by the IT 
team and combined several tools to collect and analyse data about people who 
registered on Navalny.com. The organisation used Navalny.com to recruit the 
supporters and register them by collecting their data like a name, an address, a phone 
number and an email. More than 430 000 people out of 109 million voters have 
registered as those who wanted to support Navalny’s candidacy for the election by 
the end of 2017 (Figure 6.2). The Divine Analytics was used to measure the 
efficiency of the campaign staff over time.  
Figure 6.2 demonstrates what some of the analytical tools of the campaign looked 
like. The one pictured has tracked the registration on Navalny.com. It shows that the 
organisation distinguished between volunteers (179 949 “available”), signatories 
(those who were ready to put a signature for Navalny’s candidacy – 431 686 
“available”) and people who shared their emails with the organisation when, for 
instance, signing for a newsletter (732 453 “confirmed”).  
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Figure 6.2. A screenshot from the analytical framework demonstrates the growth of 
the number of users who registered as Navalny’s supporters between 23.12.2017 and 
27.12.2017. Source: StopDesign (2018). 
 
The analytical tools helped to plan the office network and campaigning events 
(StopDesign, 2018). These tools were also used to compare the growth of the 
network following critical events. “This allowed us to determine which [campaign] 
events were successful, and which were not; what has attracted new followers and 
volunteers,” explained Volkov (2017e). Based on this data, the core activists found 
out, for instance, that the publication of new anticorruption investigations on 
YouTube led to the highest spikes in the growth of the registration on Navalny.com 
(StopDesign, 2018). The ability to build the analytic framework allowed the Navalny 
organisation to understand their followers and to plan their actions. 
The activists also used the Divine Analytics to monitor the progress of office 
coordinators. Regional coordinators used the tool to submit administrative returns 
every week. These returns included the numbers of new registered followers, 
applications for collective action submitted to local authorities, physically distributed 
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materials and information about other activities (Respondent 26, personal 
communication, August 14, 2017). Hence, the “data” analysed by the federal office 
of the organisation was not just clicks and phone numbers but also information about 
the world beyond the internet. 
Finally, the Divine Analytics tracked the fundraising process. Based on the tracking, 
the chief-of-staff published a report on his private site every month about the income 
and spending of the organisation. From these reports, one could conclude, for 
example, that the third largest source of campaign funds was bitcoin. The fundraising 
reports (Figure 6.3) were published to emphasise openness and to encourage 
crowdfunding.  
 
Figure 6.3. The spending of the Navalny organisation from the beginning of the year 
to May 2017 in thousand Russian Rubbles (100 Rubbles = $1.75). Source of data: 
the Navalny presidential campaign.  
The organisation had also received donations via a popular in Russia service 
Yandex.Money until, according to the Navalny activists, the service was pressured 
by the government and the organisation’s accounts on it were blocked (Navalny, 
2017a). Around 12% of all the donations received by the organisation up until June 
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2017 came from this service (Volkov, 2017a). After this, the Navalny organisation 
started emphasising other ways to donate including the bitcoin (Volkov, 2018e). The 
bitcoin donations constituted about 25% of the total donations received by the 
organisation for its Anti-corruption and presidential campaigns in 2017 and 2018 
(Volkov, 2018e). In contrast, during the early period when Yandex.Money was still 
available, the bitcoin income constituted around 16% as of June 2017 (Volkov, 
2017a). This use of innovative donation schemes demonstrates that organised digital 
dissidents in non-democratic environments can benefit from technological 
affordances in the areas where governmental control is still not established firmly. 
This emphasis on analytic platform development reinforced the image of the 
leadership of the Navalny organisation as progressive, technologically-savvy new 
leaders that refuse to follow the conventional bureaucratic approaches or play by the 
rules of the political establishment. 
Bennett et al. (2017) analyse the platformisation of political parties’ infrastructure in 
mature democracies. They argue that parties, primarily leftist, increasingly use 
platforms to organise and to listen to their supporters because of these supporters’ 
demand and pressure. Thus, the platformisation of political organisation, according 
to their theory, is driven by an idealistic image of an organisation as a more 
horizontal structure with many leaders or no leaders at all.  
Similarly, some of Navalny’s executives like Volkov had an idealistic view of 
political organisation driven by a version of the deliberative democracy ideal where 
everyone has an electronic voice that might influence decision-making in real time. 
However, the platformisation of the Navalny organisation has not resulted in an 
amplified voice of its ordinary supporters. By contrast, with the growth of the 
organisation and the development of its analytic tools, its regional leaders were 
monitored more extensively by the federal office, as I discussed earlier. It seems like 
only the Federal office had full access to the analytics data, at least in August 2017 
(Respondent 26, personal communication, August 14, 2017). The federal office used 
the data to analyse the actions of local offices, track their results in terms of new 
supporters recruited (Respondent 26, personal communication, August 14, 2017) as 
well as their spending, as Figure 6.3 demonstrates. Therefore, the citizens’ demand 
argument does not explain the development of the analytic infrastructure. 
208 
 
I propose to link the development of an analytic infrastructure to an organisational 
culture and the structure of anti-authoritarian movements. First, the Navalny 
organisation required a framework to track its regional offices as well as their overall 
performance. It is hard to imagine that more decentralised structures like the Anti-tax 
campaign can strategically benefit from the analysis of its overall audience on 
YouTube. But such analysis potentially benefits more centralised organisations like 
the Navalny presidential campaign. Second, data analytic tools are powerful 
alternative platforms that could hardly be affected by the surveillance of the 
government during the timing of the Navalny campaigning. Third, a startup-like 
culture that was informed by Volkov’s theory of “Cloud Democracy” could drive the 
organisation towards the development of its analytic tools, even when they were not 
really needed or used. Thus, the organisation might employ analytic activism largely 
because its key leaders had relevant skills and had a specific set of values, though 
more practical considerations such as challenges of security could have played their 
role.  
6.2 The choice of platforms for information circulation 
6.2.1 Surveillance, audience and affordances 
In 2017, the World Press Freedom Index assigned Belarus the 153rd place out of 179 
countries (Reporters without Borders, 2017). State censorship is one of the main 
reasons for this state of media freedom in Belarus. Though private web-only outlets 
enjoy relative freedom, the report on freedom of the press by Freedom House 
(2016b) claims, self-censorship is widespread among journalists of those outlets and 
ordinary citizens alike (Freedom House, 2016b; Miazhevich, 2015). “All the media 
work in a self-censorship mode to some extent. Even the independent ones. All 
political parties work in a self-censorship mode. The question is where this boundary 
[between reporting the whole story and self-censorship] is,” says the chairman of one 
of key organisations involved in the Anti-tax campaign (Respondent 17, personal 
communication, May 18, 2017). For Respondent 17, censorship was also associated 
with the persecution of people who posted political information online: 
People are now on trial for sharing a photo on social media. It is because they 
[the authorities] understand that one can go to the street [to protest], and you 
will be seen by hundreds of people in an hour. But you can publish [a post 
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about how one got out on the street] on social media and, if it is presented 
creatively or interestingly, [the post can be spotted] by thousands and dozens of 
thousands of people.  
One of the main analytical challenges in studying the Anti-tax campaign was to 
determine how exactly the information about it was circulated despite censorship. In 
particular, it was not clear from the interviews and analysis of media publications 
how the time and location of the Anti-tax rallies were communicated, especially in 
smaller towns. Most often, the interviewees mentioned two sources of information – 
word of mouth and social media platforms. 
First, word of mouth – neighbours, friends, colleagues – is a dominant source of 
information for Belarusians. According to an opinion survey funded by the EU, 80% 
of the population name word of mouth as a source of general information (Ecorys, 
2017, p. 19). Second, many interviewees emphasised the importance of “the 
internet” and “social networks” for the dissemination of information (Respondent 4, 
personal communication, May 19, 2017; Respondent 11, personal communication, 
May 24, 2017; Respondent 12, personal communication, September 9, 2017; 
Respondent 21, personal communication, September 1, 2017). For instance, 
Respondent 17 was very confident about the role of social media. While in jail in 
Maladzyechna he interacted with other people who were detained during the same 
rally or for other reasons unrelated to the campaign (Respondent 17, personal 
communication, May 18, 2017): 
90% of the [dissemination] work has been done by social networks. I 
specifically asked my fellow jailmates how they had received information 
[about the protests], and almost all named social networks. 
Respondent 17 expressed a common belief in the circles of activists and experts that 
people received information about the Anti-tax protests primarily from social media.  
This was a bit unusual because more innovative channels such as social media 
platforms have not been used that massively by Belarusian political activists recently 
(Bulhakau & Dynko, 2011; Respondent 9, personal communication, March 13, 
2017). When asked about their choice of social media platforms, the Anti-tax 
activists mostly focused on three considerations: the security of their electronic 
communication, the audience and platform features.  
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First, some core and segment leaders of the campaign chose not to use the social 
media platforms which they considered as dangerous in terms of surveillance. For 
instance, Respondent 11 (personal communication, May 24, 2017), a journalist and 
one of the leaders of the anarchist movement in Belarus who spent many years in 
prison on political charges, described VK as “pigs’ [musarskaja, a jargon word to 
refer to the police] social media.” They suggested that “the main security threat of 
using centralised social media is that you just send your data in an unknown 
direction and the elites use this for their own benefit.” Respondent 12 (personal 
communication, September 9, 2017) said that they did not use OK and VK because 
“OK as well as VK are Russian social networks. Any data about your account, 
including your login and password,” could be easily obtained by the Belarusian 
police. For this reason, the activist feared that the police could read his private 
messages. By contrast, Respondent 12 (personal communication, September 9, 2017) 
actively used Facebook because they trusted this US company: 
The servers of Facebook are located in the territory of the US only. And the 
information about your account is not given to our special services by the US. 
Only in extreme cases such as terrorism, murders. […] Therefore, I am not on 
OK, and my wife has long deleted it too, and we will never use [it]. 
Still, some groups that were involved with the Anti-tax campaign, maintained their 
public representation on less secure Russian social media. Respondent 4, a legal 
expert and political scientist (personal communication, May 19, 2017), thought that 
this was due to the attitude regarding issues of security and publicity: 
Opposition structures […] say that they are not covert structures, they are not 
plotting: “all our activity is lawful, [they say] […]. That is why we [the 
opposition] are not afraid of anything. And all that the authorities do to us is a 
violation. And this is one of the reasons why we are struggling against these 
authorities. We publish everything openly on the internet. When the authorities 
bring to trial our activists because they publish information on VK, this 
demonstrates that they are wrong, and it should be changed,” [says the 
opposition].  
 Maybe, from the political point of view, this is a wrong strategy for 
organising any protest. But there is a feeling that this is natural. 
Thus, even though the police monitored VK and persecuted for the content posted 
there, digital dissidents kept using the platform, along with OK. This demonstrates a 
strategic vision of transparency and publicity by opposition activists as something 
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that can potentially protect them. This strategic attitude to transparency can also 
explain why none but one of my Belarusian informants asked me to conceal their 
identity. At the same time, the activists tend to use platforms like Facebook or 
Telegram, which were perceived as more secure, for internal communication. 
Second, the Anti-tax leaders believed that the composition of the audiences on OK, 
VK and Facebook was different in terms of age, education level and social status. 
For instance, many activists perceived Facebook as a place for the better educated 
urban population (Respondent 10, personal communication, September 6, 2017). VK 
was considered to be populated by a younger audience interested in entertainment 
(Respondent 21, personal communication, September 1, 2017). OK was contrasted 
with these two platforms.  
“I mostly relied on OK when I informed about the campaign. There are more 
ordinary citizens of my age on OK. Young people are on VK. And there are 
few people who use Facebook in Baranavichy,” said 43-year-old segment 
leader Respondent 10 (personal communication, September 6, 2017), who was 
a driving force of the campaign in Baranavichy, a town of around 180 000 
people. 
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Figure 6.4. The cumulative audience of social media platforms in Belarus in 
December 2016 according to age. Sources: Gemius (2017). 
 
Figure 6.5. The audience of social media platforms in Belarus in December 2016. 
Source: Gemius (2017). 
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Indeed, the audience of OK was also older than the average audience of VK in 
Belarus (Figure 6.4). According to Gemius (2017), OK is the most popular social 
media platform among people older than 55. For instance, the largest portion of the 
audience of the OK page of one of key media that covered the Anti-tax campaign 
page was 40-55 years old (Respondent 20, personal communication, April 24, 2017). 
Their VK and Facebook pages had younger audiences (Respondent 20, personal 
communication, April 24, 2017). In addition, OK was relatively more popular in the 
smaller towns (Figure 6.5). In general, this older audience tends to use digital 
platforms differently from the younger generation (Rogers, 2016). 
Just as their OK audience was different from the audience on Facebook, the 
demographics of the Anti-tax rallies was also different from what activists in Belarus 
used to observe at traditional large-scale protest events (Erickson, 2017). The 
activists highlighted that many of the protesters came from social groups and lived in 
the cities that typically supported the current regime.  
In Babrujsk and Pinsk, 40% of those [who joined the protests were] of a very 
great age. An enormous number of pensioners came. (Respondent 12, personal 
communication, September 9, 2017) 
Pensioners are traditionally considered to be the stronghold of Lukashenka’s support 
(Zarakhovich, 2005). However, it seems like the contentious tax had affected 
different groups of society, many of whom lived in smaller towns where the level of 
unemployment was worse than in big cities. The requirement to pay the bill coupled 
with the country’s economic problems developed over the past three years (Erickson, 
2017). The failure of the state to support living standards might gradually make 
many of those who previously supported Lukashenka's policies angry.  
In addition to the age and the geographical structure of the OK audience, the activists 
emphasised its receptiveness towards more emotional messages. That is how 
Respondent 21 (personal communication, September 1, 2017) described it: 
On OK, as it turned out, our audience is more prone to the emotional approach. 
And many things, especially if they concern suicides12, some tragic stories [...], 
make people much more outraged than on Facebook. On Facebook, according 
 
12 In December 2016, the media reported (Kasmach, 2017) the death of 60-year old Ajvar Jaskevic 
from Asipovicy, who left a suicide note that read: “I have never been a parasite.”  
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to my observations, people perceive and attempt to discuss all these [stories] 
more rationally. On OK, such discussions are very emotional, as a rule. 
This outrage and anger can help the prospective participants of a protest movement 
to overcome the fear of persecution and come together (Castells, 2013). The 
affordances of OK that emphasised these emotions were noticed by the Anti-tax 
activists.  
Third, when comparing the affordances and features of different platforms, the 
activists emphasised that OK is easier to learn and use than, for instance, Facebook.  
I think Facebook is the most advanced network. It is very difficult to use. It is 
the most inconvenient compared to OK. There are a lot of functions, there are a 
lot of settings […]. But when you learn Facebook, it becomes incredibly cool. 
OK is for dummies. It is that easy, so one does not need to customise any 
[settings]. Facebook has very serious security settings; you can turn off and on a 
lot of things. In Facebook, everything is adjustable: who will see your posts, 
your messages, who will not see [them]. Even by category. (Respondent 12, 
personal communication, September 9, 2017) 
Some segment leaders specifically highlighted one feature that was common across 
different platforms. The leaders used the Like button to attract more attention to their 
content. In Brest, Ihar Maskouski led the group of the activist of the Hramada party. 
That was how Maskouski coordinated the digital efforts in the Brest local segment of 
the Anti-tax campaign: 
After this first rally, it was decided that everything was so great and people 
participated [in the rally], so let us develop [the movement] next weekend. And 
our Maskouski gathered us all in the office, and said: “I understand everything, 
guys, risks and everything else, but let's work on the Internet.” He immediately 
did a short workshop: “If you shared content on Facebook [or VK or OK] and 
[your] content is liked and shared within 15 minutes, then the coverage will be 
greater.” (Respondent 18, personal communication, September 6, 2017) 
Respondent 18 also told me how Brest Hramada activists used Skype to exchange 
links to the social media posts that they created, so everyone could like each other’s 
posts. They also used a comment section on local news websites to mobilise readers 
for the upcoming rallies and other actions. A comment on those sections could be 
made more visible if more users “liked” it. The Brest local activists posted comments 
under pseudonyms and then liked each other’s comments to raise their visibility. 
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Notably, the Hramada activists did not coordinate this digital campaigning with 
other campaign segments in the Brest regions or across the country. 
6.2.2 Cultural factors and communication infrastructure 
Security of electronic communication, the audience and platform features were not 
the only variables included in the digital dissents’ calculations when choosing 
platforms for organising and information circulation. I use the example of the 
Telegram messenger to show how cultural factors might have played a part in this 
choice. I already mentioned that the activists of the Navalny campaign perceived 
Telegram as a secure communication space suitable for coordination and message 
dissemination. I use the example of Telegram to argue that the choice of platforms 
can be linked to the values and the ideas of platform owners, as well as to the 
affordances of a platform.  
Core activists enjoyed using Telegram. The coordinator in one of large Russian 
cities, Respondent 25, called Telegram channels “an amazing world” (personal 
communication, June 11, 2017). Respondent 28, who had 15 years’ experience in 
activism and politics, called Telegram “a great invention” that “helps a lot” (personal 
communication, August 10, 2017). Respondent 26 called Telegram “God’s gift” 
(personal communication, August 14, 2017). These experienced core activists 
highlighted such affordances of Telegram as self-erasing conversations (secret chats) 
and anonymous political channels where many aspects of Moscow’s political life 
were discussed and “all kinds of insights revealed” (Respondent 31, personal 
communication, 15 August 2017).  
In terms of coordination affordances, the interviewed activists highlighted the design 
of the Telegram architecture that allowed for quick coordination.  
We realized that we need to coordinate the actions of people somehow. It is 
possible [to coordinate] on VK, but it is simply not as fast [as through 
Telegram]. On Telegram, a person immediately receives a notification, and he 
instantly sees [it]. (Respondent 27, personal communication, August 14, 2017)  
The coordinator referred to the push notification mechanism. The default settings of 
Telegram allow any message or post addressed to a user to be signalled on a user’s 
device through this mechanism. This means a user can receive several messages 
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every hour if they are subscribed to several popular live channels. On other 
platforms, usually, public posts are not signalled through default notifications. Push 
notifications allowed for a quick response from the participants of the St 
Petersburg’s rally as well as on many other occasions (Respondent 27, personal 
communication, August 14, 2017). Thus, the choice of Telegram is also linked to the 
platform affordances that help to speed up the process of coordination. 
The values and beliefs of Telegram owners also might explain why the Navalny 
organisation relied on this platform so extensively. A Russian entrepreneur 
Pavel Durov founded Telegram in 2014. Eight years before this, Durov founded VK, 
a social network which mainly copied Facebook, then largely unknown in the 
predominantly Russian speaking countries. When his influence grew, Durov was 
pressured by the Russian authorities. In 2011, when pro-democracy protests erupted 
in Russia, Durov refused to remove one of the pages of Navalny from VK (Rowan, 
2016). Three years later, he refused to provide the Russian security agencies with 
information about people who supported the 2013-14 pro-European protests in 
Ukraine. The Russian authorities fiercely opposed the Ukrainian protest movement 
as they feared it might spread to Russia. Not long after that refusal, Durov 
mysteriously resigned, sold his stake in VK and fled to the US (Maney, 2014). In the 
US, he turned into “an outspoken critic of Putin’s regime” (Rowan, 2016). 
This is when Durov also launched the Telegram platform. The idea of the platform 
emerged after the Russian authorities tried to pressure him in 2011. He was also 
inspired by Snowden’s revelations (Auchard, 2015). Durov likes to be compared to 
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and being described as “A tech individualist for 
a post-Snowden world.” This is a title of one of a few press articles featured on the 
Telegram corporate site (Telegram, n.d.). In this article, Durov was compared to 
Snowden with his radical views about transparency and concerns with security.  
As of January 2018, Telegram is free to use, and it is positioned as a non-profit 
platform. It has no embedded advertisement and no subscription fees. Durov, who is 
a billionaire, funds it. Being a tech entrepreneur gives him a special status. He has 
become a global tech celebrity - a status that he can use to attract money from 
investors for his other projects. The status that Telegram gives its owner might be 
more important to him than the potential profits. Therefore, the prominence of the 
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platform and its user base ultimately contribute to Durov’s social capital and wealth 
as a tech entrepreneur.  
Similar to core activists of the Navalny organisation, the founder of Telegram seems 
to be quite pragmatic and individualistic in his views on society. Durov describes 
himself as a libertarian (Sindelar, 2014). In 2012, he published “the Manifesto” 
where he proposes to eliminate any taxes paid by citizens (but not companies), 
passports and the regulation of the education system (Fitzpatrick, 2013). In the 
Manifesto, Durov appears “to value corporate freedoms above human ones” 
(Sindelar, 2014). His individualistic libertarian views with an emphasis on security 
were reflected in the architecture of Telegram. For instance, the level of your 
sociability on Telegram is defined strictly by yourself. You are not encouraged to 
replicate your existing social ties and “to friend” as many people as possible in a 
manner it is done on Facebook or VK. Durov’s belief in individual freedom, his anti-
authoritarianism are common features of geeks and hackers’ communities (Postill, 
2014, p. 404).  
Durov positions Telegram as an open and highly secure platform for communication. 
It is based on the open source code that could be monitored by any user, which is not 
common for large digital platforms. The open source, according to Durov, means 
among other things, that the Telegram code will not be tweaked to allow the state or 
other actors to access the users’ data without publicly revealing such attempts. Open 
source movement is associated with a techno-libertarian principle of openness. 
Gerbaudo (2017c, p. 188) defines openness as the criticism of the “tendency to 
closure displayed by traditional organisations.”  
Openness was one of the key values declared by the Navalny organisation. For 
example, the chief of staff Volkov has hosted a regular YouTube show called Shtab 
(Headquarters). During the Shtab streams, Volkov discussed the upcoming events 
related to the presidential campaign and explained its tactics and strategy. Volkov 
has also highlighted that “there are no secrets in the campaign,” and the show 
demonstrated that “we are absolutely open.” If the police tried to infiltrate spies in 
the organisation, it would find absolutely nothing that was not already known 
publicly, claimed Volkov (2017d). This declaration of radical transparency seemed 
to be rather a precarious measure as special services still tried to spy. Instead, the 
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Navalny organisation might declare openness and transparency as the key values to 
attract more supporters. A similar strategy was used by another platform-like 
organisation the Five Star Movement in Italy (Politi & Roberts, 2017). However, 
despite the declarations of transparency and openness, the Five Star, as well as the 
Navalny organisation, was criticised for not revealing its internal political debates 
and not allowing more internal democracy.   
The Navalny activists perceived Telegram as a secure and an uncensored platform 
with a suitable design. Both the owner of Telegram and the Navalny core activists 
emphasised pragmatic and individualistic views on society, openness and security. 
This shows that the choice of platforms is linked to the values and the ideas of 
platform owners and users. 
6.2.3 Five factors explain the puzzle of platform choice 
Among the public online domains where the two movements operated, email lists 
and data frameworks are the two elements that are common in the media ecologies of 
civic activists, especially in the organisations of a larger scale (Karpf, 2016). 
Therefore, their presence in the infrastructure of the Navalny organisation was not 
surprising. By contrast, the Anti-tax campaign did not have a centralised email list 
and did not use a data analytics approach. This can be explained by the scarcity of 
resources (Karpf, 2016) and skills (Postill, 2018) available. However, the choice of 
local rather than global platforms was more puzzling and contrasted with previous 
waves of pro-democracy political protests in Russia and Belarus in 2010-2012. 
During those waves, pro-democracy activists mostly relied on Facebook (Bodrunova 
& Litvinenko, 2016; Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015) rather than on local platforms. I was 
puzzled about why the activists of the Anti-tax and Navalny campaigns, many of 
whom led the previous waves of pro-democracy protests, switched from global to 
local platforms.  
I found that five factors help to explain this puzzle of platform choice. These factors 
are platform affordances, the composition of the audience, the level of censorship, 
the level of surveillance and organisational culture. 
First, certain affordances of digital media played an important role in the process of 
information dissemination. They are the “Like”, “Share” and push notification 
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mechanisms. The universal features of digital platforms, including the “Like” and 
“Share” buttons, are proliferating around the web and help to increase user traffic 
(van Dijck, 2013a, p. 42). On the OK platform, the Class content-sharing mechanism 
combined the affordances of the “Like” and “Share” buttons on Facebook. It allowed 
activists to disseminate their alternative messages across the OK platform relatively 
quickly by reaching the people who were not subscribed to their pages. The 
mechanism also played a role in emphasising the audience’s emotional reaction. Just 
like the “Share” button, the “push notification” feature has been adopted by many 
platforms. The Telegram messenger that was popular with the Navalny activists had 
a default setting that “pushed” every post to the mobile devices of every follower 
who subscribed to one of the hundreds of Navalny channels and groups. The push 
notification affordances helped to speed up coordination and message dissemination.  
Second, the campaigners considered the composition of the audience on different 
platforms. The Navalny organisation tried to expose a broader audience to the 
political content produced by its core and local activists, building on the audience of 
YouTube users who watched the anti-corruption investigation about the prime 
minister in March 2017. The Anti-tax activists tried to approach and engage the 
previously apolitical audience dissatisfied with the “tax on unemployment.”  
By experimenting with the use of OK and Telegram, the activists of the two 
organisations accessed a new audience that was also receptive to their messages. 
During the Arab Spring, similar attempts to innovate saw Egyptian pro-democracy 
activists using Facebook, then a relatively little-known platform in the country, to 
build support among younger people (Ghonim, 2012). The activists of the Navalny 
and Anti-tax campaigns benefited from exploring newer audiences of relatively 
novel platforms.  
Third, censorship is one of the key mechanisms that authoritarian regimes implement 
in order to control the political process online (Tufekci, 2017). Similar to the 
situation in China and some other authoritarian regimes (Cairns, 2017), digital 
censorship in Belarus and Russia is selective, as this study demonstrates. This means 
that censorship is implemented in relation to a selected, narrow circle of websites 
and platforms.  
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The practices of selective state censorship are a vulnerability for any activist 
communication infrastructure. At different points in their political history, the 
governments of Russia and Belarus demonstrated that they could potentially filter 
any major platform. Thus, traffic on local or smaller platforms such as Telegram or 
OK could be filtered too. Telegram was already being filtered in another non-
democratic country where it was popular. In the midst of the anti-governmental 
protests in January 2018, the Iranian authorities blocked Telegram (BBC News, 
2017). The Russian government have been trying to block Telegram since 2017, 
although this effort seems to have failed so far. The chance of platform traffic being 
filtered is one of the limitations of the communication infrastructure of digitally-
enabled anti-authoritarian movements.  
Fourth, along with censorship, surveillance was another structural constraint met by 
digital dissidents. For example, some segment leaders of the Anti-tax campaign, 
such as the prominent political vlogger Maksim Filipovich, even refused to consider 
opening an account on VK.  
In contrast to VK, some other locally popular platforms such as Telegram were 
perceived as safer places for activism. At the same time, despite its advertised secure 
architecture, the conversations held on Telegram secret groups can still be copied by 
any of these groups’ members and leaked to the police or the media. For example, a 
leaked conversation among members of a secret WhatsApp group provided 
journalists with data revealing tensions within the UK governing party in 2018 
(Spence, 2018). Thus, even the most trusted platforms have never fully protected 
campaign communication from third parties. The police can also confiscate or hack 
the phones of activists to access their conversations and other data on messenger 
platforms. During the Navalny campaign, the police confiscated “hundreds” of 
devices used by the campaigners (Volkov, 2018c). This led to multiple leaks of 
information. However, the campaigners managed to preserve the databases of their 
followers. These examples suggest that the limitations of digital platforms are 
associated with the risks of information leaks and surveillance. 
Fifth, Kavada (2013) demonstrated the relationship between an organisation’s 
culture, the cultural preferences of the members of the organisation, and the choice 
of platforms used by digital activists. My findings support the theory that 
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organisational culture affects the choice of platforms. Characteristics of the Navalny 
organisation, such as its emphasis on a startup-like culture, communicable charisma, 
data gathering and analysis, made the organisation look like a startup. This startup-
like culture drove the organisational culture of the Navalny campaigns and its 
choices of platforms.  
In addition, the choice of newer platforms like Telegram may be linked to the 
“traditional textocentricism” of Russian culture (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2015). 
This textocentricism has been reflected in the extensive use of the blogging platform 
LiveJournal by critical citizens in Russian-speaking countries (Bodrunova & 
Litvinenko, 2015), which pre-dates the dominant social media of the current 
generation. Longer texts are not uncommon on Telegram, as the design of its 
channels encourages a broadcasting style of communication. It might be that 
Telegram is a new LiveJournal for critical Russian citizens who prefer longer, 
reflective texts. 
6.3 Censorship and methods of content dissemination 
6.3.1 Content dissemination 
Connecting different platforms of the organisation in a single infrastructure is 
another difficult organising task. Telegram seemed to be the most significant 
coordinating element in the process of connecting pages and platforms of the 
Navalny organisation.  
 Starting from the summer of 2017, the Navalny activists disseminated all types of 
content via Telegram. This includes links to texts, video and images. A Telegram 
group has a section “shared media” that contains media files that have ever been 
shared by the participants of a group. Segment leaders stimulated their followers to 
share this content on their personal pages on other social media platforms. Segment 
leaders provided the supporters with optional mechanisms to do this.  
First, they encouraged users to write “two lines on your page” about the current topic 
using specific hashtags - an alpha-numeric string with a prepended hash (“#”) - like 
#Navalny2018 or #strike. Moreover, many of the followers who registered on 
Navalny.com periodically received invitations on their emails to share personal 
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frames about a campaign in a similar manner. This one was sent on 16 March 2018 
and was signed by Navalny:  
Let's flood the whole internet with our appeals. [...] 64% of Russian citizens use 
the internet every day, and we will easily reach them if we try, 15 minutes 
today, 15 minutes on Saturday. This time is enough for you to write the 
necessary appeals in all your social networks and groups. On local forums, in 
comment sections, wherever you want. 
Second, segment leaders asked their followers to share materials earlier published on 
the VK pages of the organisation. Third, the Navalny organisation developed several 
tools to modify the social media avatars of the users with their branded symbols. The 
organisation coordinated these mechanisms of information sharing through Telegram 
and email lists. These mechanisms constitute the repertoire of information sharing.  
At the latest stage of its campaigning from December 2017 to March 2018, the 
Navalny organisation tried to mobilise its followers to monitor the procedures of the 
presidential election. Navalny was officially banned from this election earlier on in 
December. The authorities in Russia are often criticized for multiple irregularities 
during the elections like this. At the same time, Navalny tried to discourage people 
from voting in the election as he called them “meaningless” and “predetermined” (L. 
Kim, 2018; Navalny, 2018b).  
Navalny’s organisation launched the #strike campaign to encourage citizens to show 
active voting absenteeism. The key hashtag of the absenteeism campaign was #strike 
(#забастовка). Segment leaders posted messages on Telegram encouraging their 
followers to share campaign content or to write their posts with this hashtag. Those 
followers who joined the #strike campaign usually contributed within minutes or 
hours after segment leaders had posted a call for sharing.  
There were three peaks of the volume of the posts and their shares that contained the 
hashtag #strike on VK. Figure 6.6 demonstrates them as well as the numbers of the 
posts and shares with the #strike hashtag on two platforms during the #strike 
campaign period. The highest spike was observed on 28 January 2018. It was the day 
when the series of #strike campaign rallies were held to protest the unfair 
presidential election. On that day, the users of VK wrote 614 posts with #strike. 
These posts were shared more than 4 500 times (see Table 6.1). In addition, there 
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were about 1 463 #strike posts on Instagram. The second highest spike of the #strike 
campaign happened on 16 March 2018 when Navalny distributed his message I 
quoted above just two days before the election day. On this occasion, the third 
highest spike in a post volume happened on a day when the #strike campaign was 
launched - on 28 December 2017. Hence, these three spikes of posts are associated 
with the three periods of engagements with followers on platforms aimed at 
motivating them to disseminate campaigning materials via their private networks. 
 
Figure 6.6. The natural logarithms of the number of the posts and shares with the 
hashtag #strike (#забастовка) on VK and Instagram over a period between 
27.01.2018 and 16.03.2018. 
The hashtag campaign was quite effective. The #strike posts were shared 27 161 
times and viewed more than 10.1 million times in total. In comparison, 23 310 posts 
contained the hashtag #Navalny2018 (#Навальный2018), which was promoted since 
December 2016, a period three times longer than the #strike campaign. Therefore, 
there were more #strike posts than #Navalny2018 posts per day on average. It seems 
like the campaign has a different content dissemination strategy prior to December 
2017. In particular, the activists did not rely on Telegram to ask their followers to 
disseminate campaign content that extensively in the spring and summer of 2017. 
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Table 6.1 
The most prominent campaign events and the posts with the #strike hashtag between 
27 December 2017 and 16 March 2018.  
Date Platform 
# of the 
#strike 
posts  
# of shares of 
the #strike 
posts Event 
28.12.2017 VK 151 1 754 The campaign announces the 28 
January rallies; First posts with 
#strike 
09.01.2018 VK 79 334 The campaign asks the followers to 
publish their photos with #strike 
22.01.2018 VK 108 945 The campaign encourages 
followers to share information 
about the 28 January rallies 
28.01.2018 VK 614 4 506 The 28 January rallies in 80+ cities 
16.02.2018 Instagram 133 N/A The regional offices of the 
campaign became especially active 
on Instagram a month before the 
presidential election 
16.03.2018 VK 73 3 217 Two days before the election, the 
sharing campaign intensified; 
followers were asked to share 
campaign materials 
Total posts 
over the 
period 
 
4 588 27 161   
 
 
Figure 6.7. The three-step scheme of information dissemination of the #strike 
campaign.  
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The Navalny organisation used Telegram, along with other technologies like email 
lists, as a hub to store, to encourage and to coordinate the sharing of their content 
across other platforms ranging from Instagram to VK. The process of sharing 
included three steps (Figure 6.7). That is why I call it the three-step scheme of 
information dissemination. First, the information that was later supposed to be 
shared by the followers was posted on the main campaign pages on VK and other 
social media. Second, it was shared on Telegram groups administered by its core 
team in Moscow. Almost immediately, this information was circulated via the 
sharing feature of Telegram on hundreds of local channels and groups. Third, once 
released on Telegram and VK, links to campaign materials were shared further by 
ordinary followers.  
The three-step scheme of information dissemination became a central element in the 
repertoire of information sharing used by the Navalny organisation. It linked 
campaign representations on a diversity of platforms – YouTube channels with 
Instagram hashtags, or VK event pages with Twitter posts. The scheme also helped 
to reach some people who typically receive political information via the government-
controlled mainstream media, as content analysis demonstrated. 
6.3.2 Digital censorship: The case of Navalny.com filtering 
On 15 February 2018, the Russian internet filtering agency Roskomnadzor started 
blocking the main webpage of the Navalny organisation Navalny.com (BBC News, 
2018). The agency cited a recent court ruling, which stated that an anti-corruption 
investigation published on Navalny.com might violate the privacy rights of the 
Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska (BBC News, 2018). Deripaska, who is also part 
of the Russian political elite (Shuster, 2018), was featured in that investigation along 
with the deputy prime minister of the Russian government. The agency required 
Navalny.com to remove the photos and videos related to the investigation (BBC 
News, 2018). The organisation refused. Roskomnadzor included the site on the 
registry of forbidden content and started blocking it. 
When its filtering started, the presidential campaign of Navalny had already faded, 
and his organisation launched the #strike campaign to delegitimise the election. By 
this time, Navalny.com was a number three in the Alexa ranking of political websites 
and a number 545 website in Russia overall. The ranking is calculated using a 
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combination of average daily visitors and pageviews over the past month. The site 
had about 3.5 million unique users a month. During its most active period in 2017, 
Navalny.com was in the world Top-5000 of Alexa (Figure 6.8). In addition, the site 
topped the political page and the personal political page categories in Russia 
according to the same ranking. The Alexa ranking also shows that Navalny.com had 
more unique visitors during the period of the presidential campaign than many of the 
most popular independent mainstream media like the newspaper Novaya Gazeta and 
Radio Europe/Radio Liberty Russian. These numbers demonstrate that Navalny.com 
was one of the most prominent political communication spaces on Russian internet, 
and, thus, a potential target for Roskomnadzor. 
Figure 6.8. Alexa Traffic Rank of Navalny.com in 2017-2018. Source: Alexa.  
The organisation tried to diminish the impact of filtering and overcome it. Its IT-
team used several approaches: they pressured internet service providers (ISPs) with 
social media storms; they educated #strike campaign supporters to use VPN; they 
used internet-mirrors to redirect users to another working address of the website; 
they co-opted the staff in the regional offices of ISPs; and, finally, they implemented 
a sophisticated algorithm to avoid filtering. 
The algorithm solution that helped to overcome the filtering was never discussed by 
the core activists openly. But independent IT specialists suggested that the solution 
was probably based on the specifics of the TCP/IP protocol (Korolev, 2018). These 
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specifics were not addressed in the filtering infrastructure of the Russian filtering 
agency. The filtering software used by the ISPs to restrict access to websites 
contained a breach that helped the Navalny activists to overcome the filtering of 
Navalny.com partially. By exploring the breaches of the filtering software and 
building a technical solution in advance, the campaigners ensured that their website 
was accessible to at least 60% of the Russian users (Figure 6.9) in the first days of 
filtering (Volkov, 2018b). This was a remarkable achievement for a country where 
many hundreds of thousands of internet addresses are filtered and could not be 
accessed by users without VPN. 
Figure 6.9. The access rate to Navalny.com (in %) after filtering started at 12:00, 15 
February 2018. Source: The Navalny organisation. 
Vladislav Zdolnikov was one of the key people behind the algorithm solution as well 
as other approaches to tackling the filtering of Navalny.com. Zdolnikov is an 
administrator of a popular Telegram channel in Russia “IT ugolovnyye dela SORM 
rossiyushka,”13 which had about 22 000 subscribers when the organisation tried to 
overcome filtering. On his Telegram channel, he published a message asking local 
technical specialists of ISPs to contact him via a secret chat. Zdolnikov suggested 
that he could provide them with a solution to imitate the filtering of Navalny.com by 
a provider leaving it accessible to users:  
 
 
 
13 Translates as “IT criminal cases SORM Russia.” “SORM” is a framework used by the FSB and 
other Russian agencies to monitor internet traffic. SORM was reported to be used for similar purpose 
in Belarus. The Telegram channel published news related to internet security, censorship and 
persecution for political information. Zdolnikov also used this channel to promote his paid VPN 
service to access Telegram. 
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I know that this channel is read by a large number of specialist providers. These 
are sober people who support us and hate Roskomnadzor. Please do not block 
Navalny.com, and you will receive no transfers on the “Revizor14.” […] If you 
have any insights, thoughts and ideas on how to deal with the bans, write me an 
email. (IT ugolovnyye dela SORM rossiyushka, 2018) 
This co-option technique helped the Navalny organisation to guarantee access to its 
website for many users in the provinces. Zdolnikov also used his Telegram channel, 
as well as other social media pages of the #strike campaign, to organise a social 
media storm on Telegram to direct supporters’ anger on the ISPs that filtered 
Navalny.com. He asked supporters to send the ISPs angry messages and to threaten 
them to leave for other companies who did not filter the whole website. As a 
consequence of this storm, some internet providers stopped fileting parts of 
Navalny.com – its subdomains – which were, as the organisation claimed, – different 
websites. Thus, by using advocacy techniques, the organisation partly avoided the 
state censorship of its website. 
The filtering of Navalny.com became a prominent event for Russian internet. 
Roskomnadzor has blocked only a few sites of that scale so far (Volkov, 2018b). 
However, the filtering efforts of the Russian authorities, at least in a short-term 
perspective, had mainly a positive effect on the Navalny organisation. A day after 
the filtering started, the number of Navalny.com visitors increased significantly 
(Figure 6.10). At the same time, the organisation demonstrated that it is capable of 
overcoming filtering. Nonetheless, the Russian filtering agency also won. Three 
weeks after the investigation into the billionaire was published, the organisation 
removed the content that caused the filtering. Navalny suggested that “no one longer 
views that [content]” (Navalny, 2018a). The filtering of Navalny.com was stopped 
almost immediately (RNS, 2018). 
 
14 “Revizor” is monitoring software deployed by Roskomnadzor to check whether an ISP has blocked 
a website. If the software signals that the site is still not filtered, law enforcement measures are 
invoked. If an ISP fails to restrict access to a website that should be blocked, it faces huge fines or the 
revocation of its license. 
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Figure 6.10. Unique visitors of Navalny.com in December 2017 – 16 February 2018. 
Source: Alexa.  
The preparations in combination with private and public engagement and the use of 
innovative advocacy methods such as Telegram storms led to a partial success of the 
anti-filtering efforts. This case demonstrates that the affordances of digital media can 
be actively used by both a regime (filtering strategies via a sophisticated 
technological infrastructure) and digital dissidents. It also shows that dissidents are 
capable of generating solutions to new obstacles arising from the regime’s use of 
digital media. In contrast to the Navalny organisation, the regime’ large bureaucratic 
machine represented by the filtering agency could not adapt that fast to the 
circumstances and the tactics of the IT activists. The filtering of Navalny.com is an 
example of organisational adaptation of digital media affordances to the changing 
circumstances of an authoritarian regime.  
6.3.3 Politicising an apolitical platform 
Similar to Telegram in Russia, OK grew as an important space for political 
deliberation and anti-authoritarian mobilisation in Belarus during the Anti-tax 
campaign. The OK platform as a key vehicle for sharing information was rather an 
unusual choice for activists. Despite being one of the most visited social media 
platforms in the country over the years, OK has hardly ever been considered as a 
place for political engagement in Russian-speaking societies. Reuter and Szakonyi 
(2015) found that users of this platform were less aware of facts of electoral fraud 
during the 2011 Parliamentary election in Russia when compared to users of VK. 
230 
 
The reports of electoral fraud sparked the 2011-12 protest movement in Russia. Low 
levels of political participation on OK can explain why the police did not monitor 
this platform as actively as VK or sometimes Facebook (Meduza, 2016). 
Consequently, there were no known cases of persecution for political posts on OK 
during the Anti-tax campaign (Spring96, 2017). By contrast, the cases of  
persecution for political information shared on VK and Facebook during 2017 are 
numerous (Shmygov, 2017; Spring96, 2017, 2018). The apolitical status of OK 
helped the Anti-tax activists to continue their online communication without the 
pressure typical for other popular platforms.  
The social media team of a prominent media organisation started politicising the OK 
audience among the first. A coordinator of this team explained this politicisation: 
We created an account on OK in January 2017. […] [We soon noticed that] any 
videos covering political issues, even 10 minutes long, “exploded” on OK. […] 
All other videos on culture, language, history were poorly received. The 
difference [in numbers of views between the political and apolitical topics] was 
150 times. (Respondent 20, personal communication, April 24, 2017) 
Soon after their discovery, the journalist shared the information about the increased 
political interest of the OK audience with the media team of an organisation involved 
in the Anti-tax campaign. This is how Respondent 15 (personal communication, May 
18, 2017) reckoned that: “We took advice from the journalists […] who suggested 
paying more attention to OK. We realised that OK was very different from 
Facebook.” 
The communication coordinator of another organisation involved in the Anti-tax 
campaign (Respondent 21, personal communication, September 1, 2017) felt that 
“OK […] fired up totally unexpectedly for us at that moment.” Just a few months 
before the campaign, his organisation circulated most of its information through 
Facebook. However, the specifics of its audience, as well as the technological 
affordances of OK, activists to pay more attention to it. Other media practitioners 
(Respondent 20, personal communication, April 24, 2017; Respondent 9, personal 
communication, March 13, 2017) also emphasised the importance of OK for sharing 
information about the campaign. 
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Alongside the journalists, the Anti-tax activists realised that the response of their 
audience to the same content was higher on OK (Respondent 21, personal 
communication, September 1, 2017). For example, Anatol Liabedzka, the chairman 
of the UCP, shared his post about the first regional rally of the campaign on two 
platforms, Facebook and OK. The post contained the same content announcing the 
time of the rally (Figure 5.6). On OK, the rally announcement received almost 40 
times more shares than on Facebook.  
The REP trade union was the only Anti-tax group in the sample that had 
representation on all the three main social media platforms. This unique quality 
allows comparing the relative response of its pages’ audience to the Anti-tax agenda. 
During the campaigning period, the REP posts received a relatively higher volume of 
feedback on OK in the forms of Likes/Classes and shares (Figure 6.11). This Table 
displays the basic metrics of the posts of the REP pages that was received by 
automatically accessing the APIs of the three platforms. The higher level of the 
engagement with OK content compared to other pages is especially noticeable 
during the later stages of the campaign. It seems like the OK audience became 
radicalised as the level of repression increased. The descriptive statistics confirm the 
perception of the campaign activists who believed that the OK audience was more 
responsive.  
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Figure 6.11. The engagement of the REP pages audience across the three platforms during the protest stage of the Anti-tax campaign.  
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As discussed in Chapter 1, OK has all the typical features of social networking 
platforms (Reuter and Szakonyi, 2015). However, there are a few that are unique to the 
platform. One of them is the “Class” button that plays a similar role to the Like button 
on Facebook or VK. Respondent 21 (personal communication, September 1, 2017) 
explains this sharing mechanism: 
The majority of people who use OK are not very competent in the technical 
capabilities of their devices […]. If a person presses the "class" button [on OK], 
this also becomes “share” simultaneously. Information about the fact that he 
pressed the “class” appears on his page [so friends of the user can see it]. […] 200 
likes on Facebook is not necessarily a huge coverage. [...] However, on OK, this 
is a very large coverage. This [coverage includes] the entire audience of [these] 
200 people [who pressed 200 likes]. 
Respondent 15 (personal communication, May 18, 2017) shared their vision of the 
Class mechanism: “Every “like” [on OK] is like a share. It is visible to everyone. […] 
And any like on OK leads to momentous dissemination.”  
The Class content-sharing mechanism was discovered by the administrators of 
different segments of the Anti-tax campaign while they were experimenting with the 
process of information distribution. Some of them, like the UCP, tried this mechanism 
after learning about the Class button and the OK audience characteristics from the 
journalists a prominent media. Others, like the REP coordinators, learned about the 
mechanism from the leader of one of the trade union branches who started 
experimenting with OK earlier. The Class sharing mechanism allowed the activists to 
disseminate their alternative messages across the OK platform relatively quickly by 
reaching the people who were not subscribed to their pages. Thus, the mechanism was 
instrumental in partly overcoming state censorship of the Belarusian mainstream 
media and the self-censorship of ordinary users. 
At the same time, several segments of the campaign kept relying on other platforms 
such as VK or Facebook to cover different audiences. The segmented structure of the 
campaign played a positive role in allowing anti-authoritarian activists to experiment 
with the configuration of their digital infrastructure. The ties between segments helped 
to exchange the results of those experiments. 
6.4 Communication infrastructures of anti-authoritarian movements 
The mainstream media did not broadcast the messages of the Navalny or the Anti-tax 
campaigns. These messages also faced citizens’ self-censorship. In response, both 
234 
organisations turned to digital media. They attempted to build a digital communication 
infrastructure to disseminate their alternative messages. Activists used this 
infrastructure to organise, coordinate, unite followers and disseminate their messages. 
This conceptualisation of communication infrastructure is based on the “media 
ecologies of protest” approach used by Rinke & Röder (2011) to analyse the Arab 
Spring events. I found that digitally-enabled anti-authoritarian movements operate 
within five public online domains:  
1. Accounts, pages and groups on social media platforms;  
2. Accounts, pages and groups on messaging platforms;  
3. Websites;  
4. Email lists;  
5. Frameworks for data gathering and analysis.  
The study of these domains demonstrated that social media platforms were a key 
element of the communication infrastructures of the studied anti-authoritarian 
activists. They used predominantly local platforms to build their information 
circulation ecology, for example the three-step scheme of content sharing. However, 
the use of the same platforms, such as VK or OK, by the two protest communities 
resulted in different styles of online collective action. The study also reaffirmed that, if 
activists overly rely on digital platforms, they face limitations and risks.  
The two organisations had three main goals when using digital platforms: to cover 
their activities, to reach out to the audience and to mobilise this audience. It seems that 
every major platform used by the organisation contributed to these goals. At the same 
time, the differences between the use of different platforms are apparent too. For 
instance, both VK and Telegram were used to coordinate followers, but Telegram was 
perceived as a more secure space to do so. Table 6.2 summarises other functions of the 
platforms in the communication infrastructures of the Navalny and Anti-tax 
organisations.  
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Table 6.2 
The role of digital platforms in the infrastructures of the Navalny and Anti-tax 
organisations 
Platform The Navalny The Anti-tax 
VK ‐ Local network building  ‐ The primary platform for public 
communication  
‐ Public space to coordinate 
followers 
‐ Local network building  
‐ Access the largest audience 
across the used platforms 
OK ‐ Information distribution in some 
provinces of the country 
‐ Access to a primarily apolitical 
audience  
‐ Use of the Class sharing 
mechanism to reach out to a 
wider audience (“followers’ 
friends”)  
‐ Use other affordances to 
emphasise the emotional reaction 
of the audience 
Telegram ‐ Secure space to coordinate 
followers during collective 
action 
N/A 
YouTube ‐ To stream from collective action  ‐ To host an “underground 
television” network 
‐ To stream from collective action  
 
6.5 How the affordances of digital media shape organising and 
information distribution in authoritarian settings 
6.5.1 Key affordances for digital information distribution 
Local platforms like VK, OK and Telegram dominated the digital infrastructures of 
the two organisations. In addition to email lists and frameworks for data gathering and 
analysis, the Navalny organisation created and inhabited hundreds of social media 
spaces to connect pro-democracy citizens. Its infrastructure ranged from the alternative 
television on YouTube to the hundreds of local pages on VK and Telegram. The Anti-
tax campaign adopted VK and OK, the two most popular platforms that were, 
however, at least partly controlled by the state. Along with less popular global 
platforms such as Facebook, the local platforms were used to disseminate activist 
messages.  
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The organisations used local social media such as Telegram and VK as a vehicle for 
information distribution. For instance, the Navalny organisation urged its followers via 
a newsletter and public posts to share content materials on personal social media pages 
using campaign hashtags and to use tools to modify their social media avatars so as to 
display campaign symbols. Analysis of the sharing practices of the organisation 
demonstrates that Telegram could be considered as a central node of its 
communication infrastructure. Core activists used it to store links to campaign 
materials to be shared further by campaign followers. This sharing process included 
three steps: materials were posted on the main campaign pages on VK and other social 
media by the core activists; then, segment leaders shared the links to the materials on 
Telegram groups and channels; finally, ordinary followers used links from Telegram 
to post them on their pages (Figure 6.7). I defined this process as the three-step 
scheme of content sharing. The scheme became a central element in the repertoire of 
information sharing used by the Navalny organisation. 
An unexpected feature of the Anti-tax campaign was that it relied on OK. It was 
largely apolitical, but also one of the most visited social media in the country (Table 
1.1). The segment leaders in the Anti-tax campaign politicised OK by using the 
specific affordances of the platform, such as its “Class” content-sharing mechanism. 
Hence, the study demonstrated that local platforms (VK, OK and Telegram) came to 
be used more extensively than global platforms (such as Facebook and WhatsApp) and 
were the key elements in the communication infrastructures of the two organisations.  
To a significant extent, censorship results from self-censorship by ordinary people 
when they restrict their political engagement online. Users’ self-censorship is often 
reflected in their nano-level actions (Lonkila, 2017) such as decisions concerning 
pressing the Like button or sharing content on their Timeline. Self-censorship is also 
performed at the level of micro-interactions (Milan, 2015b). A key debate is whether 
the current state of digital media, where censorship and self-censorship flourish, 
reflects the old status quo between critical citizens and a government (Filer & 
Fredheim, 2016) or whether there is a new dynamic compared to the periods when 
radio or television media dominated. If the latter is true, it would mean that political 
activists increase the chances of success (Tucker et al., 2017) when they reduce the 
impact of self-censorship and employ creative approaches to the use of the affordances 
of digital media (Tufekci, 2017).  
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I argue that the success of information dissemination by the two organisations (though, 
undoubtedly, there were failures in this process too) can be explained by their ability 
to reduce the impact of self-censorship by digital platform users. Both the Navalny 
organisation and the Anti-tax campaign tried to make sure that the followers would 
share their content in order to increase the chances of followers’ friends being exposed 
to alternative political information. These sharing acts comprise the micro-interactions 
where self-censorship persists on digital platforms. However, these micro-acts of 
sharing and liking of digital content should be deemed political (Halupka, 2014), 
especially if these actions are performed in relation to the content shared by pro-
democracy activists in an authoritarian country (Lonkila, 2017). The cases of the 
Navalny and Anti-tax campaigns show that a movement can be brought to a tipping 
point by micro-acts of sharing and liking on platforms (Margetts et al., 2016, p. 15) 
and by using multiple platforms to widen the boundaries of the political arena 
(Halupka, 2016). This demonstrates how digital media have broadened the definition 
of political action performed by the followers of anti-authoritarian movements. 
6.5.2 Affordances of digital media and forms of repressive politics 
Previous research has shown that the affordances of digital media can have both 
positive and negative consequences for digital activism. As I discuss in the following 
chapter, the effects of negative consequences were still manageable. The effects of 
positive consequences mostly reaffirm previous research and are associated with the 
main affordances of the internet (Earl & Kimport, 2011). In particular, activists use the 
internet to facilitate and coordinate their organisations at a lower cost, doing so more 
quickly and at a larger scale. For example, the Navalny organisation managed to scale 
up its Anti-corruption protest network across Russia in just a few days following the 
publication of the video materials on YouTube that revealed the undeclared property 
of the country’s prime minister. Figure 4.3 demonstrates how an organisation’s 
support grew thanks to smaller towns primarily. 
In Belarus, information about the Anti-tax campaign’s first regional rally in Homel 
quickly spread across the country’s most popular social media platforms, VK and OK. 
The Homel rally became the most attended (Table 4.3) local collective action in the 
campaign. Thus, I found that both the Belarusian and Russian pro-democracy 
movements used social media platforms such as Telegram, VK, OK and Facebook to 
lower their costs, speed up organising and communication processes and increase the 
scale of their operations. 
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I also demonstrated how the many-to-many communication capacity of digital media 
allowed activists to perform a large part of the organisational work online. For 
instance, public leaders like Liabedzka in Belarus used platforms to speed up the 
organising of unauthorised rallies in provincial cities, attracting significant attention 
from social media users when announcing the rallies with just a day’s notice (Figure 
5.6). The core activists of the Navalny organisation could not be physically present in 
many locations across such a vast country as Russia, but digital media afforded their 
representation in many localities beyond their physical reach. However, they were still 
able to build their protest networks as it had been done by some earlier “square 
movements” such as the Euromaidan (Lokot, 2016) or 15M (Postill, 2018) that were 
physically settled at the same locations for much longer terms. Thus, both 
organisations studied benefited from the main affordances of the internet. 
The study found that one of the key affordances explored by both groups of activists 
was the visibility management mechanisms of digital platforms. These mechanisms 
allowed activists to anonymise some of their social media profiles or adopt 
pseudonyms and, consequently, conceal their real identities. Previous research has 
found that the affordances of digital media enhance the visibility of a social 
movements’ cause (Duguay, 2016; Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013; Poell & van Dijck, 
2016; Tufekci, 2017). In addition, the same visibility mechanisms can enhance 
hierarchies within platform-centred social movements against their expectations 
(Gerbaudo, 2016) since “developments in communication always bring new kinds of 
visibility to new forms of public” (Meikle, 2014, p. 375). The visibility affordances of 
platforms also help the police and other security agencies to learn the real identities of 
anti-authoritarian activists (Tufekci, 2017). Visibility affordances illustrate a 
contradiction between the intentions of activists, affordances and the context. The 
same affordances can both have democratic potential and become a tool in the hands 
of authoritarian elites. 
The digital activists of the Navalny presidential campaign, the longest campaign 
studied in the dissertation, also used the listening affordances of the web (Karpf, 2016) 
to gather feedback and data from the local branches that they called regional offices. 
The core activists of the campaign used this data to monitor, control and improve the 
performance of its regional network. By using the listening affordances, the core 
activists learned that the publication of new anticorruption investigations on YouTube 
was associated with the most extensive growth in supporter numbers. The capacity of 
239 
digital media to regulate users’ visibility and listen to followers allowed activists to 
adapt to changing circumstances. 
The cases of the Anti-tax and the Navalny organisations showed that the affordances 
of digital media could be actively used by both authoritarian regimes and digital 
dissidents. They also showed that digital dissidents are capable of generating solutions 
to new obstacles that arise from the regime’s use of affordances. For example, the 
Russian bureaucratic machine, represented by the filtering agency Roskomnadzor, 
could not adapt so quickly to the circumstances and tactics of the Navalny 
organisation’s IT activists. This allowed the Navalny presidential campaign to 
maintain access to its main website for a significant proportion of users despite 
attempts by the filtering agency to block it. Similarly, the efforts of the state television 
propaganda machine (Kara-Murza, 2017) were insufficient to diminish the influence 
of activists on video platforms. In Belarus, the state also tried to use platform 
affordances to learn about the potential leaders of the Anti-tax movement by 
monitoring contentious VK content. The activists responded by adopting pseudonyms 
and moving to OK; a platform that was scarcely monitored by the police. Hence, the 
affordances of digital media are not monopolised by authoritarian states. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This chapter summarises the findings of the dissertation and sets out the contribution 
to knowledge. It also recognises the limitations of the study and outlines some 
directions for further research.  
7.1 The contribution to knowledge 
In winter 2017, the campaign to abolish the “tax on social parasites” in Belarus, a 
country often described as “Europe’s last dictatorship,” sparked a wave of protests 
unlike any seen since its independence. Collective action of the supporters of this 
Anti-tax campaign quickly spread around the country’s digital realm and reached the 
squares and streets by February 2017. It seemed as if no one could explain what was 
happening: how had the activists managed to organise their protest campaign despite 
continuous political repression? Almost simultaneously, the team of anti-corruption 
activists headed by Alexei Navalny, probably the most prominent dissidents in Russia, 
tried to launch their most ambitious project yet: to build a long-lasting protest 
movement to bring about pro-democracy changes in Russia. Just like in Belarus, the 
Russian movement was labelled as spontaneous and unexpected. 
These protest movements were born in two similar authoritarian countries but had 
different outcomes. The Anti-tax campaign led to the abolition of the contentious tax, 
but it sparked no pro-democracy change and faded quickly with more than a thousand 
activists detained. Navalny’s movement failed in all of its main short-term goals: to 
oust the prime-minister, to register Navalny as a candidate in the presidential elections 
and to delegitimise those elections. However, the movement remained in the Russian 
political arena and continued challenging the authoritarian rule of Vladimir Putin.  
The conditions for the Navalny and Anti-tax movements are remarkably similar. The 
organisations emerged in similar political and media contexts in the same period of 
2017 and resulted in four large-scale campaigns (the Anti-corruption campaign, the 
presidential campaign and the Voters’ #strike campaign in Russia, or the Anti-tax 
campaign in Belarus). Both organisations aimed not only at political change but also at 
comparable end-goals of democratisation. They relied heavily on digital platforms in 
their communication and organising. These campaigns raised contentious issues that 
resonated across the two countries. The cases left us with a puzzle: what makes a pro-
democracy group organisationally sustainable and able to challenge the authoritarian 
elite by using digital media? 
241 
To solve the puzzle of the anti-authoritarian challenge, I studied the two movements’ 
behind-the-scenes practices of organising and information operation on digital media. 
I designed the study drawing on the experiences of researchers of authoritarian 
contexts who argue for an in-depth qualitative analysis of movement practices (e.g. 
Reny, 2016). An abundance of literature addresses questions of organising, leadership 
and message distribution in the increasingly mediatised and digitised political 
environment (Bennett et al., 2017; Gerbaudo, 2017; Poell et al., 2016; Postill, 2018; 
Tufekci, 2017). However, a relatively small portion of this literature discusses what 
happens backstage within a political organisation (Postill, 2018; Treré, 2015). 
The study contributes to a debate regarding the nature of political organisation in the 
digital age (Karpf, 2019), specifically the importance of the backstage organisational 
layer of digital politics (Gerbaudo, 2017a; Karpf, 2016; Y. M. Kim et al., 2018; Treré, 
2015). This debate asks how we should conceptualise the groups of people behind 
protests and other contentious political processes that use digital media to organise. 
Can we describe some of these groups as “organising without organisations” or should 
we rather approach them as formal organisations? If the latter is a more appropriate 
approach, then how can the formal political organisation adapt to the platformisation 
of political life? These debates paid relatively little attention to political organising in 
authoritarian contexts. 
Unlike approaches that focus on the public face of protest organisations, such as the 
study of retrospective digital data, an analysis of backstage practices with qualitative 
methods unpacks organisational and leadership forms that were not intended to be 
public. The study analyses these forms by conducting extensive interviews with local 
leaders of the organisations. These local leaders gave the author unprecedented access 
in order to observe their practices and interactions. The study also examines social 
media content created by them. This approach allowed the uncovering of previously 
unidentified actors who contributed to the coordination of the movements during 
critical periods of collective action and the structures that emerged as a consequence of 
these coordinating efforts. To the best of my knowledge, this research is the first 
systematic empirical analysis of the organisational structures and leadership in the 
Anti-tax and the Navalny campaigns in 2017-18. 
The study makes three sets of contribution to literature on organisational adaptations 
and information distribution in digitally-enabled social movements and political 
organisations. First, the study contributes to the discussion regarding the nature of 
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political organising in the digital age. In particular, it refines the SPIN model for 
authoritarian environments and problematises the theory of connective action (Bennett 
& Segerberg, 2013) for repressive environments. Second, the study contributes to the 
literature regarding the role of leaders in digitally-enabled movements. It updates the 
tactical freeze theory (Tufekci, 2017) and shows how to the presence of the 
multiplicity of leadership can help a digitally-enabled movement to challenge 
powerful elites. These findings reaffirm the theories that state the importance of formal 
organisation for social movements (Bimber et al., 2012; Earl, 2015).  
Third, the study contributes to research on the affordances of digital media. It showed 
that one of the key affordances explored by both groups of activists was the visibility 
management mechanisms of digital platforms, which the literature discusses less 
extensively than the main affordances of the internet (Earl & Kimport, 2011). The 
study also contributes to the discussion of the strategies that authoritarian regimes use 
to respond to and combat online opposition (Bradshaw & Howard, 2018; Morozov, 
2011b; Roberts, 2014; Sanovich et al., 2018) by updating the classification systems for 
forms of repressive digital politics. I argue that this classification should emphasise the 
agency of an ordinary citizen rather than state actors. These findings challenge the idea 
that authoritarian regimes have neared full co-optation of the internet (Filer & 
Fredheim, 2016; Gunitsky, 2015). Instead, it should be considered as a battlefield for 
political influence. 
7.1.1 Organisation literature 
To begin my analysis of the organisational layers of the two initial protest episodes of 
the Anti-tax and the Anti-corruption campaigns, I applied Gerlach’s (2001) model of 
the SPIN (segmentary, polycentric and integrated network) organisation. According to 
the model, the essential requirement for segmentation of organisational structures is 
the presence of independent, localised groups or cells which can combine to form 
larger configurations or integrated networks (Gerlach, 2001; Gerlach & Hine, 1970, p. 
41). Such cells grow and proliferate unrelated to any central decision-making but do 
have their local leadership. This constant network rearrangement adds a dynamic to 
the organisation “which can be confusing to outside observers” such as the state elites 
(Gerlach & Hine, 1970, p. 42). In line with the SPIN model, I defined the 
organisational configuration of the two campaigns as segmentary.  
However, the organisational layers in the two cases did not satisfy the SPIN model 
completely. Instead, I propose to refine the SPIN model for repressive environments 
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and define the two organisations as anti-authoritarian movements. The social 
movement literature (Chrona & Bee, 2017; Rinke & Röder, 2011; Tufekci, 2017) uses 
the concept of anti-authoritarian movement to discuss pro-democracy protest 
organisations that follow an “anti-authoritarian ethos” (Postill, 2018; Tufekci, 2017). 
However, the definitions proposed in the literature are often unclear, while the 
discussion of the concept is sporadic. I suggest the following definition of such 
movements: anti-authoritarian movements are sustained campaigns of claim-making 
by citizens that distrust authoritarian institutions and organise themselves in order to 
challenge authoritarian power.  
After analysing backstage practices in two anti-authoritarian movements, I have found 
that these movements resembled an ad hoc, segmented style of organising. I also 
demonstrated that segmentation, if combined with the presence of more centralised 
structures, potentially allows entering negotiations with the authorities. However, only 
one movement, the Navalny organisation, dynamically rearranged its organisational 
structures based on current challenges. A network of VK pages linked to the Anti-
corruption campaign contained close to a hundred protest pages. Each page 
represented a local segment of the campaign in one of the Russian provinces. The 
segments were integrated into a network through the mechanisms of content sharing.  
The organisational dynamism of the Navalny structures is one of the critical 
differences between the two studied cases. I suggest that an organisational dynamism 
that resembles the style of organising in SPIN movements is one of the factors that 
allow for the development of a more sustainable anti-authoritarian movement. 
In the minds of many journalists, commentators and civil society experts both the 
Anti-tax and Anti-corruption protests started as spontaneous eruptions from the 
grassroots with no organisation and few (if any) leaders. Activists from these 
campaigns reinforced these views when they supported or at least did not reject the 
narratives of a spontaneous or leaderless movement. The Navalny organisation, for 
example, supported the narrative describing it as a movement of “ordinary citizens” 
before some of its protests. The narrative of a spontaneous movement was widespread 
and discussed in relation to both the Anti-corruption and the Anti-tax campaigns.  
The literature on organisational narratives suggests that narratives about “ordinary 
citizens” and “spontaneous” organising are common in social movements under 
pressure (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; Poell et al., 2016). For example, the student sit-ins 
in the USA in the 1960s were often described as spontaneous or leaderless movements 
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(Flesher Fominaya, 2015). Similar narratives were used to describe the Arab Spring 
movements and 15-M in Spain (Flesher Fominaya, 2015). However, research on those 
movements eventually demonstrated that they have been far from spontaneous 
(Flesher Fominaya, 2015) and have had identifiable though often covert leaders, such 
as Wael Ghonim during the Arab Spring uprising in Egypt (Poell et al., 2016) or the 
groups of techno-political nerds during 15-M in Spain (Postill, 2018). 
My research demonstrated that, similar to 15-M and the Arab Spring and contrary to 
the public perception, both the Anti-tax and the Anti-corruption campaigns had clear 
organisational structures. These structures organised the series of protests in February 
and March 2017 in Belarus and on 26 March 2017 in Russia, which shows that these 
were anything but spontaneous eruptions. Thus, the narratives of a spontaneous and 
leaderless protest were a “rhetorical construction” (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; Poell et 
al., 2016) and “fictive elements” (Postill, 2018, p. 43) rather than a reality.  
In the media and public discussion regarding a social movement, these fictive 
elements can be a consequence of a “gulf in understanding” (Postill, 2018, p. 123) 
about collective action, a stereotypical perception of structures without recognisable 
leadership by external observers (Gerlach & Hine, 1970). Most members of the press 
and the general public often see a protest as an inexplicable and spontaneous event that 
peaks, declines and dies out (Gerlach & Hine, 1970). Flesher Fominaya (2015) argues 
that “spontaneity” is a common problematic concept that denies agency to social 
movement networks and actors. At the same time, this concept can also be 
“strategically deployed by social movement actors and help present grievances and 
claims as the popular will of the people” (Flesher Fominaya, 2015, p. 143). Similarly, 
the “ordinary citizens” narrative provides “an effective strategy of integration of new 
participants […] and reaching out to the local community” (Flesher Fominaya, 2015, 
p. 144). Moreover, having no identifiable organisational structures helps digital 
dissidents to avoid the pressure of the authorities (Gerlach & Hine, 1970) during the 
organisation of a protest. Thus, activists sometimes try to represent their organisation 
as more dispersed and spontaneous than it really is or, at least, do not correct these 
misperceived narratives.  
I argue that the misperceptions in the organisational narratives could be strategically 
deployed by activists from the Anti-tax and Navalny campaigns. The activists did not 
suggest that they meticulously planned and constructed those narratives, but they have 
not entirely rejected them until the organisations seized their respective campaigns. 
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Therefore, digitally-enabled anti-authoritarian movements can benefit from the 
consequences of a gulf in understanding of organisational structures. 
Contrary to public perception and media reports, the two anti-authoritarian movements 
were not cases of “organising without organisations” as the connective action theory 
(Bennett et al., 2014) might have suggested. Neither were they horizontal people’s 
movements with a single charismatic leader, which contradicts the line taken by many 
authors that discuss similar social movement phenomena (Gerbaudo, 2012). The 
concept of connective action emphasises individualised and personalised styles of 
digital politics and prompts scholars to discuss how digitally-enabled civic and 
political communities use platforms to self-organise and express their concerns 
directly. However, as Kavada (2018) points out, connective action theory focuses on 
crowds rather than on social movement organisations. Even though the Anti-
corruption and the Anti-tax protests, as well as many other contemporary protest 
events, looked like crowds, I argue that both campaigns, as well as the subsequent 
campaigns of Navalny, had clear organisational layers and were directed by leaders. 
They might have looked like crowds due to a gulf in understanding of organisational 
structures of the two movements.  
At the same time, individuals who are involved in the kind of “shadow” organising 
revealed in this research can benefit were the public to view them as the case of 
“organising without organisations” (Karpf, 2019). Karpf (2019) notes that such a view 
renders “invisible those networks and institutions that leave no easily-accessible 
digital traces.” This view also discourages a more thorough investigation into the 
behind-the-scenes practices of social movements and political parties because, 
presumably, the “backstage” of connective action is only revealed through peer-
production and similar network mechanisms (Bennett et al., 2014). In other words, 
once we assume that connective action explains an episode of protest or another 
process of digital politics, we become myopic about formal organising and miss the 
shadow structures that might lie hidden from the public eye. 
If we exclude shadow digitally-enabled structures from our analysis, we risk 
disregarding important elements of organisational puzzle. Discussing the operations of 
such structures in the US, Kim et al. (2018, p. 533) argue that “the behind-the-scenes 
information operation on digital media is above and beyond any other operation we 
have ever seen in the past in terms of its scale, speed, and, most importantly, its 
capacity to amplify information.” For example, the electoral victory of Donald Trump 
246 
in 2016 that surprised many observers becomes more comprehensible when one 
analyses the operations on digital media that supported the Trump campaign. In 
particular, we know now that anonymous political campaigners or “shadow parties” 
outside of the US political party system contributed to the promotion of Trump’s 
candidacy through micro-targeting on social media (Y. M. Kim et al., 2018). These 
shadow parties are an example of political actors that can benefit from ideas such as 
connective action because these ideas allow them to keep shifting the balance between 
political elites and traditional parties while remaining unidentified. The “shadowing” 
of political organising might appear to be a long-term trend in political life in both 
democracies and authoritarian states afforded by the process of platformisation. 
This brief overview of some theories of the platformisation of politics suggests that 
key features of organising in digitally-enabled anti-authoritarian movements – the 
emergence of dynamic, ad hoc structures that can remain invisible and perceived by 
the public as inexistent – cut across many concepts of digitally-enabled political 
organisation. By conceptualising groups of activists with anti-authoritarian ethos who 
rely on digital platforms for formal organisation-building as a digitally-enabled anti-
authoritarian movement, we widen the theories of political organisation and the 
platformisation of politics beyond the narrow Anglophone and Western European 
contexts. We also problematised the influential collective action theory for repressive 
environments. 
7.1.2 Leadership literature  
The findings suggest that reliance on digital media enables anti-authoritarian 
movements to have both identifiable public leaders and hidden 
administrators/organisers. These leadership types are not mutually exclusive and can 
co-exist in the same organisational cell. At the same time, while the platform-based 
anonymity allows some evasion of persecution, public leadership remains under 
constant threat of arrests or fines.  
This management of visibility of movement leadership allowed the two organisations 
to avoid a tactical freeze (Tufekci, 2017) – a state whereby a movement is unable to 
develop or agree on new paths to take. A tactical freeze is a common feature of anti-
authoritarian movements that declare the intention to build leaderless structures 
(Tufekci, 2017). Despite the intention, movement leadership still emerges in the form 
of, for instance, segment leaders. However, this leadership is often unable to enter into 
negotiations with the authorities because anti-authoritarian movements often fail to 
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agree on a common strategy quickly enough. Tufekci (2017) showed that a tactical 
freeze reduces movements’ ability to pose a challenge to powerful elites. My analysis 
shows that the impact of a tactical freeze can be tackled by the presence of recognised 
public core and federal leaders, such as those active in the Navalny organisation. 
Therefore, my study demonstrates that the multiplicity of leadership in a digitally-
enabled anti-authoritarian movement contributes to its ability to challenge powerful 
elites. 
The presence of local office coordinators, core leaders, as well as the federal leader, 
supports arguments about the importance of formal organisation for social movements 
(Bimber et al., 2012; Earl, 2015). Specifically, it confirms that the preparation for, and 
the coordination of, collective action critically requires organisation. However, this 
formal organisation should not necessarily remain bureaucratised, as it is often 
assumed (Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Karpf, 2016). Instead of bureaucratic structures, 
social movements can rely on a combination of several organisational levels, some of 
which could be decentralised while others can remain more hierarchical and 
centralised. The core leaders of a movement should help to reinforce ties between 
these elements. During the Anti-tax campaign, its core leaders travelled across the 
country to reinforce the ties between organisational segments. During the Anti-
corruption and the presidential campaigns in Russia, Alexei Navalny, a charismatic 
leader who gave the organisation his name, also travelled extensively and met local 
segment leaders and office coordinators. The formal organisation is important for anti-
authoritarian movements because leadership links a movement together.  
The presence of a public eponymous leader is one of the major differences between 
the Navalny organisation and the Anti-tax campaign. I defined Alexei Navalny as an 
eponymous leader because he alone gave the movement his name. Navalny was often 
viewed as a charismatic personality whose presence altered the dynamics of the 
movement. However, as the case of the Anti-tax reminds, the presence of a 
charismatic personality is not a necessary precondition for an activist organisation’s 
success. Instead, I argue, the charisma of Navalny should be viewed as a 
communicable asset for his organisation. Literature (Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Snow, 
1987) describes the type of charisma that exists on an interpersonal, communicable 
level within an organisation as communicable charisma rather than as a static attribute 
of one person. Gerlach & Hine (1970) demonstrated that communicable charisma 
could diffuse through the segments of an organisation with many leaders. 
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Communicable charisma empowers activists such as independent segment leaders to 
attract and coordinate followers and helps them to glue their organisation together.  
I consider these leadership visibility arrangements as “a method of survival” (Poell et 
al., 2016) of digital activists. One of the key physical challenges faced by activists in 
repressive environments is persecution of their leaders. Both Belarusian and Russian 
regimes fear collective action (Cairns, 2017) and use a preemptive policy of 
persecution (Silitski, 2005) to isolate prominent opposition political leaders. The 
findings demonstrate that the governments indeed used a preemptive policy in relation 
to the movements. Many pseudonymous and anonymous leaders from each 
organisation managed to avoid a preemptive policy. However, security agencies 
identified and persecuted many of them later. For instance, the administrator of one of 
the most prominent Anti-tax communities PASD was detained and interrogated by the 
police, which led to his real identity being revealed. In addition, it emerged that some 
of the core activists in the organisations may have cooperated with the government 
secretly. Yuliya Yukhnovets of the REP trade union, a prominent member of the Anti-
tax coalition, acknowledged that she was an agent of the Belarusian KGB. Vitali 
Serukanov, the deputy coordinator of the Moscow office of Navalny’s presidential 
campaign, was also accused of being an agent after he unexpectedly left the 
organisation during a critical moment. The cases of Serukanov and Yukhnovets 
demonstrate the limits of civic organisations’ abilities to avoid surveillance by using 
digital affordances and remind us that visibility can also be imposed on people by 
external actors (Meikle, 2016). 
7.1.3 Affordances literature 
Apart from organising and leadership, the study also focused on how the affordances 
of digital media shape processes of political organising and information distribution in 
an authoritarian political context. There are two types of the affordances of platforms 
that shape the processes of political organising and information distribution in 
digitally-enabled anti-authoritarian movements. The first type includes capacities 
known as the main affordances of the internet, such as lowered transaction costs and 
many-to-many communication capacity of digital media. The second type of 
affordances is the visibility mechanisms and listening capacity of digital media, which 
was one of the key affordances explored by both groups. These affordances are often 
less mentioned in the literature, or its capacities became apparent only relatively 
recently.  
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The results reveal the clear patterns of information distribution with the use of 
messaging software and local platforms that had barely been used by the politicised 
public for similar purposes previously. Digital activists used local platforms like OK 
to reach out to a wider audience beyond their traditional base and messaging software 
Telegram to coordinate collective action in an environment of heavy state surveillance.  
With the proliferation of the internet, authoritarian regimes learned how to use the 
affordances of digital media to their own advantage (Gunitsky, 2015; C. Walker & 
Orttung, 2014). In particular, regimes learned how to respond to the growing influence 
of pro-democracy digital activism. The studies that discuss how the repressive 
governments have responded to this type of activism (Bradshaw & Howard, 2018; K. 
E. Pearce, 2015; Sanovich et al., 2018; Stein, 2016a; Stockmann, 2013; Tucker et al., 
2017; Tufekci, 2017) demonstrate that digital political control is often implemented 
through one of several elements of repressive digital politics: censorship, persuasion 
and surveillance, as well as online engagement of the state (for example, by using 
bots).  
The foregoing study contributes to this discussion of the strategies that authoritarian 
regimes use to respond to and combat online opposition (Bradshaw & Howard, 2018; 
Morozov, 2011b; Roberts, 2014; Sanovich et al., 2018) and clarifies the existing 
classification systems for forms of repressive digital politics. The classification 
adopted in this study distinguishes three key forms of repression at the disposal of 
regimes seeking to address online opposition – surveillance, censorship and offline 
action such as persecution. This classification does not, however, aim to offer a full 
account of forms of repressive politics. It rather evaluates the main challenges faced 
by digital dissidents in a repressive environment. I define digital dissidents’ challenges 
as the forms of repressive digital politics.  
In contrast to other approaches to the classification of “authoritarian response” (e.g. 
Bradshaw & Howard, 2018; Walker & Orttung, 2014), the approach that this study 
propagates focuses on active citizens rather than the state. The state-centric approach 
relies on policy analysis and dominates studies of authoritarian countries (Glasius, 
2018). The disadvantage of this approach is that it considers the actors, such as 
activists or journalists, merely as the functions or the objects of government media 
policy. By contrast, a classification based on the three main challenges faced by digital 
dissidents emphasises the agency of an ordinary citizen rather than a policymaker or a 
member of the political elite. This emphasis on agency makes the classification 
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described a citizen-centric framework (Dal et al., 2019) that advances the 
understanding of political activism in authoritarian settings from a citizen’s 
perspective.  
The findings reveal that the first form of repressive politics practised by a government, 
the persecution of activists, is legitimised by state policies such as laws on public 
assemblies. The police and other security agencies implement this form of 
authoritarian response. Two other forms of response, surveillance and censorship on 
digital media, are mostly implemented by government agencies such as 
Roskomnadzor in Russia and the Ministry of Information in Belarus.  
The affordances of digital media that allow a government to surveil its political 
opponents and to censor their content are platform design, settings, algorithms and 
visibility mechanisms (Lonkila, 2017; Milan, 2013; Tufekci, 2014; van Dijck, 2013a). 
In particular, censorship and surveillance practices are enabled by platform algorithms 
and ISPs that are used to monitor and filter web-traffic. Market logic (Helmond, 2015; 
van Dijck, 2013b) promotes censorship and surveillance on platforms as well 
(Stockmann, 2013). This shows that censorship and surveillance are closely linked, as 
authoritarian states often use similar infrastructures to implement both types of 
authoritarian response (Stockmann, 2013).  
In addition, the findings contribute to the literature on social and political change in 
authoritarian countries. They challenge the idea that authoritarian regimes have neared 
full co-optation of the internet (Filer & Fredheim, 2016; Gunitsky, 2015; K. E. Pearce 
& Kendzior, 2012). Instead, the study shows that the internet remains a battlefield for 
political influence between pro-democracy activists and regimes. Successful activists 
continue adapting their organisational forms and information distribution mechanisms 
in response to the repressive environment. These adaptations help them to challenge 
the authoritarian elites by relying on the democratic potential of digital media. 
To summarise, the study contributes to the debate by analysing the use of digital 
media by politically active citizens who live in authoritarian states. This discussion 
focuses on the pioneering ideas that help pro-democracy activists to use digital media 
as a means of overcoming the obstacles met in a non-democratic political system. My 
study reviewed the consequences of adaptation by ad hoc and segmented campaign 
strategies for the three forms of repressive digital politics – surveillance, persecution 
and censorship. Successful organisations are able to adapt to the challenges of 
surveillance, persecution and censorship by dispersing their organisational structures, 
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protecting their leaders and using local and alternative platforms to disseminate their 
alternative messages.  
7.2 Limitations  
An analysis of the backstage practices of large-scale anti-authoritarian movements 
poses significant methodological challenges. The case studies were organisations of 
different scales. The Navalny organisation had three campaigns in 2017-18, while the 
Anti-tax campaign was a single campaign that lasted for no more than four months. 
Even the three-year time frame did not allow a single researcher to collect enough 
qualitative data to support a full comparison of the cases. 
Consequently, the study was limited in scope and focused on three aspects: organising, 
leadership and information dissemination mostly during critical periods of 
movements’ activities. Hence, many aspects of the movements remained unstudied. 
These included identity-building within the movements, the perception of their 
audience, the effects of messages and a more systematic understanding of the frames 
used. In addition, some themes such as the use of big data, organisational culture and 
charismatic leadership were not analysed for the Belarusian case. This was because the 
Anti-tax campaign did not use big data and did not have a charismatic leader who 
could be compared to the figure of Alexei Navalny in Russia. Furthermore, it would be 
difficult to discuss any organisational culture within the Anti-tax campaign since the 
campaign had no physical or virtual locations, such as offices or websites, where such 
culture could be displayed and observed in the way that I approached the culture of the 
Navalny organisation.  
The data collection and analysis strategies have additional limitations. First, the 
discussion of the organisational networks is, to a large extent, based on the assumption 
that communication processes mirror organisational forms. Hence, I cannot generalize 
findings for the whole range of digital activists’ practices. Nevertheless, I can compare 
the findings with the existing studies of other movement and political campaigns.  
Second, I could not identify and access some of the important actors of the campaigns 
or their internal documents. They include, for instance, the administrator(s) of the 
Party of Parasites Facebook page, which was one of the five groups that constituted 
the sample of the Anti-tax campaign. In addition, I have never accessed some 
materials, e.g. the initial plan of the Navalny organisation which directed its 
operations. 
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Many leaders of both organisations were later persecuted and sometimes forced to 
leave their countries. This points to another limitation of the study. One can suggest 
that the movements were large shadow structures that have not been revealed in their 
entirety by this research. This was because, for the sake of the security of the people 
involved, I did not try to map the whole structure ostensibly operating under the 
surface. Had I done so, then my study could cause more repression against the 
individuals involved. I examined several important organisational elements that were 
part of the formal configuration of the movement, but which have not been fully 
disclosed for security reasons. Therefore, due to the secretive settings of a non-
democratic environment, the revealed networks of digital campaigners and activists 
still might be limited. 
7.3 Future research 
Plenty of scope remains for the study of authoritarian regimes. It is probable that many 
of the 90 or so current authoritarian regimes will last for generations, new such 
regimes will emerge elsewhere, and their digital repressive repertoire will only grow. 
Verifying the findings regarding the repertoire of repressive digital politics would help 
to understand better the strategies and tactics of the regimes. In particular, new 
theories to discuss the mechanisms of digital surveillance should be developed. In 
addition, more research should be done in the areas of digital misinformation and 
disinformation and, specifically, in relation to the dissemination of disinformation on 
messaging platforms – a domain of digital politics that proved crucial in one of the 
studied cases.  
Further research should compare the practices of digital activists in similar contexts to 
verify the emergence of the observed forms of organising: pseudonymous leaders and 
dynamic segmentation in digitally-enabled organisations. We need to develop 
methodologies that would allow us to analyse power distribution within digitally-
enabled movements to demonstrate how decision-making processes are organised 
within these movements. These methodologies might combine qualitative approaches 
like interviews with SNA and content analysis to systematically analyse both 
intentions and consequences of decision-making and power-sharing withing 
movements.  
Moreover, the study points to the growing importance of shadow organising in digital 
politics. Further research should investigate the effects of shadow organising on 
information dissemination and political structures building on media and political 
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systems. It should test whether the described organisational adaptations – ad hoc, 
dynamic organisational segmented structures – can be developed in democratic 
contexts and to what consequences this development may lead.   
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Appendix 1 Indicative interview questions 
[Start with the introduction of a person and their role in the campaign] 
1. Please tell me about your role in the campaign. What are your responsibilities in 
relation to it?  
a. How did you join it?  
b. What are the goals and main activities of the campaign? 
[This section is about the digital side of a campaign: platforms, technologies, choices] 
2. Who defines the organisational strategy of the campaign? Are there any main 
office/definite leaders of the campaign? 
a. What is the relationship of your unit/branch/division with the main 
office/the leaders of the campaign?  
b. Do you receive some specific instructions as to how organise your 
campaign representation online?  
c. How effective do you think is your contact with the main office/the leaders 
of the campaign as to the digital representation?  
d. Does your campaign group participate in any coalition? What are the 
consequences of this participation?  
3. How does your campaign work on its digital representation?  
a. What platforms do you use in your activities?  
b. Who is responsible for the digital representation of your campaign? 
c. What are the specific characteristics of their features you would highlight?  
d. What platforms do you prefer for what kind of activities?  
e. How do you attract people’s attention to your campaign online? Do you 
specifically arrange online materials such texts, images, videos?  
f. How would you define the audience for your campaign?  
g. Do you refer to a specific audience when you plan your campaigning on a 
particular platform?  
4. Did you or any people affiliated with your campaign/its regional branches meet 
any constraints imposed by the government/authorities/police/others like online 
censorship, hacker attacks, other online persecution?  
a. … or physical persecution? 
b. Do you think you can face this sort of constraints in the future? 
c. How much does the possibility to face these constraints affect your 
strategies, both online and offline? 
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d. Do you seek and/or follow any advice of digital security specialists, 
consultants, or anyone in relation to possible digital threats?  
e. Has your campaign(s) been affected by trolls and bots; fake news? 
f. Are there any specific constraints related to the policies or commercial 
strategies of the platforms you use? 
5. Do you use online tools/platforms to unite people who follow your 
campaign/core activists? 
a. Is it easy to become a member of your campaign? 
b. What is the role of digital platforms in maintaining this membership?  
c. Is there any formal organisation behind your campaign? Is it important to 
be a member of that organisation to be part of the campaign?  
d. From your personal position, do you think that your campaign/civic digital 
activities rather unite people in your country or divide them? 
6. Do you or your fellows follow the political developments in Russia/Belarus 
[depends on where an interviewee works]?  
a. How much are these developments, especially in relation to digital practices, 
important to your campaign? 
b. Do events that are happening in Belarus/Russia influence your campaign?  
[A personal block again] 
7. Did you receive any specific training to perform your activities within the 
campaign?  
a. Do consider talent and creativity as important elements of your civic 
activities? 
b. Do you think your organisation/campaign is concerned with the 
development of talent and creativity?  
c. How do you define yourself? Are you an activist? A digital specialist? 
Maybe a media persona [it depends to whom I am talking – and if a person 
constantly makes YouTube vlogs, could they be a media persona?]. 
d. How often do you go abroad?  
e. Do you have a large professional/personal network within your own country 
or outside it? Do you think it might somehow affect how you use digital 
platforms? 
f. How do you see your future within the campaign and/or outside it?  
g. How old are you?  
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[Snowballing] 
8. What civic campaigns in Belarus/Russia do you follow as an activist to learn 
from them and get inspired regarding their digital activities?  
9. Can I use your real name for my study, or should I better hide it?   
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Appendix 2 Informed Consent Letter 
Informed Consent Letter 
Title of the research project:  
Activism on digital platforms in non-democratic settings  
Contact Information:  
Aliaksandr Herasimenka, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom 
ales.herasimenka@gmail.com 
 
I am a doctoral researcher at the University of Westminster. I conduct research about 
internet activism in Belarus and Russia. I would like to know if you would be willing to 
take part in my study and give me an interview about your activities. This study is 
concerned with digital activists who focus on political and democratic rights such as the 
right to free and fair elections, and media freedom or fighting state corruption. In the 
study, I compare examples of digital media activism on social media such as VK and 
Odnoklassniki. 
Procedures:  
In the interview, you will be asked a number of questions. I am interested in how you 
use social media to conduct your campaigns and what obstacles you meet in your online 
activity as a campaigner. You are free to omit any question if you do not want to answer 
and withdraw from my research for any reason at any time until the results are publicly 
presented or published. 
Confidentiality: 
All the information you provide will be strictly confidential. 
Note About Voluntary Nature of Participation:  
Your participation is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or may discontinue your 
participation at any time during the interview. Your participation will be valuable to the 
research. Its results might also become beneficial for your future online campaigning.   
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Participant’s Agreement Statement 
If you agree to participate in my study, I would appreciate you signing your name and 
date to this form. 
 
****************************************************************  
 
I have read the information provided above. I voluntarily agree to participate in this 
study.  
 
 
___________________________    ___________________________  
Name        Date 
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Appendix 3 The timeline of the Anti-tax campaign before 
the tax deadline 
02.04.2015. President Lukashenka issues a decree that establishes a tax that 
became known as the “tax on social parasites.” 
Signature gathering phase 
13.01.2017. The REP trade union announces the signature gathering to abolish the 
tax and suggests that protests may follow (Charter97, 2017a); 
The “Tell the Truth!” campaign announces the “Working meeting of social 
parasites” in a large hall in Minsk (IK, 2017a).  
17.01.2017. Four organisations separately announce their plan actions to protest the 
tax (Dascynski, 2017). 
18.01.2017. The UCP’s party chairman Liabedzka attempts to collect signatures in 
the streets of Minsk to abolish the decree (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
2017a). 
19.01.2017. The members of the Anti-tax coalition have gathered in the UCP office 
for the first time (IK, 2017b). 
20.01.2017. Charter97, independent from the government internet media, publishes 
Statkevich’s announcement of the “Marsh of Outraged Belarusians” (Charter97, 
2017b). 
23.01.2017. The eight members of the Anti-tax coalition announce the rally in 
Minsk on 15 March. The idea of the regional protests on 19 February is discussed 
(Hlod, 2017). 
24.01.2017. The UCP and the REP trade union apply for an authorisation to hold a 
rally in Hrodna (Karnievich, 2017). 
27.01.2017. The UCP, the BHD, Statkevich, the Just World apply for an 
authorisation to hold a rally in Homel (AJA, 2017). 
07.02.2017. 150 000 OK users negatively react to Lukashenka’s comments 
regarding the tax. The president suggested that only a tiny fraction of the population 
was disgust by the tax (AA, 2017).  
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16.02.2017. The Anti-tax activists in Homel receive a letter from the local 
authorities that their application for the protest authorisation was refused. Despite 
the ban, they announce the rally on 19 February.  
Protest phase 
17.02.2017. 2600 people attend the first rally of the Anti-tax campaign in Minsk 
(Shmygov, 2017).  
17.02.2017. 100 people show up to a court hearing in Homel to support a person 
who was asked to pay the tax. The REP trade union, as well as other 
organisations, provide legal support and tries to mobilise people. The same day, 
the authorities decided to relieve the person of the tax duty. 
19.02.2017. The Anti-tax protests erupt in all the province centres (voblast cities) 
of the country with 2600 participants in total. 
20.02.2017. The deadline of the tax payment. 
See Table 4.3 for the post-deadline rallies 
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Appendix 4 The background of key founding members of 
the Anti-tax Coalition 
The Belarusian Independent Trade Union of Radio-Electronic Industry Workers 
(REP) - the largest independent from the state trade union (Kazlou & Alfer, 2012). 
Several months after the Anti-tax protests, the leader of the REP was accused of tax 
evasion and was subsequently found guilty of these charges, along with another 
executive of the Union. 
The Belarusian Christian Democracy (BChD) 
This is an unregistered party that was part of the Centre-right Coalition. One of its 
leaders, Vital Rymasheuski, was one of the first core leaders of the Anti-tax campaign 
to be detained. It has an observer status in the European People’s Party.  
The Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Hramada) 
This is one of three left-wing opposition parties with similar names (there are also the 
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Narodnaja Hramada) and just the Belarusian 
Social Democratic Party). All three were rather small pro-EU social democratic parties 
at the time of the movement. Its strongest local branch was located in Brest, where it is 
the largest local political opposition structure.  
The Movement for Freedom 
The Movement for Freedom that is part of the Centre-right Coalition. The Movement 
for Freedom emerged following the 2006 presidential election as an organisation of 
single opposition candidate Alaksandar Milinkievic. It is registered as an NGO; 
however, like other members of the Centre-right Coalition, it has an observer status in 
the European People’s Party, which is the largest party in the European Parliament 
(The Movement For Freedom, 2018).   
The United Civic Party (UCP) 
The UCP is a centrist opposition party founded in 1995, the second largest registered 
opposition party of Belarus in terms of membership as of 2015 (Charnysh & 
Kulakevich, 2016). It was also the only opposition party that had a representative in 
the parliament during the Anti-tax campaign. Its leader, Anatol Liabedzka, was 
considered to be an informal leader of the Centre-right Coalition, the only active 
coordinating structure of opposition political parties in Belarus at the moment of the 
campaign (Kostyugova, 2018, p. 107).  
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